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This thesis argues that the International Criminal Court (ICC) brings a new more 
deontological paradigm to international interventions, founded upon the 
universal application of legal principle, and displacing consequentialist notions 
of justice linked to human rights.  Based upon the Court’s Statute and mode of 
operations, it is argued that this is associated with assumptions concerning the 
ICC’s primacy, military enforcement, and theory of change.  The consequences 
of this development in volatile contexts are demonstrated. 
 
The case study, founded upon analysis from the war-affected community, 
examines the impact of the International Criminal Court in the Lord’s Resistance 
Army war, and reveals the relationship between criminal justice enforcement, 
and community priorities for peace and human rights.  On the basis of evidence, 
and contrary to narratives repeated but unsubstantiated in the literature, it 
demonstrates that in this case these two imperatives were in opposition to one 
another.  The Court’s pursuit of retributive legal principle was detrimental to the 
community’s interests in peace and human rights.  The subsequent failure of 
the ICC’s review process to interrogate this important issue is also established. 
 
The research establishes that statutory and operational assumptions upon 
which Court interventions are based do not hold in volatile contexts.  For the 
case study community and elsewhere, this has had adverse impacts, with 
significant implications for the ICC.  The findings indicate that if these issues are 
not fundamentally addressed, principled international criminal justice 
enforcement in volatile environments will continue to have profoundly negative 
human rights consequences.  
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Introduction and methodological Issues 
 
In the first instance, this study springs from the casual conversations that I had 
with Ugandans during the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) war.  One particular 
exchange in late 2007 has remained in my mind.  Thomas1 is an Acholi, at that 
time displaced from the war-affected area of northern Uganda where he is from, 
and where my work was based.  He was also a friend of mine—someone whom 
I had come to trust and hold in great respect.  Sitting in a Kampala café on 
close-packed Formica benches, he pointed to a copy of the New Vision, the 
government-controlled newspaper, and asked ‘Can they not see that this will 
prevent peace?  How can this war now end?’  His question referred to an article 
concerning the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrants for Joseph 
Kony and other leaders of the LRA (Osike 2007).  These were the Court’s first 
arrest warrants—a decisive step by the ICC in its efforts to end the impunity 
enjoyed by one of the world’s most brutal warlords.  It was also a time of great 
significance in efforts for the furtherance of international standards of criminal 
justice in a region blighted by an exceptionally brutal civil conflict. 
 
Thomas was not reassured by this development.  He was not focused on the 
high-minded principles involved, but upon the possible consequences.  What 
would be the impact of an ICC intervention upon his community?  He was also 
questioning the relationship between international criminal justice enforcement 
during war, and efforts to achieve peace and uphold human rights for war-
affected communities.  Could efforts to achieve arrest be compatible with a 
negotiated end to the violence?  As a father whose family remained in the LRA-
affected areas, his concerns could not have been more personal, but they were 
no less pertinent to the larger dynamics then in motion.  Coming from a   
                                            
1 His real name has been withheld to preserve his anonymity. 
2 The LRA periodically enforced its prohibition on bicycles (which they rightly perceived 
as used for such purposes) by cutting the limbs of those caught riding them, or cutting 
out the tongues of those it suspected of carrying messages. 
3 The researcher’s vehicle was used sometimes to seek to mitigate the threat to such 
individuals 
4 When referring to the three major Sections of the thesis, ‘Section’ is capitalised.  
   
2 
constituency widely perceived as expected to benefit from ICC intervention, and 
in whose name many parties to the conflict claimed to act, his were real and  
important questions about the safety and prospects for his family.  A decade 
later, this study is in many ways an articulation of his concerns, and an analysis 
grounded in evidence from the communities most closely affected, of the 
impacts and implications of these historic events. 
 
Origins 
 
The meeting with Thomas took place during my period of work in northern 
Uganda from 2000-2007 for two British non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), Quaker Peace and Social Witness (QPSW), and Conciliation 
Resources (CR).  Initially based in Gulu with QPSW, my wife and I established 
a programme to support local peace-building organisations working on the LRA 
war.  Then from 2004 my employment with Conciliation Resources (CR) 
involved jointly establishing and co-managing their programme on the LRA 
conflict based in the UK, but with frequent widespread travel in northern Uganda 
and southern Sudan as the war shifted its focus.  The work included 
accompaniment of peace activists throughout the LRA-affected areas; listening 
to the experiences of communities and individuals affected by the war; and 
hearing local community and leadership perspectives relating to the dynamics 
of the war and strategies to address it.  Later efforts centred on research and 
conflict analysis, programme development and capacity building with our 
partners, and engagement at various levels including with the relevant 
diplomatic community in Kampala, Juba and London to facilitate the peace 
efforts of these organisations as their programmes grew. 
 
Central to our work were five organisation—the Acholi Religious Leaders’ 
Peace Initiative (ARLPI) operating in collaboration with the Justice and Peace 
Commission of Gulu Archdiocese (JPC), Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA), the Gulu 
office of the Concerned Parents’ Association (CPA), and later Totto Can in 
Juba.  People’s Voice for Peace (PVP), who were linked to the Agency for Co-  
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operation and Research in Development, Gulu (ACORD), provided further 
insights.  The ARLPI/JPC collaboration involved the Anglican and Catholic  
Church authorities and their secretariats, with their extensive networks across 
the war-affected region, as well as the leadership of the Orthodox Christian and 
Muslim communities.  KKA also engaged a significant and widespread local 
network, in their case of traditional leaders.  CPA was an organisation of the 
parents and relatives of those who had been abducted by the fighting forces, 
and who were seeking their safe return.  As well as having a particular analysis 
in relation to military efforts to end the conflict, they exhibited more balanced 
gender representation than our other partners.  These organisations, their work, 
and relationship to the community are described in more detail in the section on 
community and civil society below. 
 
Experience with these groups as a participant observer enabled me to develop 
an informed analysis of the conflict; however, numerous other contacts brought 
additional perspectives, as well as a regional and international overview.  Upon 
our arrival in 2000 there were a small number of international NGOs present in 
Gulu.  These included the Norwegian Refugee Council, Associazione Volontari 
Per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), Save the Children, and Catholic Relief 
Services (CRS).  Following work by Ugandan peacebuilders and the UN, after 
2002 the profile of the conflict was raised, and there was a rapid and 
considerable increase in the presence of international NGOs in northern 
Uganda generally, and Gulu particularly.  Weekly security meetings provided an 
opportunity for information sharing with this burgeoning group, and their 
research reports (and informal contact with their researchers) added to the 
literature and knowledge of the conflict from various perspectives (reflected in 
the references provided).  Also useful were diplomatic contacts, principally in 
Kampala and London, including most notably with the UK Government 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office of the UK Government (FCO), Swedish International 
Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), and the Dutch Embassy.  These, 
and numerous other Kampala contacts, provided information on how the conflict 
was perceived externally, from Kampala and internationally.  In some   
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exceptional cases (DFID and the Dutch Embassy being particular examples) 
they also delivered strong local and regional analysis of events. These 
assessments were developed at an eventful time in northern Uganda.  
Following extensive campaigning by our peacebuilding partners, the Ugandan 
Amnesty Act was finally passed in early 2000.  The following years saw the 
establishment of the Amnesty Commission and, by 2002, the development of a 
functioning return process for LRA abductees.  This represented a reversal of 
previous Ugandan government practice, and heralded a period of increased 
hope for peace.  During this time the foundations of the Juba peace process, 
the best chance for a negotiated settlement to the LRA war for over a decade, 
were laid (Drew 2010).  However, the government’s policy of enforced mass 
displacement of the civilian population was also considerably expanded, greatly 
augmented by spontaneous displacement in response to LRA atrocities.  The 
UPDF Iron Fist operations also took place, extending their pursuit of the LRA 
(and the war itself) into southern Sudan.  At the start of 2005 the Sudanese 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (SCPA) was signed, transforming the 
situation of the LRA on the ground, and the LRA operations shifted between 
Uganda, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
 
Amidst these dynamics the 60th state ratification of the Rome Statute was 
secured and the ICC came into being.  Following referral by the Ugandan 
Government at the end of 2003, the Court’s arrest warrants against members of 
the LRA leadership were issued in 2005.  It was thus possible to witness the 
impact of the first ICC warrants from a community perspective, while working to 
develop and sustain a detailed ongoing analysis of the conflict.  This analysis 
was informed by Ugandan and Sudanese community-based peacebuilders with 
long experience and extensive networks across the conflict affected area. 
 
This situation prompted the formulation of various questions prior to and during 
the ICC intervention itself: 
1. What was the ICC’s strategy for engaging in this context? 
2. In what respects would the priorities of the affected community be 
aligned with the ICC’s own institutional interests and agenda?   
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3. Where they conflict, how and by whom would these instances be 
identified, and competing demands negotiated, balanced and 
accommodated? 
4. In seeking to issue arrest warrants into the conflict dynamic, how 
could the ICC ensure that its intervention would achieve arrest and 
end impunity, rather than (through its insistence on trials) end the 
possibility of peace negotiations and potentially prolong the war?  
5. If the existing militaries, being the only credible means of arrest, were 
envisioned as enforcers, how would the ICC avoid its warrants 
legitimising further military aggression in the name of enforcement—
aggression which had been ineffective in apprehending Kony for 
nearly two decades, but over the same period had included 
widespread violence against the civilian population?   
6. If on the other hand, the ICC was part of a coordinated strategy for 
decisive military action to end the war militarily, what would such 
enforcement mean not only to the abductees who were and are the 
LRA rank and file, but also for communities seeking their rescue, 
upon which the LRA would presumably continue to prey to sustain 
their numbers? 
7. How would the ICC’s requirement for arrest be accommodated to 
local priorities for peace, and local strategies to achieve that goal 
through return of abductees and the granting of amnesty? 
8. What in this context would be the relationship between justice in all 
its aspects for the affected population, and the process of 
international criminal law and enforcement of ICC warrants? 
 
In considering these points I was far from alone; indeed, in large part I was 
simply articulating the concerns expressed by those around me—Ugandan 
peace and human rights activists, expatriate NGO workers and researchers on 
the ground in the war zone, as well as the diplomats best acquainted with the 
dynamics of the conflict.  Most importantly, these questions were posted by 
members of the community affected by the war, seeking to make a living and 
support their families amidst the violence.  At the time I could find no answers,  
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 neither of my own, nor from amongst my contacts.  This work now seeks to 
give some response, and in the process inform future international engagement 
for the furtherance of justice in volatile environments. 
 
Scope and purpose of research 
 
The purpose of this research is to offer a clear understanding of the impacts of 
the ICC upon the LRA conflict, and to provide sound analysis of its implications, 
particularly for the ICC itself.  Some years on from the ICC’s creation in 2002, 
and following its review conference in 2010, there is now an opportunity to 
independently take stock of its work.  This research is intended as a contribution 
to that discussion, and it is hoped that the study can further a more rigorous 
evidence-based appraisal of ICC impacts, and serious deliberation about its 
mode of operations.  It would be unreasonable and indeed naive to expect a 
new institution with an ambitious global remit to function perfectly from its 
inception in all circumstances, and equally foolish to imagine it could be the best 
judge of its own efficacy.  In this instance, given the importance of the ICC’s 
potential contribution to the achievement of the rule of law internationally, and 
the possible harm should its interventions have unintended consequences, 
there is a particular need for independent analysis of the results.  As ever, past 
experience should be used to inform future practice. 
 
The subject of this research is limited to the ICC’s effects in volatile 
environments alone—those often characterised by militarisation or armed 
conflict, insecurity or widespread violence, and weak governance, including 
weakness or absence of the rule of law.  Such conditions are restricted in 
geographical extent in comparison to the ICC’s international reach; however, 
because of the particularly egregious nature of the crimes the ICC seeks to 
address, they are highly significant in relation to its remit.  War crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocides and crimes of aggression are likely to occur in 
these regions.  The ICC’s performance under these conditions is central to its 
purpose.  
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Volatile environments are also associated with contested narratives.  When 
states, governments, institutions, communities, and individuals have much at 
stake, their commitment to independent scrutiny and assessment is likely to be 
put to the test—weakened by or subordinated to competing concerns.  It would 
be illuminating for future studies to draw extensively on material from a 
selection of ICC interventions as the basis for analysis.  However, in this case 
the competing nature of assertions relating to the single context of the first ICC 
arrest warrants alone, and the degree to which these assertions are or are not 
evidence-based, necessitated a focus on one ICC ‘situation’.  From this, a clear 
understanding of both the nature and limitations of the ICC and the 
consequences of its first cases can emerge.  This thesis draws upon the 
extensive body of work that is now available, and is founded upon the 
researcher’s experience as a peace practitioner in the region (Bell 2005; 
Denscombe 2007).   
 
Data gathered during the participant observer phase of the research took case 
between late 2000 and the end of 2007, with an additional visit to the region 
made in 2010 that coincided with the ICC Review Conference held in Kampala.  
The period of university-based research at Bradford University, including the 
writing-up period, extended from late 2009 to the end of 2016.  During the 
participant observer phase the author was based in Gulu from 2000-2002, and 
then in the UK but with frequent trips to the field between 2002 and 2007. 
 
Participant observation took place extensively in what was originally Gulu and 
Kitgum Districts, which then comprised the whole of Acholiland either side of the 
Aswa River extending north to the Sudan border (including Amuru), South to 
Lira and Apac Districts, East to the border with Kotido District (including 
Kalongo and Pader) and West to Adjumani.  Work also took place in southern 
Sudan/South Sudan, principally in Yei and Juba.  Other travel extended beyond 
these areas.  Contacts with the diplomatic community were mainly in London 
and Kampala.  The work encompassed attendance at the ICC Review   
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Conference as indicated, and also periodic visits to Juba from 2005 to 2007, 
including during the talks process.   
 
In relation to accompaniment of principle actors in the conflict, the author was 
mainly working with active individuals from Ugandan Acholi civil society, 
including Lam Cosmas, Fr. Carlos Rodriguez (later Rodriquez Soto) and 
Patricia Adong from ARLPI, Godfrey Otobi Orac from CPA in Gulu, and Rosalba 
Oywa from ACORD.  Also included were Rwot Acana (paramount chief of the 
Acholi), Archbishop Odama (the Catholic Archbishop of Gulu), and Bishop 
Ochola (Anglican Bishop of Kitgum).  The author accompanied these peace 
activists on the ground across the region, to large and small events and 
meetings, and to sites of recent and past government and LRA violence.  The 
author’s presence at various more minor events relevant to the study is 
recorded in the text.  The researcher also worked with and alongside many 
other individuals active for peace in the region between 2002 and 2007. 
 
The literature already includes some assessment of the ICC’s impact over this 
period, and is rich in the number and variety of conclusions offered.  The 
certainty with which conclusions are proffered does not necessarily reflect the 
extent to which they are substantiated.  This thesis seeks to advance learning 
on the basis of evidence, and through doing so, inform future ICC interventions 
and contribute to a broader appraisal of the Court.  It will use the ICC’s Uganda 
warrants for LRA commanders as its focus. 
 
It may be noted in this account that ICC officials have not been interviewed for 
the purpose of this study, nor have Ugandan Government officials been met.  
This was an inevitable consequence of the intention to strengthen the place of 
community and civil society perspectives in the literature in the time available, 
and redress the existing over-representation of official sources.  Such views 
have at times tended to drown out accounts from the ground.  Additionally, 
Prosecutorial, Court and Ugandan Governmental positions are well represented 
in multiple references throughout the text.  This work seeks to go some way to 
redressing this imbalance and injustice.  That is not to suggest that community 
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perspectives are homogenous, nor that representing a community view is 
unproblematic.  That issue will be discussed shortly. 
 
Another consideration and possible criticism might be that the work is not 
strongly associated with a particular analytical framework, aside from the 
analysis of justice.  Observing the discourse on failed states, liberal peace, 
responsibility to protect, securitisation, and also international criminal law (ICL), 
which are relevant and referred to in the text, it was decided that the research 
material could be used most powerfully to make a case if set within a justice 
frame alone, to which supporters of the Court would mostly likely also subscribe.  
The contribution of this research is not of relevance only to critics of liberal 
peace or international criminal law, but to all who believe that justice is more 
than simple rule enforcement, that people should have some say in their own 
destiny, or that the pursuit of justice must not set aside the attainment of human 
rights. 
 
Some might suggest that a single case study is of only limited significance.  
This concern would be justified if the results were of a quantitative nature that 
revealed correlations or associations between variables that would be of greater 
significance with a larger and more representative sample.  If on the other hand, 
a single case study can be used to yield qualitative findings of a structural 
nature, for example to reveal assumptions upon which an approach is based, or 
systemic issues that are common to all cases, (for example relating to the Court 
itself), then a single study may have powerful implications of widespread 
significance.  This study lays claim to the latter justification (Denscombe 2007, 
Robson 2002; Bryman 2008). 
 
Field-based research process as a participant observer (2000-2010) 
 
It can be acknowledged at the outset that the research process used differs 
significantly from a standard pattern—data gathering during three months of 
fieldwork within a 3-year study period.  The research period for this work has 
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run from 2000-2016, encompassing the pre-ICC dynamics of the LRA war, the 
ICC’s creation and engagement, the collapse of the Juba talks, subsequent 
interpretation of the ICC’s impact, the 2010 Review Conference itself and the 
continuation of the conflict for a further decade.  Such a drawn-out approach 
has advantages and disadvantages.  A single three-year study can formulate a 
research question, offer standardised data collection, and deliver results within 
a relatively short time-frame.  This work on the other hand offers an 
accumulation of field experiences including informal information gathering, 
wide-ranging non-academic research, and formal academic research 
processes, in multiple projects across the region.   
 
The foundation for much of this experience was the accompaniment of 
community-based peace activists (from organisations to be described below) 
across the war-affected region in their work establishing and servicing a 
network of volunteer peace committees in all the major Ugandan centres 
affected by the conflict.  These groups were involved in delivering a community-
based strategy for peace that will be outlined in later sections.  This included 
mobilising communities for peace and against violence, and for amnesty and 
return of the abductees.  Work was at all levels, from active groups in each 
area, to mass new-year peace prayers held by the religious leaders, and 
traditional reconciliation ceremonies used to strengthen the return process.  ,  
 
As well as accompaniment on the ground across the war-affected area, the 
researcher was involved in collecting, processing, analysing and interpreting 
data associated with the peace work of the key civil society organisations active 
for peace (to be detailed below).  This included hearing, transcribing or reading 
and processing many personal testimonies on the ground in the Internally 
Displaced People’s (IDP) Camps or elsewhere, and receiving reports of 
violence against the community brought by volunteers to Gulu or other centres 
(often to the religious leaders).  Much information was brought to the network of 
Catholic missions across the region, who in turn relayed it to the Gulu 
Archdiocese through radio contact (and later by mobile phone), mitigating the 
need for dangerous travel on the roads.  This could provide daily reports of the 
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insecurity and violence.  The information gathered by these means over the 
seven-year period of work in the region was often not necessarily statistically 
sampled, but it was of a very extensive nature, widely sourced by multiple 
means. 
 
The researchers role also often included working on processing this material, 
including the creation of a web site and uploading daily reports of war-related 
incidents from across the region.  Other roles undertaken included input to 
strengthen local organisations’ survey sampling and data collection, analysis, 
writing and dissemination of civil society reports from the conflict affected 
region.  Many of these reports are referenced in the text (e.g. ARLPI and JPC 
2001; ARLPI et al. 2003). 
 
More formal and direct roles in research to strengthen community-based peace 
efforts was also undertaken. Purposive and cluster sampling was used with 
semi-structured interviews by a small team of researchers managed by our 
programmes (Robson 2002).  The author’s role included formulation of the 
research questions, survey design, training and co-management of the small 
research team on the ground, data processing and analysis, and report writing.  
The engagement with such material did not stop at the point of passive 
dissemination.  With colleagues’ reports and information, analysis from the field 
was used to directly inform plans for community-based peacebuilding, and was 
actively brought to the attention of policy-makers and donor government 
representatives seeking to better understand the conflict dynamics, at face-to-
face meetings in Kampala and Europe (e.g. ARLPI and JPC 2001; ARLPI et al. 
2003; CR and QPSW 2006). 
 
Beyond the lived experience of participant observation and active peace work 
undertaken, the author also carried out consultancy work for other international 
agencies.  This included evaluation of the JPC para-legal programme across 
northern Uganda, and assessment of Austrian-funded work to support women’s 
equality and youth employment.  These tasks afforded further opportunities to 
carry out more rigorous research, including cluster sampling and the use of 
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semi-structured interviews with individuals and groups, and other data collection 
methods in rural areas, homesteads, camps, trading centres and main towns 
across the Ugandan war-affected region.  Though focused upon the 
programmes concerned, the experience of gathering this data from the 
community, and its analysis, added new perspectives additional to that of 
community-based peacebuilding engagement.   
 
Central to the researcher’s role then, in the period from 2000-2007, was the 
development and sustenance of a strong analysis of the conflict informed by 
diverse datasets and multiple parties across the war-affected areas of Uganda.  
This analysis was essential to the role of supporting strategic peacebuilding 
measures to address the LRA war.   
 
In relation to the ICC, the widely informed perspective available to the author by 
these means afforded an excellent vantage point from which to observe the 
Court’s engagement in the conflict.  The fact that the researcher’s involvement 
spanned the period from before the ICC’s creation, to the collapse of the Juba 
talks and beyond, was a further advantage.  The author’s lengthy period of 
observation afforded the opportunity to informally listen to the views on the 
ground about the forceful application of ICL, and observe the associated hopes 
and fears of communities.  It also allowed, mainly through contacts with 
diplomats in Kampala, the observation of the prompt articulation of a 
disseminated narrative in support of the ICC’s engagement in real time.  The 
realisation that concerns expressed about the intervention were met so rapidly 
with (surprising as they seemed) assertions of ICC efficacy, led the author to 
begin to ask what evidence underpinned such analysis.  It seemed likely at the 
outset that, with evidence not made available, such interpretations might not be 
the product of rigorous research. 
 
The period of participant observation was concurrent with the rapid expansion 
of the return process in Uganda and its extension to Sudan, the building local 
momentum for peace from 2003, the Bigombe talks and the ICC Prosecutor’s 
intervention from 2004, the signing of the Sudanese peace treaty at the start of 
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2005, and the Juba talks from 2006-2008.  Though these events happened in 
relatively quick succession, a more standard PhD research process over less 
than a year in the field could not have captured these developments, their 
sequencing, and the appearance of contrasting narratives alongside them.  The 
extended research period was essential to the understanding of these 
developments. 
 
Equally, the intertwining of events and appearance of opposing narratives in 
relation to the community’s peace-through-return strategy, and the ICC’s 
enforcement approach, could not easily have been observed in a shorter study 
period.  The ICC’s unwavering insistence on trials during the Juba talks is 
justified in relation to the commitments enshrined in its Statute, but equally 
pertinent were the opposing strategies for peace run by civil society groups 
since before 2000 that were only then coming to fruition (though sadly not 
international prominence).  The subsequent return to war, and differing 
interpretations of responsibility for those events, must rightly be seen in the 
context of both international and local processes—the latter only being clearly 
observed as the culmination of peace work over the preceding 5-10 years.  For 
these reasons the period of participatory observation provided the main body of 
evidence and experience that was the foundation of this thesis. 
 
Desk-based research process (2009-2016) 
 
Early engagement with the literature confirmed that aspects of the author’s lived 
experience contradicted written accounts.  Despite the publication of well 
informed research from both academic and community perspectives  (Gersony 
1997; Dolan 2000b; ARLPI and JPC 2001; Dolan 2002; Human Rights Focus - 
HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; Branch 2005; Dolan 2005; Allen 2006a; Allen 
2006b; Finnström 2006a; Finnström 2006b; Ochola 2006; Branch 2008b; 
Finnström 2008; Baines 2009), much of the discussion around the ICC’s 
intervention appeared to be poorly informed.  Even a brief survey of the 
literature surrounding the intervention revealed a significant lack of awareness 
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and understanding of the conflict; and from the local perspective with which the 
researcher was familiar, the prevalence of a number of oversimplifications and 
misperceptions, errors in logic, and even misrepresentations was noticeable 
(e.g. author’s unpublished article now under revision prior to resubmission). 
 
From this point, the approach principally comprised a study of the existing 
literature encompassing the relevant background to the ICC’s development and 
intervention, and the case study context.  While the first of these was relatively 
straightforward, the contested nature of narratives surrounding the LRA war 
necessitated a methodical approach.  It was essential to trace claims that 
underpin these narratives from multiple references back to their sources, in 
order to assess their reliability.  This was instructive, as while some claims were 
revealed as substantiated from multiple independent references, others were 
not.  In the reverse process, an evidence-based understanding was built up 
from original research from diverse sources, principally from those active or 
based on the ground in the conflict region.  While some differing emphases of 
interpretation persisted even in these accounts, there was a substantial degree 
of congruence in relation to recorded events and dynamics from multiple 
researchers, both academics and local practitioners, and with the author’s own 
experience on the ground.  From the competing narratives of the LRA war it 
was thus possible to generate an evidence-based understanding of events and 
the dynamics of the conflict, as well as greater clarity about the nature and 
sources of un-evidenced assertions (Robson 2002; Bryman 2008). 
 
Using this substantiated clarity and corrected narrative of the conflict as a sound 
basis, it was possible to bring the two elements of the research together: the 
ICC’s institutional background and engagement; and the situation of its first 
arrest warrants.  As the Court entered this context, the dynamics surrounding 
the actions of this new institution could be observed, and the consequences 
identified or inferred.  This provided an opportunity to develop a fuller 
understanding of the impacts of the ICC’s intervention based upon the 
evidence, and to extract learning from these events of relevance beyond the 
single case in question.  An additional output from the research was the 
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identification of unsubstantiated claims, and the process of their generation and 
dissemination.  These too provided lessons relevant to future analysis of ICC 
interventions, and of significance beyond the case study itself (ibid). 
 
Evidence from the community as the foundation for conflict analysis 
 
This study is not based upon the author’s material and experience alone.  It 
seeks to advance the role of evidence from the civilian population more 
generally in informing our understanding of the LRA conflict.  This is particularly 
important because disseminated narratives of the LRA conflict depart 
considerably from such material, without presenting alternative sources.  The 
significant contribution of this work is that it brings material from the community 
level to bear upon these narratives, and establishes in their place a corrected 
understanding based upon evidence.   
 
In doing this the researcher is following in the footsteps of others.  Finnström’s 
work is based upon his experience of researching and living in northern 
Uganda.  Dolan’s research (including that done through ACORD in Gulu) is 
rooted in significant periods based on the ground in the war affected region (and 
in Uganda for man.  Branch too founded his work upon field-based research at 
a community level.  In each case the methodology adopted by the authors 
attests to their engagement over a considerable period with the war affected 
population.  It is their practice of presenting evidence from the community level 
that has been extended in this thesis (Branch 2004, 2005, 2007b, 2008b, 2009 
etc; Dolan 2000b, 2002, 2005, 2010, 2011; Finnström 2006a, 2006b, 2011 etc). 
 
The author’s research and engagement on the ground has already been 
mentioned, but the foundations for this thesis extend beyond that material, and 
beyond the academic literature rooted in the field, to include significant local 
research.  Surveys of community views by local organisations are also based 
on evidence from the ground, and these too powerfully challenge existing 
narratives (see Chapter 4).  The ARLPI study ‘Let my people go’ (2001) is an 
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account of the creation and maintenance of IDP camps, based upon the views 
of 900 individuals in 24 IDP camps across Acholiland.  It flatly contradicts the 
popular understandings in relation to this issue.  Though less methodologically 
clear, HURIFO’s ‘Between two fires’ (2002) report offers similar conclusions 
based upon widely gathered testimonies from IDP camps in Gulu District, and 
consists to a significant degree of excepts from interviews with camp residents.  
The ARLPI study ‘Seventy times seven’ (2003) is based on interviews with 200 
returnees and over 500 participants overall, powerfully making the case for 
amnesty and return—one dismissed by academics and analysts more distant 
from the region (see section 6.2).  The Blattman and Annan report ‘On the 
nature and causes of LRA abduction: what the abductees say’ (2010), based as 
the title implies on interview evidence, lends significant support to the case for 
considerable re-interpretation of popular understanding (section 4.3).   
 
Beyond the author’s material, that of other researchers, and local organisations 
on the ground who drew upon community views extensively, accounts based on 
lived experience were also informative.  Prominent amongst these is the 
material presented by Rodriguez Soto (2009), who spent many years as a 
parish priest and peace activist in the region.  Also of significant value because 
of their presence on the ground and their lengthy engagement in most of the 
IDP camps are the reviews by UNOCHA referenced in the text (2003-2005).  
The Ministry of Health of Uganda/World Health Organisation survey (2005) was 
extensive, sampling people’s experience from across the region.  Again, it’s 
conclusions challenge popular narratives of the war.  Other community-based 
survey data adds additional credibility, including that of the International Center 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) survey data, the widely disseminated 
misinterpretation of which is observed in the text (see sections 5.1, 5.3 and 6.2). 
 
These sources, each rooted in accounts and responses of community members 
from across the Ugandan Acholi region, form a strong basis upon which to 
analyse the conflict, the ICC’s engagement in it, and its implications. 
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Community and civil society 
 
Throughout this thesis the term ‘community’ is used to indicate the population 
living in the war affected area.  The principle element of this group were the 
Acholi people of northern Uganda, although neighbouring tribes were also 
impacted (sometimes greatly), by the war.  The relevant population in Sudan 
and DRC are only included where clearly indicated by the text. 
 
This is not to imply that the community experience can be un-problematically 
observed.  Communities comprise diverse elements with contrary experiences, 
beliefs and views.  Differences in age, gender, financial and social 
circumstance, geographical location, status, education, religion, ability or 
disability, opportunity and many other factors ensure that the reality of 
community experience and opinion is diverse, complex and multifaceted.  Any 
claim to generalise a ‘community view’ should be made cognisant of this 
diversity.   
 
However, notions such as the ‘overriding community desire for peace’, the 
‘widespread community demands for access to their homes and land’, or ‘the 
desire to see the return of their children from the LRA alive rather than dead’ (all 
of which will be discussed), can be unequivocally stated as a community 
perspective, notwithstanding a minority of dissenters to each of these positions.   
 
There were reasons for some degree of homogeneity of view on these points.  
The vast majority of the population of Acholiland at some point experienced 
extreme suffering, including the death or abduction of family members and/or 
friends, and forced displacement from their homes, and extreme poverty 
including hunger, and the collapse in many respects of normal social structures 
(e.g. Dolan 2011; Ministry of Health of Uganda and WHO 2005).  With the 
population generally experiencing all of these things, many of them concurrently 
and over many years, and perceiving them to be caused by the war, they 
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overwhelmingly wished for the war to end (Finnström 2011; Pham et. al. 2005, 
2007).  To interpret this desire (which was accompanied by a desire for food) as 
simply one preference amongst others, as some studies have done, on the 
grounds of the complexity of community views, is to obscure the predominant 
community’s wishes.  This will be demonstrated (see section 6.2).   
 
For that reason, this study does not shy away from indicating widely held 
community perspectives, but does so only where these are based on 
interpretations endorsed by multiple field-based studies, accounts and 
observations from across Ugandan Acholiland over periods of at least a 
decade.  Consistent with the author’s observations on the ground from 2000-
2007, a comprehensive reading of the major academic scholars and surveys 
from those based in Acholiland, and the prominent local society studies using 
data from 1997-2007, confirm this view (e.g. ARLPI, Branch, Dolan, Finnström, 
HURIFO, JPC, Ministry of Health of Uganda and WHO, Rodriguez Soto). 
 
If the notion of a community view is complex, so is the relationship of civil 
society to community.  It is appropriate to acknowledge that the term ‘civil 
society’ encompasses many parties other than those with which this thesis is 
concerned.  From Gulu in 2000, charged by QPSW to work as a ‘resource for 
peace’, the researcher determined to work to strengthen those civil society 
elements most engaged with the community, and most effectively seeking to 
address the priorities that the community identified (so far as could be 
practically determined).  This work will focus on the principal civil society 
organisations active for peace in northern Uganda with some claim to 
representative status at the time.  Even amongst those taking forward a 
community informed agenda, there are of course differences between their 
motivations and those of the community itself. 
 
Ker Kwaro Acholi (KKA) was the CBO of the Acholi traditional leadership.  
Acholi leadership structures are beyond the scope of this work to discuss, but 
the organisation was able to reach communities across Acholiland.  It used its 
standing to further the popular calls for peace, and engage with others to that 
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end.  As is widely known, this included running reconciliation processes 
between Acholi clans, and ceremonies to support the reintegration of returnees.  
It also included engagement with the LRA to encourage peace talks and return 
(in collaboration with ARLPI and others), gathering and sharing information on 
LRA and UPDF activities against the community, and seeking to represent 
community interests in various fora.  The traditional leadership were in all 
probability also engaged in seeking to strengthen and further the interests of 
their own institution—including by implication its undemocratic nature and 
unrepresentative qualities (e.g. Allen 2010).  An analysis that naively interpreted 
all KKA aspects as aligned with the interests of the community would be 
incorrect; however, as one of the principal organisations with a significant claim 
to representative legitimacy and popular respect, it was active in promoting the 
community priority of a peaceful conclusion to the war that avoided the killing of 
community members.  
 
The Concerned Parents’ Association (CPA) too was an institution which sought 
the safe return of LRA abductees, and the protection from abduction of all 
children in Acholiland.  This agenda was closely associated with the community 
agenda for peace.  Nevertheless, being made up of parents and relatives of the 
abductees it represented a particular interest group within the population, more 
strongly supportive of return and perhaps more generally opposed to retributive 
justice and military efforts to destroy the LRA than the community as a whole.  
Not all community members wished for the abductees’ safety, or their return—
some doubtless (and understandably) wished them gone or dead.  Although its 
perspectives and purposes were widely shared, the CPA like any institution had 
interests subtly distinct from those of the community. 
 
The Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) were central to civil 
society efforts for peace, and the participant observer role of the researcher.  
Bringing together all the main Christian denominations and the Muslim 
community they were the religious representatives of the great majority of the 
population.  ARLPI collaborated with the Catholic Justice and Peace 
Commission (JPC).  It organised impromptu popular protest rallies at sites of 
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killings and atrocities attended by hundreds, and annual new year’s peace 
prayers attended by thousands.  Church compounds were used as night-
shelters for many hundreds of children seeking to avoid abduction.  Archbishop 
Odama (the Catholic Archbishop), led a demonstration against abduction and 
the plight of young people, in which he himself slept in Gulu bus park in protest 
at their plight and lack of protection.  Another bishop, whose wife had been 
murdered by the LRA, was an outstanding voice for peace and against 
retribution.  ARLPI established peace committees run by volunteers across 
Ugandan Acholiland actively developing and promoting strategies for peace, 
and supporting the amnesty and return process on the ground.  They also 
nominated messengers to bring news of LRA or UPDF attacks and atrocities 
from their communities to ARLPI—a role many took up at their peril.2  Using 
these networks ARLPI was actively informed of people’s aspirations and their 
plight on a daily basis.  The organisation was able to bring these issues to 
national prominence, and because of their activism church representatives were 
singled out for killings by the LRA.  Church compounds were raided and radios 
smashed or stolen, and their priests were often threatened and sometimes 
ambushed in their vehicles and shot.3  The government too threatened and 
denounced them (Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
 
ARLPI’s separation from the population must be acknowledged.  Their 
leadership was of course not gender balanced, nor representative in many other 
ways, and they were doubtless influenced by the agendas of their own parent 
institutions.  Yet their congregations were enormous and active, and the Acholi 
community of northern Uganda was highly religious.  From the experience of 
participant observer regularly from 2000-2007 it was clear that the agenda 
promoted by these selected civil society institutions, and delivered principally by 
many volunteers from the community, was relevant to (and a manifestation of) 
popular demands for peace, food, amnesty and return of their children, and 
                                            
2 The LRA periodically enforced its prohibition on bicycles (which they rightly perceived 
as used for such purposes) by cutting the limbs of those caught riding them, or cutting 
out the tongues of those it suspected of carrying messages. 
3 The researcher’s vehicle was used sometimes to seek to mitigate the threat to such 
individuals 
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release from the camps to return to their homes.  ARLPI, JPC, KKA and the 
CPA (who collaborated consistently on these agendas) were amongst the most 
prominent civil society advocates for the community, and particularly for their 
desire for peace, the return of abductees alive, and people’s right to go back to 
their homes. 
 
For these reasons, this research focuses on the substantiated wishes of the 
community founded upon evidence, and the role and agenda not of civil society 
as a whole, but of these key members of it who carried forward a popular 
strategy for peace based on a community-led agenda.  Henceforth unless 
otherwise stated, in this study the term ‘civil society’ will be used to refer to 
these key institutions, which demonstrated through their engagement with the 
war affected community, and work to further goals overwhelmingly endorsed by 
them, their own leadership role for peace in the region. 
 
Researcher identity and other limitations of the approach 
 
No research is entirely objective and without flaws, and an awareness of these 
issues is essential in informing research methods and conclusions.  The identity 
of any researcher will necessarily influence the data collected and the analysis 
presented.  As a British white male, highly privileged in the northern Ugandan 
context, the researcher will necessarily suffer from biases of understanding and 
interpretation which will be reflected in the findings.  Further misperceptions 
may relate to the field of knowledge and study, as a peace practitioner in the 
field and subsequently a researcher in Bradford (Denscombe 2007; Bryman 
2008).   
 
The author’s work on the ground supporting the local peace organisations from 
2000 to 2007 presents many advantages, but also some limitations.  The 
privileged access enjoyed to many of those working on the ground for peace, 
and to the situations of their work across northern Uganda and into southern 
Sudan, equipped the author extensively for this research.  Without this 
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experience it would not have been possible to have gained the overview of the 
conflict presented, nor to observe so clearly the impact of the Court upon the 
conflict, and its subsequent interpretation.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge that as someone engaged with community peace processes the 
researcher was an active player rather than an entirely dispassionate observer.   
 
The peacebuilding focus of the work is likely to have influenced data sampling 
and collection, data handling, interpretation and report-writing.  As a participant 
observer the author was not neutral to the outcome of events, and while 
significant efforts were made to ensure that the research practice was not 
influenced by the author’s subject-position, it is unlikely that this can have been 
entirely successful.  The nature of the work will at times have exposed the 
researcher to elements of the community more predisposed to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, and less committed to military solutions.  Through such 
biases the author may have been disproportionately influenced by those with 
agendas for the return of abductees alive, and less engaged with either 
supporters of the Government’s military process, the LRA’s campaign, or the 
ICC’s prioritisation of retributive justice.  Community members may in all 
likelihood have censored their responses to direct questioning (or that of 
Ugandan researchers) to provide answers they thought were preferable.  
Multiple other biases of sampling and response may have taken place, relative 
to geographic location, economic, social, educational or physical circumstances, 
gender, age and so on.  Each of these sampling issues could have enhanced a 
preference in interpretation and analysis in favour of a community peacebuilding 
perspective. 
 
Another issue is the author’s lack of knowledge of the Acholi language, which 
doubtless caused the understanding of accounts and events to be less nuanced 
than it might otherwise have been, and is likely to have further influenced 
sampling efforts.  Similarly, limited cultural awareness was probably a further 
impediment to learning, notwithstanding the researcher’s best efforts to follow 
the guidance of Ugandan colleagues.  Such considerations will doubtless have 
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affected both the author’s own understanding, and others’ perceptions of the 
research in the field, which will in turn have influenced accounts given. 
 
Further biases relate to the perspectives of those individuals who guided the 
researcher through these issues and during the research period in northern 
Uganda in general.  Our skilled and extremely well informed partners included 
the religious and traditional leaderships of the region, and particularly the 
talented and often inspiring staff working for peace and human rights on their 
programmes, with whom the author spent much time.  Other important partners,  
whose perspectives contributed considerably to this work, included those 
representing parents of the abductees, self-help groups of victims of the LRA, 
and long-established centres for their rehabilitation based in the region.  Their 
insights were instrumental in informing this work, though inevitably none were 
entirely objective. These individuals were well educated adults, more often men 
than women, and relatively privileged in their own communities (Robson 2002). 
 
In relation to gender there were multiple challenges.  With the author being 
male, and the religious and traditional leadership structures also being 
predominantly led by men, there is a high likelihood of significant biases in this 
respect.  Men also tended to be over-represented in peace committees and 
other organised structures through which the author worked or gathered data.  
Significant efforts were made to address this issue.  CPA was led by Angelina 
Atyam, while PVP was co-ordinated by Rosalba Oywa, both women of 
outstanding vision and outspoken views.  Gulu Community Vocational School 
(GCVS), with which we also worked, was also led by a woman, bringing a total 
of three of the six organisations with which we initially engaged.  Additionally the 
peace committees made significant efforts to promote women’s representation, 
and women were well represented amongst the ARLPI secretariat, if not its 
leadership.  Despite these measures the views of women will likely have been 
under-represented. 
 
A further challenge was to embark on the formal PhD process in 2009 intending 
to use large amounts of data gathered before it was anticipated that the author 
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might use it as the foundation for a PhD.  Notes from the field were not always 
maintained to the standard necessary for specific inclusion in the thesis, for 
example dates, locations, names, photographic evidence and other pertinent 
details were not always recorded.  Sampling of data in insecure environments 
was often carried out hurriedly, to sufficient standards to develop conflict 
analysis and inform peacebuilding strategy yet not attract undue attention, but 
not always to standards ideally suited for academic research.  Equally, 
documents that in hindsight would have further substantiated aspects of the 
work, were not always kept for future use or filed appropriately, either by partner 
organisations or by the researcher.  As a result, while the body of data from the 
participant research phase remains extensive and generally authoritative, 
significant richness of detail has been lost even before the formal PhD process 
began. 
 
In order to mitigate these effects the author actively sought to address such 
issues.  This has not been a quick or superficial analysis of either the ICC, or 
the LRA war.  The ICC is well documented from its own and multiple other 
sources.  In relation to the case study context, the researcher was working in 
the region for seven years, travelling extensively across the LRA-affected areas 
in northern Uganda and southern Sudan.  This prolonged pre-research 
engagement in the field encompassed multiple roles, and these exposed the 
author directly and indirectly to people’s experiences of the war, from the 
personal to the national and international level.  These perspectives were 
supplemented in the pre-research phase by learning from Ugandan government 
representatives, national and international NGOs, diplomats in Uganda and the 
UK, Court representatives, and others with a national and international 
perspective.  This breadth of perspectives has contributed to the identification of 
common views from diverse quarters (Denscombe 2007). 
 
Since the conclusion of that pre-research phase, the author has sought to 
address potential biases arising from the field experience through triangulation 
of that learning with the academic literature, local, national and international 
research, journalism and other sources.  There has been the opportunity to 
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bring together multiple perspectives, testing conclusions drawn at one level with 
research at another.  The account presented thus rests upon extensive 
evidence and accounts drawn from diverse sources (Bryman 2008).  Limitations 
to the research are discussed further in section 8.2.2. 
 
Structure  
 
This study is written in three sections.  Section 1 comprises three chapters, and 
provides a background to justice theory, the creation of the ICC, and issues 
relevant to its engagement in volatile environments.  It concludes by identifying 
aspects of the Court’s statute and implied mode of operations that are relevant 
to its engagement in violent contexts.  Section 2 provides the case study 
material, outlining the dynamics of the conflict as understood by scholars who 
have specialised in the field, and as described by the local community at the 
time.  It then articulates an interpretation of events in relation to the ICC’s 
intervention that prevails in the literature and has been widely disseminated.  It 
then tests this narrative against the evidence.  Where discrepancies are 
encountered, an amended account is proposed that is consistent with the data.  
While Section 1 is concerned principally with justice, Section 2 deals with the 
dynamics of violence against the civilian community.  Section 3 draws out the 
implications of the research findings, and throws light upon the power and 
purpose of the Court.4  At the local level, its impacts relate to the situation—the 
LRA war, and the populations affected.  At the international level the findings 
concern operational matters of relevance to ICC interventions in all volatile 
environments.  Finally, at a statutory and theoretical level, the implications in 
terms of the legal foundations and moral underpinnings of the Court are 
examined.  The findings prompt recommendations for further research at each 
level.  
  
                                            
4 When referring to the three major Sections of the thesis, ‘Section’ is capitalised.  
Where the text refers to itself, the sub-section(s) concerned are simply indicated as 
(3.2.4, 4.2) etc.  Sub-sections are referred to as ‘sections’ (all lower-case) for brevity. 
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Contribution 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge at three levels.  In relation to the 
case study itself, it brings an analysis of the LRA conflict with a strengthened 
community perspective.  To do this, it draws on original field-based experience 
and material from community-based research that has been under-utilised in 
the academic literature.  This is used to significantly extend the notion of an 
‘official discourse’ beyond Finnström’s original work, into the period leading up 
to and including the Juba peace talks—a significant contribution (Finnström 
2006a, 2006b, 2008).  Correcting the marginalisation of community 
perspectives that has often taken place in mainstream accounts, the thesis 
establishes the principal dynamics of the war as relating to abduction by the 
LRA, and the displacement and deaths/killings caused by both military parties to 
the conflict.  Using evidence from the ground, complemented by the academic 
research of others, the cyclical nature of the violence of both sides towards the 
community is demonstrated—a further contribution (Rodriguez Soto 2009; 
Blattman and Annan 2010).  Bringing into the academic literature a clarification 
of the peacebuilding strategies of community-based actors, and on the basis of 
field-based evidence and literature from sources active on the ground, the war 
is demonstrated not as a two- but a three-sided conflict.  Following the lead of 
Branch and others the agency of the community is observed (section 4.4).  The 
thesis establishes a that the community had a distinct non-violent strategy to 
end the war, in opposition to violent approaches adopted by the LRA, 
government and ICC.  This demonstration and articulation of community agency 
as well as its victimisation, constituting it as a third party to the conflict, is 
another contribution of the study.  In the process, and as another original 
contribution, the work highlights how data has been selectively deployed by 
institutions to further incomplete or incorrect understandings of the war and the 
ICC’s impacts (chapter 6).   
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Building from this firmly founded understanding of the LRA’s war in northern 
Uganda, the second area of contribution is a clear understanding of the ICC’s 
impact on events.  In a three-sided conflict the ICC is observed to intervene 
against the civil society strategy for a non-violent resolution to the war, in favour 
of the government’s military efforts against the other two sides in the conflict, 
the LRA and the community.  The study analyses the ICC’s impact on the Juba 
talks in some detail, and notwithstanding the possibility of failure in any case, 
the study reveals the Court’s effect on talks.  This was to place its own 
preconditions on their successful conclusion, which were and are still 
insurmountable, and thus to ensure the failure of peace talks indefinitely, as well 
as at the time of the Bigombe and Juba processes themselves.  This 
clarification, on the basis of evidence and argument, is a further original 
element. 
  
However, it is at the third level that the thesis makes its most powerful 
contribution to knowledge.  By analysing the justice approach taken in the 
Rome Statute and the ICC, this work identifies multiple assumptions embedded 
within the Statute that underpin the Court’s operations.  These relate to its 
primacy over other international interventions, its justice frame, its enforcement, 
and its theory of change.  Most prominently, the Court marks a decisive 
departure by the international community in relation to its interventions in 
volatile environments.  The ICC requires that international interventions shift 
from justice notions emphasising the consequences of actions, to those 
prioritising a more deontological approach, that emphasises rule adherence and 
enforcement.  The implications of enforcing this simple frame on complex 
violent contexts, and resisting considerations of their consequences, is 
profound.   
 
Related observations spring from this finding.  It is noted that international 
interventions bound by ICC arrest warrants are not, according to the Statute, to 
be accompanied by a context specific theory of change that articulates their 
anticipated impacts.  Equally, the understanding that has been gained in the 
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sphere of international development, that for interventions to be successful they 
must be locally informed, has been largely set aside by the Rome Statute.  
 
The profound impact of the shift away from consequentialist notions of justice 
towards deontological measures is shown using the case study.  Significantly, 
and in a further original contribution, the learning is then extended by reference 
to other ICC interventions.  The concerns drawn from the one context are 
demonstrated to be widely relevant.  The thesis thus establishes that in volatile 
environments, the subordination of consideration of consequences is highly 
problematic.  Application of the Court’s deontological frame runs counter to the 
interests of communities affected by war while simultaneously failing to assure 
the extension of ICL. 
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Section 1 The International Criminal Court 
Chapter 1 Justice in theory and practice 
 
1.1 Tensions within the concept of justice  
1.1.1 Introduction 
 
Notions of what is morally right are beset by irresolvable tensions.  These 
divergences manifest themselves most prominently as social and political 
upheaval or military conflict, but they are revealed at all levels and intensities, 
and in multiple arenas.  With regard to justice, all human activity is held in 
tension as if upon a web, the threads of which are suspended between 
righteous poles that can never be reconciled. 
 
Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ depicts a state prior to the establishment of notions of 
justice, in which individuals strive against one another for survival.  From this 
chaos, founded upon shared understandings concerning behaviour, alliances 
emerge.  These germs of collaboration provide the possibility for group 
cohesion and progress.  With social rules, societies can begin to generate, 
sustain, share, disseminate and apply knowledge or wealth.  The wellbeing of 
all is served by social regulation of one kind or another.  Even the simplest 
mathematical modelling of animal behaviour demonstrates as much (Hobbes 
1651; Maynard Smith 1982). 
 
To the extent that such systems rely upon notions of fairness, in order to elicit 
co-operation, ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems 
of thought’  (Rawls 1999: 3).  Social systems that endure require some 
semblance of order, and concepts of justice play a fundamental role in 
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establishing and sustaining relationships upon which such order may be 
founded.  
 
However, as soon as different groups form, their interests may be in opposition 
to one another.  Opposing interests generate conflict, as each entity seeks to 
advance its cause, often perceiving its claim to be just and legitimate.  Conflict 
is not removed, but managed, displaced and sustained within and between 
groups; constituencies continue to espouse opposing views that rest upon 
opposing notions of justice.  Such differences run to the heart of social and 
political debate, and concern how societies function and regulate themselves 
(Sandel 2011). 
 
In our lives today formal and informal mechanisms to mediate these tensions 
abound.  Within states for example, rules govern social discourse, economic 
activity and political debate, and these activities each negotiate justice issues.  
Many of our institutions are in part fora for the same purpose—social, economic 
and political structures engaged in framing, enacting, and enforcing conceptions 
of justice. 
 
These practicalities overlie deeper disjunctures within the concept of what is 
just.  These variances are ones we recognise even within ourselves.  Poles of 
justice exist, that at once exemplify a pure conception of what is right, and 
simultaneously exhibit monstrous injustice.  We experience an attraction to the 
notion of individual freedom, yet were it to be attained in its purest form we 
would find ourselves returned to a Hobbesian nightmare.  We seek the greatest 
good for the greatest number, but would be repulsed by its achievement should 
it be secured through the use of slaves.  Whatever our personal leanings 
between freedom, equality, the greatest good, or individual rights, there is a 
creative tension between the poles of justice that we as individuals, and the 
communities and societies within which we live, must navigate (Bentham 1789; 
Kant 1797; Nozick 1974; Rawls 2009; Sen 2011).   
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Prominent amongst our institutional mechanisms for the regulation of society 
and the promotion of justice are legal systems.  Like justice itself, the law serves 
both a coercive and creative function, retributive in its treatment of 
transgression; facilitative and even foundational of collaborative enterprise.  In 
its framing, enactment and enforcement, legal process carries with it 
assumptions about the nature of justice and the means by which it should be 
upheld.  Even within the law itself, scholars differ about the extent to which the 
law should bend to accommodate external notions of what is just.  Legal 
processes therefore sit not above, but within these debates about what is right.  
They too are suffused by the contradictions inherent in the deeper notions of 
what is just (Durkheim 1893; Marsh et al. 2004). 
 
This thesis interrogates issues of justice, and how they are conceived in law 
and applied in practice.  It concerns the creative tension between poles of 
justice, and what may happen when champions of one pole, through the purity 
of their vision and the clarity of their call, briefly triumph over the balanced 
nature of the whole, with considerable consequence.  Proponents of one justice 
pole can fail to sufficiently appreciate competing claims.  Driven by their cause, 
they may seek the mantle of the whole of justice, for one element alone.  An 
account of the philosophical underpinnings of justice is well beyond the scope of 
this study; however, the relationship between justice and the law requires some 
clarification. 
 
1.1.2 Consequentialism and deontology as two poles of justice 
 
Most readers will be familiar with the essential distinction between 
consequentialist and deontological approaches for determining what is just.  
The former entails an assessment of the just nature of an action according to its 
consequences.  It is often associated with utilitarianism and the writings of 
Jeremy Bentham, and is frequently characterised as relating to the achievement 
of the greatest good for the greatest number (Bentham 1789).  The 
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determination of a just deed with reference to its outcome is a powerful 
measure; a pole of justice with significant appeal.  It also has deficiencies.  In 
the first instance it requires the prediction of the outcome of an action, which 
may be difficult or impossible in many instances.  Following from this, a 
consequentialist approach fails to provide a clear code by which the just nature 
of actions can be determined.  Without such a code, norms of behaviour are 
much more difficult to establish.  A further significant concern is that it may lead 
to the interests of a minority being disregarded for the greater good of the many.  
At the utilitarian pole, unbalanced by competing justice concerns, if a horrific act 
against a small number brings benefit to a sufficiently large number, it is 
permitted.  More rounded consideration of what is just reveals that the ends do 
not always justify the means. 
 
Deontological theories on the other hand, commonly associated with Immanuel 
Kant, concern acting in ways that are consistent with self-determined and just 
universal laws which, when used by individuals motivated out of duty, form a 
moral basis for action to the benefit of all (Kant 1797).  Such an approach 
emphasises motivation, regardless of consequences.  Unlike the 
consequentialist view, it prohibits the use of individuals as only a means to an 
end, and instead insists upon their being viewed only as ends in themselves.  
One may observe the emergence of notions of the rights of an individual in this 
view, and the more prominent use of rules to govern behaviour.  This approach 
has clear advantages.  It requires no predictive capacity, and by delivering a 
code that may guide behaviour it can contribute to the establishment of norms.  
Yet it also has flaws.  In practice societal rules or laws determined by imperfect 
processes may only approximate to deontological codes.  Many laws uphold a 
degree of inequality and discrimination, whether overtly or covertly.  They have 
outward deontological form, but not the inward quality of true deontological 
justice.  Furthermore, to a deontologist the application of a just rule is sufficient, 
without reference to its consequences, even when obedience to this norm may 
result in monstrous injustice.    
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Yet few would argue that obedience to a code prohibiting lying would have 
justified the betrayal of Anne Frank and her family to the Gestapo.  
Deontological commitments must be held in tension by consequentialist 
considerations.  These poles are necessary to the consideration of justice and 
neither alone resolves justice issues (Sandel 2011).  
 
While the consequentialist and deontological poles are of particular concern to 
this text, more contemporary developments of considerable power must be 
acknowledged.  John Rawls has attempted to address some of these issues.  
Most prominently, he has proposed that issues of justice be settled from behind 
a ‘veil of ignorance’, by ourselves as arbiters, unaware of our identity and place 
in society.  This models fairness, as it prevents selfish bias.  Under such a 
system, he suggests, we would reject utilitarian notions of justice, not knowing 
whether our own interests might be sacrificed for the greater good.  Instead we 
might award to each person the most extensive liberties, consistent with similar 
liberties for all, and manage social and economic inequalities to the greatest 
benefit of the most disadvantaged, with positions allocated on the basis of 
equality of opportunity.  These conceptions represent a considerable advance, 
but they do not resolve all justice considerations (Rawls 1999: 266).5 
 
Rawls’ attention to the needs of the most disadvantaged is strongly challenged 
by others, who regard the associated sacrifice of individual freedoms required 
as unacceptable.  Libertarian systems propose that justice concerns individual 
rights, rather than societal approaches, and focus on property rights and their 
just acquisition and transfer (Nozick 1974).  The pole of justice concerning 
individual freedoms is emphasised.  We may observe then that the justice poles 
of freedom and equality are also in tension, each contributing to, yet neither 
resolving, the broader conception of justice. 
  
                                            
5  Were debates about justice themselves to be carried out from behind such a veil, 
one can only imagine how much more popular such a proposition might be. 
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Notwithstanding the role of consequentialist thought in identifying just actions, 
for pragmatic reasons social systems must adopt rules to allow their functioning.  
Equally, we must accept that a pure deontological approach, that advocates the 
use of rules fashioned by each individual for their own adherence, motivated by 
duty in a manner that they conceive as universally applicable, would be 
impractical.  Groups require shared conventions of behaviour, albeit commonly 
informed by deontological perspectives.  
 
In this text the term ‘consequentialism’ will generally be used, intending to 
include utilitarian notions in which the sum of costs benefits to the group are 
assessed.  The opposing pole will be referred to as ‘deontological’, indicating 
the relatively close association of the law to such rule-based systems, but 
acknowledging the imperfect relationship of the law to a pure Kantian 
deontological system.  
 
The discussion thus far has focused upon how justice is characterised.  Once 
shared rules are established, consideration must be given to the mechanisms 
by which these norms are upheld, and a second area of theoretical debate 
concerns how injustice should be identified and addressed. 
 
1.1.3 Addressing injustice—retributive, restorative and distributive 
modes 
 
When social groups choose deontological systems to regulate themselves, 
quickly the question arises: what should be done when rules are transgressed?  
One means by which rules may be upheld and advanced is through retribution.  
Retributive justice, which requires an enforcement process, identifies the 
punishment of offenders as central.  Justice is seen to be done when 
proportionate punishment is delivered by a transparent and impartial system—
giving the culprits ‘what they deserve’.  Retributive methods necessarily address 
injustices of the past (Nozick 1981).   
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Deterrent justice, in some respects associated with retributive approaches, may 
also be achieved through punishment of the guilty party.  In this case, its 
purpose is attained when future unjust acts are deterred—an effect anticipated 
if the probability of being caught is high, and the punishment severe.  If freed 
from deontological constraints, disproportionate punishment that ‘makes an 
example’ of an offender may provide a more effective deterrent.  Both deterrent 
and retributive justice modes may be enforced through the same punitive 
mechanism, though there is clearly some tension between their requirements.  
An informative discussion of these issues and others in relation to transitional 
justice and post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda can be found in Clark and 
Kaufman (2008). 
 
Systems operating a retributive or deterrent approach are focused upon the 
offender.  Though they may have wider societal goals and their operation may 
be associated with consequentialist aspirations, they are triggered when rules 
are transgressed.  ‘Justice is done’ when the penalty is delivered.  Retributive 
and deterrent approaches thus concern the application of rules and the 
maintenance of norms, and require practical means of enforcement. 
 
Restorative justice approaches have some similarities to retributive modes, but 
concern the repair of harm done and the restoration of the relationship between 
perpetrator and victim or wider society.  These too address themselves to past 
injustice often identified by the transgression of rules, but rather than focus on 
offenders, they place victims more centrally.  Reparation, which seeks to 
compensate individuals or communities for past injustice and repair harm done, 
may be involved.  Avoiding emphasis on enforcement and punishment, these 
methods may not require the attribution of guilt.  Restorative or reparative 
approaches can be appropriate in complex situations where protagonists have 
both victim and perpetrator roles.  Additionally and more pragmatically, they 
may be appropriate where power resides with the perpetrator, thus preventing 
enforcement.  Like retributive justice, restorative methods commonly concern 
the application of justice approaches to situations where rules have been 
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transgressed.  They tend to be associated with the maintenance and extension 
of prevailing norms (Sherman and Strang 2007). 
 
Yet other methods emphasise redistribution, whether of power, wealth, status, 
or other social, economic or political commodities.  Distributive systems may be 
associated with more radical or fundamental egalitarian assessments of just 
arrangements.  They go beyond consideration of adherence to, and 
transgression of, rules, and address themselves to societal structures and 
systemic issues.  Unlike retributive or restorative approaches, which principally 
concern the maintenance or extension of norms, distributive approaches may 
imply more critical assessment of social structures (Konow 2003; Laczniak and 
Murphy 2008). 
 
As utilitarian, deontological, libertarian or egalitarian approaches identify just 
arrangements differently, so too does each means of addressing injustice.  
Retributive enforcement punishes offenders; restorative methods reaffirm past 
arrangements; distributive approaches seek a more equitable future.  Each 
alone fails to resolve justice even in relation to the stealing of a loaf of bread.  
The selection of a justice mode, like conceptions of justice itself, carries 
profound implications for the organisation of society.  Through choices 
concerning the philosophical basis for justice and the mechanisms by which it 
may be advanced or sustained, much is determined. 
 
1.2 Tensions of application—justice and the law 
1.2.1 The veil is lifted 
 
As soon as justice is applied, new tensions arise.  Rawls’ veil of ignorance is 
lifted, and the pure discussion of moral concepts becomes clouded, suffused by 
issues of power, interests and ideology.  The application of justice is essential 
for its principles to become more than utopian aspirations; however, in the 
process much may be lost.   
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As Hobbes makes clear, societies require more than a theoretical system to 
govern behaviour.  People’s co-existence demands shared norms, which may 
take the form of rules or guidelines, that are understood and observed (Hobbes 
1651).  These may be freely adopted, individuals perceiving their own interests 
to be served by submission to common expectations of behaviour.  Where 
norms are seen as just, conformity will be more readily secured.  Yet social 
systems cannot function by acquiescence alone.  If individuals transgress they 
must be punished, the better to uphold the norm and assure conformity of 
others.  Where necessary, any society must deploy coercion to ensure 
compliance (Durkheim 1893). 
 
To perform these functions in practice, states require social institutions for their 
proper regulation and function.  By whatever means they are governed and 
whoever’s interests they may favour, legislatures establish codified rules which 
are applied through legal systems.  Such regulatory systems require both 
elements.  Fairness and impartiality enhance legitimacy and confer authority, 
but the scales of justice are accompanied by the sword, and coercion ensures 
compliance.  Systems that rely too heavily on one pole alone may prove 
unstable (Weber 1922). 
 
In a Western context at least, the law may be divided into two main areas.  Civil 
law governs the resolution of disputes and compensation.  It includes the 
regulation of finances and investment, trade and property law.  It also covers 
constitutional law governing how laws will be made and politics managed, and 
administrative law concerning the behaviour of governmental bodies.  Criminal 
law, which this study is primarily focused on, concerns behaviour that is harmful 
to society, and relates to specific actions codified as crimes.  Applied to 
individuals, the sanctions deployed may be punitive, but the objectives are not 
exclusively retributive.  Though criminal law concerns the application of rules, its 
purposes encompass consequentialist perspectives.  Through incapacitation of 
the perpetrator, deterrence, rehabilitation or other means, the regulation of 
society will be promoted (Marsh et al. 2004; Zender 2004).   
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As soon as it is applied then, justice is instrumentalised for other purposes.  
Through its role in legitimising societal regulation it becomes associated with 
social control.  The law’s relationship to justice is not straightforward, and 
divergent demands of justice and coercion add a new layer of complexity.  
Justice lends legitimacy, and affords the authority to wield the power.  However, 
institutions clothed in justice may be vehicles for other agendas (Weber 1922; 
Foucault 1977).  
 
1.2.2 Characteristics of the law 
 
Laws operated by states display common characteristics, and in their ideal form 
consist of codes and processes that are principally constraints on the behaviour 
of individuals, institutions, and government; they restrict arbitrary abuses of 
power, and are applied in an independent and impartial manner.  In relation to 
criminal law particularly, as will be the focus of this thesis, laws address 
infringement through applying retributive punishment.  As argued above, such 
measures are perpetrator-focused, and relate to past deeds.  Implicit in this 
approach is the notion that guilt can be ascribed to the individual.  Once criminal 
law is codified and adopted, it must be enforced, in order that its purpose of 
norm maintenance and social regulation is achieved (Zender 2004). 
 
Observing these preceding elements, Robertson has suggested that law is a 
coded system of rules over behaviour that are enforced through social 
institutions (2006: 90).  He proposes that a crucial difference between law and 
ethics is the enforceable nature of the former.  However, as has been 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, this is not the only major distinction to be 
made between the two.  The law offers an interpretation of applied justice 
measures mediated by consideration of power, interests and ideology.  It also 
encodes assumptions regarding the tensions between the opposing poles of 
justice.  Additionally, as discussed, criminal justice implies a retributive, 
backward-looking approach to transgressions that focuses upon the individual 
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offender, and arises from particular codified conceptions of what is just, and 
when justice has been upheld.  Coercive force for societal regulation is 
associated with legal systems, not only in practical instrumental terms, but as a 
fundamental and intrinsic feature of the law.  As well as applying justice, the 
law’s purpose is to regulate society.  Taken together these features 
demonstrate that any legal system will be both imperfect, and partial.  Legal 
systems are neither intended to comprehensively express a society’s 
understanding of justice, nor are they intended only for that purpose.  The law 
does not resolve justice issues, but instead provides a framework as one 
element of broader justice perspectives.  To mistake the law for justice is a 
profound conceptual error. 
 
1.2.3 Legal positivism and idealism 
 
The discussion so far has concerned how the law relates to justice at a 
conceptual level.  However, there are also debates amongst legal scholars 
themselves, and within the legal establishment, concerning how the law should 
be conceived, applied and interpreted in relation to justice. 
 
The aforementioned notion that arbitrary exercises of power should be curtailed 
can be observed in the Magna Carta, and before that at least back to Aristotle.  
Mani (2002) describes a minimalist view of law which offers one important 
perspective:  providing a framework of regulation, it enables people to live within 
known boundaries and operate their affairs in a permitted manner.  It facilitates 
predictable and consistent patterns of enforcement, outside of which the 
coercive or punitive power of the state will be withheld.   
 
Such a conception of the law defines legal justice in its own terms, conforming 
to its own strictures, emphasising the requirement for internal consistency and 
independent application (Mani 2002: 1-50; Aristotle (no date)).  This view is the 
foundation of legal positivism, which may be defined as: ‘the theory that laws 
and their operation derive validity from the fact of having been enacted by 
   
40 
authority or of deriving logically from existing decisions, rather than from any 
moral considerations (e.g. that a rule is unjust)’ (Oxford Dictionary of English 
2010). 
 
Positivist legal scholars thus contend that the law’s legitimacy rests upon its 
foundations, not its consequences, and hold centrally that there is a separation 
between law and morality (Hart 1958; Hart 2012).  More recent scholars concur: 
‘In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it 
forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits.’ 
(Gardner 2001: 199)  Such a view contends that the law’s relationship to justice 
in its broad sense is more distant than has hitherto been discussed.  Others 
concur: 
 
Whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of 
certain structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies 
ideals of justice, democracy, or the rule of law.  What laws are in force 
in that system depends on what social standards its officials recognize 
as authoritative; for example, legislative enactments, judicial decisions, 
or social customs.  The fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, 
or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the 
law, and the fact that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is 
never sufficient reason for doubting it.  According to positivism, law is a 
matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practised, tolerated, 
etc.); as we might say in a more modern idiom, positivism is the view 
that law is a social construction. (Green 2003) 
 
Legal positivism thus upholds the notion that the law is justified from within.  
The positivist ideal is a system of law that is entirely consistent internally with 
itself (Coyle 2006). 
 
This minimalist conception contrasts with a maximalist position, which seeks to 
extend the relationship of law to justice.  Sometimes described as ‘legal 
idealism’, such a view anticipates that the law is an expression of notions of 
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justice not limited to the impartial application and enforcement of internally 
consistent regulation.  This view holds that the law as practised should reflect 
moral demands and lead to just outcomes.  Such arguments may be founded 
upon conceptions of natural law that posit certain rights and values as 
universally applicable, conferred by virtue of human nature (Mani 2002).  
Alternatively, maximalist views are also proposed from an interpretive 
perspective, which places emphasis on the interpretation of legal statutes and 
history to deliver just outcomes.  In recent decades this position has been 
championed by Ronald Dworkin, most prominently in his book Law’s Empire 
(1986). 
 
Observers will note that an overly positivist approach may deliver judgements 
that conform to legal requirements, but depart so clearly from society’s moral 
sense that they may weaken the legal system, by promoting unjust outcomes 
that undermine its legitimacy and authority.  By contrast, an overly idealist view 
may deliver judgements that satisfy society’s moral sense but, because of the 
complex and often contradictory nature of ethical considerations, they may 
produce legal judgements that lack consistency.  Through the introduction of 
broader justice considerations, such an approach may be more vulnerable to 
political and philosophical challenge or manipulation.  It could ultimately weaken 
the legal system by failing to develop a unified approach to legal questions that 
can be applied impartially (Coyle 2013). 
 
Such tensions of application are introduced as soon as justice is sought or 
claimed by legal means.  While some of these relate to the lack of 
independence of legal systems from unjust influence, others concern the law’s 
regulatory function and necessary association with coercion.  Further conflicts 
arise between notions of law that value internal consistency, against those that 
prioritise just outcomes.  Irresolvable differences of justice conception are 
overlain by inherent tensions of legal application.   
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1.2.4 Competing, complex and diverse notions of justice in Africa and 
the West 
 
Justice in all societies is a contested notion, and simplistic binary comparisons 
of African and Western views are rarely if ever helpful.  It should be 
acknowledged that the distinctions above spring from a Western philosophical 
origin, and may not fully encompass all African notions of justice, which are 
themselves competing, complex and diverse.  The moral and cultural 
expectations of cultures that have developed largely in isolation from one 
another over centuries are likely to differ.  Nevertheless, in order to function, all 
societies must regulate justice issues, and notions such as obedience to norms, 
the importance of consequences in determining just actions, punishment of 
transgression, maintenance of relationships, and consideration of the 
distribution of power and resources amongst people, are likely to be common to 
all.  In that context, and noting that there will be limitations to the application of a 
Western frame, the justice concepts discussed so far remain powerful in 
understanding diverse African justice notions.   
 
In recent decades, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has 
been a prominent example of the application of justice processes in Africa.  Its 
conception and implementation display deontological and consequentialist 
elements.  Seeking to navigating the post-apartheid situation, in which 
transgressions of justice norms had been extreme and systemic, the 
Commission did apply deontological norms—there were requirements to tell the 
truth in order to avoid prosecution for crimes for example.  Yet its emphasis was 
less retributive than a prosecutorial approach, and in the event it contributed to 
the avoidance of further widespread violence while delivering significant justice 
measures—a consequentialist success.  The public articulation of truth, apology 
and contrition also laid the foundations for considerable restorative justice 
progress (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report of South Africa 1999; 
Tutu 2012).   
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The post-genocide gacaca process in Rwanda is also amenable to analysis 
using the justice notions so far described.  It emphasises restorative methods, 
deploying an element of punishment with the fundamental aim of restoring 
relationship between the parties to a conflict (Clark 2008d: 297-319).  Such 
practices depart significantly from legal notions of justice, with their much 
stronger emphasis on retribution, which can dominate the justice discourse in 
the West (see 3.1.5).  Another prominent element of gacaca is its participative 
nature, with its legitimacy residing in theory at least in the involvement of the 
populace rather than its administration by an independent elite.  Unsurprisingly, 
such processes have come under significant criticism from the international 
legal establishment, and others, whose understanding of justice norms and 
purposes may differ (ibid). 
 
In Uganda local justice practices such as mato oput were, like gacaca, adapted 
from traditional roots to address the considerable wrongs committed in the LRA 
war and manage their aftermath.  They too emphasise restorative elements, put 
less weight on retributive justice than is common in the West, and seek to repair 
relationships and allow social structures to continue to function after great 
injustice (Pain 1997; Allen 2006b: 128-168; Baines 2007).  Local justice is 
discussed in more depth as an element of Ugandan peacebuilding in Section 2.  
These examples illustrate that justice measures applied in Africa, as elsewhere, 
contend with opposing elements that are in tensions with one another.  The 
successful furtherance of justice requires that its competing elements are 
applied in a balanced and considered manner. 
 
Conceptual issues are not the only influences bearing upon African approaches 
to justice.  Practical concerns commonly have significant influence on justice 
measures adopted, and this has been apparent in South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Uganda, and elsewhere (Clark 2008d; Harris and Lappin 2010; Okello et 
al. 2012; Beresford 2014).  These issues of implementation are the focus of the 
next section.   
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1.3 Tensions of implementation—international criminal law 
(ICL) 
 
The discussion so far has clarified which elements of justice are promoted, and 
by what mode they are advanced, when the law is applied.  ICL, though 
emphasising a deontological process, nevertheless seeks outcomes that can 
only be assessed consequentially.  Such outcomes relate to the advancement 
of human rights and other goals, as well as the attainment of ICL.  The 
relationship between these fields requires some explanation from the outset. 
 
International law governs the relationships between states, their interaction with 
international institutions, and the functioning of those institutions themselves.  
Unlike municipal law within functioning states, international law suffers the 
weakness that it is not consistently enforced, operating as it does without a 
police force or compulsory court, notwithstanding the work of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  States can ignore its basic principles, and go 
unpunished.  Yet it is not impotent.  States also perceive their vital interests to 
be bound up with its general maintenance, the better to ensure stability of the 
international system, and therein lies its strength.  This practical necessity for 
the regulation of behaviour, rather than considerations of natural law or justice 
itself, is the foundation upon which international law rests (Dixon 2013). 
 
While municipal law originates primarily from national legislatures, international 
law stems from multiple sources.  Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ names 
these, while specifying what texts apply.  Included in the list are international 
treaties, customary international law, general principles of law, judicial decisions 
and other sources.  To this list, resolutions of other bodies including the UN 
Security Council and General Assembly should also be added (Dixon 2013; 
Shaw 2014).   
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As a branch of the UN, the ICJ was established in the momentum for improved 
international governance that followed the end of the second world war.  Its 
remit was limited at the outset to disputes between states, and even then only 
to those accepting its jurisdiction.  While its Statute confers upon it the ability to 
intervene in human rights cases, in practice it has been little used.  The Court 
has struggled to secure not only jurisdiction (both China and Russia for 
example, have never accepted its authority), but also compliance with its rulings 
(France and the US have withdrawn after facing cases against them).  As a 
result, Britain remains the only permanent member of the Security Council that 
accepts its authority (Robertson 2006: 99). 
 
While notions of the rule of law and civil law date back over two thousand years, 
and international law has been developed over the past few hundred years, 
international criminal law has only recently emerged.  International criminal law 
is distinguished from other branches of international law by its focus on 
individuals as perpetrators.  The Nuremberg trials influenced the development 
of both international criminal justice, and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which is discussed in section 1.3.2 (UN 1948a, Robertson 2006: 34).  
The trials established the notion that individuals have international duties, which 
transcend their duties to states.  War crimes, crimes against humanity and 
crimes against peace were each articulated, while genocide was soon to follow, 
and named as transgressions that amount to international crimes (Cassese 
2008).  
 
Following the military tribunals post-world war two, the Genocide Convention 
(1948) was intended to further this development.  It had little impact, and 
despite the efforts of the International Law Commission, the machinery of legal 
enforcement in relation to the gravest breaches of human rights law was not 
effectively put into place (Maogoto 2004).  This issue was not tackled until the 
latter years of the last century, when ad hoc tribunals were established to deal 
with grave breaches of human rights (Cassese 2008: 315-335).  These 
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developments and their association with the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
1.3.1 ICL and its relationship to power and enforcement 
 
When justice finds its expression in the law it does so at some cost to itself.  
The tensions encountered in the transition from pure conception to codification 
inevitably mean that it will be compromised to some degree.  Then, when the 
law in turn finds expression through implementation, a second step from pure 
notions of justice is taken.  In order to secure its coercive capability, law must 
secure the necessary practical means, and additional compromises will usually 
be necessary. 
 
Regarding criminal law within states, the necessary means to secure law 
enforcement are relatively straightforward.  Notwithstanding the independence 
of the judiciary (should it be so), whoever controls the executive will in many 
instances control both the civil powers of arrest and the means of retributive 
punishment.  With its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the state is well 
placed to act within its own borders (Weber 1919).  In these circumstances, 
arrest is commonly decisive and quick, taking place with sufficient power so as 
to be overwhelming.  Enforcement in this context may have few extraneous 
consequences.  
 
This may also be the case with international criminal justice.  The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals, and to a large extent the ad hoc tribunals/ hybrid courts 
(for example those for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone) also 
applied criminal justice in relatively stable contexts, compared to the contexts in 
which crimes were committed.  Granted, in certain circumstances this process 
was not entirely uncontroversial in relation to its possible destabilising impacts; 
however, ICL was enacted in these circumstances without igniting further mass 
violence (Ostojic 2014).   
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Relative to national law enforcement, at the international level the stakes are 
higher.  The negative consequences of failure to enforce legal standards have 
been clearly observed.  Human rights and international criminal justice activists 
point to political and diplomatic compromises during peace negotiations that 
have led to impunity for the gravest crimes.  Through the expediency of 
diplomats, perpetrators of atrocities who threaten continued violence have been 
allowed to evade justice—consequentialist concerns, perhaps focused on short-
term considerations, have to some extent prevailed.  It is this pragmatism, 
which some may perceive as amoral, that the institutions of international 
criminal law are intended to address.  These bodies seek a more principled 
deontological approach.  Robertson, articulating his sense of injustice at the 
impunity secured through negotiations and enjoyed by perpetrators, has 
characterised diplomacy as ‘the antithesis of justice’ (Robertson 2006: xxxii).  
Notwithstanding complications concerning the use of the term ‘justice’ as a 
synonym for the operation of legal process, this is a significant point. 
 
One consequence of efforts to extend the reach of criminal law beyond state 
boundaries is the requirement for enforcement in regions where the state’s 
monopoly on violence may be contested.  To leave these regions untouched by 
the retributive process of ICL allows perpetrators—indeed often perpetrators of 
the most notorious crimes—to go unpunished.  However, unlike criminal law 
within states, the enforcement of ICL is most needed in situations which are 
unstable or in turmoil, and often where crimes are ongoing.  These are 
circumstances of the greatest institutional and humanitarian risk.  Here, the 
promotion of ICL enforcement may legitimise the use of force, influencing the 
balance of power in favour of arrest; but it may also have other, less favourable 
outcomes. 
 
Since international law lacks any standing enforcement capacity, if the norms of 
international criminal justice are to be extended globally, the institutions of 
international criminal law will need to align themselves with political and military 
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power on an ad hoc basis.  Overtly, this presents a threat to their impartial 
operation—a significant risk (Rodman and Booth 2013). 
 
Thus, relative to municipal criminal law enforcement systems the machinery of 
ICL faces uniquely difficult challenges.  These encompass the extreme gravity 
of the crimes addressed, the scale, severity and complexity of the security 
contexts encountered, and the difficulty of enforcement in these environments.  
The enactment of ICL takes place in arenas that are inescapably political, with 
competing and sometimes powerful interests.  Such complications far exceed 
the demands usually placed upon a criminal court (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004; 
Franceschet 2012a; Franceschet 2012b). 
 
Additionally, in forming the necessary alliances, the servants of ICL must be 
seen to be impartial, free as far as possible of political and institutional interests.  
Advancing their purpose, they will encounter the tension between their legal 
mission to extend impartial and unwavering norms of criminal justice, and their 
own political circumstances.  They must accommodate themselves to political 
and military power, but they must not be seen to do so. 
 
1.3.2 ICL and its relationship to human rights 
 
In conflict and war, human rights are not consistently advanced by the most 
powerful stakeholders; they are not necessarily upheld by the dominant political 
forces; nor are they generally advanced by the stronger military power.  A belief 
that they are would be astonishingly naive.  Yet without its own enforcement 
machinery ICL is anticipated to engage in such contexts to end impunity, and 
many expect it to do so in a manner that advances human rights.  These are not 
contexts that resemble an idealised conception of the Nuremberg trials.  Quite 
the opposite—they are turbulent situations of extreme ongoing violence.  Into 
these arenas, the conflicting tensions within and between justice and the law, 
including its coercive elements, are being placed.  It is appropriate then that the 
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relationship between the promotion of international criminal law and human 
rights is considered. 
 
The relevance of human rights to ICL has already been implied, and it is a 
thread that runs through the tensions previously identified.  Assessments of 
human rights impacts are necessarily consequentialist.  The human rights 
banner, in different guises, is claimed by champions of both the freedom and 
the equality poles of justice.  Maximalist views of law prioritise outcomes 
perceived as just, reflecting concerns that include human rights issues.  When 
choices are made in the real world between concepts of justice that are in 
tension, there will be human rights consequences (Mani 2002). 
 
In general terms, prior to the second world war, human rights were not central 
to the concerns of international relations.  With the exception of laws on slavery, 
and civilian treatment in war, there was little in international law that concerned 
what we now term human rights.  Perspectives on this issue were changed by 
the second world war, the manner in which it was conducted, and particularly 
the Holocaust of systematic mass murder of civilians by the German Nazi 
regime.  Following the allied victory it became apparent that the world lacked 
the legal machinery with which to address such acts, in relation to both the 
protection of the victims and the punishment of criminal perpetrators (Donnelly 
2007).  
 
This study has argued that that ICL confers upon individuals duties; conversely, 
international humanitarian law (IHL) confers rights.  Like other aspects of 
international law, IHL principally originates in treaties and custom.  The UN 
Charter was signed by 51 states in 1945 and entered into force after its 
ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council in the same 
year.  Today almost all nations have joined, bringing the total to 193 out of a 
total of 206 (UN 2015a).  The preamble to the Charter affirms ‘faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’ and 
for the first time in a treaty recognised human rights as of international concern.  
According to Article 55, the UN is bound to promote ‘universal respect for, and 
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observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (1945; Dixon 
2013).   
 
However, the Charter did not effectively oblige states to uphold these 
standards, or articulate clearly what they were.  The latter task at least was 
fulfilled in 1948, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, with eight abstentions and no dissenters, though 
opposition by the US and USSR amongst others prevented the creation of a 
binding document (UN 1948a, Robertson 2006: 32-40).  The Declaration is now 
generally accepted to be the foundation of human rights law, and it underpins a 
body of human rights treaties at both national and international level (UN 2008; 
UN 2015b). 
 
Today three generations of human rights are recognised.  The first of these is 
advanced by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
It concerns, amongst other issues, the right to life, freedom from slavery and 
torture, the right to a fair trial, and recognition before the law.  These are the 
rights most commonly written into national laws (UN 1966a).  The second 
generation concerns social and economic rights, such as the right to work, 
social security and education, and these are underpinned by the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN 1966b).  The 
enforcement of these rights is less consistent than those of the first generation, 
their nature being more diffuse, and the tone of the document being more 
promotional than regulatory.  The third generation is more general, concerning 
the right to development, environmental protection, peace, and self-
determination.  While the previous generations clearly relate to individuals, 
these latter elements are to some extent more communitarian.  To some degree 
they are harder to define, and any binding regulatory measures may be more 
difficult to secure (Dixon 2013). 
 
As we have seen, the furtherance of the norms of law rest upon a particular mix 
of consequentialist and deontological approaches, and ICL is no different in this 
respect.  Through the dispassionate application of its codes to its caseload in 
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deontological mode, ICL is intended to deliver the consequence of a more just 
global environment.  Persuaded of this perspective, most advocates for ICL 
perceive the extension of its norms as closely linked to the promotion of human 
rights.  This is a natural association, as international criminal law is intended to 
address the most serious crimes—ones in which breaches of human rights 
have been extreme.  Bringing perpetrators of such crimes to face the full force 
of the law is envisaged as a fundamental step towards establishing these acts 
as internationally unacceptable.  Through its operation case by case ICL will, it 
claims, establish the norms that its advocates wish to see upheld and extended 
globally (Human Rights Watch - HRW 2004b; Schabas 2006; Cassese 2008: 3-
31; HRW 2008; Mendes 2010; Schabas 2011: 61). 
 
Yet even within states, on occasions where violent crimes are ongoing, for 
example in hostage situations, the process becomes more complicated.  
Consequentialist considerations may emerge, and political power may be 
exerted to temper the legally driven imperative for enforcement.  Despite the 
judicial requirement for timely due process, negotiations may take place; arrest 
may be delayed or even eluded; compromises may be struck; hostages may be 
rescued.  Human rights on this small scale may be furthered by some 
moderation of the exigencies of criminal law.  Under some circumstances there 
may be tension between the demands of criminal law and furtherance of human 
rights (Franceschet 2012b).  
 
Returning to the international stage similar examples may be conceived.  The 
requirement to enforce ICL may be placed upon some states, while perpetrators 
themselves control the enforcement apparatus of another or others (or 
alternative significant means to defend themselves).  As with hostage situations, 
but on a grand scale, there is then the potential for operations associated with 
criminal law enforcement if unchecked to have significant human rights impacts.  
The tensions that occasionally exist in unstable situations within states may be 
greatly magnified at an international level.   
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These tensions have already been demonstrated, for example in Northern 
Ireland, and Geoffrey Robertson’s preface to the third edition of his book Crimes 
Against Humanity addresses this issue (Robertson 2006: xvii).  Robertson 
rightly celebrates the achievement of peace in Northern Ireland as a positive 
step for human rights, and he does this in the context of observing the more 
general advancement of international criminal law.  Yet peace in this instance 
was achieved through the Good Friday Agreement, which stipulated the early 
release of paramilitary prisoners convicted under British and Irish law (Good 
Friday Agreement 1998).  Many of them were guilty of killings and other serious 
crimes.  What is notable in Geoffrey Robertson’s argument is that in this 
instance peace was attained in part by overlooking the requirements of legal 
process and releasing those who had been convicted, so that human rights and 
justice in a broader sense might be furthered as a result.  Criminal law in 
relation to a small number of individuals was set aside in order to promote 
human rights and justice more broadly for the community as a whole.  Principles 
of international criminal law must on occasion be tempered in furtherance of 
justice.  Appreciating the long and complex political history, many in the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland welcomed the achievement of peace, and recognised 
the necessity of compromise.  Others have articulated the importance of such 
flexibility in different contexts (Vinjamuri 2010). 
 
Unfortunately this example also contradicts the point which Robertson 
previously sought to make in the same paragraph of his preface, when he 
discusses his retention of the subtitle of this book ‘The Struggle for Global 
Justice’.  As the book concerns the advancement of international criminal law 
and the associated end to impunity for perpetrators, the case for the 
achievement of peace and justice in its broad sense through selectively 
bypassing criminal law enforcement in Ireland, north and south, is not illustrative 
of his point.  Justice may be furthered by promoting the application of criminal 
law in some circumstances, and by setting it aside in others.  If one is to 
estimate the relevance of criminal law to the attainment of justice, it is better not 
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to conflate the two as Robertson has done, but to distinguish clearly between 
them at the outset. 
 
We may now expect that our notions of the relationship between ICL and 
human rights will be tested.  With the advancement of ICL into new situations of 
ongoing civil strife and terrible violence, these issues will be clarified.  Positivist 
priorities for legal consistency will battle with idealist notions that the law should 
reflect human rights imperatives; deontological views concerning regulatory 
enforcement will vie with utilitarian notions of just consequences. Dynamic 
tensions within and around legal processes, and embedded in our concepts of 
what is right, will be played out in the most violent contexts of our time.   
 
1.3.3 ICL and transitional justice—moving from volatility to good 
governance 
 
Issues raised up to this point relate to the foundations and form of ICL, and its 
relationship to other aspects of law and human rights.  However, the role 
conceived for ICL reaches beyond engagement with other legal approaches.  It 
is anticipated that during this century ICL will become central to, and set 
parameters for, the engagement of the international community in volatile 
environments as a whole.  To the extent that international institutions are 
seeking to enable such regions to move towards good governance, ICL is now 
expected to play a key role.  It is pertinent to briefly consider how this significant 
new mode of operations relates to the existing literature on how states recover. 
 
There may be instances where communities have transformed themselves 
directly from a condition of lawlessness to one regulated by the law, impartially 
and without the need for intermediate stages.  This could perhaps happen more 
readily in societies in which a functioning and well-resourced state passes 
transiently through a period of political violence, before returning to its former 
stability.  Often, however, the shift from violence to good governance is a 
troubled process.  States that have experienced traumatic events do not easily 
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return to well-regulated norms (Collier et al. 2008).  This can be the case 
particularly in regions that were never well-governed, well-resourced or stable, 
or where violence has been particularly prolonged, widespread or deep-rooted.  
The traumas currently experienced by societies in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Syria and Libya, as illustrated on the World Bank ‘Worldwide Governance 
Indicators’ interactive web site, all illustrate this point (World Bank 2015).  
Societies experiencing militarisation or armed conflict, insecurity or widespread 
violence, and weak governance including weakness or absence of the rule of 
law, do not easily transform themselves.  Almost by definition, communities 
suffering these abuses are prominent amongst those experiencing international 
crimes (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2007).  They are the volatile environments that 
are our focus. 
 
Such territories have been the subject of significant academic and political 
discussion.  Two fields are identified here for attention: the literature on ‘failed 
states’ as some have called them, and the literature on transitional justice.  
Each is very extensive, and a brief review of both these fields will be helpful. 
 
Weber’s observation in 1915 that for a state to function it must retain its 
monopoly on the use of physical force remains relevant today (Weber 1919).  
The past three decades have seen the production of a considerable volume of 
literature on failed states.  However, this concept has also been brought into 
question, revealed as influential in policy-making circles whilst flawed or at least 
very poorly defined as a concept itself (Taylor 2013).  Despite these difficulties, 
the term has been widely applied and adapted—for many purposes.  The notion 
of failed cities, and efforts to measure the extent of failure, broadened the use of 
the concept (Gros 1996).  Taxonomies of state failure have emerged, 
suggesting their varied nature and the necessity of developing improved 
understanding in order to inform reconstruction interventions.  Within these 
debates, the collapse of the rule of law is observed amongst other ills (ibid). 
 
The factors perceived to lead to the creation of such volatile environments are 
varied.  They may be structural—relating to inequalities of social, economic or 
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political power, including those stemming from previous post-conflict 
settlements.  The failure of the rule of law is but one aspect amongst many; 
both a cause and symptom of wider dysfunction.  Failures of criminal justice do 
not by any means encompass the totality of the challenges faced by affected 
communities (Bates 2008; Collier 2008; Collier et al. 2009). 
 
Despite the difficulties associated with ‘state failure’ as a term, the means of 
state recovery have become an abiding preoccupation of the international 
system.  Unsurprisingly these are also complex and multifaceted, requiring 
trade-offs between different approaches.  Brinkerhoff (2005) has identified core 
concepts and cross-cutting themes relevant to rebuilding governance systems.  
Ramsbotham et. al. (2011: 213) provide a post-war reconstruction/ withdrawal 
matrix listing five broad sectors (security, law and order, government, economy, 
and society), relevant to enabling states to move on from conflict.  In each of 
these sectors phases are indicated within which different aspects of post-
conflict recovery work may become appropriate.  These elements they describe 
as ‘non-sequential and nested’, and they amply illustrate their interdependence 
and complexity.  The importance of context in informing the nature, order, 
interrelationships and manner of these interventions is implicit throughout.  In 
these complex contexts, the holding of democratic elections has also been 
individually examined.  This work also endorses the general picture of mixed 
and complex outcomes dependent on context (Chesterman et al. 2005; Collier 
2009; Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman et al. 2013).  In relation to the 
transformation of volatile regions to patterns of good governance, almost all 
studies attest to the complexities of this process.  Such rebuilding has been 
characterised as ‘among the world’s gravest challenges’ (Myers 2008).  
 
The literature on transitional justice is also considerable.  According to the ICTJ, 
transitional justice refers to ‘the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that 
have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of 
massive human rights abuses.  These measures include criminal prosecutions, 
truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional 
reforms’ (ICTJ 2015).  Working in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, Clark 
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poses a framework of six key transitional justice themes:  reconciliation, peace, 
justice, healing, forgiveness and truth (Clark 2008b).  He outlines the tensions 
that exist within and between these concepts, and between aspiration and 
capability for each of them and their constituent parts.  The analysis presented 
in this collection highlights the difficulty of disentangling and addressing these 
issues, emphasising how decisions must be based upon a thoughtful 
consideration of these complex interactions that is highly specific to local 
circumstances.  It suggests that these determinations shape how post-conflict 
societies recover from violence, and that the consequences of such choices can 
be long-lasting and unpredictable (Clark and Kaufman 2008). 
 
These intricacies, and the growing literature in this field serve to further 
emphasise the importance of context in determining outcomes relating to 
justice.  Given these fields of study, the deployment of international criminal 
justice in a particular context will almost certainly require careful deliberation, 
good timing, sensitivity to conditions (including extant transitional justice 
measures already in place) and a degree of flexibility.  An uncompromising 
stance by any party may prove problematic (Minow 1998; Cobban 2007; Hinton 
2010). 
 
The literature on volatile regions and on transitional justice reflects the 
observation that recovery from widespread violence and lawlessness to well-
regulated governance, justice and stability is not straightforward.  Implicit in both 
fields of work is a strong emphasis on the multifaceted nature of internal or 
external actions required to contribute to the rebuilding process.  There is a 
need for a deep understanding of the context, and the adaptation of 
interventions in order that progress may be made (Bates 2008). 
 
By contrast an essentially deontological application of ICL would place less 
emphasis on context and multifaceted processes.  It would provide a clear 
standard of global retributive justice, applicable to all contexts.  The ideal behind 
such an approach would be that ICL’s deployment will contribute to establishing 
a route out of lawlessness and state dysfunction, and towards the achievement 
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of universal human rights.  On occasion, this may be the case; however, there 
may also be a tension between the law’s imperatives and the need for 
multifaceted interventions with context-specific, complex priorities for state 
recovery, as indicated by the research base. 
 
An unwavering vision of the extension of ICL into volatile environments then 
presents certain issues.  The relationship between the enforcement of ICL and 
the promotion of human rights and justice is uncertain and variable, and the 
implications of enforcement in volatile environments, even in the recent past, 
are yet to be fully understood.  In any event, the literature on volatile 
environments and transitional justice presents an evidence base that instead 
endorses context-dependent, multi-faceted approaches.   
 
1.4 Review 
 
Chapter 1 has introduced the concept of justice as suspended between poles 
including those of equality, freedom, deontology, and consequentialism.  Each 
pole contributes to the whole, while no single pole resolves justice issues itself. 
Each in its extreme form, un-tempered by the others, presents the possibility of 
great injustice.  It has also explored approaches to the maintenance of justice, 
including retributive, restorative and distributive modes.  It observed that each of 
these achieves and identifies just outcomes in a different way.  This analysis 
showed ICL to further one particular aspect of justice, with a specifically 
deontological and retributive approach.  
 
Section 1.2 looked at the relationship of justice to law, and introduced issues 
encountered when notions of justice are formulated and enforced as law.  
Further complications concerned the distinction between legal positivism and 
legal idealism, and debates about if and how notions of morality should 
influence the legal process.  As in the West, African notions of justice were 
identified as competing, complex and diverse, extending well beyond and above 
legal frameworks, and into environments where retributive approaches may be 
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neither effective nor practical.  These arguments demonstrated that the 
relationship of the law to justice is contested, both in the Western and 
international context. 
 
Finally, the relationship of ICL to the practicalities of enforcement, the 
furtherance of human rights, and the advancement of good governance in 
violent contexts, was discussed.  The evidence-base to support the prioritised 
application of ICL as the most appropriate means to promote justice in these 
context was questioned.   These matters commend ICL’s application and 
enforcement in volatile contexts for analysis. 
 
Underlying much of this Chapter, and indeed significant aspects of this thesis, is 
the relationship between the law and power.  ICL, conceived as Justice and 
equipped with the scales, must negotiate discreetly with Power for the sword; 
Power, newly clothed in Justice’s robes, becomes freed to pursue its own 
agendas.  Such is the stepping-off point for this research. 
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Chapter 2 Interventionism, international 
criminal law, and the creation of the ICC   
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Liberal interventionism, the pursuit of liberal objectives in foreign policy, has 
gained significant momentum in recent decades following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and end of the Cold War.  Western powers have sought to promote values 
and structures informed by their own experience, with the support of 
international institutions under their influence.  New foreign policy objectives 
have included the advancement of human rights and the promotion of good 
governance.  Efforts have embraced measures to strengthen multi-party 
democracy; reform of the security sector; (re)build state institutions; strengthen 
checks and balances on state power including a free press and independent 
judiciary; and where finances allow, enhance public health and education 
(Sachs et al. 1995; UN 2000; Robert et al. 2005; Sachs 2012).   
 
These liberal measures have often been accompanied by pressure for reform of 
economic and financial systems.  Neo-liberal economic policies have been 
advanced in the name of development; international financial institutions have 
pushed trade liberalisation, open markets, independent central banks, and 
deficit reduction with structural adjustment.  Such goals have been furthered 
through aid conditionality of bilateral donors, or terms set by international bodies 
such as the IMF and World Bank, through which considerable leverage has 
been achieved (Dollar and Svensson 2000; Easterly 2005). 
 
Such interventions have come under increasing scrutiny on the grounds of their 
questionable efficacy, as data has emerged and problematic issues have been 
revealed.  Others regard these initiatives as more fundamentally flawed, an 
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extension of the West’s historical practice of imposing externally generated 
ideas, systems and structures, especially upon African or other peoples (Young 
1995; Paris 1997; Duffield 2001; Chang 2002; Cooper 2007; Clark 2010a; 
Mamdani 2010; Paris 2010; Cooper et al. 2011). 
 
Increasing international support for military backed humanitarian intervention 
has supplied further impetus.  The extension of ICL into new environments may 
be seen in the context of these events.  Conceived as of benefit to its recipients, 
it provides a framework of fundamental standards that are universally 
applicable, and to which all have a right. 
 
2.0.1 Drivers for decisive humanitarian intervention and international 
criminal justice 
 
In the context of liberal interventionism, and the burgeoning debate about its 
consequences, there were particular circumstances that strengthened the case 
for forceful humanitarian engagement.  The 1990s saw the eruption of a series 
of brutal civil conflicts.  Most notable amongst these was the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994 in which over 500,000 were killed, and which was only brought to an 
end by the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front made up principally of 
Rwandan exiles from Uganda.  In its aftermath, the preceding failure of the 
international community to intervene militarily to protect the Tutsi population 
proved a powerful incentive for more concerted and principled international 
action (Eriksson et al. 1996; Evans 2009; Mills 2013; UN Undated). 
 
The sense of frustration with international impotence was heightened by the 
Srebrenica massacre the following year, in which over 8,000 Bosnian Muslims, 
mainly men and boys, were murdered by the Army of Republika Srpska under 
the command of Ratko Mladić in a formerly UN-designated ‘safe area’.  This 
atrocity, described as ‘genocide’ by the ICJ, and the worst crime on European 
soil since the second world war, added to the mood for more decisive 
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international action in the face of mass crimes (Annan 2005; ICJ 2007; BBC 
2014). 
 
Significantly, following the failure to intervene militarily in Rwanda and 
Srebrenica, other international action in the same year was more decisive.  UN 
forces on the ground were supported by a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) bombing campaign (its first major combat operation) to protect UN ‘safe 
areas’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serb forces.  Further NATO bombing 
followed in 1999 in Kosovo when air power was used to force the withdrawal of 
the Yugoslav army from the territory, in preparation for the NATO (Kosovo 
Force) KFOR ground forces peace-keeping operation and the establishment of 
the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Beale 1997).  
 
The momentum for forceful humanitarian intervention was reflected, and further 
enhanced by the successful engagement of the British Army in the long-running 
war in Sierra Leone a year later.  Operation Palliser was originally planned as a 
means to effect evacuation of foreign citizens from the Freetown area in the 
wake of advancing Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces.  The engagement 
led to more assertive British involvement in the war in support of the Sierra 
Leone Army and UN forces, and the subsequent defeat of the RUF.   
 
These events prompted other diplomatic moves.  The Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) doctrine was developed in response to a United Nations call to develop 
clearer norms around international responses to systematic gross human rights 
violations (UN General Assembly 2005: para. 138-140; Ki-Moon 2009).  This 
was initially taken forward by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty in the early years of this century, and proposed balancing 
states’ right to sovereignty with responsibilities placed upon them.  Where a 
state is unable or unwilling to protect its people from major violations of their 
human rights it proposes criteria to be used to assess the case for military 
intervention (Evans and Sahnoun 2002; Evans 2009).   
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Efforts to promote international criminal law can be seen in this liberal 
interventionist context.  Allied, in intention at the least, to the promotion of 
human rights and now with the possibility of UN-endorsed military operations, 
here was a chance to extend criminal justice processes and strengthen 
international norms.  Released from the compromises necessitated by the cold 
war, political allegiances could be forged that might apply these norms.  Justice 
might now be included in the liberal project; events at this time provided further 
impetus (Young 1995; Ki-Moon 2009). 
 
The 1990s was thus a time of heightened optimism concerning the potential for 
international intervention, military if necessary, to promote security, peace, 
human rights, and good governance.  Set against the backdrop of shameful 
inaction, and followed quickly by successive military, political and purported 
humanitarian success, some felt that debates concerning the legitimacy of 
intervention and uncertainty of outcome should be set aside, replaced by the 
promise that more muscular political leadership, prepared to take decisive 
military action to promote clear humanitarian outcomes, could prevail.  
International prosecutions at the ad hoc international tribunals, shortly to be 
discussed, enhanced the credibility of this vision, indirectly creating steps 
towards the broader goal of advancing norms of international criminal justice.  
These were not only achievements in themselves, but part of an overarching 
narrative of global humanitarian progress:  the more enlightened deployment of 
military power, aligned with the clarity and impartiality of the international 
criminal justice process, promised a brighter future for humanity (Crane 2005; 
Robertson 2006).   
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2.1 Creation of the International Criminal Court 
 
Some perceive that,  like humanitarian aspects of liberal interventionism, the 
development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been largely driven 
by the aspiration to reduce human suffering in war (Robertson 2006).  The 
following sections trace its development, from early efforts to constrain military 
excesses to modern attempts to secure a climate of accountability for the 
gravest crimes, and with it the primacy of law over political and diplomatic 
expediency. 
 
2.1.1 Origins 
 
On 3rd January 1872 the Swiss humanist Gustave Moynier presented a 
proposal to the International Committee of the Red Cross for an international 
tribunal to enforce humanitarian norms and laws during war (Maogoto 2004).  
Moynier had previously believed that reason and public opinion alone could rein 
in the behaviour of states and prevent the worst abuses.  However, events 
during the Franco-Prussian War had obliged him to change his views.  Moved 
by the suffering of civilians and spurred by the impunity subsequently enjoyed 
by perpetrators on both sides, he had become convinced of the need for 
international enforcement of humanitarian law.  His proposal was for a 
permanent international criminal court able to bring suspected perpetrators to 
international trial (Hall 1998). 
 
Over a decade earlier, his compatriot the businessman Henri Dunant, shocked 
by what he had witnessed, recorded the suffering of casualties in the aftermath 
of the battle of Solferino.  His account was widely disseminated, and influenced 
both the establishment of the International Red Cross four years later (a project 
with which Moynier was also involved), and the drafting of the first Geneva 
Convention of 1864 which provided for the humane treatment of injured or sick 
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combatants in war (Dunant 1862; International Committee of the Red Cross - 
ICRC 1949). 
 
Moynier and Dunant’s concerns had precedents.  The aspiration that the 
conduct of war should be governed by laws, or at least regulated by 
humanitarian considerations, had been articulated centuries before.  In 'The Art 
of War' Sun Tzu advocated the avoidance of the annihilation of an opponent or 
other unnecessary violence, and respect for prisoners of war (Tzu 500 BC?).  
Such sentiments influenced the conduct of war in India, Japan and Europe in 
subsequent centuries, and by 1625 these ideas had been strongly supported by 
Grotius, who advocated that suffering inflicted on civilians should be limited to 
that determined by military necessity.  A century later, motivated by 
humanitarian convictions, Montesquieu asserted that protagonists in a conflict 
should inflict the least possible harm in order to achieve their objectives, and his 
contemporary Rousseau sought to underscore the distinction between active 
combatant and civilian, and to demonstrate on the basis of reason why the latter 
should not be targeted in war (Grotius 1625; Rousseau 1762; Beigbeder 1999). 
 
If Moynier’s goal of reducing suffering in war was not new, neither was the 
aspiration of addressing it through legal process.  The trial and execution of 
Peter Von Hagenbach in 1474 by a court of the Holy Roman Empire for brutal 
crimes committed during the occupation of Breisach in modern day Germany 
may be the earliest example.  It is notable that the defence that he was 
following higher orders was rejected by the court (Schabas 2011).  Though 
rarely applied, the concept of individual responsibility for what would now be 
termed international crimes endured and was strengthened over subsequent 
centuries.  In 1815 for example, the Congress of Vienna obliged state 
signatories to prosecute alleged pirates and slavers under their own national 
laws (Beigbeder 1999; Maogoto 2004). 
 
These faltering steps towards international humanitarian standards and criminal 
accountability took place alongside the emergence of the European powers and 
the development of partially conflicting imperatives of military doctrine.  The 
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birth in Europe of the modern nation state is often traced back to the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, when the concept of the sovereign state with sole authority 
over its territory and peoples was consolidated (Maogoto 2004).  Such 
sovereignty permitted no interference in the internal affairs of another state, 
thus allowing national leaders to evade accountability for their violations of 
international norms (and for the mis-treatment of their own civilians).  In this 
context, war could be seen as a normal aspect of international relations; ‘the 
continuation of policy by other means’ (Von Clausewitz 1832).  The strongest 
states prevailed, using diplomatic means where possible and military means 
where necessary to pursue their national interest.  From the early nineteenth 
century Clausewitz’s ideas increasingly influenced military strategy, and his 
doctrine of decisive military force placed humanitarian considerations as 
secondary.  International law at the time imposed few effective constraints on 
states, and national leaders sought to pursue their goals by the means available 
(Strachan and Herberg-Rothe 2007).    
 
By the middle of the 19th century, changes were taking place that would 
contribute to a shift in attitudes and the development of new structures and 
institutions. The increasingly economic nature of warfare, and by implication the 
growing importance of the role of civilians in winning wars, implied their partial 
co-option.  While they were becoming central to states sustaining a war-fighting 
economy, the ever more destructive nature of war also meant that they might 
more often become its victims.  Conversely, this period marked an increased 
tendency for international conflict to be settled by arbitration, a factor that might 
have encouraged Moynier in his efforts (Brownlie 1963; Brownlie 2002). 
 
In any event, Moynier's proposition was part of wider attempts to regulate 
international relations and the conduct of war.  Yet despite the developing 
momentum for improved humanitarian standards, in 1872 his proposal for an 
international court was not greeted with widespread legal or political 
acceptance.  In the absence of a body to establish the tribunal it relied upon the 
support of states themselves.  Perhaps reluctant to curb their own sovereignty 
or expose their leaders to accountability, states ensured that his plan came to 
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nothing.  However, his efforts mark the clear articulation of the aspiration for an 
international criminal court, with the intended purpose of bringing perpetrators of 
atrocities to trial, thus promoting the alleviation of suffering in war. 
 
2.1.2 The world wars and their aftermath 
 
From the end of the 19th century the pace of events quickened.  The Hague 
Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 took place against the backdrop of 
increasing tension in Europe, and developing military technology.  They were 
called to discuss the codification of the laws of war, and led to the Hague 
Conventions which included agreements on arms limitation, the development of 
international humanitarian law, and provisions for the protection of civilians in 
war.  The Conventions declared certain acts illegal and imposed duties upon 
states, but did not provide for the criminal liability and prosecution of individuals.   
 
A decade later, the aftermath of the first world war provided further impetus to 
efforts to strengthen international law, and the fate of perpetrators of mass 
crimes again received international attention. The scale of the suffering in the 
'Great War' was colossal, and deaths alone are thought to have surpassed nine 
million military personnel, and six million civilians.  Of the civilian deaths, a 
million or more were the result of the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the 
Ottoman Empire.  Crimes were committed against civilians on both sides, but 
Ottoman crimes are believed to have been the greatest and most flagrant 
violations (Beigbeder 1999). 
 
In response to public outrage at these deeds, the Allies’ statements prior to the 
armistice gave repeated assurances that individual perpetrators would be tried 
for their crimes, yet the Compiègne armistice of November 1918 indicated that 
none should stand trial.  It stipulated that 'no person shall be prosecuted for 
having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the 
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armistice', thus postponing criminal justice processes until the conclusion of a 
peace treaty (Armistice of Compiègne 1918: Item 6). 
 
The subsequent Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and 
on Enforcement of Penalties was expected to investigate such crimes, and to 
lead to charges against individuals responsible; however, it is not clear whether 
political interests would ever have allowed it to meet these aspirations.  US and 
Japanese opposition to trials for crimes against humanity and to trials of heads 
of state complicated the proceedings and weakened the final report, issued on 
29th March 1919.  It did recommend establishing an international court of 
representatives of the victors, but also that none should be charged with making 
aggressive war (Commission on the responsibility of the authors of the war and 
on enforcement of penalities 1920).   
 
Other national interests further weakened efforts to achieve accountability.  
German and Ottoman objections to international tribunals on the grounds of the 
threat they posed to sovereignty constrained the extent to which the 
Commission's report influenced the subsequent peace treaties of Versailles and 
Sèvres.  The Versailles treaty text proposed individual accountability even for 
crimes committed in the name of states, and provided for the trial of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II and German military personnel.  However, in the event political 
influences prevented a trial of the Kaiser, and the subsequent Leipzig war 
crimes trial in 1921 before the German Supreme Court failed to deliver 
accountability.  Ottoman war criminals similarly escaped justice.  The Sevres 
treaty was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which unlike its 
predecessor endorsed Ottoman amnesties in relation to the Armenian 
genocide.  International attention had already turned from dealing with the past, 
to preventing the spread of Bolshevism following the Russian revolution.  Thus, 
despite the allied victory, the public desire for accountability, and the promises 
made, in the final event diplomatic considerations prevailed and the principal 
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perpetrators once again went unpunished.6  The political expediency of the 
1920s may have had its costs.  Apparently confident of the continuing primacy 
of such considerations, in 1939 shortly before the invasion of Poland Adolf Hitler 
is said to have stated  'Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the 
Armenians?'7 (Treaty of Versailles 1919; Treaty of Sèvres 1920; Treaty of 
Lousanne 1923; Cassese 1998: 2). 
 
Between the wars, efforts were made to establish an international criminal court 
through the League of Nations, but these failed to gain ratification by a sufficient 
number of states.  It was not until the aftermath of the second world war that 
further progress was achieved, and in relation to the most serious crimes, strict 
adherence to Westphalian concepts of sovereignty was tempered by the 
international legal process. 
 
During the second world war, from 1939 to 1945, over fifty million people died.  
Of these, over two thirds were civilians, the greatest responsibility for which was 
borne by German forces.  This included of course the extermination of six 
million Jews and approximately five million others (mainly Poles) in the death 
camps and elsewhere, and half a million in the east European ghettos from 
starvation and disease.  Japanese crimes were also notable, including gross 
maltreatment of prisoners of war including their starvation, torture, execution, 
and use in biological warfare experiments.  Though not instigators of the war, 
the Allies were also guilty of deliberate mass killing of civilians, including the 
war-time deaths of well over half a million people in the Soviet gulags, and 
perhaps between 300,000 and 500,000 civilians killed by US conventional and 
nuclear bombing of Japan (1946; Seldon 2007). 
 
Various diplomatic efforts promoted and detracted from progress on the trial of 
war criminals.  The UN War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) was inaugurated in 
                                            
6 By contrast, in economic terms, the post-war settlement did not leave the German 
people unpunished, and the burden of reparations may have contributed to the origins 
of the second world war. 
7 Note that the authenticity of this quote is disputed. 
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1943 with the support of 17 allied nations.  However, British and US concerns 
over their own capacity for independent action, and intention that the 
commission would apprehend, charge and try war criminals (rather than simply 
to investigate and record their crimes as they had anticipated), soon resulted in 
a decline in governmental support, and its dissolution in 1949.  Despite this, the 
UNWCC was able to compile dossiers on over 8,000 alleged war criminals 
which eventually informed national prosecutions (Maogoto 2004). 
 
The process of establishing international military tribunals was more successful.  
The Moscow Declaration of 1943 signed by the US, Soviet Union and UK, 
indicated the allied intention to prosecute the Nazis for war crimes, and set in 
motion the process that established the London Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal.  The London (or Nuremberg) Charter was signed by 
representatives of the four major powers, the Soviet Union, the United States, 
Britain, and France on 8th August 1945, and laid down the laws and procedures 
by which the Nuremberg tribunals would operate.  Trials of the major war 
criminals were soon underway, with warrants issued against 24 Nazi leaders in 
October 1945.  These were completed nearly a year later with the conviction of 
19 defendants, twelve of whom were sentenced to death (Robertson 2006). 
 
The Nuremberg process allowed for prosecutions on four counts: conspiracy 
(an unprecedented charge more completely articulated as 'participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of a crime against peace'); 
planning, initiating or waging crimes against peace (another  unprecedented 
charge, except for the failed trial of Kaiser Wilhelm II); war crimes (involving 
serious breaches of the laws relating to armed conflict); and crimes against 
humanity (unprecedented at the time, these were crimes such as murder, 
enslavement and extermination committed against civilian populations).  The 
charges were challenged as ex post facto criminalization because the London 
Charter had been adopted after the crimes took place; however, the judges 
ruled that it would be wrong to leave the Nazi crimes unpunished.  In view of the 
enormity of the acts, and despite legal objections, in this instance it was the 
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political necessity to hold at least some of those responsible to account that 
drove the process of developing international law forward.  However, political 
imperatives also operated to deter some prosecutions, and certain war crimes 
charges were dropped after evidence of comparable behaviour by British and 
US militaries was uncovered (Robertson 2006: 248; Schabas 2011). 
 
In the Pacific theatre, the Allies established the 'International military tribunal for 
the Far East' leading to the Tokyo trials, which commenced at the end of April 
1946.  Despite drawing on the Nuremberg provisions, the Tokyo tribunals were 
less independent of political influence.  Structured more like a court martial than 
a court, the charges, proceedings and sentences were significantly influenced 
by the US supreme commander in the region, General Douglas MacArthur.  The 
28 defendants were charged with three categories of crime.  Class A charges 
were for conspiracy, and were brought against the highest decision-makers; 
Class B charges related to the commission of atrocities and crimes against 
humanity; and Class C charges related to those with criminal responsibility 
lower in the decision-making processes.  The trials taking place over two and a 
half years and involving judges from eleven nations, resulted in seven death 
sentences and eighteen prison sentences, sixteen of which were for life.  In the 
event US political desires to reinstate Japan as a major ally in the region were 
such that all those imprisoned were released on parole or had their sentences 
commuted by 1957, one later becoming Prime Minister (Maogoto 2004). 
 
Despite the politically influenced nature of the charters and implementation of 
the tribunals, they nevertheless represented a decisive break with the past and 
a huge step towards the establishment of new legal norms.  Perpetrators of 
mass crimes had been brought to justice irrespective of issues of national 
sovereignty, and a precedent of international trials for those responsible for the 
most egregious crimes had been set.   
 
Subsequent developments at the United Nations helped to secure this advance.  
In 1946 the procedural and substantive principles informing these tribunals were 
used by the UN General Assembly to inform the development of international 
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criminal law.  As discussed in section 1.3, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations later adopted the 'Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide' (UN 1948b), and the definition of genocide was 
subsequently incorporated unchanged into the Rome Statute of the ICC.  By 
that time the UN Charter had already been signed by over fifty states, Article 55 
of which established the protection of human rights as too important to be left to 
sovereign powers alone (Schiff 2008; Schabas 2011). 
 
This progress in the development and application of international law represents 
the advance of deontological frameworks, through which wars and violence may 
be regulated, and the rights and interests of individuals advanced.  To the 
extent that concerns about justice have influenced such matters, the vagaries of 
consequentialism have been complemented by the clarity of international legal 
standards and expectations. 
 
2.1.3 The creation of the ICC 
 
The period from 1950 to 1990 saw the development of international criminal 
law, placing obligations on individuals rather than on states, although neither 
the UN nor any other international body was generally able to enforce its 
provisions.  Their failure to act was principally determined by Article 2(7) of the 
UN Charter, which stipulates that 'nothing contained in the present charter shall 
authorise the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
jurisdiction of any state'.  Sovereignty was thus upheld, though subject to the 
proviso that ‘this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII’; a significant caveat (UN 1945). 
 
Developments in the way wars were being waged during this period also 
presented challenges to the existing body of law.  Civilian populations, 
distinguished by their ethnic or religious identity or other factors, were 
increasingly involved in, or victims of civil wars, including insurgencies and 
counter-insurgencies, further blurring the already weakened distinction between 
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combatants and non-combatants.  Unlike the preceding Hague Conventions 
which dealt with the means and methods of warfare, the Geneva Conventions 
sought to protect the victims of war, including civilians.  The 1949 Geneva 
convention was updated by the 1977 protocols, particularly with reference to 
these emerging forms of non-international armed conflict.  Yet in spite of the 
obligation on states to punish grave breaches of the Conventions, prosecutions 
remained rare (Kerr and Mobekk 2007). 
 
During this time, the International Law Commission (ILC) was requested by the 
UN General Assembly to study the feasibility of an international criminal court, 
producing a Draft Statute in 1953, and a Draft Code of offences in 1954.  The 
definition of the crime of aggression contained within the latter proved 
contentious, and this was not resolved until 1974 when a political rather than 
legal settlement was reached, giving responsibility for this primarily to the UN 
Security Council (Bassiouni 1987; Kerr and Mobekk 2007).  Subsequently it was 
not until 1981 that the General Assembly requested the ILC to resume its 
activity, and these efforts were given renewed impetus following the end of the 
Cold War in 1989 when an initiative of Caribbean and Latin American countries 
led by Trinidad & Tobago, seeking to address aspects of the international drugs 
trade, initiated a resolution at the UN General Assembly to renew efforts for a 
permanent international court.  Eventually in 1991, following revision of its 1954 
draft, a revised form was sent to Member States for their comments.  This later 
led to the ILC's draft Statute (on procedural and organisational issues) 
completed in 1994, and its 'Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind' two years later.  Both documents were to greatly influence the drafting 
of the Rome Statute (ILC 1994; 1996). 
 
At the same time that the drafting of the Statute was gaining momentum some 
movement was also achieved on the issue of enforcement, in part spurred by 
reaction at the UN to atrocities being committed in the former Yugoslavia.  
Chapter VII of the UN Charter had always provided the possibility of Security 
Council sanctioned military intervention in the event of a 'threat to peace and 
security'.  It was the reinterpretation of this power by the Security Council to 
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include the protection of human rights within the borders of a state that enabled 
a measure of enforcement to be achieved (1945).  By 1992 it was clear that war 
crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed in Bosnia, and a 
proposal for a Statute for a court to try war criminals put forward by Lord Owen 
and Cyrus Vance was given UN endorsement before the end of the year.  On 
22nd February 1993 the UN Security Council decided to create, as a UN body, 
a tribunal mandated to prosecute war criminals guilty of crimes committed in the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991—the first international tribunal to apply modern 
international criminal law.  Borrowing on the Statute and Code prepared by the 
ILC, Security Council resolution 827 established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in May 1993.  Its trials in The Hague, 
including that of Mladić for genocide, are continuing (1993; BBC 2015a). 
 
The genocide in Rwanda that took place a year later provided further impetus.  
In response to a request from the new Rwandan government, the UN Security 
Council voted to create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
November 1994, in a belated attempt to salvage its tarnished reputation.  
Located in Arusha, the Tribunal was given jurisdiction over serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighbouring 
countries in 1994.  Its statute is similar to that of the ICTY, but with provisions 
reflecting the internal nature of the war (United Nations Security Council - 
UNSC 1994).  Facing none of the complications of issuing warrants into a 
region still undergoing violent conflict (at least within Rwanda itself) the ICTR 
was able to target the highest profile perpetrators from the start.  However, it 
also encountered difficulties including obstruction by the Rwandan Government 
of attempts by the ICTR to investigate crimes allegedly committed by members 
of the Tutsi minority (Robertson 2006; Kerr and Mobekk 2007). 
 
Four years later the momentum for accountability was sustained. Following a 
request from the Sierra Leonean Government, the UN passed a resolution to 
set up a court in collaboration with the Government, to prosecute crimes 
committed since 1996 in the civil war.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) came into being in 2002, and notably the warrants for Foday Sankoh 
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and Charles Taylor for war crimes were issued a year later.  Sankoh later died 
in custody, while Taylor remained at large until 2006 when he was arrested 
crossing the border from Nigeria to Cameroon (UNSC 2000; Dorman 2009; 
Harris 2012). 
 
From the start, the ad hoc tribunals faced enormous challenges in seeking to 
administer new laws, while at all times meeting the highest standards of 
international justice in difficult circumstances.  Their challenges have not only 
been technical, and they have received considerable criticism in relation to their 
harmonisation with other modes of transitional justice, and relationship to 
political settlements (Ainley et al. 2016).  Though perhaps not overly well-
resourced by international standards, some have faced considerable local 
criticism on the grounds of costs, their slow progress, and their distant 
relationship to the communities on whose behalf they have sought redress.  
Their record thus far on promoting peace and reconciliation has also been 
questioned.  However, these criticisms in part reflect the extremely high 
expectations placed upon them (Goldstone 1996; Dougherty 2004; Zacklin 
2004; Nsanzuwera 2005; Kelsall 2009; Harris and Lappin 2015).   
 
Despite these impediments, tribunals represented significant further progress in 
developing individual accountability for international crimes.  They established a 
precedent for engagement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, permitting 
military enforcement to defend the human rights of civilians in internal armed 
conflicts in the interests of peace and security; and crimes against humanity 
were deemed to have taken place in peacetime as well as war.  In some 
respects ad hoc tribunal provisions even extended beyond those later 
incorporated into the Rome Statute.  The ICTY excluded the defence of 'duress' 
which allows for a limited defence on the grounds of superior orders, though it 
was later reinstated in the Rome Statute.  Additionally these tribunals 
established the structure and mechanisms of an international criminal court, and 
demonstrated the possible role of the Prosecutor (Mendes 2010; Schabas 
2011).   
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By their nature ad hoc tribunals require timely political will to be established in 
the aftermath of each conflict.  They are also subject to political pressures from 
parties with vested interests and the accusation that they dispense only victor’s 
justice.  Furthermore, inconsistencies between tribunals could undermine the 
process of establishing international norms and the positive deterrent effect that 
might arise from the presence of a permanent court.  These disadvantages 
contributed to sustaining the momentum for a permanent court (Maogoto 2004).   
 
Such developments in the application of international criminal law took place 
alongside the final diplomatic moves leading to the creation of the International 
Criminal Court.  In 1994 the UN General Assembly made the decision to press 
on with ICC establishment using the ILC drafts.  The Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court was formed to take this 
forward.  Issues such as complementarity with national legal processes, and the 
limits to jurisdiction were discussed, and the statute for the court was combined 
with the code, to bring the definition of crimes into the same governing 
document.  In the following year  the Preparatory Committee for the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (PrepCom) was empowered to 
progress its development with the participation of member states, NGOs and 
international organisations.  A series of amendments took place between 1996 
and January 1998, when a consolidated draft was submitted.  This equipped 
the Rome Conference to finalise work on the Statute, and the ‘Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court’ was convened on 15th June 1998, with the participation of 160 
states and approximately 250 NGOs (Schiff 2008; Schabas 2011). 
 
There were a number of groups attending the conference that sought to 
influence its outcome, but by far the most influential was the group of ‘like-
minded states’, chaired by Canada and numbering 60 at the start of the 
conference, and including permanent Security Council members Britain and 
France before its close.  In opposition to the other members of the Security 
Council, they took a common position, critical of aspects of the Draft Statute 
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and favouring a strong court with independent powers.  In particular, they 
sought jurisdiction of the court over genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity; the elimination of a Security Council veto on prosecutions; 
independent power for the Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu; 
and a prohibition of reservations to the Statute.  Through their numbers, 
organisation, and widespread geographic spread, they were able to achieve 
significant influence, and chaired most of the working groups during the 
conference (Schabas 2011).   
 
The conference process charged a number of working groups to discuss 
specific issues, and bring proposals back to the Committee. The final draft was 
presented on 17th July, the last day of the conference, requiring a two thirds 
majority to carry.  In the event it was passed by 120 votes to seven (opponents 
including the US, China and Israel), with 21 abstentions.  The Court itself finally 
became operational  on 1st July 2002 following its ratification by its 60th State 
Party (ICC 2013a). 
 
In theoretical terms this development significantly further extended the 
deontological frame of international law.  The remit of the Court, to address 
these most serious crimes, and the degree of independence secured for its 
actions, defined it as a significant advance.  Previously, political and diplomatic 
systems could at best be used to advance justice by promoting consequentialist 
concerns alone, but such processes have provided little assurance that 
perpetrators, if sufficiently powerful, would be subject to codes of behaviour and 
punished for transgressions.  The new power of the Court presented an 
opportunity to address this situation internationally for the first time.  The 
independence of the Court placed it largely outside the political reach of such 
individuals.  The creation of the Court was a landmark event in the 
advancement of deontological justice norms.   
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2.2 Operation of the Court 
2.2.1 Aspirations 
 
The establishment of the Court is still a gift of hope to future 
generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal 
human rights and the rule of law. (Annan 1998) 
 
The UN Secretary General was one amongst many heralding the ICC’s creation 
as a huge step forward for human rights.  Human Rights Watch itself, which had 
campaigned long and hard for the ICC’s establishment, articulated the views of 
a broad swathe of the NGO community when the Court received its 60th State 
ratification four years later, stating  ‘This is an historic moment for the cause of 
human rights and international justice.’ (HRW 2002c).  Aspirations for the Court 
were thus high, and reflected a belief that its creation and functioning as a legal 
body would have far-reaching effects well beyond its legal remit. 
 
The local processes of bringing perpetrators to justice was expected to be 
aligned with the goal of fully entrenching the norms of international law.  Legal 
enforcement would be entwined with the promotion of human rights for all; the 
Court’s efforts would benefit the victims of war and atrocities, and help 
communities recover.  As Amnesty International stated in 2000, ‘Victims and 
their families will have the chance to obtain justice and truth, and begin the 
process of reconciliation’ (Amnesty International - AI 2000: 1).  The intervention 
of the Court in individual cases was thus anticipated to be in the interests of 
civilians caught up in these terrible events.  The arrest and trial of perpetrators 
would draw a line under their suffering, and bring at least some measure of 
justice as well as the foundation for future reconciliation.  In this way 
organisations committed to promoting the rights of individuals, such as Amnesty 
International, with its aim of ‘effective action for the individual victim, global 
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coverage, the universality and indivisibility of human rights’, saw their cause 
advanced through the Court’s establishment (AI 2002a: 4). 
 
The rule of international law was to be furthered through a process of criminal 
law enforcement, by which the Court could issue arrest warrants into ongoing 
wars and conflict zones around the world, bound not by diplomatic constraints 
or the nuances of local political considerations (which had for too long delivered 
impunity to the most egregious perpetrators), but by the principled clarity of 
international legal standards and their enforcement.  Communities on the 
ground would be the primary beneficiaries of this process, their interests  
associated with, and promoted through, the furtherance of international justice.  
It was perceived by many as an achievement by and for global civil society 
(Glasius 2006). 
 
With the anticipation that a fresh deontological approach would also yield 
consequentialist gains, and anticipating the melding of legal enforcement with 
human rights promotion, the signatories to the Rome Statute were acting in 
many respects true to Moynier’s original vision.  Articulating their intentions in 
the Preamble to the Rome Statute, states declared themselves to be: 
 
Mindful that during this century many millions of children, women and 
men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity. 
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world [and …]  
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes. (Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998) 
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2.2.2 Jurisdiction and crimes 
 
Given the goals proclaimed in the previous section, it is now appropriate to 
outline the structure and powers invested in the Court to enable it to deliver on 
its mandate.  The following section provides a very brief account of its legal, 
temporal, and geographic jurisdiction, the organs of the Court, the means 
through which investigations may be initiated, provision for victims, and key 
checks and balances articulated in its Statute. 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of cases is defined in the Rome 
Statute, and is limited not only to the gravest crimes, but also temporally, 
geographically, through complementarity with national courts, and by the means 
of referral of cases. 
 
The crimes named in the Statute require some elaboration.  The first, 
‘genocide’, involves an intent to destroy a ‘national, ethnic, racial or religious 
group’ by means such as killing, causing physical or mental harm, inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring physical destruction, or the prevention of 
births or removal of children (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
1998: Articles 5-6).  The second, ‘crimes against humanity’, falls into the remit 
of the Court when it is part of ‘a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population’.  The Statute outlines similar acts to those 
relating to genocide, but also other offences—specifically, including rape and 
other sexual crimes, persecution, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer 
of populations, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of liberty (Article 7).  
Article 5 identifies ‘war crimes' as falling within the Court’s jurisdiction.  These 
are stipulated at some length and include many of the acts previously 
mentioned, while also making reference to breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and ‘serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict’ (Article 8).   
 
Though there were efforts to include the crime of aggression in the 1998 
Statute, its definition could not be agreed, and in the end it was named only with 
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an indication that the Court would exercise jurisdiction over aggression only 
‘once a provision is adopted [...] defining the crime [...]’.  Article 8bis was added 
at the 2010 review conference (subject to the amendment process indicated in 
Article 121), and prohibits the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution [...] 
of an act of aggression […] which constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations’ (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: 
9). 
 
Temporally, the jurisdiction of the Court is restricted to crimes committed after 
its creation (Article 11), following its 60th state ratification.  In the event, the 
Statute entered into force on 1st July 2002 for those states that had signed.  
Geographically, once a state has ratified the Statute, the Court has jurisdiction 
over the stipulated crimes committed on its territory by nationals of any state, 
and by nationals of that state committed anywhere.  Subsequent state 
signatories thus extend the jurisdiction of the Court following their own 
ratification.  Additionally, states that have not yet signed or ratified the Statute 
may accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to a specific crime (Article 
12.3).  
 
Even where these conditions are met and the Court has jurisdiction, a case is 
only admissible when the relevant state itself is ‘unwilling or unable’ to act 
(Article 17).  The Court’s activity is thus envisaged as complementing and 
enhancing national judicial processes rather than superseding or supplanting 
them.   
 
Vested with this task, the Court’s purpose, composition, jurisdiction and 
administration are outlined with some clarity in the Rome Statute.  In order to 
appreciate the powers of the Court and understand its actions and approach to 
cases, the organs of the Court are now outlined, with a summary of their 
function. 
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2.2.3 Structure and function 
 
The Presidency oversees the administration of the Court, with the exception of 
the Office of the Prosecutor.  This includes three elements: the Pre-Trial 
Division, the Trial Division, and the Appeals Division.  The Pre-Trial and Trial 
Divisions, which may consist of one or more Chambers according to the needs 
of the Court, are responsible for the judicial functions of the Court (Articles 38-
39). 
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber is required to assess applications for the issue of arrest 
warrants from the Prosecutor and, if approved, issue them.  It is required to 
carry out tasks necessary to assist in the preparation of the defence, and 
provide for the protection of victims and witnesses, and any others summoned 
or arrested by the Court.  It is responsible for determining whether there are 
sufficient grounds to proceed to trial.  It must also protect evidence and deal 
with states, including for example seeking their co-operation, or protecting 
information relevant to national security (Articles 56-61,72,82). 
 
The Trial Chamber is responsible for the management of the trial and 
sentencing itself.  It must ensure that the trial is fair and carried out within a 
reasonable time period, that the rights of defendants are observed, and that 
victims and witnesses are adequately protected.  Its responsibilities for the 
management of the trial include providing evidence (and ruling on its 
admissibility), summoning witnesses, protecting confidential information, and 
recording the proceedings (Articles 63-65,72,74,76,81-83). 
 
Appeals by the prosecution or the defence against acquittal, conviction or 
sentence, are dealt with by the Appeals Chamber.  Decisions of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, for example with regard to jurisdiction or admissibility, may also be 
appealed.  Additionally, the Chamber deals with certain internal matters of the 
Court, for example the consideration of whether, due to concerns about 
impartiality in a case, the Prosecutor might be disqualified from hearing.  In 
carrying out these duties the Appeals Chamber has all the powers that the Trial 
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Chamber would normally possess to conduct the process (Articles 18,36,82-
84). 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) acts as a separate organ of the Court, 
independent from the Presidency and its other Divisions.  It is responsible for 
receiving (or instigating) referrals, and assessing these to determine whether an 
investigation should proceed.  The OTP is also responsible for carrying out any 
ensuing investigation to determine whether arrest warrants should be issued, 
and for taking forward subsequent prosecutions (Article 42). 
 
The Registry is responsible for non-judicial activities of the Court, and includes 
the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU).  In consultation with the Prosecutor this 
unit ‘provides protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and 
other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the 
Court, and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such 
witnesses’ (Article 43).  Consideration of the rights of victims has not generally 
been prominent in international criminal or humanitarian law, but perhaps due in 
part to the growing prominence of the restorative justice discourse, their 
interests have started to be recognised.  The Security Council resolution 
establishing the ICTY acknowledges that victims’ rights to seek compensation 
should not be compromised by the Tribunal’s proceedings (Schabas 2011).  In 
contrast to this modest provision, the Rome Statute made a clear break with the 
past.  Most importantly, the Statute provides for victims to take a much greater 
part in the proceedings, and to express their views and concerns.  Since the 
Court’s launch, hundreds of victims have applied to participate in hearings, 
placing a significant burden on the Court.  As well as providing for participation, 
the Statute allows for consideration of the issue of reparations, including 
determining the degree of loss a victim may have suffered, seeking restitution 
from a convicted person by requesting States to seize proceeds, property and 
assets (ibid).  These powers, overseen in part by the semi-autonomous Trust 
Fund for Victims, represent significant progress in considering the interests of 
victims in international criminal law.  Such measures perhaps reflect the 
underlying intention that the Court should strengthen the profile of victims’ 
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concerns relative to the historical prominence of political considerations, and 
thus further contribute to the prevention of human rights abuses through ending 
impunity (Article 75). 
 
In situations that are both under the Court’s jurisdiction and admissible, there 
are three ways in which an investigation by the Court may be instigated: referral 
to the Prosecutor by a State Party; referral to the Prosecutor by the UN Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; and instigated by the Prosecutor 
him/herself proprio motu.  This third option gives the Prosecutor the power to 
intervene to address crimes independent of the wishes of the Security Council, 
an important provision in the creation of an independent Court (Article 13). 
 
In a number of additional respects the Statute reflects the determination of its 
drafters to put an end to impunity.  The Prosecutor may decide not to proceed if 
the investigation ‘would not serve the interests of Justice’ (Article 53).  There 
are clearly circumstances in which the Prosecutor might for legitimate reasons 
wish not to go forward.  The circumstances of an investigation might, due to 
jurisdictional restrictions for example, cause the Court to intervene in a conflict 
to address some crimes but not others in a way that adds new asymmetries to 
perceived grievances and injustice in a conflict; an unduly rigid insistence on the 
application of criminal justice norms might in some circumstances detract from 
the Court’s broader mission.  Yet mindful of how authority might, under political 
influence, once again be misused to deliver impunity for the most powerful, the 
Prosecutor’s power was limited.  A decision not to continue with an investigation 
must be confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, which has no reciprocal power to 
seek to halt an investigation itself.  There is thus a mechanism by which an 
investigation may be halted based upon the view of the Prosecutor, but only 
subject to approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber (ibid). 
 
In addition to a decision not to proceed by the Prosecutor there are also means 
to defer an investigation’s commencement or proceeding.  In a concession to 
the US, French and Chinese delegations, Article 16 of the Statute ultimately 
puts the Court under some political control.  Using a resolution adopted under 
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Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council may ‘request’ that an 
investigation or prosecution is deferred for a period of 12 months, after which a 
new resolution must be adopted if the ICC’s process is to be further delayed.  
Such a request would be mandatory upon the Court, and so this Article provides 
a route through which perpetrators might escape justice, though only so long as 
they retain sufficiently widespread international political support or leverage to 
sustain annual deferral of their case by the Security Council. 
 
Despite the expectation that the Court would intervene in ongoing conflicts 
where atrocities of the gravest nature are being perpetrated, the Statute pays 
relatively little attention to the apprehension of suspects.  Lacking the means of 
achieving arrest itself, the Court must rely on others working on its behalf.  Part 
9 of the Statute, comprising Articles 86-102, addresses international co-
operation and judicial assistance.  These oblige States Parties to co-operate 
with the Court in various ways, while Non-States parties may also be invited to 
assist.  Such issues include the ‘surrender’ of suspects to the Court, their travel, 
extradition, and related administration and communications to and from the 
Court.  It also deals with matters relating to arrest, particularly provision of the 
necessary documentation and issues concerning detention in custody.  Article 
93 mentions the identification and location of the suspect, their questioning, and 
the seizure of evidence.  No mention is made of the manner of the seizure of 
the suspect themselves, though the Article 93.1(l) indicates the requirement for 
States parties to provide ‘any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by 
the law of the requested State[…]’, which may include action by its armed 
forces.  Article 97(b) anticipates that the surrender of a suspect to the Court by 
a State may not be possible, but only on the basis of their location not being 
known (or that the requested person is not the one named on the warrant); not 
for other reasons pertaining to their being significant commanders in conflict 
zones, as might have been anticipated.  Part 10 of the Statute then deals with 
‘enforcement’, but this term refers only to the application of the sentence itself.  
Perhaps reflecting the relative ease of enforcement within states due to their 
monopoly on violence, the means of moving from issuance of a warrant to the 
achievement of arrest is largely absent from the Statute.   
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2.3 Anticipated impact of the Court   
This preceding technical description of the structure and function of the Court 
does little to articulate the relationship of its activities to its purpose.  The 
mechanisms by which actions of the ICC are envisaged to achieve its aims are 
now outlined. 
 
2.3.1 Retribution 
 
The moral obligation and/or legal duty to administer retribution is prominently 
articulated in the Statute itself; however, the means by which it is expected that 
international courts will contribute to the establishment of broader justice 
objectives are relatively little discussed, though notable exceptions exist (Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: 1; Clark 2008b; Clark 2008c; 
Branch 2011: 181; Rodman 2012: 69).  The criminal justice process operates 
principally in retributive mode, impartially determining the guilt of perpetrators 
and delivering proportionate punishment.  Through these means the 
disapproval of society is demonstrated, social behaviour regulated, and the 
power of the state (or other body) affirmed.  Though the retributive mode does 
not exclude other justice elements, including reparative or restorative efforts for 
example, it is clear that in the case of criminal law justice is seen to be done 
when the correct punishment is appropriately delivered.  
 
Retribution, though, is not the only mechanism by which the ICC is thought to 
promote international criminal justice, and various other effects are articulated in 
the literature. 
 
2.3.2 Deterrence 
 
Most prominent of these is deterrence—the belief that by bringing the most 
notable perpetrators to retributive justice, those individuals themselves as well 
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as others in future (specific and general deterrence as Vinjamuri describes it) 
will be deterred from committing crimes (Vinjamuri 2010: 194).  The credible 
prospect of arrest and prosecution is expected to deter individuals from 
planning or committing international crimes, knowing that such acts will no 
longer be tolerated by the international community.  Through deterrence future 
cycles of violence may be averted, and atrocities prevented (HRW 1998: 1).  
Additionally, the mere prospect of ICC investigation or arrest warrants might 
itself deter, even without the Court’s formal engagement or effective 
prosecution.  It has been suggested that in a conflict scenario, warrants could 
contribute to a peace-making process, in which perpetrators are brought to 
justice even during the hostilities themselves.  An intervention might serve to 
stay the hand of others and bring a moderating influence on events.  By 
removing those who are most culpable, peace may be attained not after justice, 
but through it (Ocampo 2006b: 6; Akhavan 2009: 628-629; Vinjamuri 2010).  
Anticipating that humanitarian standards will increasingly be upheld and the 
norms of international criminal justice extended, others have emphasised a 
longer-term impact in relation to deterrence, with cumulative benefits stretching 
forwards over many years (Ocampo 2006b; Vinjamuri 2010: 194).  Rodman has 
considered the mixed evidence for the efficacy of deterrence-based 
approaches, but in any event effective deterrence rests upon credible 
enforcement, and the Court’s performance in this regard depends on its ability 
to galvanise others with enforcement capacity to this end (Rodman 2012).  
Action by the Court will of course only provide a deterrent effect if its retributive 
punishment is worse than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
2.3.3 Marginalisation 
 
In addition to impacts through retribution and deterrence, the ICC may 
contribute towards the marginalisation of perpetrators.  Citing the Milosevic, 
Taylor, Karadzic, and Uganda cases (the latter to be discussed) Human Rights 
Watch argue that issuance of warrants can affect the power dynamics of a 
situation, by discrediting the suspect and contributing to their isolation or 
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stigmatisation.  It may make denials that a crime has occurred less credible, 
and in the longer term contribute to the creation of a historical record based on 
evidence for crimes.  Arrest warrants might also establish practical difficulties 
for perpetrators, such as obstructing national or international travel, or creating 
uncertainty around their fate should they venture abroad.  A further impact could 
be the increased international attention brought to bear upon a conflict as a 
result of ICC engagement.  Each of these mechanisms could contribute to a 
process that promotes a dynamic for peace (HRW 2009b).  Akhavan cites the 
Uganda case specifically as an example of this phenomenon and his evidence 
will be examined in later chapters (Akhavan 2009: 641-643). 
 
Vinjamuri describes a related process of inducement, to which Hayner has also 
referred.  This proposes that warrants encourage perpetrators to negotiate, as 
they may face the prospect of trial even if their military campaign is successful.  
However, this mechanism is not fully articulated by either author, and as the 
prospect of trial following indictment must remain whatever the outcome of 
negotiations, the motivation to talk and thus potentially hasten trial is not entirely 
clear.  The Uganda case is given as a pertinent example by both authors, and 
this will also be discussed in section 6.3 (Hayner 2009: 17; Vinjamuri 2010: 
195). 
 
2.3.4 Individualisation of guilt 
 
An additional means by which the ICC may further justice is through the 
individualisation of guilt.  When responsibility for atrocities is perceived to rest 
with communities or groups who are not brought to justice, resentments and 
hatreds may be fostered or sustained, and the seeds of future conflict planted.  
As Human Rights Watch explain, ‘Without individualizing guilt, the notion of 
collective responsibility for crimes has greater resonance, and it is easier for 
blame focused on a group to be passed from one generation to the next.’ (HRW 
2009b: 6).  The perception of culpability for injustice residing with a very small 
number of individuals may be helpful at different levels.  Criminals are identified 
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for retribution, which may provide deterrence; the majority are absolved or at 
least escape punishment, facilitating the possibility of stability; and potentially, 
societies may through this process be better reconciled.  The international 
criminal justice system identifies individuals most responsible for atrocities for 
retributive punishment, providing accountability and challenging narratives that 
deny crimes and culpability on the basis of evidence.  Richard Goldstone, the 
first joint Prosecutor for the ICTY/ICTR has expressed this in an interview, 
reported as follows: 
 
Such interethnic violence usually gets stoked by specific individuals 
intent on immediate political or material advantage, who then call forth 
the legacies of earlier and previously unaddressed grievances.  But the 
guilt for the violence that results does not adhere to the entire ethnic 
group.  Specific individuals bear the major share of the responsibility, 
and it is they, not the groups as a whole, who need to be held to 
account, through a fair and meticulously detailed presentation and 
evaluation of evidence, precisely so that the next time around no one 
will be able to claim that all Serbs did this, or all Croats or all Hutus. 
(Weschler 1995) 
 
Whether or not Goldstone’s view that a few individuals bear so much more 
responsibility than other active perpetrators is invariably the case, the 
individualisation process clearly performs a regulatory function in identifying a 
few for retributive punishment intended to express society’s disapproval, 
deterring others, and absolving the rest. 
 
The individualisation of guilt may also contribute to the removal of spoilers from 
a conflict situation.  If some individuals are unable or unwilling to negotiate, 
warrants that lead to their arrest may have the effect of allowing negotiations to 
proceed.  In a reversal of one argument often put in opposition to ICC 
intervention, which proposes that warrants create spoilers who are unwilling to 
negotiate themselves into a trial, advocates for the Court have proposed that if 
there is adequate enforcement to remove the spoiler from the negotiation then 
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the prospect of successful talks can be promoted.  Critical to this mechanism’s 
(and thus the Court’s) effectiveness for a positive rather than a negative 
outcome is the capacity to efficiently effect arrest.  The implications of securing 
this necessary capability is central to the analysis forthcoming in this text. 
 
2.3.5 Complementarity 
 
It is hoped that the complementarity of national and international criminal law 
enforcement enshrined in the Statute can give new momentum to states’ own 
legal processes.  One means by which the Court’s influence is expected to be 
projected is through the strengthening of national legal responses to mass 
crimes.  In the first instance national courts have an obligation to prosecute 
perpetrators of serious international crimes, and it is only where this duty is not 
fulfilled and the state’s legal systems are either unwilling or unable to prosecute, 
that the ICC has jurisdiction.  In order to act in such circumstances states must 
refer their situation to the ICC or otherwise relinquish their responsibility for 
prosecution, thereby offering jurisdiction to the Court (Akhavan 2009; HRW 
2009b: 13).  Furthermore, through such interventions justice systems around 
the world may be emboldened by the actions of the ICC; their hand may be 
strengthened by the prospect of possible ICC intervention should they fail to act 
against their own perpetrators (Ocampo 2006b).  Human Rights Watch claim 
(though they provide no evidence) that international criminal justice 
interventions have indeed had a broad and far-reaching effect, strengthening 
courts’ legal process, building capacity and emboldening those who seek to 
uphold the rule of law.  They perceive that as a result of the ICC’s example, 
through the engagement of its staff and those working for other accompanying 
criminal justice organisations, states’ own legal system’s capacity to address 
crimes will be strengthened.  At the same time it is recognised that such 
capacity building is a long-term project that requires more than symbolism to be 
effective (HRW 2009b: 198; Vinjamuri 2010). 
  
   
90 
2.3.6 Furthering the norm—creating the ‘era of enforcement’ 
 
While each of these mechanisms may have value in itself, when combined they 
contribute to an overarching goal of furthering the norms of international justice, 
and an expectation of prosecution for international crimes.  This case was 
articulated by ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow, who gave an instructive 
account of the various means by which the Tribunal was thought to have 
contributed to the furtherance of justice following the genocide, and provided a 
foundation for the ICC’s establishment (Jallow 2008).  Akhavan and others have 
further emphasised the societal role of such expectations, promoting the 
‘stigmatization of crime through judicial processes, leading to the reinforcement 
of habitual lawfulness’ (Akhavan 2009; Mendes 2010: 628).  As the former ICC 
Prosecutor has pointed out, it may be erroneous to measure the Court’s 
success by prosecutions achieved; its success may lie in the climate that it has 
succeeded in creating, despite the lack of prosecutions at international level, or 
their prevalence at national level.  Some might question whether this situation 
has arisen already from so few successful prosecutions, and whether, in these 
early stages at least, successful prosecutions could form one measure of 
progress in relation to the Court’s claim to be furthering its own norms.  
However, the possibility of success without a significant number of prosecutions 
must be acknowledged (Ocampo 2006b: 10). 
 
In theoretical terms, it may be observed that the process of advancing the new 
norms of international criminal law is deontological in itself.  The law will be 
applied according to the Statute, as determined by the Prosecutor and the 
Court, who will follow due legal process.  The anticipated impacts of these 
actions is expected to extend far beyond deontological compliance alone.  They 
include marginalisation or removal of perpetrators, deterrence of future crimes, 
strengthening of good governance, and the establishment of international 
standards of behaviour in relation to international crimes, and presumably the 
advancement of human rights.  The success of the Court’s deontological 
process, it is argued, will be measured by its consequences.   
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If the vision of an international rule of law that protects all and deters potential 
perpetrators from committing mass crimes is a straightforward and compelling 
one, the path towards this goal has also been perceived as uncomplicated, at 
least in principle.  Warrants for arrest will simply be issued into situations, based 
upon the crimes committed, within the Court’s jurisdiction.  Through this most 
linear of strategies, by the threat or reality of prosecutions, the new climate of 
global accountability before the law will be achieved.  This ambition has been 
characterized as the ‘era of enforcement’ (Robertson 2006: xxxiii). 
 
2.4 Review 
 
Resting upon the identification of the nature of ICL, Chapter 2 has traced the 
development of the ICC.  From its origins in the late 19th century following the 
impetus of the horrors of the France-Prussian War, through the Nuremberg 
trials and the Special Courts over a century later, the emergence of the Court 
was observed.  The mode of its operation was also articulated, as determined 
by its Statute and other documents.  Lastly, the means of its anticipated impact 
were analysed, culminating in the vision of its international enforcement and the 
ending of impunity for perpetrators of international crimes.  The next chapter 
considers this ambition in situations of great volatility—the principal context of 
its likely operations.  
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Chapter 3 The pursuit of international criminal 
justice in volatile environments 
3.0 Introduction 
 
For any new venture, the moment prior to commitment is significant.  Poised 
between theory and practice, like a majestic ship on a slipway, there is an 
opportunity to take stock.  We may appraise the prospect and anticipate events, 
prior to an irrevocable act.  Such a hiatus is an occasion upon which to observe 
clearly the qualities of the craft—to consider its ballast and trim—seeking to 
ensure that forthcoming events hold few surprises.  Planners and implementers 
of the Statute may well have been impatient for the launch.  Informed by an 
understanding of the nature of justice, the specific qualities of ICL and the 
design of the ICC, they would have been keen to witness its capabilities, their 
eagerness perhaps sharpened by the urgency and importance of the task. 
 
In this chapter, before the transition from theory to practice, there is a parallel 
opportunity to appraise the project and its suitability, so that its performance 
may be better understood.  Others have also applied themselves to this task, 
and anticipated the deployment of ICL into the new, volatile environments of the 
Court’s interventions. 
 
Some dilemmas and tensions that the ICC faces are rooted in more 
particular moral values and objectives.  First, the Court is premised on 
legalism, the idea that problems in the political domain should be settled 
on the basis of ‘impartial judgement, according to rules,’ as Judith 
Shklar writes (1964).  Legalism is undoubtedly appropriate for criminal 
justice problems.  However, the ICC operates in a very different political 
and institutional context from criminal justice systems within states.  
(Shklar 1964; Franceschet 2012b: 55)   
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Having analysed the nature of justice and its relationship to ICL, this study now 
turns to an appraisal of the ICC, to identify how this new institution might be 
anticipated to perform in practice. 
 
3.0.1 Volatile environments 
 
The Court’s remit to address the most serious violations of human rights means 
that it will most often intervene in environments where atrocities have taken 
place—contexts that are more likely to be loaded with political and moral 
complexity.  These may include states affected by war or insurgency, and 
regions experiencing political turmoil, economic collapse, environmental 
disaster or humanitarian crisis.  While facing such challenges, these areas may 
be subject to a plethora of local, national or international interactions and 
dynamics that work across multiple domains.  These are the volatile contexts 
into which international criminal justice is to be extended through the 
engagement of the ICC. 
 
Such regions may present significant practical challenges for the Court, 
especially in relation to effecting arrest, where some or all parties may have 
their authority contested and their legitimacy questioned, often with good 
reason.  Engagement in such complex circumstances may not always be 
straightforward, and actions in one domain may have far-reaching 
consequences in others.  The strict application of the law applied in these 
contexts may sometimes be compatible with political, humanitarian, security or 
other justice initiatives, but this will not always be the case.  Nouwen and 
Werner for example have argued that the ICC’s own political dimensions should 
be acknowledged (Nouwen and Werner 2010).  The following sections in this 
chapter analyse the nature of some theoretical and practical complications that 
arise.  
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3.1 Theoretical challenges 
3.1.1 Moral imperative as a foundation for action 
 
A significant driver behind the move towards the extension of international 
criminal justice has been the principled requirement to act against those most 
responsible for committing mass crimes.  The enormity of human suffering 
instigated by perpetrators of international crimes has given impetus to this 
notion, and this view has been prominently articulated in relation to the 
Nuremberg Trials and again in the Preamble to the Rome Statute:  ‘[…] 
unpunished criminal offences on a massive scale are an affront not just to 
individual victims but to the moral integrity of the larger world society.’ 
(Franceschet 2012b: 55).  The felt need to secure legal justice has been a 
powerful motivator and continues to engender support for the cause (Crane 
2005; ICC 2010b; HRW 2011b). 
 
Clark alludes to this, and takes the discussion a step further, when he states in 
relation to the ICTR: 
 
The fundamental questions of post-conflict institutions—whether, and 
why, it is necessary to punish perpetrators of mass crimes (and the 
connected question, whether amnesty rather than punishment may 
ultimately better facilitate peace, reconciliation, truth or some other 
goal)—suggest the centrality of questions of justice in this context[…]  
Post-conflict legal institutions, such as the ICTR, are trapped 
uncomfortably between backward- and forward-looking pursuits, 
punishing perpetrators of past crimes while claiming—though usually 
failing to articulate precisely how—punishment will contribute to 
reconstruction or reconciliation.  (Clark 2008b)   
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Thus the impetus for an international criminal trial rests significantly on 
‘backward-looking’ concerns about the just nature of proportionate retributive 
punishment.  This conviction may be so deeply held that the requirement for 
additional ‘forward looking’ consequentialist justification, and an evidence base 
upon which such a view might rest, may seem extraneous.  However, as 
discussed in Chapter 1 and indicated by Clark, such a perspective also 
contributes to the rationale for ICL.  By their nature, claims for legal process 
concern anticipated future benefit to wider society, and the maintenance and 
extension of normative standards.  They go beyond case-specific 
circumstances to embrace a universalist view with presumed consequentialist 
benefits.  The expectation is that ICL will be appropriate and effective, and that 
through its global application and an end to impunity, broader justice benefits 
will accrue. 
 
Now that there is a growing body of evidence from international criminal law 
cases and contexts, champions and detractors of the extension of ICL should 
welcome the opportunity for independent scrutiny of the Court’s impacts.  
Mechanisms by which the ICC might be effective, or more effective than other 
approaches, can now be assessed through its results.  Given the high stakes 
associated with interventions in these environments, and the potentially grave 
consequences of ill-judged actions, there is an urgency to this task.  With 
ramifications well beyond the legal realm, the Court will necessarily find itself 
exposed to scrutiny from many perspectives.  These will include those with 
differing concepts of justice and its moral foundations; advocates for less 
principled, more evidence-led approaches targeted on the broad consequences 
of intervention beyond the legal domain; and proponents of methods led more 
by consideration of context or outcome than by the desire for a more 
deontological approach.  The foundation of the Court’s case for intervention 
rests upon the notion that above all these situational complexities, there is a 
universal imperative for the Court’s engagement, upon which the ‘moral integrity 
of the larger world society’ depends.   
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3.1.2 The overarching role of ICL as a binding framework 
 
The Court is not only committed to addressing the past in retributive mode, but 
also to moulding ongoing interventions around the priorities of individual 
criminal case law.  As the Prosecutor has explained:  
 
With the entry into force of the Rome Statute, a new legal framework 
has emerged and this framework necessarily impacts on conflict 
management efforts […]  Any political or security initiative must be 
compatible with the new legal framework insofar as it involves parties 
bound by the Rome Statute. (Ocampo 2007b: 4)  
 
On the then-Prosecutor’s view, this framework extends to all political and 
security interventions in these contexts by signatory states, and by the 
international community including the UN and its various organs.  As discussed, 
wherever possible the enormity of the crimes considered by the Court warrant 
their being addressed through legal process; however, international criminal 
justice interventions are not designed to resolve the situations in which such 
crimes take place (ibid).  The former Prosecutor’s view seemed initially to 
support a coordinated approach with other agencies and a consequentialist 
perspective with regard to managing multiple interventions in conflict contexts 
(Ocampo 2003).  However, this has not been sustained, as Rodman has 
observed (Ocampo 2007b; Rodman 2012: 59).  Despite its broad ambition to 
contribute to the global furtherance of human rights, the Court can only engage 
the legal aspect of a situation.  With its ability to impose its own paradigm over 
other parties, the ICC has a new overarching role.  Henceforth its criminal 
justice mandate sets limits for all manner of international action in conflict 
contexts.  The operation of an institution with a focused legal perspective but 
much broader powers creating the possibility of significant impact beyond its 
area of concern and expertise, has the potential for unintended consequences.  
This merits critical interrogation (Mamdani 2010).   
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One aspect of the new legally framed international approach is the prohibition of 
peace deals that would offer amnesty for perpetrators of international crimes in 
return for an end to hostilities, demobilisation, or other co-operation (Hayner 
2009).  This is a decisive departure from practice that preceded the ICC’s 
creation.  As we have seen in Chapter 1, the UK government for example, now 
a strong proponent of ICL and a signatory state of the Rome Statute, resolved 
its own violent internal conflict through the Good Friday Agreement (1998).  This 
provided for the release from prison of convicted paramilitary prisoners on both 
sides.  Impunity for the few was part of the solution that delivered peace and 
security to the many.  South Africa has also ratified the Rome Statute, yet its 
own Truth and Reconciliation Commission, offered immunity from prosecution in 
return for testimony (Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report of South 
Africa 1999).  Such a process would no longer be legal in the case of 
international crimes (or arguably workable in the context of an ICC intervention).  
Where international arrest warrants are issued instead, such solutions are no 
longer legal; signatory states are obliged to implement arrest by those means at 
their disposal (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: Articles 
86-99; Cassese 2008: 349-351).  The issuance of an ICC warrants thus 
precludes significant other options for conflict resolution, prioritising the arrest of 
suspects whatever else may accompany it (the limited options for removing 
warrants are discussed in 2.2.3). 
 
Secondly, other activities by the international community are constrained.  Once 
warrants are issued, enforcement efforts to achieve arrest must be prioritised by 
the international community wherever they conflict with other activities.  This is 
the case whatever the likely impact, for example upon efforts to enhance human 
rights, security, or good governance  (Ocampo 2006a: 3; Hayner 2009).  This 
may have widespread consequences relating to multiple types of engagement.  
Efforts to build trust, for example with warring factions, possibly including those 
for whom warrants have been issued, those who fear arrest, or those 
associated with them, may be affected.  Agencies carrying out work for 
humanitarian aid, justice in its broader senses, or economic and social 
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development, may find their efforts impaired.  This would be particularly the 
case if they are perceived to be under the influence of signatory state actors, 
UN agencies, or other international bodies legally bound to assist the ICC.  
Trust in, and relations with, any party that suspects believe could be under the 
Court’s influence will be affected.  The terrain for all justice and human rights 
interventions, and much more besides, is profoundly altered (Ocampo 2007a: 4; 
HRW 2009b). 
 
The ICC thus raises the stakes and narrows the considerations.  Once warrants 
are issued, the legal commitments of engaged states and international agencies 
determine that henceforth they become committed to retributive justice 
enforcement measures, whatever their previous role. 
 
3.1.3 The normative framework and its implications 
 
This study has so far argued that the engagement of the Court is to a significant 
extent founded upon an expressed moral imperative, and provides an 
overarching, binding framework within which other interventions must 
henceforth take place.  Peace deals can no longer provide impunity, and 
international engagement must be framed by the requirements of international 
criminal law enforcement.  The possibility that the ICC’s legal approach to a 
case may have consequences aside from the case itself, and that these effects 
may be outside the remit of the Court and beyond the legal domain, has been 
acknowledged. 
3.1.3a A normative process 
The Court also brings normative means as well as ends.  Investigation, 
issuance of warrants, arrest, trial and retributive punishment are prescribed.  
Only limited variations in this process are permitted, at the discretion of the 
Prosecutor (Ocampo 2006b: 5).  It is anticipated that this particular approach to 
ending impunity is almost as universally relevant as the desirability of ending 
impunity itself.   
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It may be argued that this rather linear strategy is likely to be more effective in 
some circumstances than in others.  If independent analysis identifies 
circumstances where retributive justice processes are likely to promote the 
restoration of peace, security and justice more broadly, that may strengthen the 
case of the ICC’s normative project.  Analysis that indicates that such 
processes are unlikely to be effective, for example where retributive justice 
efforts have already stoked violence, will raise difficult issues.  At stake may be 
the immediate interests of communities affected, or the longer-term prospects 
for security and good governance.  A third possibility is that the Court’s 
interventionist mandate may adversely impact the strategic interests of a 
powerful state.  ICC interventions may be particularly controversial in contexts 
of extreme and widespread violence.  In any event, the normative process of 
the application of ICC warrants is intended to be universally appropriate. 
3.1.3b A shift from consequentialism 
This discussion underlines the key issue of consequences, introduced in section 
1.2.2.  In addition to its universal remit, ICC engagement also signals a 
departure from consequentialist considerations.  In relation to domestic cases, 
the application of legal process with the prioritisation of deontological process 
that that entails, is familiar.  Notwithstanding the ameliorative influences that 
jury trials, non-mandatory sentencing tariffs, or pleas of mitigation may offer in 
terms of allowing some flexibility to take circumstances and consequences into 
account within the criminal justice system, the introduction of the Court that 
projects ICL into new contexts represents a markedly stronger emphasis upon 
deontological ideas of justice.  In volatile environments, particularly those where 
the outcomes of action or inaction may be extreme, the motivation for 
international interventions has often related to political interests, ideological 
conviction or (most commonly in relation to justice) consequentialist concerns 
for the outcome.  Those seeking to advance justice have, at least in theory, 
considered the likely consequences of their interventions, and engaged with 
others to inform their activities through an understanding of local context.  Often 
agencies have, as a minimum, aspired to adapt their programmes for different 
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contexts to achieve particular results.  This move towards greater contextual 
understanding and more locally informed programming has been a central part 
of the development and humanitarian intervention discourses for some decades 
(Chambers 1983; Chambers 1997; Anderson 1999; Evans 2009; Schiff 2012). 
 
Now under the aegis of ICC warrants, such actors can still carry out these 
functions but only so far as they fall within the paradigm of the imposition of 
international criminal justice.  ICC actions against individual perpetrators set 
parameters for other activities, shape the context, and mark a significant shift to 
deontological engagement.  Now, significantly, the framework within which all 
must now work is not context-specific but normative.  It is applied not in a 
manner based on its likely consequences, but upon the application of 
dispassionate legal considerations, grounded in statute and the impartial 
application of its process.  Long-term considerations of the consequence of its 
activities fall beyond the case-specific circumstances and the Prosecutorial 
remit.  For these reasons the intervention of the Court is likely to provoke some 
debate, and while it may not within its own processes analyse the 
consequences of its warrants, it is desirable and even essential that others 
should do so. 
3.1.3c A depoliticised focus on criminal acts over systemic justice issues 
The Court’s anticipated engagement in conflict scenarios and in unstable 
regions also carries with it the imperative to address identifiable acts defined as 
crimes as a priority over structural issues, setting limits within which the latter 
may be tackled.  The Prosecutor is not empowered to consider systemic 
injustice as such, except when it can be shown to constitute the gravest 
international crimes, and even then only when individual(s) might be held to 
account (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: Article 25).  
The occurrence of political and economic marginalisation and multiple other 
forms of denial of human rights are less likely to come to the attention of the 
Court than conspicuous events such as atrocities, yet these structural issues 
may be significant contributors or fundamental to the dynamics for conflict.  
Tried by the SCSL,  the case of Charles Taylor is pertinent in this regard.  His 
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undoubted crimes were committed in a political context, and the frame that was 
brought through his arrest to resolve those issues was a narrow one (Harris and 
Lappin 2015).  More generally, the Court’s framing of an overarching paradigm 
for international interventions in volatile scenarios shifts the international focus 
away from systemic concerns by focusing on the culpability of individuals.  This 
focus springs from the ICC’s criminal justice remit and the gravity of the crimes 
with which it is concerned, whether or not they are relevant to resolving the 
underlying conflict dynamic.  As Nouwen and Werner observe, such a shift in 
approach has considerable political implications, which are only strengthened 
by claims of legalism’s political neutrality (2010).8  It follows from this that, 
implicit in the Court’s focus on the crimes of individuals and an overarching 
remit that curbs other justice approaches, is an assumption that situations of 
injustice will be addressed through action against individuals; that trials will 
impact positively upon society, and not just the individual concerned.  The 
Court’s early cases provide an opportunity to test this assumption. 
 
Equally, the ways in which institutions confront injustice are likely to affect the 
ways in which they define it.  Measures that culminate in the arrest, trial and 
conviction of a perpetrator of international crimes may be seen to have brought 
justice, particularly by those with a professional focus on legal issues.  In the 
same context, from the perspective of campaigners against inequality for 
example, in relation to access to healthcare or education, and political or 
economic rights, injustice may still prevail.  The Court is of course not mandated 
to consider these other justice issues, so they fall outside not only its remit but 
also its notice.  The specificity of the Court’s criminal justice approach means 
that its furtherance may obscure broader justice issues, or even be pursued at 
their expense.  While the framework imposed by ICC engagement may affect 
those working on any aspect of justice, the justice remit possessed by the Court 
                                            
8 The focus on individual crimes over systemic issues is a political act in itself.  As 
Anatole France observed in 1894  ‘The law in its majestic equality forbids rich and poor 
alike to sleep under bridges, beg in the streets and steal loaves of bread’  France, A. 
(1894) Le lys rouge.  (2015) Paris: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.  
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is specifically legal.  For this reason the ICC should not be seen as delivering 
justice, but rather applying ICL. 
3.1.3d Defining the ‘interests of justice’ 
If the ICC delivers justice only or largely in terms of ICL, then the Prosecutor’s 
responsibility to consider justice more broadly might well place him in a difficult 
position.  The ‘interests of justice’ are referred to a number of times in the 
Statute and related documents.  As explained in section 2.2.3, according to 
Article 53, the Prosecutor must determine whether or not an investigation would 
be ‘in the interests of justice’.  Should the Prosecutor not wish to proceed with 
an investigation, the Pre-trial Chamber must also determine whether this 
withdrawal would be ‘in the interests of justice’ (ICC 2002; Ocampo 2007b; 
Schabas 2011: 254-255). 
 
However, the ‘interests of justice’ have not been defined in the Statute or Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence.  It was initially unclear whether ‘justice’ in this 
context meant a broad understanding relating to the ‘peace, security and 
wellbeing of the world’ or a narrower legal definition.  It may be that the drafters 
of the Statute assumed the two issues to be intimately associated.  It may even 
be that they also considered the interests of the Court itself to be closely 
associated with both interpretations.  Could a determination that might cause 
damage to the Court, for example the decision to withdraw an arrest warrant, be 
in the interests of (international criminal) justice?  Clearly in the context of the 
civil enforcement of just laws there may be a close relationship between justice 
and the application of criminal law; in volatile environments where pursuit of 
criminal justice enforcement may itself be violent, and could profoundly affect 
the course of a conflict or of international approaches to dealing with violence 
on a regional level, the relationship between legal enforcement and other 
aspects of justice is more complex.  In such a circumstance it becomes 
important to distinguish whether the Court operates in the interest of justice in a 
broad or narrow legal sense.    
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Guided by the Statute, Prosecutors have struggled with this issue.  In the 
Prosecutorial Strategy 2006 the former Prosecutor states ‘The Office has the 
obligation to assess the interests of victims as part of its determination of the 
interests of justice under Article 53 and Rule 48’ (Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 1998; ICC 2002; Ocampo 2006b: 8).  At a first 
reading this is reassuring—victims’ interests will be taken into account.  Yet the 
realities of the new contexts for ICL must be considered.  For example, if all the 
children of a community were abducted, the whole community would doubtless 
consider itself a victim of such a crime.  And if such practices were widespread 
they would constitute an international crime.  The Court is intended to address 
mass crimes such as this.  Yet neither the Statute nor the Prosecutors 
addresses the reality that whole communities may be the victims of international 
crimes.  The same paper states:  
 
The concept of the interests of justice established in the Statute, while 
necessarily broader than criminal justice in a narrow sense, must be 
interpreted in accordance with the objects and purposes of the Statute.  
Hence, it should not be conceived of so broadly as to embrace all 
issues related to peace and security […] a decision not to proceed on 
the basis of the interests of justice should be understood as a course of 
last resort. (Ocampo 2006b: 6) 
 
This passage is less reassuring.  The interests of victims can clearly not be 
upheld while matters relating to their security are subordinated to larger 
concerns.  Later, there was an attempt to clarify this issue, however it further 
emphasised the narrow approach to considerations of justice and victimhood: 
 
It would be exceptional for a Prosecutor to decide that an investigation 
is not in the interest of justice, and the victims.  The ‘interests of justice’ 
must of course not be confused with the interests of peace and security, 
which falls within the mandate of other institutions, such as the UN 
Security Council. (Ocampo 2010a: 6)   
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Security considerations are thus the concern of other institutions, while the 
Court will prioritise its justice process.  How the interests of victims (whether 
they are individuals or communities) may be prioritised, while their security is 
not, is an open question.  The second Chief Prosecutor revisited the issue:  
 
The Prosecutor is not required to establish that an investigation serves 
the interests of justice.  Rather, the Office will proceed unless there are 
specific circumstances which provide substantial reasons to believe that 
the interests of justice are not served by an investigation at that time 
[…]  
the concept of the interests of justice should not be perceived to 
embrace all issues relating to peace and security.  In particular, the 
interests of justice provision should not be considered a conflict 
management tool […] 
there is a strong presumption that investigations and prosecutions will 
be in the interests of justice, and therefore a decision not to proceed on 
the grounds of the interests of justice would be highly exceptional. (ICC 
2013d: 16-17) 
 
This statement is more decisive, and still less reassuring for advocates of 
human rights of victim communities.  The first point rolls back the ‘do no harm’ 
agenda, by indicating that international intervention in the form of ICC warrants 
will be assumed to be a good thing, and placing the onus on others to establish 
that it is not (Anderson 1999).  The second confirms that an intervention might 
be deemed in the interest of justice, even if it negatively affects conflict 
management efforts, likely to be associated with the security of a community.  
Others, such as the UNSC, may consider the security issue, but they are not in 
any event empowered to interfere with the Court’s judicial process to prevent it 
from intervening (Vinjamuri 2010).  The last shows circularity—because of the 
strong presumption in favour of prosecution, prosecutions will normally proceed.  
Despite this, it is consistent with previous statements: a narrow interpretation of 
justice will be used in determining the 
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Court’s actions—one that sets aside considerations of peace and security.  This 
position rests alongside an assumption that this will be in the interest of victims, 
even though issues of their security are not considered.  This is the strategy 
designed for contexts where mass atrocities have already been committed, 
which are the Court’s focus.  Though it is not properly discussed by the Statute 
or the Prosecutor, there continues to be an apparent perception that 
international crimes will have only isolated and individual victims.  There is, in 
other words, a strong emphasis on enforcing criminal law based on a 
presumption that it will be broadly beneficent, regardless of circumstances. 
 
Elsewhere it is claimed that the interests of peace and justice are intimately 
related, and that the Court serves the interests of peace by prioritising the 
interests of (international criminal) justice.  These goals are not necessarily 
incompatible, but they do rest upon a central assumption: the Prosecutor need 
not allow broader considerations of peace and security to impede prosecutorial 
process, because consideration of peace and security will be advanced through 
the singular pursuit of international criminal justice.  This supposition is now 
being tested in the violent contexts of ICC engagement (Ocampo 2007b: 8; 
Roth 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010). 
 
If the interests of justice are rather narrowly drawn, so are the identification and 
interests of the victims.  A prosecutorial strategy document identifies the 
‘interest of victims’ as one of its four fundamental principles.  This consideration 
is meant to commence before an investigation is launched, so in this respect it 
could in theory lead to the ICC staying its hand in particular cases.  However, 
the provision rests only upon Articles 15 and 53 of the Statute (where the 
interest of victims appear to be congruent with prosecution), as an aspect of the 
interests of justice.  As justice is narrowly defined to exclude the security of 
communities, and the Statute surprisingly appears to anticipate victims as if 
they were isolated individuals (as for a municipal court), such consideration 
seems very unlikely to impede the prosecutorial process (Ocampo 2010b: 6-7).  
The likelihood that ‘victims’ of these enormous crimes are not isolated, but are 
whole communities, is not made explicit nor even identified.  This failure of the 
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Statute, interpreted by prosecutors with a legalist perspective, leaves their 
security beyond the Court’s remit to consider. 
 
3.1.4 The retributivist approach in volatile environments 
 
The essentially retributive approach of criminal justice and its function as a 
deterrent that marginalises perpetrators has already been outlined.  This aspect 
of the Court’s approach remains central when ICL is applied to volatile 
environments.  The routine that prevails in peace time, to issue warrants and 
bring to trial law breakers, is anticipated to equip this new organisation to deliver 
justice even in the most challenging situations. 
 
It has already been explained that the application of retributive justice in these 
contexts has the potential for unintended consequences beyond the legal 
domain.  Some will present themselves for trial voluntarily, as was the case with 
Abu Garda, who was a suspect during the ICC’s investigation of crimes in  
Darfur and whose case is now closed (ICC 2012).  Many other alleged 
perpetrators may not, and so the retributive justice approach is likely to require 
enforcement.  In the contexts with which this study is concerned, warrants may 
be implemented by civil police forces, but more often this task is likely to fall to 
security services or the military.  And just as the focus upon the legal domain of 
justice may yield wider consequences, so too may its enforcement, particularly 
as the practical implications are outside the Court’s remit to consider (and 
means to control).  Warrants may intentionally or inadvertently legitimise military 
action including the preparation for and execution of military operations.  The 
ICC’s 2011 warrant for Colonel Gaddafi played a part in legitimising the NATO 
intervention in Libya—the humanitarian aftermath of which has been grave and 
complex (Harding et al. 2011; Fraihat 2016; Reardon 2016).  In such 
circumstances, failure to effect arrest (or death) of a suspect may lead to 
ongoing military operations.  The promotion of international criminal justice by 
military means may of course be well associated with the aims of states or 
political forces caught up in such violence; but whether they are or not, the 
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Court in these circumstances will have entered the dynamic of the war 
(Vinjamuri 2010; Rodman 2012; Rodman and Booth 2013).  
 
The concern that justice as a whole may be conflated with criminal justice has 
another aspect.  ‘Securitisation’ is the concept that extraordinary measures are 
legitimised when an actor moves an issue from the political to the security realm 
(Duffield 2001).  Something similar is risked when the enforcement of 
international criminal justice is demanded, in contexts in which that process is 
unavoidably military (ICC 2010a; Roth 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010).  In 2007 
the former Prosecutor was speaking to a significant degree about the LRA and 
the military process to apprehend its leadership when he said: 
 
The challenges are immense for political leaders. In this new system, 
global standards have been established without a global police or 
enforcement apparatus; enforcement of the Court’s decisions is the 
responsibility of national states […] 
It is the lack of enforcement of the Court’s decisions which is the real 
threat to enduring Peace. Allowed to remain at large, the criminals 
exposed are continuing to threaten the victims, those who took 
tremendous risks to tell their stories; allowed to remain at large, the 
criminals ask for immunity under one form or another as a condition to 
stopping the violence. They threaten to attack more victims. I call this 
extortion, I call it blackmail. We cannot yield.  Ladies and Gentlemen, 
the decisions taken in Rome must be respected.  Because it is the law. 
(Ocampo 2007a)  
 
Here ICL is depicted as a security issue, the failure of enforcement of which 
threatens enduring peace and allows criminals to continue to threaten violence.  
The matter becomes more important if justice in its wider sense is conflated with 
the narrow attainment of international criminal justice for one or more alleged 
perpetrators; as if criminality were identified as the greatest, or indeed the only, 
source of injustice.  The following section identifies an example of this 
phenomenon.   
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3.1.5 Peace vs. justice 
 
Ocampo’s 2007 paper addressing the relationship of ICL to peace was entitled 
‘Building a future on Peace and Justice’ (ibid).  In selecting his title he was of 
course alluding to compromises used in the past to deliver peace, while 
granting amnesty to perpetrators (McDonald 2014).  Given the foregoing 
discussion it is clear that aspects of justice may reside on either side of this 
question; some elements of justice may be delivered through strategies that 
emphasise peace deals while others will be emphasised through approaches 
that prioritise ICL.  Where societies are attempting the difficult transition from 
war to peace, measures that focus on one aspect of justice alone may affect 
other justice-promoting interventions.  As neither approach encompasses 
justice as a whole it would be more accurate then to characterise each by the 
focus of its emphasis, ‘peace vs. criminal justice’, or more accurately, ‘peace vs. 
criminal justice for the perpetrators of international crimes for whom ICC 
warrants have been issued’. 
 
As advocates for the Court will rightly point out, in a regional war the 
beneficiaries of peace may be disproportionately identifiable in time and place 
(here and now); the beneficiaries of incremental advancement of international 
criminal justice through enforcement may be disproportionately remote and in 
the future.  These difficult choices have been discussed by Rodman, who 
observes the position of Richard Goldstone (former Chief Prosecutor of the 
ICTR): ‘If you have a system of international justice, you’ve got to follow through 
on it.  If, in some cases, that’s going to make peace negotiations difficult, that 
may be the price that has to be paid.’ (McGreal 2007; McGreal 2008; Rodman 
2012: 62-64).  Some will be troubled by the stark nature of this observation, but 
it reflects an intellectual honesty concerning the implications of the Statute.  The 
ICC, on the basis of the Rome Statute and its interpretation, clearly prioritises 
the enforcement of retributive justice to address impunity of certain suspects 
over considerations of peace and security for communities.  
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It is fair to observe that peace for amnesty deals may deliver a peace 
agreement but no peace, or a negative peace in which injustice is sustained as 
the price of obtaining a cessation in violent conflict (Galtung 1996).  Such 
distinctions are not trivial: insistence upon ending impunity for one perpetrator 
may prolong a war and risk further atrocities by any party; impunity for 
international crimes may perpetuate a climate in which atrocities may be 
committed without regard to consequences and in which the most notorious 
perpetrators go free, apparently rewarded for their behaviour (Robertson 2006).  
In a consequentialist frame, each strategy may deliver just or unjust outcomes, 
and it is incorrect to associate broad justice goals exclusively with either 
approach. 
 
The calls for justice to be attained through military intervention that have been 
noted earlier are a clear example of the transfer of the concept of justice into the 
security domain (Buzan et al. 1998, Duffield 2001).   This process is associated 
with the tolerance of practices that would not normally be acceptable, and such 
assertions may be tested using case study material. 
 
Finally, ambiguity may be observed at the highest levels with regard to 
statements concerning peace and justice.  As the UN Secretary General stated, 
‘Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather 
mutually reinforcing imperatives.  Advancing all three in fragile post-conflict 
settings requires strategic planning, careful integration and sensible sequencing 
of activities.  Approaches focusing only on one or another institution, or ignoring 
civil society or victims, will not be effective’ (Annan 2004).  This statement may 
be intended to endorse ICC engagement, through noting the mutually 
reinforcing agendas and thus echoing prosecutorial claims for the advancement 
of peace through international criminal law enforcement.  However, by 
emphasising the need for integrated approaches, sequencing, and the role of 
civil society, this account rests uneasily alongside the deontological imperatives 
set out in the Statute.   
   
110 
 
In his paper, the former Prosecutor contends that peace and international 
criminal law reside on the same side of the justice equation, essentially because 
peace with impunity is no longer permissible by law (Ocampo 2007a).  For an 
international criminal lawyer who perceives justice as achieved through due 
legal process, ‘justice’ is not present if impunity is sustained.  According to this 
view, peace attained by granting immunity to perpetrators of mass crimes is not 
a sustainable just peace or a legitimate means to a worthwhile goal.  Thus, by 
asserting that these elements lie together he is in fact asserting the overarching 
paradigm of ICL—that where necessary peace should not prevail until 
international criminal justice is done.  In doing so, ICL prosecutors of this 
disposition are far from alone (AI 2002b; AI 2008; HRW 2009b; HRW 2010a; 
Benner and Prendergast 2011; Invisible Children 2013).  
 
Others hold the view that justice and peace may broadly lie together, but for the 
opposite reason.  Proponents of justice in its wider sense may view retributive 
justice for a handful of individuals as only one element of justice; they may see 
the cessation of military action by both sides as presenting a better opportunity 
for the advancement of peace.  They may view non-military means as more 
effective or appropriate for the advancement of a just society, whether these be 
formal or structural societal mechanisms as proposed by liberal interventionists, 
or national (including legal) or local justice for other societal processes.  For 
those individuals also, justice may reside on the same side as peace (Rodman 
2006; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2007; Branch 2010b; Branch 2010c; Vinjamuri 
2010; Rodman 2012).  
 
Each side of this debate then makes the same claim—that justice and peace 
are—or at least can and should be—significantly aligned.  However, they differ 
on what justice is (whether primarily the application of international criminal law, 
or a much broader concept), to whom it primarily applies (perpetrators and 
individuals as victims of international crimes, or communities and societies in an 
affected region), and how it may be achieved (whether through enforcement, or 
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other means).  There are thus considerable problems with the conceptualisation 
of a peace vs. justice dichotomy. 
 
3.1.6 Issues of legitimacy 
 
The preceding discussion has established that where the ICC intervenes to 
address international crimes in volatile contexts, the overarching paradigm 
imposed has significant implications regarding which aspects of justice are 
prioritised and how they may be sought, and profound ramifications for how 
these violent contexts may or may not now be approached by the international 
community.  It is possible that international criminal justice efforts may on 
occasion harmonize with local measures and that they complement one 
another.  They may operate alongside each other without detrimental effect, but 
this will not always be the case.  Given that context has such a bearing on 
determining outcomes in relation to justice, especially in volatile environments, 
and understanding both the particularity and uniformity of the international 
criminal justice approach, there will be instances where local and international 
measures to promote justice are not the same; where they interfere with each 
other in negative ways, or even where they are incompatible.   
 
The power of the Chief Prosecutor (and other bodies of the Court) to determine 
where and when ICC interventions take place is extensive, and has been noted 
in Chapter 2.  Aside from the options for referral by States Parties and the UN 
Security Council, and the exceptional possibility of UN Security Council deferral 
of investigation, it is the Prosecutor who directs the focus of the Court.  The 
basis for these decisions is outlined in the Statute, and rests upon the Court’s 
jurisdiction and consideration of the gravity of the crimes, subject to 
consideration of the ‘interests of justice’—an apparently well-crafted ambiguity. 
 
The Court and its officers can claim legitimacy for their actions at a number of 
levels.  Calls for its intervention by communities and their leaders affected by 
international crimes, and by the victims of atrocities and their families, may lend 
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local legitimacy.  National governments, particularly those with a democratic 
mandate or other claims to legitimacy themselves, can add to the case for the 
validity of ICC engagement.  States that have themselves ratified the Rome 
Statute may be seen to contribute their own authority in this regard, and they 
may further enhance the Court’s mandate in a particular context by referring 
that situation to the Court.  However, the foundation for the Court’s legitimacy 
lies in its Statute; the powers conferred by its endorsement by the States 
Parties, underpinned by the compelling vision of a world where the norms of 
international criminal justice prevail, and in which perpetrators of mass crimes 
may not escape punishment, whoever they are.  Struett expresses the 
universality of this legalist ambition as follows: 
 
The legitimacy of Courts is a function of their claim to uphold universal 
rules of law that the community has chosen to adopt, regardless of 
whether doing so is popular or even prudent in a particular case with 
particular constituencies. (Struett 2012: 83) 
 
By way of clarification, the community reference is not to the affected population 
but the international community conferring legitimacy upon the Court’s actions.  
The belief that the local community itself should decide its own justice 
processes has been referred to previously in section 1.4.4, where the 
complexity and multifaceted nature of these choices was indicated.  The 
normative and overarching aspect of the ICC’s interventions, and the focused 
legal nature of the decision-making, marks a derogation of power and agency 
from affected communities, to the machinery of international criminal justice.  
This means that the interests of affected populations will no longer be the 
central concern of decision-makers (Branch 2004; Branch 2007b; Murithi and 
Ngari 2011).  International criminal justice is a global project driven forward by 
institutions with a global vision for justice, however much context-specific 
priorities will on occasion need to be balanced against broader considerations.  
This has been acknowledged by advocates for the Court who, in relation to the 
Uganda case, have indicated:   
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[…] the delivery of local justice may be to the interests of victimized 
communities, such a grassroots, victim-centred approach must be 
balanced against broader implications for Africa and the international 
community. The Acholi people of northern Uganda are clearly not the 
only constituencies of this situation before the ICC.  While every effort 
should be made to ensure local empowerment and a cessation of war, 
the effect of impunity in a situation already before the ICC would have 
far-reaching consequences elsewhere, especially in Africa. Even a 
superficial observer would recognize that an amnesty precedent for 
Joseph Kony would have catastrophic consequences for the ICC’s 
credibility in the Darfur situation where leaders such as President Bashir 
of Sudan are eager to find a pretext to escape liability. Although it may 
be desirable to take into account the concerns of local communities, the 
constituency of international criminal justice extends far beyond this 
local level. (Akhavan 2009: 646) 
 
This and similar observations may have significant ramifications.  The legal 
basis for the Court’s legitimacy means that it is in theory released from 
consequentialist considerations in relation to communities affected by conflict; 
and indeed, this is implicit in its Statute.  The observation that the interests of 
ICL and the Court may differ from those of war-affected communities in 
individual situations, and that the Court may then be bound by global rather 
than situational considerations, follows from its remit.  The fact that it is the 
Court itself to determine these matters, based on how the Prosecutor interprets 
the interests of justice, means that there is scope for significant unpalatable 
consequences for communities in volatile regions, as a result of decisions 
intended to further ICL on the global stage.  Richard Goldstone’s ‘price that has 
to be paid’ may be significant (McGreal 2007; 3.1.5).  This issue, in relation to 
the consequences for affected communities, and the benefits of the furtherance 
of international criminal justice, can be examined through analysis of ICC 
interventions going forward.  It is important that it is, given the gravity of the 
implications and the potential severity of the consequences (Krehoff 2011).   
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3.1.7 Theory of change 
 
Many international interventions designed to achieve specific goals are 
underpinned by a ‘theory of change’, that outlines the envisaged network of 
causal linkages between an intervention or sequence of interventions in a given 
context, their outcomes, and the intended eventual impact.  As has been 
argued: 
 
Improving the lives of disadvantaged populations - whether through 
better schools, after-school programs, or teen pregnancy prevention 
clinics - requires proven theories of change.  The very development of a 
field depends on their diffusion, replication, critique, and modification.  
Yet some organizations refuse to articulate a theory of change and 
some funders think it would be intrusive to demand that they do so. The 
interests of all concerned are served by a developmental approach to 
creating and evaluating theories of change.  (Brest 2010) 
 
Even if primarily seeking to apply deontological measures outside a 
consequentialist framework, it is important that interveners are able to identify 
the anticipated relationships between actions and their intended impact.  
 
Section 1.3.3 has already identified that the literature on how regions or states 
move towards stability and good governance does not identify external (and if 
necessary, militarised) enforcement of international criminal justice as the 
primary mode of engagement appropriate to volatile contexts.  Nor does it 
suggest that international intervention should be spearheaded by retributive 
justice priorities.  Rather, as has been shown, it suggests that processes that 
govern the transition from violence to just and stable societies are complex, 
sequenced, and multifaceted (Colletta et al. 1996; Paris 1997; Paris and Sisk 
2009; Putzel 2010).   
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Advocates for the ICC are clear about the Court’s purpose: it is investigation, 
issuance of warrants, arrest, trial and imprisonment of those responsible for 
international crimes.  They are also confident that the Court’s impact will be the 
extension of the rule of international criminal law, with concomitant 
consequences relating to human rights and wellbeing.  These beliefs were 
articulated in a similar form to the ICRC by Moynier in 1872, and Dunant before 
him (2.2.1).  Mechanisms through which these outcomes can be achieved are 
now established (2.4).  What has not been made clear, and would be required 
from a coherent theory of change, is how these mechanisms would deliver the 
desired change in the volatile environments in which the Court is expected to 
act. 
 
An examination of the Court’s strategy documents, made available on its web 
site, does not answer this question.  However, those pertaining to the Uganda 
warrants do articulate organisational goals relating to the efficient functioning of 
the Court as an institution.  They identify that the environments for operation are 
different to those of courts in the past, and that this presents particular risks 
relating to witness testimonies.  They show targets for implementation relative 
to the Court’s processes, such as numbers of investigations, arrests, 
convictions and so on.  The former Prosecutor also indicated that he would 
focus investigations upon those who bear the greatest responsibility for the 
most serious crimes (Ocampo 2003; Assembly of States Parties to the Rome 
Statute - ASP 2006; Ocampo 2006b; Ocampo 2007b; Ocampo 2010b).  In 
relation to the situations of its interventions, the Court’s goals concern its own 
legal processes, but do not correspond to an articulated theory of change. 
 
3.2 Practical challenges 
 
The preceding section outlined potential issues for the Court stemming from its 
Statute and its application.  The Prosecutor’s task is no less challenging when 
considered with respect to the situations in which the OTP is expected to 
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intervene.  Notwithstanding the normative progress it represents, even at 
Nuremberg the principles of a fair trial were applied to some extent selectively 
as noted earlier, in accordance with the interests of the victorious parties.  
Where appropriate the ICC, by contrast, is anticipated to intervene in active 
conflicts, and in a manner that is perceived to be impartial and in accordance 
with its criminal justice mandate.  This throws up potentially difficult issues that 
merit careful discussion.  The following section outlines practical challenges to 
the work of the Court arising from the circumstances of its interventions, its 
operations and enforcement. 
 
3.2.1 Opportunities for intervention 
 
The ICC’s jurisdictional limits mean that its opportunities for intervention are 
necessarily restricted.  The nature of the crimes included in its Statute suggest 
that they will often be perpetrated in the most unstable regions, where 
processes of law enforcement and governance generally are weakest.  
Furthermore, the required focus on interventions in signatory states unwilling or 
unable to bring perpetrators to justice may necessitate a very clear 
understanding of, and ability to work within, the practical constraints.  Already 
then the Prosecutor’s options for intervention are limited.  In reality though, and 
in relation to its interventions on the ground alone, the Court also operates 
under further and often un-stated constraints.  It must choose to act where there 
is a reasonable prospect of successful investigation, arrest, trial and conviction.  
Numerous unexecuted arrest warrants with little prospect of successful 
enactment could undermine the Court’s credibility.  In reality these challenging 
environments may demand that the Court secures military collaboration from 
states willing and able to assist.  Additionally, in selecting its interventions the 
ICC must not alienate others, and must sustain a political environment for itself 
that will enable it to continue to secure political, military and financial support.  
This is a severe challenge when considered alongside the requirement placed 
upon it to conduct itself in a neutral fashion and through its legal function 
enhance its own legitimacy, apparently un-influenced by political considerations 
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(Struett 2012).  The Prosecutor is therefore likely to face significant practical 
and political challenges defending his selection of interventions and the identity 
of warrant recipients on legal grounds alone.  All arrest warrants so far have 
been issued against Africans and in relation to African conflicts.  Situations such 
as Afghanistan, Iraq/UK, Israel/Palestine and Georgia are under examination or 
investigation, but none have yet led to Court intervention (ICC 2016). 
 
3.2.2 Complications relating to military enforcement 
 
Other significant complications attend the enforcement of arrest warrants.  As 
previously noted, the ICC itself has no police force.  The Rome Statute 
anticipates that in some circumstances suspects may present themselves for 
trial, as in the case of Abu Garda (ICC 2012), or be arrested by civil police in 
accordance with due legal process as in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba, former 
DRC vice-president, who was arrested by the Belgian authorities (ICC 2014).  
Of course the Court’s mandate extends beyond democratic states, and includes 
territories where security services may not be properly regulated and 
accountable.  Thomas Lubanga was apprehended in Kinshasa, for example, 
where the security services have a questionable human rights record (ICC 
2015c).  Nevertheless, in relation to the enormity of the crimes that ICC 
suspects stand accused of, and notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, 
it seems likely that in most circumstances the achievement of civil arrest would 
often be overwhelmingly beneficial both in relation to the individual case and the 
broader context of human rights observance and accountability.   
 
In other cases, the situation presents greater challenges.  It has already been 
observed that as a permanent Court the ICC will issue arrest warrants into 
active conflicts and regions, where civil police are unable to operate, and where 
atrocities may well be taking place, often by various parties, above and below 
the ICC’s ‘gravity’ threshold.  In such cases, arrest by military means may be 
the only option.  In these circumstances the ICC lacks control over how others 
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act upon its warrants, and the legitimacy lent to aspiring enforcers may have 
unintended consequences.  
 
Reflecting Articles 86 to 93 of the Statute, and as stated on the ICC’s web site, 
‘States Parties to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation to cooperate fully 
with the ICC.  When a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate, 
the Court may refer the matter for further action to the Assembly of States 
Parties’ (Article 87).  There is no provision for the Prosecutor to decline the 
assistance of states with records of abuse.  It may be that warrants could help 
to curb their worst infringements, but this is speculation and the lawful 
behaviour of enforcers cannot be assumed. 
 
As it stands, signatories that have ratified the Statute include states whose 
military and security services have a deplorable reputation for human rights 
abuses.  In the case of Colombia for example, where the government of Juan 
Manual Santos is apparently committed to promoting human rights and ending 
impunity, the security services continue to be implicated in international crimes 
(AI 2012).  According to Human Rights Watch, the Philippines security services 
are responsible for politically motivated extra-judicial killings yet the Philippines 
too is a State Party.  Now that they are signatories, only their failure to ratify the 
Statute relieves the security services of Sudan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Syria 
from joining with the Court to promote enforcement (HRW 2011a). 
 
In Africa, the continent of all the warrants of the ICC’s first decade, states 
engaged in the enforcement of warrants are operating security services that 
perpetrate grave human rights abuses.  The Central African Republic (CAR) 
has been riven by conflict for many years, and while armed groups probably 
constitute the primary perpetrators on its territory, the CAR security forces are 
known to commit atrocities with impunity (AI 2011a).  The DRC is another state 
whose security services have committed multiple human rights abuses amidst 
internal conflict and civil wars (AI 2011b).  The Prosecutor completed an 
agreement with the Sudanese Government to co-operate in implementing its 
Uganda case warrants in October 2005, eight months before opening its 
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investigation into Sudanese atrocities in Darfur which culminated in the 
issuance of the warrant for the Sudanese President Al Bashir for genocide three 
years later  (Ocampo 2006c: 31; ICC 2015b).  Even the Ugandan state (and 
particularly elements of its armed forces) was found guilty by the ICJ of violating 
international humanitarian and human rights law in DRC, including killings, 
inciting ethnic conflict, training child soldiers and torture (ICJ 2005b).  Yet each 
of these states is involved in seeking to enforce ICC warrants as an aspect of 
their broader military operations.  It is notable that even one non-ratifier, the US 
which ‘unsigned’ the Rome Statute in 2002 thus distancing itself from the 
Court’s international criminal justice standards and commitments, is by contrast 
significantly involved in the Court’s international military enforcement (Branch 
2010b; Branch 2011).  The securitisation of international criminal justice is of 
more than theoretical concern. 
 
ICC warrants thus have the potential to affect the dynamics of active conflicts, 
becoming military objectives in their own right, or elements in the propaganda 
campaigns that accompany or seek to justify wars.  There is a possibility that 
ICC warrants could be used to legitimise military activities including violence in 
zones already experiencing atrocities at the hands of rebel or government 
forces, as they seek to apprehend their foes by military means and secure the 
publicity coup of an international trial.  This prospect has prompted some to 
observe that international criminal justice has become caught up in a paradigm 
of ‘conflict authorisation’ (Findlay and Henham 2010).  Stakes may be raised for 
military commanders on all sides of a conflict, as they seek to become ICC 
enforcers and/or to evade trial.  The ICC has little control over this process after 
an warrant has been issued, and thus consideration of the human rights 
implications of warrants must take place prior to their issuance.  Even accepting 
Struett’s view that the Court must engage in consideration of these elements 
covertly, it is far from clear how this can be done (Struett 2012).  Issues of 
diplomatic and military context are wide-ranging and hugely complex, and fall 
well outside the Court’s expertise in legal matters.  It is not even clear that the 
Court’s structures have the capacity to properly assess the ramifications of its 
own interventions.  The former Prosecutor’s view that issues of security and 
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peace fall within the remit of the UNSC or other bodies may in fact reflect a 
realistic assessment of the Court’s abilities.  As has been indicated, the Court’s 
independence, rooted in its legal mandate, would in any case only allow it to be 
influenced by issues of peace and security in highly exceptional circumstances. 
 
In conclusion, the implications of issuing an ICC warrant into uncertain and 
dangerous environments extend beyond the case itself, and enforcement efforts 
will have the potential to become significant elements of military and political 
campaigns or strategies.  The relationship between military activities and ICC 
enforcement in conflict zones thus has the potential to generate unintended 
consequences with significant human rights implications.  The Court is not 
mandated to consider such issues, and those organisations or individuals that 
are, have little influence over its legal process.  If there is private consideration 
of these issues by the Prosecutor it must remain confidential to preserve the 
pretence of political independence, and thus beyond public scrutiny.  
Theoretical concerns have already been raised in relation to the Court’s 
objective to further the global norms of international justice, potentially at the 
expense of the interests of the human rights of affected communities.  Early 
warrants provide the opportunity to assess these anticipated complications of 
ICC military enforcement in practice. 
 
3.2.3 Complications relating to the protection of witnesses 
 
A second challenge in relation to the issuance of arrest warrants into active 
conflicts relates to the protection of victims, witnesses and their communities.  
This issue is anticipated in the Rome Statute (Article 68, and 57.3).  Specifically, 
the Rome Statute states the following: 
 
The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and 
witnesses. (Article 68.1) 
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Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Statute 
may lead to the grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his 
or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any proceedings 
conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such 
evidence or information and instead submit a summary thereof. (Article 
68.5) 
 
Related regulations charge the Prosecutor with responsibilities in relation to 
assessing risk to witnesses and others, and concern themselves with issues 
such as safety, well-being, psychological and psycho-social issues, and 
avoiding the possibility of re-traumatisation.  Measures anticipated to mitigate 
risk include possible alternatives to questioning, data protection safeguards, 
and additional security measures in consultation with the VWU (which itself has 
no capacity for ensuring community security as such).  It is important to 
consider whether these assessments and measures are likely to be 
commensurate with the task, given the scale and severity of the national and/or 
regional security issues involved (ICC 2009b: regulations 36, 45-47).  
 
The militarised and potentially violent contexts in which protection will need to 
take place may also be tight-knit communities where visits and conversations 
with Court officials or outsiders, or periods of travel or absence to facilitate 
contact with Court officials, can be rare and conspicuous.  Communities from 
which witnesses have travelled may be well aware of individuals’ movements 
and engagement with the Court, and even if their evidence is made 
anonymous, the location of the crimes in question or the incident involved 
cannot easily remain secret.  Through no fault of the Court, it may not be easy 
or in some cases possible to sustain the anonymity of witnesses. 
 
The Statute has provision for the protection of victims, witnesses and their 
families (Articles 68, 87).  These measures address (at least in theory) the 
relatively unlikely though still extremely serious possibilities of violence against 
targeted individuals.  This attention to relatively small-scale risks that would be 
appropriate in less dangerous contexts is reflected in prosecutorial reporting, in 
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relation to work in the DRC for example (Ocampo 2006c: 11-12).  However, in 
these new contexts groups whose leadership have had ICC warrants issued for 
them may be quite indiscriminate in meting out vengeance, in retaliation for 
evidence offered or simply opinions expressed.9  Armed forces seeking to teach 
witnesses a lesson or deter others need not identify the individuals or their 
families for reprisals, as the Statute and regulations seem to imply.  Atrocities 
inflicted on a witness’s community may be just as effective, particularly if 
committed on a large scale.  The engagement of victims and witnesses with the 
Court even at the investigations stage, or their testimony in relation to an 
incident or specific geographic location, may place communities already 
vulnerable to attack from rebel forces or states militaries or security services at 
significant risk.  The protection of communities put at risk in such situations 
could have been addressed in the Court’s procedure documentations 
concerning the long and short-term plans for the protection of those put at risk.  
However, neither here nor in the Statute does the scale of this issue appear to 
be anticipated (ICC 2002: Rule 17).  Again, through no fault of the Court or its 
officers, the safety of witnesses or those in line for reprisals in these violent 
contexts will sometimes be well beyond its power to assure.  This lack of 
Statutory anticipation of the circumstances of international crimes is an 
extension of the issue raised in 3.1.3d concerning the narrow identification of 
victims of crime as individuals, rather than communities. 
 
The Prosecutor and other Court officials are aware of such challenges, as 
Schabas observes, but as previously discussed security concerns have been 
set aside as falling within the remit of other agencies (Ocampo 2003; Schabas 
2011: 358-360; Rodman 2012).  An example occurred in 2005, in relation to the 
                                            
9 This is not a hypothetical example.  The LRA has in the past heard broadcast of a 
community in northern Uganda celebrating a setback it had suffered.  In response it 
returned and committed an atrocity at that location upon the whole community, 
irrespective of which individuals were celebrating (author’s notes).  If rebel groups 
commit collective punishment in this way, in an environment where there is no prospect 
for military protection (as has been the case throughout the LRA’s area of operations) 
then what means can the Court realistically provide to protect whole communities that 
are put at risk by the statements of witnesses, whose provenance can be identified on 
the ground through community networks, ICC activity, or by the evidence they submit? 
(Allen 2006b). 
   
123 
Darfur warrants, when Professor Antonio Cassese indicated that the continuing 
insecurity of potential witnesses prevented effective and safe investigations.10  
The Prosecutor stated ‘at the heart of Professor Cassese’s observations is the 
belief that the [Office of the Prosecutor] and the Chamber have a responsibility 
to enhance security for victims of crimes in Darfur’.  The Prosecutor was 
forthright in his position, stating that the intervention of the Court ‘should have 
the consequence of contributing to the protection of the civilian population in 
Darfur, by preventing further crimes’ but that it was not mandated to do so (ICC 
2006a).  Notwithstanding Rule 17 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (ICC 2002), which (astonishingly unrealistically) charges the Victims 
and Witnesses Unit with providing ‘adequate protective and security measures’, 
his view was that the responsibility for security lay with others.  In the case of 
the Darfur arrest warrants, this would have included the Government of Sudan 
(led by Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir who was subsequently wanted by the 
ICC for Darfur crimes himself), the UNSC, African Union and other relevant 
international organisations, even though their respective willingness or 
capability to assure protection was highly questionable.  This Prosecutorial view 
is consistent with the position identified in the previous section, that security 
concerns fall outside the remit of the Court. 
 
Subsequently, the former Prosecutor likened such threats to blackmail, 
indicating that moral and practical considerations should be set aside in favour 
of the legal necessity to pursue arrest and prosecution (Ocampo 2007a: 9).  
The Statute makes provision for protection in theory for individual victims, 
witnesses and their families, but not in practice.  As already established, the 
larger issue of the protection of victim communities is considered outside the 
Court’s remit even at a theoretical level. 
 
Finally, in relation to both the issue of military enforcement of arrest warrants 
and protection of witnesses, and perhaps with Nuremberg in mind, the 
situations apparently anticipated by the drafters of the Statute seem to assume 
                                            
10 Professor Cassese was then Chair of the UN Commission of Enquiry and one of the 
two advisors requested by the Court to advise on the protection of victims. 
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that military force will in any case prevail and be aligned with the Court’s 
purposes.  In a situation where the ‘wrong’ side wins a war or retains or gains 
control of territory, or is able to operate in a region where witness communities 
cannot be protected—and indeed in many of the situations into which the ICC is 
expected to issue warrants—the aspiration of the Court to effect arrest or 
protect witnesses and their communities may not be realistic or realised.  This 
does not imply that ICC warrants will not have effects in such circumstances.  
Indeed, the binding paradigm applied to international interventions conveyed 
warrants will apply indefinitely.  After issuance of arrest warrants their 
application, and the prioritisation of international criminal law (ICL), become a 
permanent fixture of an ongoing conflict indefinitely curbing other options to for 
security or peace. 
 
3.2.4 Complications relating to peace processes 
 
If these first two challenges relate to the complications of military enforcement 
of ICC warrants, the third relates to their effect on efforts to bring conflicts to a 
close.  Given the Court’s legal purpose in bringing to an end to impunity 
particularly for those most responsible for the gravest atrocities, and the 
expectation that it would intervene in volatile regions, it was inevitable that ICC 
warrants would soon become relevant to peace negotiations.  Efforts to prevent 
or end wars by negotiation, should they involve the offer of amnesty or the 
possibility of impunity for perpetrators, would challenge the ICC’s purpose.  The 
leaders of military groups bearing the greatest responsibility for international 
crimes could in some cases both be targeted by the ICC, and be crucial to 
peace negotiations.  With such individuals being unlikely to negotiate 
themselves into a trial, peace treaties might in future need to accommodate 
themselves to the new reality.  Under the influence of the ICC, peace with 
impunity for suspects is no longer an option.  This clear position is reflected on 
the ICC web site, where it is stated: 
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Can peace and justice work together?  International justice, national 
justice, the search for the truth, and peace negotiations are not 
alternative ways to achieve a goal; they can be integrated into one 
comprehensive solution. It is essential to ensure that any conflict 
resolution initiative be compatible with the Rome Statute, so that peace 
and justice work effectively together.  (ICC 2015a) 
 
It is required by the Court that in practice, as well as in theory, negotiated peace 
should be attained only when compatible with the ICC’s prosecutorial process.   
 
This is not just a theoretical concern.  The Court’s stand is already influencing 
the guidelines on what UN sponsored peace negotiators or State signatories 
may offer.  They may not give amnesties to perpetrators of crimes within the 
remit of the Court.  The UN has provided clear guidelines in this respect, and 
the expectation is that negotiations are accommodated to the requirements of 
the Rome Statute (Hayner 2009; UN Secretary-General 2010: 7-8,10; UN 
guidance for effective mediation 2012: 16).   
 
The rationale supporting a strong stand by the Court and its high standards of 
criminal justice understandably relate to the vision of the Court and its 
supporters for a new climate of international justice, and its efforts to usher in 
this ‘era of enforcement’ as a means to promote human rights for all.  In relation 
to this vision, a complementary claim has been that peace attained at the price 
of impunity is likely to be short-lived in any case (Ocampo 2007a).  While this is 
not universally accepted, and counter evidence can be found (the examples of 
the Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission have been referred to), proponents of this view point 
to examples of failed treaties that offered impunity.  These include the 
unsuccessful 1994 Lusaka Protocol that sought to put an end to the Angolan 
civil war, and the 1999 Lome Accord of the Sierra Leone conflict, which 
awarded Savimbi and Sankoh respectively impunity for their crimes (Lome 
Accord 1999; Prendergast 1999).  Events surrounding Charles Taylor’s 
detention in Nigeria in 2006 and subsequent trial have been controversial.  
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While his culpability for war crimes is not generally contested, the possibility of a 
Court process for Liberia was prevented though political pressure—a measure 
that some believe averted the risk of triggering considerable instability and 
further violence (Ainley et al. 2016).   
 
The ICC recognises that the requirement for treaties to deliver perpetrators 
(who are potentially the leaders of their delegations) to trial has raised issues for 
some, and indeed a session at its 2010 review conference was devoted to a 
discussion about peace and justice issues.  James LeMoyne (mediator and 
former special advisor for Colombia to the UN Secretary-General) and Barney 
Afako (legal advisor to the chief mediator on the Ugandan peace process 
negotiations) presented the dilemmas or challenges they perceived in 
reconciling peace with criminal justice (ICC 2010a).  But it is the Prosecutor’s 
position, as the individual empowered to take such issues into consideration, 
that determines the Court’s readiness to respond to this issue.  The Rome 
Statute places the Prosecutor at the heart of these deliberations. 
 
In guiding the Court through its engagement with peace negotiations there are 
four options.  The Prosecutor may determine that it would not be in the interests 
of justice to proceed with an existing case under Article 53.  However, it is now 
evident that this option is restricted in application to the furtherance of a narrow 
view of justice and would be highly exceptional.  One may expect it to be 
applied only very rarely, and then upon a legal basis alone.  A second option of 
limited relevance to securing lasting peace deals is a request by the UN 
Security Council, under Article 16, that a case be deferred for 12 months.  It 
seems unlikely that such a temporary measure would satisfy those named in 
arrest warrants seeking to avoid trial indefinitely, sufficiently to facilitate a peace 
settlement.  The principal choice facing the Prosecutor is therefore between the 
third and fourth options: to defer arrest warrants (potentially indefinitely) until an 
opportunity to arrest with reduced human rights consequences arises, perhaps 
in line with Struett’s view of necessary but discrete political accommodation 
(2012); or to allow negotiations to take their course within the ICL paradigm, 
achieving arrest if possible or allowing a return to war if necessary.   
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Faced with the practical assessment of the value of an intervention, the 
asymmetries relating to consideration of this issue (previously indicated in 2.3.2 
and 3.1.3) come to the fore.  They mean that in practice the Prosecutor must 
act as both an advocate for prosecution, and as an independent assessor of the 
value of prosecutorial efforts in relation to other interests.  Additionally, as 
previously discussed, the Prosecutor may be compelled to proceed with a 
prosecution by the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC), but there is no mechanism to 
compel him/her to stop.  With such grave possible consequences the 
Prosecutor’s is perhaps an unenviable position. 
 
The new situation created by the issuance of warrants into active conflicts 
creates another situation in practice that has received insufficient attention.  
Prior to issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC, a perpetrator may be deterred 
from committing further atrocities by this possibility.  However, following their 
issuance suspects lose the incentive not to commit atrocities as they will face 
trial if apprehended in any event.  Additionally, they lose the incentive to engage 
in (UN sponsored) peace negotiations, which can no longer offer them amnesty.  
Issuance of a warrant may thus remove the deterrent effect upon their actions 
while precluding a negotiated peace.  The human rights implications of ICC 
warrants in active conflicts are thus uncertain, and analysis of the ICC’s impact 
in such situations will be needed to determine its consequences.  The warrants 
issued against Omar al-Bashir (President of Sudan), Laurent Gbagbo (former 
president of Ivory Coast, now on trial), and Muammar Gaddafi (Libyan 
President, now deceased) are cases in point, and these issues will be 
discussed in later sections. 
 
The preceding discussion indicates that, in relation to practical issues such as 
military enforcement of ICC arrest warrants, protection of those affected by its 
engagement in conflict areas, and impact on peace negotiations, ICC 
interventions have significant potential to trigger unintended consequences in 
relation to justice and human rights issues.  Additionally, it can be seen that 
expectations placed upon the Prosecutor in particular, to make judgements 
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between the interests of his or her prosecutorial process and the interest of 
communities that may be affected by unpredictable but potentially grave 
impacts, are considerable.  The intertwining of criminal justice aspirations with 
military enforcement processes, as heralded by the Rome Statute, and the 
expectation of intervention in active conflicts, lead the ICC and communities 
affected by atrocities into new situations, with consequences that are difficult to 
predict. 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
 
Considering the purpose of the Court as envisaged by Moynier and Dunant 
(Dunant 1862), it is appropriate to assess to what extent their intention to 
regulate the ways in which wars are fought and to limit the suffering that they 
cause will be brought about by the ICC’s activities.  They anticipated a process 
of criminal investigation, issuance of warrants, arrest, trial, prosecution and 
punishment of the most notorious perpetrators, and this vision is shared by the 
Court today.  The ICC also perceives this chain of events to be instrumental for 
the achievement of stability, security, peace and justice.  By the iteration of this 
process it is hoped a new climate of adherence to the law may be created and 
disseminated through international and national legal systems, establishing 
Robertson’s ‘era of enforcement’ (Robertson 2006).  Human rights campaigners 
from around the world are drawn to this vision. 
 
It is possible to distil from the preceding discussion assumptions that underpin 
the belief that by pursuing its focused criminal justice purpose the ICC is likely 
to achieve the Court’s broader goals for humanity.  While they are intimately 
interlinked, these beliefs embedded within the Court’s Statute or fundamental to 
is function fall under four broad headings: the primacy of the Court; its 
interpretation of justice; the requirements of enforcement; and its theory of 
change. 
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This thesis is concerned particularly with volatile environments, in which ICC 
warrants may become part of a conflict dynamic, or where the intervention of 
the Court is likely to be associated with violence of suspects or enforcers.  
These are circumstances in which the consequences of success or failure are 
heightened.  By articulating the suppositions embedded in the Rome Statute, or 
made by the Court or the Prosecutor, it has been possible to examine their 
appropriateness in early cases addressed by the Court.  The following section 
summarises these key findings, and are the first product of this research. 
 
3.3.1 Assumptions underpinning the use of international prosecutorial 
justice mechanisms in volatile environments 
3.3.1a Primacy 
The frame brought by the Court is universalist, to be applied in all 
circumstances of its warrants, subject to the Statute, and the Prosecutor’s 
discretion.  The Statute and its related documentation binds signatory states 
and international agencies to its process.  Addressing the crimes of individuals 
is now the first priority in the volatile contexts of Court warrants; there, 
henceforth, the application of unwavering and universally applied criminal 
justice processes for the most prominent offenders is an overarching justice 
paradigm.  Other approaches to justice or means to achieving it must conform 
to its standards.  This primacy of international criminal law and its methods, as 
projected by the Court, extends not only over signatory states and international 
agencies, but also over the will of populations affected by crimes who may be 
caught up in the ensuing process to achieve arrest.  Communities affected by 
atrocities may not impede the Court; and this arrangement is deemed to be 
universally effective and appropriate. 
 
There is the possibility of the Court’s process being curtailed ‘in the interests of 
justice’.  This seems to provide the opportunity to address instances where 
communities affected by atrocities, their human rights and understandings of 
justice, are not aligned with the interests or actions of the Court.  However, 
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according to the Statute, it is the Prosecutor who is empowered to arbitrate 
between the interests of ICL and the community.  The Prosecutor’s own 
interests are inevitably closely bound to those of the Court and legal process.  
There lies here a profound assumption that the interests of the Court and 
communities (including their human rights and any other notions of justice or 
self-determination they may have), are aligned, and that Prosecutorial 
discernment alone is sufficient to manage any conflicting priorities. 
 
Most fundamentally, there is an assumption that the unwavering application of 
ILC through the Statute will better advance ICL itself than a more nuanced 
approach, aligned with other interventions and broader community justice and 
human rights interests. 
3.3.1b Justice 
The Statute brings with it clear interpretations of justice.  Previously 
consequentialist considerations have dominated international engagements in 
volatile situations.  These have often been informed by context, and assessed 
according to impact.  The adoption of the Rome Statute marks a decisive shift 
by the international community away from consequentialism, towards a 
deontological approach (with much more long-term consequentialist goals).  
International interventions in volatile contexts where the ICC intervenes will be 
subject to the enforcement of the rules of international criminal law.  The new 
paradigm in place is deontological, focused upon the dispassionate application 
of legal codes. 
 
The Statute also determines that justice approaches will be predominantly 
retributive.  The Court’s process subordinates restorative justice methods.  
However, volatile environments where the historical roots of violence are 
complex, and victims and perpetrators hard to differentiate, may still deploy 
restorative mechanisms.  Truth and reconciliation commissions and traditional 
justice approaches may operate only when they do not impede the new 
retributive process of the Court.   
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3.3.1c Enforcement 
Retribution requires enforcement, and there is an assumption in favour of the 
enforcement of ICL.  In the volatile contexts of many ICC interventions, where 
crimes are most heinous, civil arrest will often not be possible and military 
enforcement will be required.  The contexts of warrants will include wars and 
regions where instability and conflict is widespread.  Although violence will 
clearly often be necessary to apprehend suspects, the Court’s relationship to 
the violence of its own enforcement is undefined.  There may be an assumption 
that enforcement, even if violent, will be swift and localised, but some 
enforcement actions could be prolonged and/or widespread.  The Court has 
little or no control over who will carry this out, and how. 
 
During this process there is no clarity about how communities (including but not 
restricted to victims and witnesses) will be protected, whether from perpetrators 
in response to warrants, or from the violence of the Court’s own enforcement.  
Communities affected by ICC intervention may be situated within wars where 
territories are exchanged, and new risks to victims or witnesses emerge.  
Additionally, there appears to be an assumption that ICL enforcement will be 
aligned with superior military power.  However, ICC warrants may be issued 
against both sides or multiple parties, or into contexts where suspects for whom 
warrants have been issued become the victors.  In such circumstances 
witnesses may become targets.  The Court is not equipped with extensive 
powers of conflict and context analysis, and its deontological frame implies that 
it should be led by the gravity and nature of crimes committed rather than 
consequentialist considerations.  Thus, in any event, there is an assumption 
that the outcome of violence associated with warrants, whether by enforcer or 
perpetrator, will be proportionate and acceptable. 
 
The Statute is intended to prohibit impunity, and peace deals mediated by the 
international community may no longer offer amnesty to the targets of ICC 
warrants.  Where peace is are not achievable without such amnesties (i.e. 
where suspects are not prepared to offer themselves for trial), there is an 
assumption that a continuation of war is preferable to their sanctioned impunity.   
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Decisions to defer or otherwise impede implementation of ICC warrants for 
moral or practical reasons are not acceptable (ICC 2010b; Ocampo 2010a).  
Issues of peace and broader notions of justice fall outside the Court’s brief and 
into the remit of other organisations, to which the Court is not accountable.  
3.3.1d Theory of change 
Associated with the emphasis on criminal law as the primary frame with which 
to advance a justice agenda in volatile environments, is the notion that by 
confronting the crimes of a few individuals, a broader situation will be 
addressed.  The theory of change in unstable environments implicit in ICC 
interventions is not usually explicitly laid out by its advocates; however, it places 
the application of criminal prosecutions for international crimes as central.   
Whatever else may be taking place in these violent and diverse contexts, 
criminal arrest and the ending of impunity for suspects, advanced by military 
means if necessary, is assumed to be significant in furthering the development 
of good governance and the rule of law.  In consequence, where conflicts are 
sustained in order to seek an end to impunity, other initiatives with other 
priorities, whether for justice, improved governance or humanitarian goals, may 
be postponed, or limited by the Court’s often violent enforcement process. 
 
3.3.2 From theory to practice 
 
This research has so far identified a number of respects in which international 
criminal justice in general, and the ICC in particular, carry specific but often un-
stated answers to questions concerning the nature and definition of justice, and 
how it should be promoted.  The perspective of the Court and the drafters of the 
Rome Statute will be critiqued in the light of the case study.  The following 
chapters will present learning from the LRA warrants and thus assess the extent 
to which the Court’s first cases have borne out or challenged these 
assumptions, and the degree to which lessons from this early experience have 
been articulated and allowed to inform the future functioning of the Court. 
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Appraisal complete, we can proceed from theoretical considerations to practice 
and evidence. 
 
From the perspective of the newly established Court in 2002, there was a need 
to identify situations in which crimes of sufficient gravity had apparently been 
committed.  There would need to be some prospect of identifying individual 
perpetrators for ICC warrants, and of gathering evidence for trial in the context 
on the ground.  Just as importantly, a credible means of apprehending the 
suspects would need to exist; enforcement by state(s) of sufficient power and 
legitimacy to be respectable promoters of international criminal justice would be 
necessary. 
 
The LRA commanders initially appeared to present an ideal first case.  The 
opportunity to address a situation of growing international concern—an 
intractable conflict in which the Court might precipitate a positive shift in the 
dynamics.  If the new norms of ICL could be projected into a region previously 
seen as beyond its reach, or into a live conflict hitherto beyond the remit of ad 
hoc tribunals, so much the better.  Unofficially the Prosecutor may also have 
considered issues such as the strength of the armed group concerned, and its 
cause, agenda and local or international support.  A weak or isolated force with 
few, unreliable, or disreputable international benefactors or friends to 
complicate the ICC’s engagement politically, or its enforcement militarily, would 
be advantageous.   
 
Further characteristics might enhance the Court’s apparent legitimacy, should 
the intervention be successful.  A move that responded to calls from human 
rights advocates internationally for justice, and to requests from communities 
affected by atrocities for international intervention, would strengthen its mandate 
and could enhance its reputation.  State referral would add further legitimacy to 
an intervention, and potentially enhance the process of enforcement.  The 
alignment of ICL with state and community priorities might be particularly 
important in the early cases. 
  
   
134 
Remarkably, to a greater or lesser extent, all these conditions could be seen to 
have been met in the case of the Lords’ Resistance Army atrocities in northern 
Uganda, commanded by Joseph Kony.  The LRA leadership were subjects of 
the ICC’s first warrants.  At the time, in many ways this case was seen to be an 
ideal intervention by the Court.  Conditions for its first entry into troubled waters 
must have seemed auspicious.  
 
A decade and more on from these events, some conclusions relating to issues 
of justice have already been offered, and widely accepted.  The alignment of 
peace and criminal justice priorities have been identified and assessed; 
notwithstanding some controversy, the impact of criminal justice measures on 
peace processes in the light of this case has been claimed to be positive.  The 
Uganda case, while initially seeming troublesome, has latterly been identified as 
exemplary in various quarters (Seibel and Holzinger 2008; Akhavan 2009; 
Hayner 2009; HRW 2010a; ICTJ 2010; Roth 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010).  
However, the evidence base of early findings merit careful examination.  The 
next Section critically analyses the single situation of the LRA warrants.  This 
case study has the potential to yield conclusions at all levels.  
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Section 2 Case study 
Chapter 4 Background to the LRA war 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Section 1 has offered observations concerning the nature of the ICC and the 
mandated and implied characteristics of its interventions.  These arise directly 
from its Statute, interpretation of justice issues, and intended mode of operation.  
Section 2 concerns the case study, and provides an evidence-based overview 
of the first intervention.  Chapter 4 examines the roots of the conflict in Uganda, 
and its dynamics in the 1990s and early 2000s.  This leads on in Chapter 5 to 
an account of how the ICC intervention from 2004 to 2010 has been interpreted, 
particularly by its supporters in the legal, governmental and military 
establishments, and the international human rights community.  These two 
chapters prepare the ground for the application of evidence from the affected 
communities in Chapter 6, which allows the established understanding of 
events to be tested and re-assessed.  Appendix 1 gives a chronology of some 
of the events referred to in the text. 
 
Any articulation of events during a contemporary military conflict is likely to be 
contested; however, by relying on evidence from communities directly affected 
by the violence, and those working with them or researching their experience on 
the ground at the time, an account rooted in community experience from 
multiple and widespread sources is developed.  The evidence-base for this 
thesis has been indicated in the Introduction, and the references supplied in the 
text point to specific studies, reports, and accounts from lived experience of the 
author and others that substantiate the points as they arise. 
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4.0.1  Narratives of the conflict 
 
A ‘dominant narrative’ of the LRA conflict exists, and has shaped external 
interventions over three decades.  Branch eloquently encapsulates its main 
thrust: 
 
[The official discourse proposes…] the meaningless, criminal brutality of 
the LRA, the innocent child-victim, and the Western saviour—the image 
that has informed the numerous interventions in northern Uganda.  But 
this image, or minor variations on it, is not unique to the way violence in 
Uganda is represented in the West.  In fact, Africa itself tends to be 
seen as one large terrain of afflicted humanity, as a continent of mere 
humans without history, agency, or meaningful political or social life.  
Their suffering is the suffering of the human, and thus coded as human 
rights violations, crimes against humanity, or humanitarian crisis.  
(Branch 2011: 5) 
 
Branch further argues that Westerners (or perhaps interveners influenced by 
the Western model), having empathised with and abstracted Africans’ pain as 
their own, and failing to perceive African and political and social agency, then 
feel entitled (even obliged) to act as ‘redeemers’.  This narrative has proved 
immensely popular, powerful and resilient in the case of northern Uganda.   
 
Adapted for the Ugandan context, this view holds the Ugandan government as 
an exemplar of the ‘African renaissance’ and an agent of the West’s redeeming 
mission (Museveni 1997; Mbeki 2000).  Its actions have been understood as 
aligned with the interests of the (supposedly helpless) civilian population, and its 
military efforts to restore the rule of law have been seen in sharp contrast to the 
LRA’s senseless campaign of terror and atrocities.  They have tended to portray 
events as a simple binary clash between two protagonists, often perceived as 
good and evil; the latter being either mysterious, inexplicable or ‘magic’.  Some 
even seek a resolution through awarding perpetrators ‘celebrity’ status.  Insofar 
as this shallow and bipolar view has informed international interpretation of 
   
137 
events it has been dangerously misleading (Woodward 1991; Drogin 1996; Rice 
2007; Green 2012; Invisible Children 2013).   
 
While the LRA’s deplorable conduct is not in doubt, the dynamics on the ground 
have long demonstrated these perceptions as false (AI 1989; AI 1991; AI 1997; 
Gersony 1997; AI 1999; HRW 2002a).  However, from the turn of the century 
this dominant narrative was increasingly identified and systematically 
discredited.  Through thoroughgoing research Finnström, Dolan and Branch 
have presented a rigorous critique of the LRA war, and articulated a 
sophisticated understanding of its dynamics from the communities caught up in 
it, consistent with the data (Dolan 2000b; Dolan 2002; Branch 2004; Branch 
2005; Finnström 2006a; Finnström 2006b; Finnström 2008; Branch 2009; 
Finnström 2010). 
 
More generally, from the late 1990s the LRA war was often described as a 
forgotten conflict; ‘the world’s worst and most forgotten humanitarian crisis’ as 
the UN under-secretary for humanitarian affairs Jan Egeland described it in 
2003 (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 198).  However, just preceding and then during the 
first decade of this century it gained international prominence partly as a result 
of his work, and the efforts of local and international bodies and 
intergovernmental agencies.  NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and 
Amnesty International (AI) produced reports highlighting the suffering of 
civilians, while local organisations called for greater international engagement 
(AI 1997; HRW Africa and HRW Children's Rights Project 1997; AI 1999; ARLPI 
and JPC 2001; HRW 2002a; HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; ARLPI and 
Justice Resources 2003; HRW 2003a).  These calls were amplified through UN 
and ICC involvement, and by mass campaigns such as those in the US by 
Enough and Invisible Children.   
 
Meanwhile, it can be argued that incomplete analyses by many agencies failed 
to adequately perceive that their interventions were framed by the dominant 
discourse.  International NGOs and other intervening bodies have tended to 
highlight aspects of the war falling within their own remit, whether in the field of 
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human rights, justice, health or others (AI 1997; HRW 2003a; Ministry of Health 
of Uganda and World Health Organisation 2005; War Child 2015).  More 
recently those seeking the clarity of simple messaging for mass communication 
have presented their audience with clear moral choices apparently linked to 
decisive actions to resolve the conflict, as opposed to complex ethical dilemmas 
and questionable remedies (Benner and Prendergast 2011; Invisible Children 
2013). 
 
Academic research on the ground highlighted specific issues of great urgency, 
further demonstrating particular inadequacies of the dominant discourse.  In-
depth research by Dolan (2011: particularly 72-106), for example, brought the 
Ugandan government’s degree of responsibility for civilian suffering to light; 
Baines (2007) has documented traditional reconciliation practices relevant to 
alternative approaches to justice; while Allen (2006b) has promoted critical 
examination of these and other aspects of the conflict, such as the international 
focus on abduction of children over adults.  Finnström (2008: particularly 71-74) 
identified clearly the powerful and relevant political context within which the war 
unfolded, as well as its frequent misrepresentation (Finnström 2012).  Branch 
(2011) has brought into question the benefits and legitimacy of external 
interventions, while the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) and 
others on the ground have provided a more detailed and nuanced analysis of 
events rooted in their full history, founded upon the experience of civilians over 
the preceding decades (Dolan 2000b; ARLPI and JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; 
Oywa 2002; Rodriguez 2004a; Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
 
As already indicated in the Introduction, this chapter takes an evidence-based 
approach drawing upon academic studies by researchers, peace workers, and 
local CBO staff who lived and worked on the ground, survey data drawn from 
the community by local and other organisations, and the lived experience of the 
researcher and others referenced in the text.  With diverse academic, local, and 
original material, it offers an account of the conflict that is to a significant extent 
sited within its political, social and economic context, and grounded in the 
experience of civilians caught up in the violence.     
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4.1  The origins of the war 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the conflict it is necessary to acknowledge 
the complexity and difficulties associated with notions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘tribe’.  In 
Uganda, as elsewhere, perceptions of identity in these respects are strong, and 
Uganda’s post-colonial history is significantly influenced by them.  Notions of 
ethnic allegiance, often including possession of a common language as well as 
shared social and cultural practices, have frequently been mobilised for political 
purposes (Smith 1986).  Understandings of ethnic or tribal identity and their 
basis are much debated, but the comprehension of these perceptions as a 
social construct that can change over space and time is pertinent.  A 
constructivist view that does not accept ethnicity as a basic human condition, 
but acknowledges it in so far as it is useful to interpret events, is appropriate in 
this instance (Abizadeh 2001; Murji and Solomos 2015).  In this context, the 
Acholi in Uganda, those people from Acholiland, are considered those who 
identified themselves as such.  They principally lived in the Districts of Kitgum 
and Gulu, as they were defined in 2000, spoke the Acholi language and 
conformed in the broadest sense to Acholi social and cultural norms.  Today 
those districts have been subdivided, encompassing Gulu, Amuru, Nwoya, 
Lomwo, Pader, Kitgum, and Agago. 
 
‘Community’, and the notion of ‘community leaders’, are also constructs 
requiring some clarification, and another field of considerable academic study.  
The common understanding of community as a social unit within a single 
geographical location with shared identity, norms and values, is relevant here 
(Nisbet 1970; James 1996).  In this study, unless otherwise indicated, the term 
is used to refer to the Acholi community in northern Uganda, the principal 
victims of both sides in the war (Girling 1960).  When doing so it is 
acknowledged that, as within any group, individuals within it held a wide range 
of views, perceptions and experiences.  A community view has only been 
indicated where it was founded upon evidence of very widespread support, 
such as in the popular strongly held desire for peace, food, an end to the killings 
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and abductions, and permission to return to their homes.  These issues will be 
examined below. 
 
The community leaders indicated in this research are most commonly those 
with prominent positions in the principal civil society organisations with strong 
constituencies across Acholiland—the religious and traditional leaders.  These 
institutions commanded very widespread popular engagement across the 
region, though not unanimous support.  Due to the nature of such institutions 
these positions were dominated by men.  However, prominent women were 
also amongst the leadership group, including figures such as Rosalba Oywa, 
the director of ACORD, and Angelina Atyam, the founder and director of the 
Concerned Parents’ Association (CPA) based in Lira. 
 
4.1.1  The roots of discord 
 
The war in northern Uganda is popularly considered to have begun in 1986, 
when Museveni came to power in a military coup.  At this point his National 
Resistance Army (NRA) forces swept north, driving the remnants of the 
defeated United National Liberation Army (UNLA) before them.  Many of the 
UNLA forces were Acholi, and while some disbanded and returned to their 
homes, others sustained some level of resistance within northern Uganda or 
from southern Sudan.  NRA efforts to crush these forces were only partially 
successful, and subsequent decades saw sustained military resistance—a 
circumstance that brought about a succession of rebel movements.  These 
events culminated in the LRA war, an account of which is provided in the 
following sections (Gersony 1997; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). 
 
Inter-tribal rivalries significantly pre-dated the LRA war.  Decades of British 
colonial rule were characterised by differential treatment of Uganda’s tribes.  
While the Baganda in the southern central area of the country were selected for 
administrative and business roles, northerners in general and the Acholi in 
particular were recruited into the army and police.  The British presided over a 
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system in which northerners were marginalised in employment and education, 
investment and infrastructure. Through mechanisms such as these the 
Ugandan state came to be established upon deep economic and social rifts that 
exacerbated ethnic divides (Gersony 1997; Branch 2010a). 
 
These divisions were intensified by post-independence mis-rule.  Milton Obote 
(Prime Minister and then President, 1962-71, 80-85) a Lango from the north 
adjacent to the Acholi region where the war has been centred, and Idi Amin 
Dada (President 1971-79), a Kakwa from the north west across the Nile, were 
responsible for gross human rights abuses by the army and other security 
forces.  The Acholi comprised a significant proportion of Obote’s military, and 
became associated with his abuses.  After Obote’s overthrow in 1971 Amin 
brutally purged the military of Acholi and Lango tribes, and persecuted 
prominent Acholis in Kampala and the North, forcing many into exile.  However, 
following the ousting of Amin in 1979 Obote was re-elected in a poll 
characterised by violence and accusations of vote rigging.  Subsequently the 
Lango-Acholi alliance of northerners was renewed, and the Acholi were again 
recruited in large numbers into the army.  It is thought that at this time 30-40 per 
cent of the army were northerners (Allen 2006b: 25-55; Dolan 2011: 39-71). 
 
These events prompted Yoweri Museveni, a Banyankole from the south-west, 
to launch his National Resistance Movement (NRM) and NRA guerrilla war in 
1981.  Basing his operations in the Luweero Triangle north of Kampala, he was 
able to recruit Baganda from the central area and Banyarwanda (Tutsi migrants 
from Rwanda) to join his Banyankole forces (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010).  
During the ensuing brutal counter-insurgency war, the Acholi were popularly 
seen as responsible for Obote’s atrocities (Museveni 1997).  It was not until 
1985, with the increasing success of the NRA rebellion, that Ugandan military 
support for Obote faltered.  In July a coup led by Gen. Basilio Okello’s Acholi 
forces ousted Obote from Kampala, and Gen.  Tito Okello was sworn in as the 
first Acholi President of Uganda.  His premiership was short-lived, and the 
peace treaty signed with Museveni in December 1985 did not last.  In January 
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1986 the NRA seized power in a coup, and Museveni was able to install himself 
as President.   
 
These events have left deep and lasting inter-ethnic grievances on all sides.  
Led by Museveni, the mainly Bantu tribes from the south perceived themselves 
as having been robbed of their imminent victory over the Uganda National 
Liberation Army (UNLA) by Okello’s coup.  Having been the victims of violent 
misrule at the hands of Obote and Amin, and perceiving recent atrocities in 
Luweero as perpetrated primarily by northerners, there were powerful 
motivations to seek redress and revenge.  Observers have noted that official 
NRA media sources at the time perceived the Acholi to be significantly 
responsible for events (Behrend 1999; Finnström 2008: p75). 
 
On the other hand, the Acholi and other northerners had suffered (and continue 
to suffer) decades of political and economic marginalisation by the British and 
post-independence governments, in addition to their persecution by Amin.  
Their hopes of power and the opportunity to address these inequalities in their 
favour glimpsed in 1985 with the installation of the Obote regime, had been 
dashed by Museveni’s seizure of power.  This was an act many of them 
interpreted as betrayal.   
 
By 1986 the context for the war in northern Uganda was one of powerful and 
justifiable inter-ethnic grievances.  There was an absence of social or political 
processes sufficiently strong to contain the resulting animosities—enmities that 
had developed and been nurtured by many parties in their efforts to secure or 
maintain power and dominance.  As Dolan explains, 1986 was a year in which 
the ongoing political and military conflict in Uganda underwent a dramatic shift 
in power, and while the war in the north can be traced back to this point, the 
preceding account demonstrates that it was the latest manifestation of a conflict 
with roots in profound historic injustices.  Subsequent events involved a 
sequence of Acholi rebel groupings and leaders, each drawing strength and 
legitimacy from this powerful political, social and economic situation (Lucima 
2002).   
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4.1.2  Reshaping of the divide (from 1986) 
 
The first decade of the northern Uganda war did little to address these 
grievances, and much to exacerbate them.  During 1986 the Acholi remnants of 
the UNLA forces loyal to Tito Okello fled to Acholiland, pursued by the NRA.  
However, armed resistance did not commence at this time, and when the NRA 
arrived in Gulu in March 1986 they met no opposition from UNLA forces, who 
returned to the rural areas or retreated to Sudan. 
 
Branch (2011) has outlined the weakness of Acholi civil and political structures 
at this point, the challenges presented by the large influx of former UNLA 
forces, and the role of lineage authorities in absolving them of their past 
misdeeds and assisting in their reintegration.  NRA abuses in the north were 
significant at this time, and included the detention of hundreds of civilians in the 
search for weapons caches.  Branch’s account suggests that the insurgency 
that emerged was to a large degree the result of abuses by the NRA; that Acholi 
military resistance was preceded by a misconceived NRA counter-insurgency 
operation during this period.  Certainly widespread violence against the 
population took place, including a massacre by the NRA of over 40 civilians in 
NamOkora in late 1986, and many instances of male rape by the NRA’s Second 
Division (AI 1999; Lamwaka 2002; Branch 2011: 45-89; Dolan 2011: 44-45).  
The period was also characterised by looting across the entire region of most of 
the Acholi cattle by Karamojong raiders and NRA forces, a process that stripped 
the population of a significant proportion of its wealth (Finnström 2008: 71-74; 
Dolan 2011: 40). 
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4.1.3  The Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) emerges (from 
1987) 
 
While the military confrontation across the ethnic north-south divide was 
reshaping itself and escalating once more, the possibility of political dialogue 
being used for national reconciliation was receding.  The Acholi were largely 
removed from positions of power at a national level, and popular 
representatives in the north were bypassed in favour of more pro-government 
candidates (Omara-Otunnu 1987; Branch 2011: 111-118).  Events such as 
these seem to have been instrumental in galvanising support for further Acholi 
armed resistance, particularly the newly forming Uganda People’s Democratic 
Army (UPDA) comprising mainly former UNLA fighters.  In the deteriorating 
political and security situation the Acholi civilian population hoped for some 
measure of protection.  UPDA demands for human rights and political 
representation had some credibility, and thus they achieved some measure of 
approval from Acholi traditional authorities.  However, in later years, some of 
the Acholi traditional leadership accepted responsibility for blessing or 
endorsing the armed insurgency (Gersony 1997).   
 
Despite the support it received, the UPDA was unable to make military progress 
against the NRA, and before the end of the year its forces and those from the 
UNLA began to break up under a combination of military and social pressures 
(Branch 2011: 66).  Some remnants regrouped around a spirit medium, Alice 
Auma, who came to be known as Alice Lakwena.  Her Holy Spirit Mobile 
Forces, the military wing of the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), grew in numbers 
from late 1986.  With the aim of cleansing Uganda and overthrowing Museveni 
she instilled in her followers the belief that they could walk into battle singing 
religious hymns, would be unharmed by bullets, and that stones thrown by them 
could turn into grenades.  During late 1986-87 the HSM won significant 
success, and was able to advance towards Kampala, only eventually being 
defeated at Jinja, where a crossing of the Nile would have left them only 80km 
from the capital (Behrend 1999).   
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In 1988, the following year, elements of the UPDA and the Government signed 
the Pece Peace Agreement in Gulu.11  Some of the remnants of the UPDA were 
subsequently recruited into the NRA; however, this did not herald an end to the 
war as other factions remained in the bush (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 29). 
 
4.1.4  Abuses by both sides (late 1980s) 
 
Alice’s father Severino Lokoya also worked to regroup certain rebel elements at 
this time, until his arrest in 1989.  These events enabled Joseph Kony, an 
Acholi from Odek who also claimed to be related to Alice, to unite many of the 
remaining forces under his control.  From this beginning Kony was able to 
establish what was to become the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Behrend 
1999). 
 
The betrayal of the Okello regime by Museveni in 1986 was widely felt, but 
Kony apparently perceived the Pece agreement as further duplicity on the part 
of the demobilised UPDA elements, again with the collaboration of Museveni 
(Behrend 1999: 173-174).  Furthermore, while Lakwena’s success against the 
NRA in late 1986 had brought her some degree of popular backing, by the late 
1980s civilian enthusiasm for further armed conflict was dwindling.  Just as 
Kony came to lead the rebel movement, so he found popular enthusiasm for his 
campaign falling away.  Within only a few years the LRA was obliged to resort 
to coercion in its recruitment efforts (Gersony 1997; HRW Africa and HRW 
Children's Rights Project 1997). 
 
Kony’s sense of betrayal by Museveni and mistrust of his own community may 
have been further heightened by NRM engagement with the Acholi population.  
The NRM government was at this time strengthening its Resident 
Commissioner/ Local Council representation on the ground.  This involved 
establishing a system of locally elected representatives alongside government 
                                            
11 Pece is a suburb of Gulu which holds the stadium where the peace deal was signed. 
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appointed officials in all rural areas.  These posts were apparently intended to 
represent local views and opinions to the Movement government, while equally 
having the potential to operate as a tool with which to gain information to 
combat the insurgency in the villages.  The LRA thus came to identify these 
posts as an arm of the state, and an enemy within, whether or not the individual 
concerned was a legitimate local representative.  Thus, in Kony’s eyes, 
elements of the civilian population soon became targets to be cleansed from 
Acholi society, by violence if necessary (Branch 2010a; Branch 2011: 69-75). 
 
The late 1980s was thus a period in which civilians continued to suffer at the 
hands not only of government forces whom they perceived as an occupying 
army, but also rebel factions willing to punish individuals and communities for 
their perceived collusion with the government.  In rural areas people often slept 
in the bush, hiding from forces who might accuse them of sympathies with their 
enemies; people became increasingly alienated from the rebels who claimed to 
represent them.   
 
Then, from 1990-91 the Government’s Operation North launched a brutal 
counter-insurgency offensive.  It coincided with severe losses to HIV of NRA 
officers, and faltering steps to create a more professional national army.  These 
factors may have hampered efforts to instil discipline.  Travel was restricted, 
and communications between the north and the rest of the country were 
disrupted.  Many civilians were rounded up for screening, and those without 
papers were liable to be shot.  Additionally the population was organised into 
‘Arrow Brigades’, an act that significantly antagonised the LRA, and effectively 
placed civilians on the front line of the conflict.  Units armed with bows and 
arrows or other traditional weapons were expected to defend themselves 
against armed rebel attack.  Even as the northern Uganda war was entering a 
wider regional dynamic, civilians were already finding themselves caught 
between fighting forces each seeking to extend their control over the population 
(AI 1991; Lamwaka 2002; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 29; Branch 2011: 72-80).   
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4.1.5  Internationalisation of the conflict (from 1991) 
 
In August 1991 the Government announced that Kony had been defeated, and 
Operation North was wound down (Rodriguez Soto 2009: p30).  However, 
others have argued that the main impact of Operation North was the alienation 
of the civilian population (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 11).  In any event, new 
dynamics were emerging that would serve to decouple the conflict from its 
domestic Ugandan constituencies and sustain the violence.  The war was 
acquiring its international dimension.  General Al-Bashir had come to power in 
Sudan through a bloodless coup in 1989, and allied himself with the National 
Islamic Front.  As the cold war ended, the US perceived the emerging threat of 
Islamic extremism, and began support for the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA)’s independence struggle.  This brought Uganda to the US front-line, and 
through this new prominence Museveni’s administration was able to secure 
significant diplomatic, financial and logistical support from the US for its efforts.  
John Garang himself, the SPLA leader, was seen in Gulu in 1991—a sign of the 
strengthening links between Sudan’s rebel movement and the Ugandan 
Government. 
 
In retaliation Sudan began delivering assistance to Uganda’s own insurgency—
the LRA.  This included money, arms and logistical support.  The tit-for-tat 
relationship between Uganda and Sudan, each backing the others’ rebel group, 
had begun (Gersony 1997; International Crisis Group - ICG 2004).  One effect 
of Sudanese intervention may have been to free the LRA from the necessity to 
nurture a civilian constituency in support of its war.  Certainly the shift from a 
tactic of selective attacks against the population to more indiscriminate violence, 
apparently intended to demonstrate the Government’s inability to control and 
pacify the North, coincides with this development.  Additionally targeted 
punishments intensified, focused upon Acholi officials perceived to be aligned 
with the government, compliant to its demands, or found disobeying LRA 
dictates.  The LRA practice of mutilating civilians began, and included the 
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cutting of lips or ears and the amputation of limbs of those suspected of 
spreading news, collecting information, or passing messages (AI 1997; HRW 
Africa and HRW Children's Rights Project 1997; Branch 2011: 80-87). 
 
This juncture was significant.  For the first time both of the military protagonists 
in the Ugandan conflict, Government and LRA, could afford to prosecute the 
war independently of local support, backed by international actors for whom 
humanitarian consequences in northern Uganda were but one strategic 
consideration amongst others.  This would not be the only instance of the 
decoupling of the conflict dynamics from community concerns (Doom and 
Vlassenroot 1999: 25-26; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 9-12; Mwenda 2010). 
 
4.1.6  The 1994 peace talks  
 
Despite these ominous developments, during 1992 the Arrow Brigades were 
disbanded by the government, and from the middle of that year and onwards to 
the end of 1993 the security situation improved.  As it transpired, the conflict 
was displaying its longer term tendency to rise and fall in intensity over time 
(Dolan 2000b).  At this time LRA groups were even seen openly in Gulu town, 
and there was increasing optimism that peace could return.  Many believed that 
the war had effectively ended (Gersony 1997: 39-41). 
 
Contacts between the Government and LRA, led by Betty Bigombe, the Minister 
of State for Pacification of the North, took place and led to a ceasefire towards 
the end of that year.  In early 1994 talks led to a request by Kony for a six 
month period to allow him to gather LRA forces in preparation for disarmament. 
Hundreds of LRA soldiers came to trading centres, anticipating an end to the 
hostilities.  At the same time there was considerable distrust between the two 
parties, and speculation that this period of calm might be used by the LRA to 
recruit (with the promise perhaps of resettlement packages following successful 
talks), and to negotiate military support from Sudan (ibid).  Some local sources 
have indicated verbally to the author their belief that the LRA were using the 
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period to regroup.  The Ugandan military may also have perceived a chance to 
crush the rebellion quickly at this point, without the need for talks.  
Overconfidence that the army could quickly defeat the LRA has long been a 
characteristic of Government perceptions, and significant elements of both 
sides may have been opposed to a deal.   
 
Whether prompted by these considerations, or other motives, on 6th February 
1994 Museveni gave the LRA a seven day ultimatum to surrender.  This 
precipitated the collapse of the process, and hostilities resumed (Rodriguez 
Soto 2009: 31).  The next major opportunity for peace was more than a decade 
later. 
 
4.1.7  Sudanese support for the LRA:  multiple atrocities and mass 
abduction (from 1995) 
 
On the ground in northern Uganda throughout the 1990s and 2000s, spells of 
relative calm followed by more extreme violence were apparently associated 
with the movement of LRA forces between Uganda and Sudan (Gersony 1997).  
Facilitated by Sudanese military assistance, the period that followed was 
characterised by deliberate and intensive LRA targeting of unarmed civilians 
and use of new weaponry such as landmines.  Sudanese support increasingly 
enabled the LRA to operate from bases in the south of Sudan, where training 
and preparation of abductees could take place, and from where groups could 
be sent back to Uganda to engage the UPDF, attack civilians and abduct future 
fighters (Dolan 2000b; Rodriguez 2004b).  As well as the ongoing low level (but 
often appallingly brutal) violence, Gersony (1997) identifies ‘signal incidents’.  
These included the Atiak massacre in April 1995 in which approximately 200 
civilians were killed, many of them executed; the Karuma/Pakwach convoy 
ambush of March 1996 in which approximately fifty civilians, many of them bus 
passengers, were burned alive or executed; the Acholpi refugee camp 
massacre in July 1996, in which at least 100 were killed; and the Lokung/ 
Palabek massacre in January 1997 when well over 400 were systematically 
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clubbed or hacked to death—then the largest LRA massacre in Uganda of the 
war.12   
 
Attacks were not limited to this period, and indiscriminate LRA violence towards 
the civilian population continued during the following decade, often taking place 
on a daily basis.  Later, other large-scale massacres occurred including those of 
Pajong in Mucwini, where 90 were killed in July 2002; Amyel in October of the 
same year in which 120 died; and Barlonyo, Lira (a district in Lango) in 2004 
where close to 300 were massacred (UN Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs - UNOCHA 2004; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 33,118).  By this 
stage attacks were not confined to the Ugandan Acholi population; killings and 
other abuses were also taking place more widely in Uganda and Sudan.  When 
challenged, apologists for the LRA, and even Kony himself, have claimed that 
such horrific actions against the civilian population were not its own (Schomerus 
2010).13  These denials have little credibility, particularly as they are 
contradicted by multiple local sources from the communities themselves 
suffering the violence, and recorded in local survey-based reports (ARLPI and 
JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003 and author’s widespread 
observations). 
 
In addition to committing atrocities in Uganda, the LRA’s direct military 
engagement against the SPLA necessitated a larger force, and in the absence 
of opportunities to recruit from the increasingly alienated local population it 
increased its practice of abduction of civilians, particularly youth, to augment its 
numbers (AI 1997; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 12; Branch 2011).  This is not 
to say that abduction was always a simple process of kidnapping young people 
from their homes.  While extreme coercion was often used and violence 
deployed to retain those taken, this is an overly simplistic view of LRA practice 
                                            
12 Exceeded only by the Christmas Massacres in DRC following the breakdown of the 
Juba talks. 
13 The author encountered members of the Acholi diaspora in London in 2000 and 2003 
who, perceiving the Ugandan Government’s hostility, mistakenly believed that the LRA 
were innocent of these crimes.  The diaspora organisation Kacoke Madit did much to 
challenge such misperceptions during this period and subsequent years by improving 
communication between communities suffering atrocities and the Acholi diaspora. 
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as others have demonstrated (Allen 2006b: 60-71; Mergelsberg 2010).  
Notwithstanding these complexities, the term abduction is still broadly accurate 
to describe the LRA’s means of securing new fighters into its ranks.   
 
Evidence indicates a pattern of taking adolescents consistent with their 
perceived ability to fight and survive in the bush (Blattman and Annan 2010).  
Many hundreds were abducted from 1995 onwards.  The Gulu-based NGO 
Human Rights Focus (HURIFO) for example, report an LRA target of 1,200 
child abductions in Kitgum alone for 1995; and quoting church sources they 
indicate that this target was easily exceeded (De Temmerman 2001; HURIFO 
2002: 14).  By 1997 Human Rights Watch estimated that between 6,000 and 
10,000 had been abducted over the preceding two years, with half of them 
remaining in the bush (HRW Africa and HRW Children's Rights Project 1997: 3-
4; Doom and Vlassenroot 1999: 25).  Abductions were reduced between 1999 
and 2001 with only some hundreds being taken (reflecting a quieter period in 
the war), but resumed in 2002 when between June 2002 and March 2003 
Human Rights Watch estimated 5,000 new abductions, and 3,000 in 2004 
according to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
UNOCHA (Government of Uganda and UNICEF 2001; HRW 2003a: 2; 
UNOCHA 2004: 1; Dolan 2010).  The proportion of total LRA’s numbers who 
were originally abducted has been much discussed, but evidence suggests that 
an approximate figure of 80 per cent is likely (Blattman and Annan 2010: 135).14 
  
                                            
14 It should be noted that the role and experience of abductees is complex, though 
beyond the remit of this research to discuss (HRW Africa and HRW Children's Rights 
Project 1997; Nordstrom 1997; Nordstrom 2001; ARLPI et al. 2003).  Abduction itself is 
discussed at greater length in section 4.3 
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4.1.8  Engagement with Sudan, Operation Iron Fist and LRA retaliation—
intensification of the conflict (from 1995) 
 
In relation to efforts for dialogue, there had been a long track record of efforts to 
engage the LRA and its predecessors in Sudan.  Lamwaka indicates that first 
contacts across the border with the UPDM/A took place in 1986/7, and 
describes early efforts for peace and their collapse prior to commencement of 
talks, after an attack by Ugandan government forces (Lamwaka 2002: 29-30).  
A decade later efforts to engage the LRA/M took place in Khartoum as part of 
the international Kacoke Madit peace efforts sponsored by the Italian 
Community of Sant’ Egidio, in collaboration with local efforts for peace by the 
Acholi religious and cultural leaders.  Contact with the Sudanese Government 
also occurred, and while diplomatic relations between Uganda and Sudan were 
cut off in 1995 ostensibly because of Sudanese support for the LRA, efforts to 
re-engage the Sudanese were underway again by 1999.  These gained 
momentum through the efforts of the Carter Center leading to the Nairobi 
Agreement at the end of that year, signed by Museveni and Bashir, which was 
intended to give impetus to efforts to resolve the conflict (Neu 2002; Allen and 
Vlassenroot 2010: 13; Dolan 2011: 50-51). 
 
The Carter Center work paved the way for subsequent initiatives, and in 2000 
the Sudanese and Ugandan Governments agreed to cease their reciprocal 
support for each other’s rebel movements, and that LRA bases in Sudan should 
be relocated 1,000km north of the Uganda border.  While this provision was not 
implemented at the time, the resumption of diplomatic relations between 
Uganda and Sudan in August, and the US declaration of the LRA as a terrorist 
organisation in September 2001, contributed to more concerted action.  Four 
months later Ugandan troops were already massing in the north in preparation 
for an offensive (Neu 2002; Otto 2002: 56-57; Dolan 2010). 
 
UPDF Operation Iron Fist was launched into southern Sudan in March 2002.  It 
was intended to destroy the bases out of which the LRA had been operating in 
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recent years, and took place with the consent of the Sudanese authorities and 
in the context of the US ‘War on Terror’ (New Vision 2002).  Government 
rhetoric was characteristically bold, anticipating a decisive blow to the rebels; 
however, on the ground in northern Uganda there was considerable scepticism 
that the offensive would prove successful, and much concern that the LRA’s 
retaliation against the civilian population would be brutal.  In the event the 
UPDF was successful only in destroying LRA bases, not the LRA itself.  This 
setback was matched by its failure to rescue abductees.  By June, of the 3,000 
LRA members whose return had been hoped and prepared for, UNICEF 
indicated that only two infants had been rescued (Dolan 2011: 54).  Over the 
course of subsequent months local fears were realised, and the LRA returned to 
Uganda visiting its campaign of atrocities and abduction upon an 
unprecedentedly large area, engulfing neighbouring districts of Lira and Apac, 
and parts of Soroti well beyond the Acholi and Langi borders.  LRA violence 
over the following years included the aforementioned Barlonyo massacre on 
21st February 2004, and for a period even greater numbers were displaced, well 
beyond the Acholi region (Justice and Reconciliation Project - JRP 2009).  
Operation Iron Fist II was to follow from March 2004, redoubling the UPDF’s 
efforts in southern Sudan, though again failing to prove decisive. 
 
4.1.9  UPDF conduct (to 2004) 
 
In the context of LRA abduction of children it should be noted that the Ugandan 
Government has itself used children in the armed forces, and has sometimes 
acquired them by coercion (HRW 2003a; HRW 2003b).  This has not been on 
the same scale as the LRA, and use of children in the Local Defence Units, for 
example, did not involve abduction and the same brutal treatment as that 
received by LRA abductees.  But the use of child soldiers nevertheless 
contravenes international standards and International Criminal Law in relation to 
under-15s since at least 2002 (Robertson 2006: 103).  The Gulu-based human 
rights organisation HURIFO also report this practice being resented by the local 
population and associated with other abuses (Rome Statute of the International 
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Criminal Court 1998; HURIFO 2002: 57; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers 2008). 
 
Equally concerning, the UPDF response to LRA attacks including the ‘signal’ 
incidents was often very slow indeed.  LRA looting of villages or camps could be 
quite systematic due to the time made available by this practice.  Following their 
arrival in a settlement and prior to any response from the Ugandan military, 
abductions by the LRA could be organised to include every suitable adolescent 
and child (Weeks 2002: 10).  The major incidents previously mentioned provide 
examples.  At the Atiak massacre in 1995, after the few local defence youth 
were overrun by the rebels, the army failed for six hours to respond to the LRA’s 
lengthy perpetration of an organised atrocity.  This included the hacking to 
death of 250 people, which took place in Ayugi Valley only 6km from the 
settlement, and close to a large military detachment.  The UPDF arrived after 
the LRA had withdrawn (Gersony 1997: 44; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 12).  
Following the attack on Acholpi in 1996 in which 100 were murdered, the UPDF 
arrived from their nearby detachment a full two days after they received news of 
the LRA’s attack, too late to engage the LRA, even though the atrocities took 
place over more than a day (Gersony 1997: 47-49; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 33).  
In the case of the Lokung massacre  in 1997 (involving 400 deaths) the local 
UPDF force arrived at the scene five days after the killings began (ibid).  These 
examples of the UPDF’s failure to protect the people even in the face of some 
of the most extreme incidents are indicative of a wider practice also noted by 
Dolan (2011: 145-146).  By the early 2000s complaints by civilians concerning 
these and similar occurrences were widespread throughout the north (Otunnu 
2002; Weeks 2002: 10; ICG 2004; Mamdani 2010).15 
 
The UPDF’s misconduct was not limited to passively allowing the LRA to 
massacre civilians.  The UPDF also committed violent acts against the civilian 
population itself, albeit on a much smaller scale.  Otunnu and Gersony indicate 
                                            
15 During my work supporting local peace initiatives on the ground, we frequently 
encountered communities where such accounts were widespread across Ugandan 
Acholiland. 
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UPDF brutality from the late 1980s; Dolan thoroughly documents the civilian 
experience of being the victim of both sides in more recent times; and UPDF 
brutality and killings are reliably documented up to 2004 (Gersony 1997; Otunnu 
1998; Branch 2004; HRW 2005: 6; Otim and Wierda 2010; Dolan 2011: 144-
157).  Regarding the period leading up to the ICC intervention the literature 
provides numerous examples.  In June 2002 the rebels attacked Purongo, 
killing two or more, abducting others and burning 50 huts.  The UPDF 
detachment responded by withdrawing from the camp, a civilian settlement, and 
shelling it killing at least five.  Fifteen civilians died overall, though the 
government New Vision newspaper attributed all deaths to the LRA (Finnström 
2008: 156-157).  In October of the same year, after the LRA’s Amyel massacre, 
the UPDF response included killing seven civilians, in addition to over 100 killed 
by the LRA.  Less than three months later in January 2003 the UPDF 
responded to the LRA abduction in Pella near NamOkora by indiscriminately 
bombing the area in which the LRA were moving, killing nineteen, mostly child 
abductees whom the LRA had tied to each other to prevent escape.  The New 
Vision reported them as rebels put ‘out of action’ (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 116-
119).  These acts closely preceded Uganda’s referral of the LRA to the ICC at 
the end of that year—they were the immediate context into which the ICC 
intervened. 
 
Thus far, this account has mainly concerned the events that are frequently 
referred to as the backdrop to the war: the historical roots of the conflict; the 
LRA’s campaign of violence; the UPDF’s offensives; internationalisation of the 
conflict; and (in the more balanced accounts) some indication of UPDF abuses.  
It is a narrative of the war largely viewed from a diplomatic level.   
 
It is also pertinent to note that the role of civilians in the conflict is complex.  
While most of the population was not involved in committing violence on either 
side, and was principally engaged in seeking to secure food and the other 
basics for survival, the role of some individuals is complex.  Children and youth 
were forcibly taken by the LRA, and targeted by the UPDF.  Many grew up in 
the LRA, traumatised and coerced to remain, yet coming to occupy an 
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ambiguous position between pure civilian and combatant.  Such roles have 
been commented upon in the literature on ‘new war’ (Duffield 2001; Münkler 
2005; Kaldor 2013).  In this study, due to the violence administered by both 
armed sides against the abductees, and the widespread lack of support for the 
LRA and government by 2000 (notwithstanding its political roots), terms such as 
‘troops’ and ‘wives’ that are frequently used in texts on the LRA have been 
avoided. 
 
The sections that follow highlight events that are less well understood, are 
commonly misrepresented, or are more often absent from mainstream 
accounts.  Yet they are no less well evidenced, and they are central to the 
civilian experience of the war.  Lacking the mouthpiece of a national newspaper 
or government institutions to promote their perspectives, or the prominence 
bestowed upon those who commit the most shameful mass atrocities, the civil 
society and community perspectives have been both passively ignored and 
actively stifled.  Restricting the analysis to evidence already publicly available, 
this account will highlight three aspects of the conflict that shaped the 
community’s experience: the creation of the camps and particularly their impact 
upon the population; the dynamics of the conflict from a civilian perspective; and 
the community’s estrangement and dissention from both the LRA and the 
government’s actions and strategies for prosecuting the war, and their 
alternative efforts to secure peace. 
 
4.2  The camps—a military strategy with humanitarian 
consequences (1996 onwards) 
 
Despite the UPDF’s unresponsiveness to LRA attacks and its violence towards 
people, in 1996 the Ugandan government reacted to the crisis by requiring the 
population to move to ‘protected villages’ closer to UPDF detachments (HRW 
2002a: 1).  Commonly known as the ‘camps’ these settlements were seen by 
many as ‘protecting villages’ because of the UPDF detachment’s position, 
usually in the centre (Otunnu 1998; Finnström 2008; Branch 2009: 131-165; 
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Branch 2011: 75-78).  The process of the creation of the camps has been 
poorly understood by many, some perceiving them as principally a civilian 
response to the insurgency.  This is inaccurate.  Interviews with the population 
on the ground by ARLPI and the Justice and Peace Commission of Gulu 
Archdiocese (JPC Gulu)16 in 2000 and 2001, a period in which the author was 
working closely with the two organisations, has yielded a more informed and 
complex picture (ARLPI and JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; Weeks 2002: 2-3; HRW 
2005; HRW 2011b: 24-25).  The issue of their creation and continuation through 
to 2007 is important, as deaths in the conflict have been shown to be much 
more often caused by the displacement, and concomitant destitution and health 
issues, than by the physical violence and atrocities of the war itself (Ministry of 
Health of Uganda and World Health Organisation 2005; Mwenda 2010). 
 
Up to 2001 in Kitgum District (at the time Acholiland east of the Aswa River17) 
LRA violence was instrumental in the creation of the camps.  In the late 1990s, 
partly in response to the intense violence of the ‘signal incidents’, people moved 
to the main trading centres seeking protection from LRA attacks and 
abductions.  ARLPI reports that by 2001 these spontaneous settlements 
contained perhaps 20 per cent of the population.  Displacement at the hands of 
the LRA to this point then was significant in this part of Acholi. 
 
In Gulu District (at the time Acholiland west of the Aswa River), events were 
more dramatic.  The same period saw most of the population (ARLPI estimate 
80%) moved to camps by the UPDF, the displacement taking place on the 
instruction of President Museveni.  Beginning in mid-1996 the population was 
instructed to move to the main trading centres with little notice, and this was 
militarily enforced.  As a result of these actions, and despite contrary 
instructions from the LRA to move deeper into the bush (which people ignored 
at their peril), the civilian population was forced to abandon their homes and 
possessions, food, crops and livelihoods as directed by the army (HURIFO 
                                            
16 The two principal religious organisations from the community active for peace in the 
region. 
17 District boundaries have changed a number of times over the period in question. 
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2002: p15).  On arriving at the trading centres they found no provision for 
shelter, sanitation, water or food, and once located in the camps the UPDF 
announced that anyone found outside could be shot as a rebel collaborator—a 
message that the UPDF subsequently enforced (Rodriguez Soto 2009: pp102-
3).  Driven by government forces from their homes, and largely prevented from 
returning for food or belongings, large sections of the population became 
destitute.  On the basis of their on-the-ground observations throughout this 
period, and interview data, ARLPI believe that many children died during this 
period as a consequence (ARLPI and JPC 2001: 10; HURIFO 2002: 8; Branch 
2007b: 181; Branch 2011: 76-78). 
 
Subsequent years saw a continuing dramatic rise in displacement across the 
whole of Acholiland and some neighbouring areas, from under 110,000 in 1996, 
to over 500,000 in 2001 (Dolan 2011: 108).  Operation Iron Fist which began in 
March/April 2002, led subsequently to LRA reprisals upon civilians  which 
caused people to flee to the main centres, and Rodriguez records a further 48 
hour Government ultimatum to the population to leave their homes at the end of 
September 2002 (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 102, 106).  In that year those displaced 
rose to approximately 800,000, and by 2003 over 1.2 million people were 
displaced in the Acholi and Teso sub-regions (UNOCHA 2003: 12).  Following 
further LRA violence after Iron Fist II this rose again to approximately 1.6 million 
(over a larger geographical area) in 2004.  By this stage 90-95 per cent of the 
population of the Acholi sub-region were displaced, due to the violence of both 
armed groups (UNOCHA 2005a: 1).  This timing is significant, as it was in the 
middle of this year at the height of this emergency that the ICC Chief Prosecutor 
opened his investigation. 
 
4.2.1  Rationale 1—civilian protection 
 
Broadly, three rationales have been put forward to explain the creation of the 
camps.  The one most closely associated with an ‘official discourse’, as 
Finnström has critically observed, relates to civilian protection.  The population 
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were forced into the camps for their own protection, moving them to centres 
where the UPDF was better able to protect them.  However, any assumption 
that the army was principally occupied in defending the population has been 
contradicted by painstaking research.  Dolan has worked extensively with 
communities in northern Uganda recording people’s experiences of violence 
against themselves and their property between 1986 and 1999.  While the LRA 
is certainly revealed as the most active and brutal perpetrator, incidences of 
torture, rape, shootings, killing of relatives, and other crimes were often carried 
out by the UPDF (Dolan 2011: for example, 57-62).  From his extensive 
experience as a priest and peace activist in northern Uganda, Carlos Rodriguez 
Soto also records incidents of UPDF violence, including against children after 
2000 (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 101, 116-117).  Even as recently as 2005, during 
UPDF efforts to enforce ICC warrants, US government cables released through 
WikiLeaks indicate that the US ambassador required the Ugandan government 
to consult with him in advance if the UPDF intended to use US intelligence to 
commit war crimes (Hepple 2010). 
 
Further undermining the suggestion that the camps were created primarily to 
protect civilians, Branch and others have observed that although the UPDF 
detachment could provide some sense of security to the population, their 
numbers were often far too few to provide protection.  In some camps, there 
was less than one soldier per 1,000 inhabitants (Civil Society Organisations for 
Peace in Northern Uganda - CSOPNU 2004; Branch 2007b: 181)—sufficient to 
pose a threat to unarmed civilians taking the risk of returning to their homes for 
food or belongings, but insufficient to provide meaningful security in the event of 
an armed LRA attack. 
 
Additionally, the camps did not effectively prevent abduction.  The period before 
and after their creation was associated with intense violence against civilians by 
both sides.  In relation to abduction, a crime for which the LRA bears 
unequivocally by far the greatest responsibility, there was an ongoing failure of 
local, national and international agencies to successfully protect the civilian 
population.  This issue was highlighted nationally and internationally through 
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advocacy work by parents of those abducted throughout this period.  The failure 
of measures to prevent abduction was both consistent, and nationally and 
internationally publicised by the NGO of parents of abductees, the Concerned 
Parents Association (CPA).  UNICEF reported nearly 29,000 abductions 
between 1986 and 2001, nearly 13,000 of which had not returned, 5,500 of 
them children (Government of Uganda and UNICEF 2001).  While the period 
from 1999-2001 had shown reduced activity, UNOCHA reported 8,400 
abductions in the year from June 2002.  Despite periods of relative inactivity, 
the LRA’s practice of mass abduction was sustained during and following the 
creation of the camps.  Abduction by the LRA continued regardless of the 
community’s displacement to (or incarceration in) the camps. 
 
4.2.2  Rationale 2—prosecution of the war 
 
A second explanation for the government’s strategy concerns the prosecution of 
the war, with a combination of control of the civilian population and indifference 
to its plight.  By this reasoning confinement of the civilian population to the 
camps would allow the UPDF to hunt the rebels in the rural areas more freely 
(HURIFO 2002; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 103).  This aspect of the second 
rationale is also compatible with mainstream accounts; however, its implications 
depart significantly from the official discourse.  Amnesty International (AI) 
claimed that the LRA and UPDF were by this time competing for control rather 
than the support of the populace, and the camps facilitated government access 
to the people.  As AI state in their 1999 report, ‘The control of the civilian 
population is a strategic issue for the government’s Uganda Peoples’ Defence 
Forces (UPDF) as well as for the LRA.  This puts civilians of all ages at the 
heart of the conflict, rendering them especially vulnerable to human rights 
abuse by both sides’ (1999: 13-38).  This view is consistent with a speech made 
two years later by the Second Deputy Prime-Minister Moses Ali (a powerful 
figure in Museveni’s government).  He addressed a mixed audience including 
many local Acholi in Gulu following an LRA attack close by, in which children 
had been locked in a hut and burned to death.  As the Government 
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representative present, he addressed them directly about the event.  This was 
an audience that was palpably suffering a sense of shock, grief and deep 
anguish.  He denounced them, and the surrounding community from whom the 
children came, as the sea in which the LRA fish swim (ARLPI and JPC 2001: 
11; New Vision 2001).18  Such conduct stood as an eloquent and powerful 
expression of the government’s position in relation to civilians experiencing 
commonplace LRA atrocities; and it is consistent with other accounts of 
government conduct.  His statements were greeted with silence from the floor 
(Dolan 2011). 
 
4.2.3  Rationale 3—collective punishment 
 
A third view contends that the UPDF was not seeking to finish off the LRA or 
protect civilians, but to contain and sustain the war in the North, or at least 
tolerate its continuation (Mwenda 2010).  Some proponents of this interpretation 
cite the substantial backing received by the Ugandan Government from 
international sources that found its way into the military, the business interests 
of UPDF top brass in the well established war economy of northern Uganda, 
lingering ethnic antagonism within the Government towards the Acholi, and the 
persistent failure of the UPDF to deal a decisive blow to the LRA.  This account 
sees Government and UPDF actions as more actively hostile to the Acholi 
population (Dolan 2005; Dolan 2011: 144-150). 
 
In support of this view, it is clear that UPDF violence could not be put down to 
the indiscipline or the criminal acts of commanders alone.  Incidents of UPDF 
violence were not confined to the camps and remote areas, nor to instances of 
isolated brutality and killings.  Violations were at times flagrant and co-
ordinated, sometimes even occurring in the main population centres adjacent to 
                                            
18  Having been told of the atrocity shortly before Moses Ali’s speech in Gulu, as a 
member of the audience the researcher was deeply shocked.  Such a message, to the 
local population who hours before had suffered this appalling atrocity, was stark.  The 
deep silence with which it was greeted by the crowd, with neither forced applause nor 
remonstration, was equally powerful. 
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or even inside civil district headquarters.  For example in one military operation 
on the night of 16th September 2002, Gulu prison (the main prison in northern 
Uganda) was stormed by the army.19  Investigations revealed that one person 
had been extra-judicially executed by the army within the prison, while nineteen 
others were abducted (Lango, Acholi MPs Set Gov't Conditions 2002; AI 2002c; 
AI 2003; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 100-101).20  Civilians were already aware that 
UPDF violence against people commonly went unpunished.  These crimes were 
not isolated incidents of indiscipline, but clearly ordered, sanctioned or tolerated 
at a high level (HRW 2002a; ICG 2004; HRW 2005).  Human Rights Watch 
observed a ‘sharp decline’ in human rights observance by the Ugandan 
authorities in 2003 (HRW 2003b). 
 
Amidst co-ordinated military violence directed at civilians, this third view 
interprets the creation of the camps as a collective punishment visited upon the 
Acholi by the Government—‘Social Torture’ as Dolan has termed it.  This 
opinion was popular amongst those held in them. Interviews with camp 
residents reveal the intense suffering caused by their displacement (Lomo and 
Hovil 2004: 6-7; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 103-108; Dolan 2011).  Many spoke of 
damage to Acholi culture and way of life, as well as loss of their homes and 
livelihoods.  In the camps drunkenness and prostitution, suicide and HIV rates 
were all greatly increased.  It was quite common during this period to hear 
people talk of the Acholi ‘becoming finished’ as a people, and the LRA itself 
may have held this view (ARLPI and JPC 2001; Dolan 2011: 180, 220-221).21  
Olara Otunnu, the former UN Undersecretary-General and Special 
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, has characterised these events 
                                            
19 I was staying a few hundred yards from the prison at the time.  There was a 
prolonged exchange of gunfire audible across the town—it was clearly a significant 
military incident at the heart of the largest population centre of the region. 
20 I encountered another specific instance of such abuse close to the centre of town in 
the same period, though my notes on the event are incomplete.  After dark one 
evening while returning home I narrowly avoided becoming caught up in an incident.  A 
UPDF operation unfolded within a few hundred yards of me which culminated in 
gunshots.  Accounts supplied the following morning indicated that the bodies of a 
number of youths had been found close to the district police station, bound and 
executed.  I have not been able to trace reporting of this event. 
21 I heard this view reasonably commonly from civilians in the camps and main 
population centres in Acholiland, between 2000 and 2006.  
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as genocide, perpetrated by the Government; others have observed that they 
amount to international crimes (Otunnu 1998; Otunnu 2006; Branch 2007b: 
182; Dolan 2011: 150-153). 
 
Whether the camps were intended to have this effect or not, and whether the 
Government sanctioned or simply tolerated these impacts, they were facilitated 
and sustained by LRA atrocities and UPDF violence.  The huge rise in 
displacement over the period leading up to the ICC’s engagement greatly 
increased civilian death rates.  The health and mortality survey by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) and Ugandan Ministry of Health in 2005 estimated 
that 1,000 excess deaths per week were taking place amongst the displaced 
Acholi population, relative to a non-emergency situation.  Their survey included 
violent deaths, which at the hands of all sides were less than 10 per cent of the 
total.  In their words, the direct and indirect effects of displacement amounted to 
‘a very serious humanitarian emergency’ (Ministry of Health of Uganda and 
World Health Organisation 2005: iv).  There can be little doubt that population 
displacement to the camps was a central dynamic of the conflict during this 
period. 
 
4.2.4  Summary 
 
Interpretation of the Government’s motivations for creation and maintenance of 
the camps thus ranges from protection, through control, to punishment of the 
civilian population.  The difficulty of clearly distinguishing their intent may 
hamper our full understanding, though some conclusions can be drawn. 
 
The evidence of UPDF brutality generally, and during camp creation 
specifically, based on their massive expansion despite their disastrous impact 
on the civilian population, contradicts the protection hypothesis.  A policy 
designed to protect the civilian population would have precluded the UPDF from 
driving them at short notice from their homes using rape or armed coercion, or  
enforcing it with artillery and bombing by helicopter gunships as was the case; 
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neither would it neglect to offer them shelter, sanitation or other amenities even 
to the most vulnerable upon their arrival; nor would it use the threat of violence 
to prevent people returning to collect food or belongings.  Reducing large 
sections of the population to destitution reliant on emergency food aid is not 
consistent with a policy of protection.  The continuation of LRA abduction from 
1996 to 2002, and thus the failure of the camps to offer protection, is also 
pertinent.  Based on the evidence from the ground, the view that the creation 
and maintenance of the camps effectively protected the population, or was 
motivated by a desire to protect, is very difficult to sustain (ARLPI and JPC 
2001; Finnström 2008: 131-166; Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
 
Explanations relating to control of the population and military strategy against 
the LRA, or perhaps the insignificance of community interests relative to other 
strategic military and political priorities, are more plausible.  This is particularly 
the case if one believes that the Government was or became increasingly 
serious about trying to end the war.  Expansion of the camp system despite its 
catastrophic consequences for the population may have been due to ignorance 
(wilful or not); and the clearance of the countryside for hunting the LRA may 
have offered the prospect of military advantages, whether or not these were 
realised.  Yet given the scale of the crisis that unfolded between 1996 and 
2005, explanations based solely on control require an unusually high (though 
perhaps not unprecedented) level of ignorance and indifference to the suffering 
of the population in order to be plausible. 
 
Interpretations based on collective punishment of the Acholi people are 
consistent with the evidence put forward by local and international 
organisations, and researchers on the ground, before, during and after the 
creation of the camps.  Yet this view is not consistent with every act of the 
Government and UPDF.  One prominent counter example in this case is the 
increasingly positive role played by the UPDF from 2004 in receiving returning 
abductees and passing them to humanitarian agencies.  Another is the Ministry 
of Health’s collaboration with the World Health Organisation to produce the 
health and mortality survey in 2005.  The evidence thus seems to support an 
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understanding of the creation of the camps based on a mix of control and 
punishment of the civilian population, with elements of the Government and 
UPDF more or less hostile to the population; conscious, complacent or ignorant 
of their devastating impact.   
 
4.2.5  The camps—a crisis inflicted upon the community by government  
and LRA 
 
This section has brought us to the first of a number of fundamental observations 
about the conflict that, despite their primary importance in understanding the 
dynamics of the war and the abundance of evidence available, are frequently 
overlooked.  Central to the civilian experience of the war from the late 1990s 
was the brutally violent displacement of the Acholi population from their homes 
to the camps, at the hands of the Government and LRA.  This was associated 
with extraordinary levels of suffering and death; a defining aspect of the war and 
a crisis inflicted on civilians by both sides.  Though some have noted these 
dynamics, this understanding is largely absent from the official discourse 
(Mwenda 2010). 
 
4.3  The conflict dynamics—civilians were victims of both sides 
4.3.1  LRA politics and tactics—a rational strategy 
 
The LRA has often been caricatured as irrational in its behaviour, or as 
committing violence mindlessly.  These views are perhaps understandable in 
part as an emotional response to the intensity of the atrocities perpetrated, but 
they are deficient in important respects.  In developing its strategies to address 
the war it is important not to mischaracterise the LRA as random in its activities, 
inexplicable in its tactics and strategy, or motiveless in its origins.  After all, by 
2005 the LRA had sustained a military campaign for approaching 20 years, in 
an environment with little popular support (Dolan 2002; Olsen 2007).  This was 
achieved despite significant military pressure from the Ugandan, South 
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Sudanese, and Congolese armed forces working with international assistance.  
Throughout the period up to the mid-2000s the LRA remained able to 
destabilise large areas of Uganda, and to retaliate when attacked.   
 
Similarly, when patterns of LRA abduction are analysed they do not reveal 
inexplicable acts, but a strategic and rational (if cruel) approach based on the 
LRA’s requirements and the gender and age of the abductees (Blattman and 
Annan 2010: 154-155).  Large-scale atrocities at a national level may have 
served to indicate the LRA’s potency and ability to destabilise a region.  They 
were clearly used to punish communities or individuals for acquiescing with 
government instructions, while locally they could also have served to seal 
abductees into the bush, believing that their own crimes made their individual 
return to the civilian life impossible. 
 
In relation to its origins, others have documented evidence of the LRA’s political 
agenda in the aftermath of the NRA’s successful war in the 1980s.  However, 
the LRA’s identification of political grievances, such as the marginalisation of 
the North, extended into this century (Finnström 2008: 120-127; Schomerus 
2010; Dolan 2011: 83-85). 
 
To acknowledge that the LRA has or has had a political agenda does not of 
course demonstrate that it can make a legitimate claim to represent its 
purported constituency.  Through their practice of massacres, mutilation and 
brutality they have placed themselves beyond legitimate claims as 
representatives, while the political grievances of the north have remained.  But 
an understanding that Kony feels or felt himself left ‘holding the tail of the lion’, 
as he has expressed on local radio, abandoned by his supporters in a 
campaign against Government repression, is significant and relevant (Finnström 
2006b: 210-211; Finnström 2008: 99-130, 214-217; Branch 2010a; Dolan 2011: 
83-92). 
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4.3.2  Ugandan military spending 
 
Mwenda documents that defence spending by the Government, during a period 
of greatly increasing international donor support, rose from 42 million US dollars 
in 1992 to 88 million four years later, and then 110 million in 2001, 200 million in 
2004 and 260 million US dollars in 2010 (ICG 2004: 12; Mwenda 2010: 51).  As 
outlined above, between 1996 and 2004 the Acholi population was displaced to 
the camps, supposedly to clear the countryside for military engagement, and 
Operation Iron Fist was launched at a time when the UPDF was withdrawing 
from the DRC.  Setting aside exchange rate fluctuations this marks a period of 
greatly increased spending on the UPDF, and intensifying military engagement 
with the LRA and the community.  Yet during this escalation, LRA numbers, 
though hard to pin down and harder to compare given their exclusion or 
inclusion of dependents, do not show a clear trend, at least until 2004.  
Estimates from various sources have been compiled as follows: 3,000-4,000 
combatants in 1997; 1,000-1,100 in 2001; 2,000 in 2002; 2,000-3,000 fighters in 
2002; and roughly 3,000 total in 2004 (Gersony 1997; Weeks 2002; ICG 2004: 
5; Dolan 2011: 74).  Given the significant efforts to debilitate it, the group 
appeared to be rather resilient.  This might be explained to a significant degree 
by its ability to abduct thousands per year, and the absence of effective 
measures to address the practice, let alone prevent it.  Figures from UNOCHA 
in 2004 indicate that the LRA abducted 3,000 in the year to October 2004, 
bringing the total abducted to 21,000 (UNOCHA 2004: 1). 
 
The dramatic increase in Ugandan military spending had apparently not yet 
resulted in a comparable change in fortunes for the LRA.  By late 2004 it may 
be that the dynamic new context of the war was changing this balance, and this 
is discussed in 6.2 in more detail. 
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4.3.3  UPDF measures of success 
 
One result of the LRA’s requirement to sustain its numbers, its inability to recruit 
voluntarily, and the ease with which it was able to abduct, was that most of its 
numbers were abductees.  Some have suggested that the proportion of 
abductees within the LRA ranks is as high as 90% or even more, and 
characterised all these abductees as children.  Such claims and generalities are 
not always well referenced, and may owe something to the requirements of 
strong and clear advocacy messaging (Allen 2006b: 63).22  Research indicates 
that abduction by the LRA included adults and children for the short-term 
carrying of loot, often followed by release (UNOCHA 2003; Allen 2005; Allen 
2006b: 60-71).  However, abduction for longer periods was more often 
associated with those under 18.  Additionally, as some abductees could remain 
in the bush for many years, some abducted as youths became adults within the 
LRA, and thus the characterisation of an ‘army of abducted children’ needs 
some qualification.  As suggested in 4.1.7, while the exact proportion of 
abductees within the LRA is not known, conservative estimates suggested a 
figure of around 80% (Blattman and Annan 2010).23   
 
With this in mind, the means by which success was measured by the UPDF is 
significant.  The UPDF has consistently reported its progress in terms of 
numbers of LRA ‘combatants’ killed, or the small numbers of LRA remaining 
(New Vision 2002; Ojwee 2002b; Ojwee and Moro 2002; ICG 2004: 14; 
Rodriguez Soto 2009: p161).  This makes perfect sense provided one regards 
all LRA members as simply a military opponent.  With roughly 80% of the LRA 
being abductees, this measure is a clear illustration that the UPDF’s military 
campaign was not seeking to serve the interests of the affected population.  Any 
                                            
22 Allen refers to a press release issued by the ICC in 2004.  This appears to have been 
removed from their web site.  The ICC analysis paper on the Northern Uganda 
situation has also been removed from their site.  My requests for information 
concerning the ICC’s analysis of the LRA conflict prior to its warrants have not elicited 
any responses. 
23 Given the length of the war, other children and potential fighters in the LRA were 
born there, and may have no wider conception of their wider circumstance.  The 
degree of culpability of many within the LRA for their crimes is complex. 
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military engagement intended to benefit a community would not assess its 
success by the number of abducted members of that population it had managed 
to kill, and how few of those who had been abducted remained alive. 
 
4.3.4  The conflict dynamics—a cycle of abduction and killing 
 
Elements of the case study described so far can now be brought together to 
illustrate the central military dynamic of the conflict.  Although this analysis is 
based upon largely uncontested material, the clarification of the conflict dynamic 
that naturally arises from it is routinely omitted from the official discourse (and 
the literature more generally). 
 
In the context of the LRA sustaining its numbers through abduction 
(acknowledging the complexities implied by that term), claims by the UPDF of 
its success in killing combatants were often greeted on the ground with dismay.  
The notion that this was linked to a reduction in LRA numbers was generally 
met with scepticism.24  This was because, as explained in 4.1.7, 4.1.9 and 
4.3.2, the LRA had for the preceding decade or two been able to abduct 
hundreds, sometimes thousands of replacements largely unhindered by UPDF 
interference.  Higher LRA death rates simply indicated a faster death rate 
amongst abductees, necessitating a faster rate of (unimpeded) abduction, and 
had little if any impact on overall LRA numbers.  This much could be observed 
from the data for the decade up to 2004. 
 
Work by Blattman and Annan (2010) has helped to quantify this phenomenon, 
and while it is appropriate to express caution in relation to the general 
applicability of the quantification from a single study, its findings match the 
                                            
24  Reading the Ugandan press between 2000 and 2006 I observed that the capture or 
killing of LRA members was frequently poorly reported.  Firstly repeated reporting of 
the same event gave the perception of multiple incidents, while consistently hubristic 
accounts of the LRA’s debilitation and imminent demise proved inaccurate.  The 
identification of LRA members returning alive was frequently presented as the rescue 
of abductees, while those who were killed were identified as combatants.  Rodrigues 
(2009) gives multiple examples of these practices in his account. 
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broad community experience substantiated thus far.  Blattman and Annan’s 
study indicates that in their sample, 80 per cent of those who were abducted did 
return.  Their analysis revealed the fate of abductees as follows: of the overall 
total, 64 per cent escaped, 20 per cent died (or in a minority of cases remained 
alive in the LRA), 12 per cent were released by the LRA, and 4 per cent were 
captured by the UPDF.  It is clear then that the principal action reducing LRA 
numbers was escape; death from any cause but including UPDF action was a 
second but far less frequent outcome; while the outcomes one might hope for if 
the militarised factions were concerned with community welfare—release by the 
LRA or capture by the UPDF—were the least likely scenarios (Blattman and 
Annan 2010).  These dynamics are expressed in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.  The central military dynamic of the LRA war 
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There had for the preceding decade been a well established and devastating 
dynamic between the LRA and UPDF in which civilians suffered at the hands of 
both parties.  The LRA with Sudanese support was able to abduct children and 
adults and sustain its numbers; the UPDF, with international backing principally 
from the US, sought to kill LRA fighters (often the abductees) as enemy 
combatants.  These forces were in balance for the previous decade or more: 
the LRA able to capture and train fresh abductees to make up for its overall 
losses (by all means) faster than the UPDF was able to kill them.  Both sides 
were able to increase the intensity of this violence by launching offensives, 
Operation Iron Fist and the LRA reprisals being notable examples.  Offensives 
had thus promoted the rate of killing and abduction, without decisively affecting 
the dynamic.  UPDF violence never succeeded in killing enough of the LRA (the 
abductees) quickly enough to deliver a decisive blow; and with abduction 
unhindered, the LRA had always been capable of replenishing its numbers 
forcibly from the civilian population.  This cycle in which the population was 
trapped, being abducted by one side only to be killed by the other was, after 
displacement to the camps, the second key element of the war.  It is also largely 
absent from the mainstream accounts, one International Crisis Group (ICG) 
paper being a notable exception, where it is briefly articulated (2004: 14).  
These figures are in broad agreement with a local study by the religious leaders 
and others at this time (ARLPI et al. 2003). 
 
As one would expect, civilian proposals to establish a route out of this impasse 
involved neither intensifying the violence against themselves, nor killing their 
abducted relatives.  Their approach reflected their experience of the conflict, 
observing that escape was the main means by which LRA numbers were 
reduced.  Blattman and Annan’s findings that return was the principal route out 
of the LRA, broadly similar to estimates reported by Dolan, provide a compelling 
rationale for community supported civil society approaches to addressing the 
conflict (Dolan 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; Blattman and Annan 2010).  
 
In addressing the conflict through community-based non-violent means there 
were considerable obstacles to overcome, not least the spending preferences of 
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the Ugandan Government and international donors.  The escalation in funding 
available for the UPDF has already been outlined in 4.3.2.  Figures from the 
Ministry of Finance, quoted by the International Crisis Group in 2004 indicate a 
Ugandan defence budget of over US$200m, from a national budget of 
US$1.52bn.  The war in northern Uganda would undoubtedly have represented 
a significant proportion of defence spending (ICG 2004: 12).  Meanwhile the 
most prominent organisations promoting return included ARLPI and the Justice 
and Peace Commission of Gulu Archdiocese, operating with a small number of 
dedicated staff and local volunteers out of tiny offices, and using for the most 
part bicycles and a few vehicles (including this researcher’s), that were often 
borrowed or time-shared with other projects.  Their annual budgets were 
broadly in the region of US$100,000, and often much less.25  Although local 
efforts to promote and support the escape of abductees (to be described below) 
were largely un-resourced, escape was far more successful a means of 
reducing LRA numbers than all other processes put together.  In contrast, 
evidence of escape being significantly associated with UPDF military 
engagement is largely lacking.  Local research in 2002 suggested that 6% of 
returnees escaped during a military attack, though it is not known how many 
deaths these attacks were associated with (ARLPI et al. 2003: 13).  Starkly put, 
the evidence that is available seems to suggest that it was hundreds of times 
cheaper to get an abductee out of the LRA alive than dead.  The affected 
communities presented an alternative approach to ending the war.  This is the 
focus of the next section. 
 
4.4  Civil society activism in a three-sided conflict (2000-2006) 
 
Based on this discussion, it is clearly unhelpful to characterise the war as 
between adversaries on behalf of the civilian population (the UPDF) and against 
it (the LRA).  This description is incomplete in its understanding of the origins 
and behaviour of the LRA; and it does not help us understand the UPDF’s 
                                            
25 From 2000 and 2006 I was involved with assisting local peace organisations 
including ARLPI and others secure and manage funding for their programmes.    
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actions in seeking to control or punish, rather than protect, civilians.  It is also 
mistaken in its portrayal of only two active sides in the conflict with opposing, 
principally military, visions for its conclusion.  Supported by civil society actors, 
the role of the civilian population was not simply as victims of both sides, but as 
constructively engaged in generating a different vision for how the conflict might 
be ended, and furthering the means to do so (Armstrong 2010). 
 
The systematic military abuses by both sides against the civilian population 
have been widely observed, and even on that basis alone one could argue that 
the term ‘three-sided conflict’ is clearly applicable to the LRA war.  The following 
section goes further, and illustrates not only the separate interests of each 
group, but also their distinct strategies for engagement and ending the war - the 
two being military and the third being a civil course of action.  The status of 
protagonist in a conflict is often conferred through their use of violence.  By 
contrast in this case it is appropriate that the community facilitated by key civil 
society institutions be recognised as the third party, with distinct and different 
interests, strategy and engagement in this war.  The ‘three-sided’ term is not 
intended to preclude the possibility of further actors, nor to obscure the diversity 
of views present in each party.  It denotes agency and a degree of common 
purpose or coherent action, which in the civil case alone was non-violent 
(Branch 2005). 
 
4.4.1  Civilian peace activism 
 
Diverse approaches to justice in Africa have already been noted, in relation to 
the discussion of fundamental justice concepts (1.2.4).  In northern Uganda, 
community efforts supported by key civil society actors for peace and justice 
rested upon a holistic understanding of justice concepts, encompassing 
deontological and consequentialist themes, and restorative as well as retributive 
processes.  Grievances underpinning the conflict had their roots in the divisive 
colonial and post-colonial settlements, and reparative and redistributive notions.  
Through the suffering imposed upon the population by the camps and the 
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conflict dynamic these concerns were heightened.  Communities deprived of 
necessities of life such as food and clean water, their homes, livelihoods, and 
security for remaining family members, perceived justice remedies far more 
immediate and profound than retribution.  In the first instance they sought food, 
and peace, which represented the possibility of the restoration of the 
necessities of life (Pham et al. 2005: 4). 
 
In pursuit of these goals, restorative approaches to justice with these 
consequentialist priorities were emphasised, as they have been elsewhere in 
Africa (see 1.2.4).  Pain’s work in the 1990s was prominent in promoting 
traditional leaders’ use of reconciliation mechanisms to foster restorative justice 
approaches to addressing the conflict (Pain 1997).  Local traditional justice 
mechanisms, including mato oput, tong gweno, and gomo tong emphasised 
restorative means to achieve roco wat—the restoration of relationships (Baines 
2007).   
 
Such approaches have been thoroughly researched and critiqued, in relation to 
their suitability for the purpose.  Doubts have been articulated over whether 
mato oput, for example, as an inter-clan mechanism for conflict resolution and 
the restoration of relationships, could ever adequately resolve what was 
undoubtedly a much broader and more serious issue.  Equally, an erosion of 
the authority of male elders over the decades of war had taken place.  The 
corresponding emphasis placed by Pain on the reinstatement of their authority 
in order that they might address the national and internal Acholi turmoil might be 
unrealistic, or counterproductive.  The social order that the male elders 
represent upheld systems of power and privilege that were to some degree 
entangled with the political origins of the war itself.  Some have suggested that 
the crisis of Acholi society that the war represented may have been an 
opportunity for social reform.  By contrast, the intervention of external agencies 
in support of their re-imposition (or indeed invention and imposition), might 
simply be a further imposition that would restrict local political agency.  Of less 
relevance perhaps than their utility, were claims that reconciliation practices 
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were or were not authentic  (Dolan 2000a; Allen 2005: 65; Allen 2006b; 
Finnström 2008: 197-232; Allen 2010; Branch 2011: 154-178).  
 
Many of these criticisms and concerns have merit.  The circumstances of 
existential crisis and catastrophic violence facing the Acholi people may have 
presented an opportunity for progressive social reform.  However, the priorities 
voiced by people were primarily for food and peace, and not the restructuring of 
Acholi social systems.  The male-led religious and traditional leaderships, which 
were thrust to the fore by the circumstance of the war, and doubtless used 
external interventions to entrench their power in some instances, were also 
seeking to address the issues of most profound concern to their communities, 
and engaged in securing the return of LRA abductees from the bush alive.  The 
transient external support for these institutions from NGOs and others, which 
were in all probability associated with some social ills, were aligned with a 
locally conceived and led non-violent strategy to change the strategic course of 
the conflict.  The work of the religious and traditional leaders in campaigning for 
and securing the Amnesty Law in 2000, for example, reflected a 
consequentialist approach to justice, prioritising what communities demanded 
most urgently (ARLPI and JPC 2001; ARLPI et al. 2003; ARLPI 2004).   
 
Despite the work of Dolan, Branch, Rodriguez and others, community-backed 
civil society efforts to end the conflict have too often been marginalised or 
omitted in mainstream accounts of the war, and military efforts to end the 
conflict have eclipsed non-violent initiatives (Rodriguez 2004a; Branch 2005; 
Dolan 2005; Rodriguez Soto 2009; Branch 2010a; Dolan 2011).  As is 
demonstrated elsewhere (forthcoming article under revision prior to 
resubmission), the civilian population has even been mistakenly characterised 
in the literature principally as victims whose efforts to end the war had failed, 
and who were awaiting rescue (Akhavan 2005).  This does not reflect the depth 
and breadth of civil activity that took place, and the extent to which it provided 
an alternative approach to resolving the conflict, opposed to violent LRA and 
government strategies.  Nor does it acknowledge the many victims of the 
violence who heeded the calls for restraint in dealing with those who had 
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wronged them, subordinated their desire for revenge and recrimination, or 
participated in activities to promote peace and restore relationships, in many 
cases at great personal cost or risk to themselves.26 
 
The civilian response to the conflict can be seen as shaped by their experience 
of abduction and atrocities, killings by both sides, displacement and 
impoverishment over the preceding decades.  Civil society efforts focused on 
seeking to end these dynamics: community-based research that highlighted the 
civilian experience of the war; prevention of abduction, and the return of 
abductees alive, free from the fear of prosecution by the authorities; forgiveness 
and reintegration of former combatants; contacts with the LRA that might turn 
the return process into a powerful dynamic that could help to end the conflict; 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, as opposed to the use of violence 
by either side; an end to confinement in the camps; and the chance to return to 
their homes, land and livelihoods.  Accepting individuals’ desire for revenge, the 
civilian population by 2000 longed for an end to the war—and to the abduction, 
killings, atrocities and displacement, that continued to affect them so severely 
(Branch 2004: 17; Branch 2005; Pham et al. 2005; Worden 2008: 4; Rodriguez 
Soto 2009).  This desire for peace is overwhelmingly reflected in the activities of 
civilian actors (ARLPI and JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; ARLPI 
2004).  Restorative justice measures were a strategic response by the 
community that presented the possibility of securing peace; it was one which 
did not require the violence against the civilians that was generally associated 
with military efforts. 
  
                                            
26 Travelling and working with civil society leaders I observed widespread and popularly 
supported calls for peace through return of combatants to the civilian life, and heard 
descriptions from returnees of their fear of reprisals from community members.  I also 
received accounts of terrible acts of revenge, and others of enormous compassion or 
great tolerance. 
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4.4.2  Community-based research  
 
In developing an understanding of the conflict informed by the population, 
organisations like the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development 
(ACORD) which supported Dolan’s research, HURIFO, ALRPI and JPC were 
prominent.  Each was active in research that highlighted aspects of the conflict, 
and each is referenced in this chapter.  A key strength of their approach was 
their data collected from the war-affected population and accompanying 
analysis.  Equally important was their close engagement with victims of the 
violence through multiple initiatives to support their interests.  This close 
community link and constancy of presence during the war resulted in in-depth 
understanding, and explains in part the congruence of their analyses. 
 
This congruence extended to shared understanding of the experience of 
civilians, role and conduct of the UPDF, obstruction of civil society peace efforts 
by the government, and the brutal creation and devastating impact of the 
camps.  The publications Let My People Go (ARLPI and JPC 2001), Between 
Two Fires (HURIFO 2002), and Seventy Times Seven (ARLPI et al. 2003) were 
particularly important in emphasising people’s demand to be released from the 
camps, for human rights to be respected by both sides, and for implementation 
of the Amnesty Law.  Justice and Peace News, the monthly JPC newsletter that 
was the only regular publication about the war from within the war-affected 
area, was published in two languages in print and email, and was widely 
circulated nationally and internationally.  It provided a chronology of events 
compiled from reports from the ground that was in sharp contrast to accounts in 
the government controlled New Vision newspaper.  Between 2001 and 2002 the 
ARLPI web site www.acholpeace.org (now closed) disseminated reports from 
communities of violent incidents, often on the day the news reached the 
religious leaders (the author was managing this site at the time).  These aspects 
of the war—ones that are informed by people’s experience of it—are central to 
an accurate understanding of what took place.  They indicate a profoundly 
different understanding to the binary and military-focused account of the conflict 
that has commonly circulated in the media and internationally.   
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4.4.3  Return and amnesty 
 
The experience of abduction, particularly of girls from St. Mary’s College, Aboke 
in 1996, led Angelina Atyam and other parents to form the Concerned Parents 
Association (CPA), a group of parents of those who had been abducted.27  The 
emphasis of this group’s activities was on advocacy for the prevention of 
abduction and the return of the abductees alive.  Their local, national and 
international work was significant in raising the profile of the conflict. 
 
The issue of the return of abductees, as opposed to their being killed in combat 
as LRA members, or punished for their crimes following their return by military, 
community members, or legal authorities (Finnström 2008: for example 9), also 
underpinned the work of ALRPI, JPC and others.  In campaigning for an 
Amnesty Law they sought to give abductees a right to return from the bush 
without fear of legal redress for their crimes.  Against determined opposition 
from the government, and President Museveni in particular who initially 
opposed the move (Odong 2002; Allen 2005: 21,32-33; Pham et al. 2005: 49), 
this civil society campaign gained support from the international community and 
was in the end successful in securing the Amnesty Act at the end of 1999 
(Dolan 2011: 51). 
 
Painstaking work over the following years sought to establish this route out of 
the LRA, for the abductees and any who would renounce rebellion, as a reality 
on the ground.  Even after the passing of the Amnesty Act, the government’s 
obstructionism continued (Pham et al. 2005: 49).28  The Commission was not 
                                            
27 The author worked with Godfrey Orac, co-ordinator of the Gulu office of CPA from 
2000-2003, and have remained in contact with him.  Accounts of the conflict from the 
perspective of parents of the abductees, as well as witnessing Angelina’s passionate 
advocacy for the return of abductees and the protection of Acholi children from 
abduction, deepened my understanding of the conflict dynamic.  From 2000-2002 I 
also worked to support the development of a vocational school which sought to give 
former abductees skills and help returnees reintegrate into civilian life. 
28 Notwithstanding the grave concerns about the methodology used in this population-
based survey, discussed in section 6.2.2. 
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properly resourced and was extremely slow to get off the ground (Dolan 2011: 
99-100).  It was not until 2001 that the first Amnesty Commission offices in Gulu 
and Kitgum, funded by the European Union, were tasked with the process of 
issuing amnesty certificates to returnees.  In the period from 2000-2003/4 
political foot-dragging by the government was complemented by UPDF 
obstruction of communication with the LRA groups seeking to return (Pham et 
al. 2005: 46-49; Rodriguez Soto 2009; Dolan 2011: 53). The lack of respect for 
the law shown by the UPDF, such as the prison storming, executions, and 
killing of the occasional returnee by the army, may also have served to 
discourage the process. 
 
By contrast, local NGOs aided by some international partners supported this 
process, disseminating information about the amnesty on the ground through 
local networks, by using leaflets, radio stations in Gulu and Juba particularly, 
and other means.  The amnesty was popular on the ground and local groups 
were active in this work, using songs and dances to further spread the message 
(Lomo and Hovil 2004: 6, 60-65).  ARLPI, JPC and others established a 
network of Peace Committees throughout the Acholi region in almost every 
displaced people’s camp, and facilitated them to promote the possibility of 
amnesty, return, and reintegration.  Persuading young people, and others, that 
return was an option should they be abducted was one element; however, 
reaching those within the LRA and overcoming their mistrust (and LRA 
disinformation) was a significant challenge.  This intensive work commenced 
between 2001 and 2002. 
 
In addition to Government obstructionism, and consistent with an understanding 
of the conflict as three-sided, the LRA also made significant efforts to counter 
the amnesty message: radios were confiscated, available only to more senior 
commanders; and abductees were taken north into Sudan, far from 
opportunities to escape.  There they could be held for years before being 
selected to return to Uganda as LRA combatants.  There are also accounts of 
groups of abductees being forced by the LRA to witness the brutal torture and 
killing of those who had unsuccessfully sought to escape.  This was done as an 
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example and warning to others.  Some interviews with escapees indicate that 
they had little expectation that they would survive their effort to return, fearing 
death at the hands of other LRA members, the military (perceiving them to be 
active LRA members), or communities seeking revenge (Allen 2006b: 75; CR 
and QPSW 2006; Blattman and Annan 2010: 140-143).29   The LRA continues 
to abduct hundreds of people each year (HRW 2010b: 39; Invisible Children 
2014). 
 
Despite Government ambivalence and LRA opposition, 4,000-5,000 or more 
LRA members had returned and applied for amnesty by 2004 (Allen 2006b: 75; 
Dolan 2011: 100).  This figure is a fraction of the total number of returnees; 
indeed, local research compiled in mid-2002 found that only 1.6% of their 
sample of returnees had received amnesty packages, and fewer still amnesty 
certificates (ARLPI et al. 2003: 15-16)30.  It is surprising then that effectiveness 
of the return process overall is often crudely and inaccurately equated with that 
of the institutionalised amnesty and resettlement numbers, which grew 
considerably between 2002 and 2006.  Official figures tended to significantly 
underestimate the number of returnees.  This further highlights the 
effectiveness of securing the return of the abductees alive as a means to 
reduce LRA numbers, as opposed to killing them (ibid). 
 
Allen suggests that the increase in return rate of LRA abductees from 2002 may 
have been in part due to UPDF activity in Sudan, as well as radio broadcasts.  
                                            
29 These observations were in accounts by returnees given to me at the time.  I was 
one of the team that developed the Conciliation Resources ‘Coming Home’ report, my 
role encompassing formulation of the original concept, and collaboration in all aspects 
of the research, its dissemination, and application.  Through interviews with returnees 
from the LRA the work identified why abductees remained in the LRA, what facilitated 
their choice to leave, how they escaped.  It was formulated with the local peace 
organisations involved in promoting return and amnesty, and was primarily used to 
strengthen their strategies for fostering peace in Uganda, and Sudan.  Published by 
Conciliation Resources, it was a collaboration between Ugandan and UK peace 
organisations. 
30 By mid-2002 the amnesty process was starting to gain momentum.  However, before 
that time this local research revealed that a considerable proportion of returnees went 
directly back to their villages, avoiding both the amnesty process and the support 
programmes run by NGOs. 
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However, the civil processes encouraging return in Uganda, actively promoted 
by local leaders and linked to the use of radio messaging, seems to provide a 
more powerful explanation.  First, unlike the UPDF’s war in Sudan, the civil 
society return process took place in Uganda where return was accelerating.31  
LRA commanders were starting to come out of the bush with their fighters, 
through local Church contacts, as early as March 2001.  This was a year before 
the UPDF entered Sudan with Operation Iron Fist (Allen 2006b: 75; Rodriguez 
Soto 2009: 8-18).  Additionally, though continuing to operate in Uganda, the 
LRA’s movement of its bases into southern Sudan from the late 1990s or early 
2000s may have been a response to the need to prevent escape and the return 
of fighters to the community.  We know from accounts on the ground at the 
time, figures compiled about the amnesty process, and academic studies that, 
the return process was a much greater cause of loss to the LRA than death or 
capture by the military, this seems a more plausible explanation (Rodriguez 
Soto 2009, Blattman and Annan 2010, Dolan 2011).  Despite the likelihood that 
this more impactful process could have had the greater influence, this possibility 
is not mentioned in the literature.  All accounts that the researcher has 
encountered suggest military pressure was principally responsible, without 
discussion (Etengu 2001; Ojwee 2002a; ICG 2004: 7-8; Akhavan 2005; HRW 
2011b: 29).  In so far as reduction in LRA numbers played a part, the belief that 
the Ugandan military were responsible for prompting the LRA’s move to Sudan 
is founded upon an assumption: that the approach with considerably less 
impact on LRA numbers was by far the most influential.  This unsupported belief 
in military efficacy, contrary to evidence, is deployed as the foundation for a 
further claim, to be examined in the next chapter. 
 
4.4.4  Toleration and reintegration 
 
In addition to securing the Amnesty Law, seeking its effective implementation, 
and facilitating practical means of return for those in the bush, community 
                                            
31 Informed by the Ugandan civil society strategy to achieve peace through the return 
process, I worked on the ground intermittently in South Sudan seeking to support the 
development of additional local radio messaging in 2005 and 2006. 
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leaders were active in nurturing the civil society willingness to receive and 
accept the returnees.  ARLPI and JPC organised New Year peace rallies, public 
meetings, peace prayers and remembrance events (sometimes directly 
following atrocities) calling for an end to the violence and for the respect of 
human rights, but also for return of abductees and their acceptance and 
reintegration.  Religious leaders instructed and implored communities to forgive 
those who had wronged them, and reminded them that their own children who 
had been abducted would also require such forgiveness in order to return.  
Though Allen has pointed out that the Acholi capacity to forgive has often been 
exaggerated, this advice was part of an effort to create an environment to which 
abductees could return—one in which, if they were not universally forgiven or 
even accepted, they were at least tolerated and could achieve some level of 
personal security (Allen 2006b: 128-131). 
 
Such efforts complemented other work by civil society groups, promoting 
reconciliation and reintegration.  The activities of the Rwodi (traditional chiefs), 
and their NGO Ker Kwaro Acholi were prominent and significant.  The informed 
critiques of these processes have been indicated (4.4.1), but nonetheless they 
were a significant aspect of civil society peacebuilding associated with the 
strategic practice of supporting reconciliation and promoting the return and 
acceptance of abductees.  As an element of the civil peacebuilding strategy, 
there is some clear evidence of their effectiveness (Binomugisha 2010). 
 
Established and relatively well resourced Ugandan NGOs such as Gulu Support 
the Children Organisation (GUSCO) and Kitgum Concerned Women’s 
Association (KICWA) were instrumental in providing returnees with 
accommodation and psychosocial support following their return, and supporting 
reunion with their families or otherwise being returned to the community.  
Thousands of returnees passed through their facilities on their route back from 
the LRA (HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; UNOCHA 2004). 
 
Other civil society efforts complemented this work, and at a local level there 
were numerous small-scale self-help initiatives or small business set up by 
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those who had returned, Kica Ber being one example in Gulu.  Projects also 
offered vocational training to returnees and others, including Gulu Community 
Vocational School (GCVS), St. Monica’s tailoring and vocational school, and 
others.  These efforts may not always have been well integrated with all other 
efforts, and were in most cases greatly under-resourced; however, they 
represent further civil society engagement in supporting return, resettlement 
and reintegration. 
 
4.4.5  Contact and mediation 
 
ARLPI and JPC also carried out a significant amount of work encouraging 
reconciliation at the local level throughout this period, including between the 
Acholi and neighbouring tribes.  The Peace Committees already mentioned 
(4.4.3) were able to act as a bridge between the religious leaders and local 
officials who in many cases were amongst their members.  They in their turn 
were able to be contact points for aspiring LRA returnees, facilitating their safe 
emergence from the bush.  But this network’s activities were not confined to 
assisting the return of individuals.  The religious leaders had begun to engage 
active LRA commanders in the bush in dialogue.  By promoting the possibility of 
amnesty they facilitated the return of commanders, together with those under 
their command.  The return of Onekomon Kikoco from Sudan with a group of 
twelve (formerly abducted) fighters in March 2001 was perhaps the first 
prominent example.  As attested earlier, the religious leaders were consistent 
throughout this period and up to the present, in advocating dialogue and 
rehabilitation over violent military enforcement and retribution, as the means to 
bring peace (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 1-18; ARLPI 2013). 
 
Due to the violent and unpredictable behaviour of the LRA such efforts were of 
course extremely risky, and the possibility of disruption and sabotage of this 
process by the government/UPDF increased these dangers.  These activities, 
and efforts to obstruct them, have been described in some detail by Rodriguez, 
though their potential to alter the dynamics of the conflict, particularly if they had 
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been adequately resourced and enabled, has been otherwise neglected in the 
literature.  From 2002, increasing numbers were returning.  Initially through the 
release of women and children to local religious leaders, groups of 31 and 94 
had returned in mid-2002.  By 2003 contacts with LRA commanders became 
more frequent (Rodriguez Soto 2009).  Through multiple escape, return or 
release processes, by individuals and groups, through unofficial and sometimes 
official channels, by December 2005 statistics from the Amnesty Commission 
indicated that more than 10,000 had received their amnesty certificates in the 
Acholi region (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 39).  This number is of course much larger 
than the estimates of LRA ‘fighters’ remaining in the bush, which as we have 
seen rarely numbered more than 3,000.  Although complicated by numerous 
factors, including time in the bush and verifiability of return, this nevertheless 
represented a strategic shift in the dynamic of the war by any measure. 
 
These local efforts—promoting an understanding of the conflict based on the 
community’s experience; calling for release of the population from the camps; 
enabling contact, mediation and return from the LRA with amnesty for the 
abductees; and a measure of tolerance and reintegration—can therefore be 
seen to form a coherent alternative non-violent approach to addressing the 
conflict and ending the war.  It was one that by 2005 was achieving 
considerable success.  With the possibility that the third side in the war might 
secure its objectives and end the conflict in a manner consistent with its own 
interests, it is perhaps not surprising that it was obstructed by the Government 
and opposed by the LRA. 
 
4.4.6  Civilian peace activism—the third way 
 
The essential point emerging from this section is that civilian efforts to end the 
war were significant, and in sharp contrast to the violent approaches 
emphasised by the other two sides.  Informed by a strong analysis of the 
conflict, from the perspective of those communities who were victims of it, they 
were strategic, and effective measures were being implemented despite hugely 
   
185 
inadequate resources.  This is not to say that they were always successful, or 
well co-ordinated and executed, but they were a practical alternative for how 
peace and justice could be attained without killing the abductees, and by 2004 
this civil society approach was having a significant impact (CSOPNU 2007).   
 
Local approaches to attaining peace and justice were thus characterised by the 
following: 
1. Broad-based plans developed and activities implemented by 
communities affected by the violence across the region, by community 
leaders, whether from religious denominations, traditional leaders, or 
community-based projects and organisations for the promotion of 
human rights. 
2. Rejection of the violence of both armed groups and prioritisation of the 
interests of communities affected by the violence, rather than primacy 
being given to one aspect of a larger national or international political or 
military strategy. 
3. A non-violent strategy for peace specific to that conflict, and rooted in 
the experience of its dynamics, that promoted a return process for 
abductees/rebels, founded upon the principle that they should renounce 
rebellion, return and claim amnesty.  This was complemented by 
leaders’ widespread engagement with communities to receive and 
tolerate or support returnees, and their on-the-ground negotiations with 
rebel groups to secure their participation. 
4. A demand that people should be allowed to return from the camps to 
their homes immediately according to their wish, in accordance with 
international law as a restoration of their human rights. 
5. A broad view of justice that sprang from the recognition of many 
decades of injustice, which saw the cessation of violence and the 
rebuilding of relationships as central.  It included within it the human 
rights of the affected civilians, including the abductees.  This contrasted 
markedly with others’ approaches that proposed the extension of 
retributive approaches, focused on a narrow view of justice to address 
specific grievances, and sought its achievement through violence.   
   
186 
 
4.5  Other avenues to peace (2004-2010) 
 
March 2004 operation Iron Fist 2 was launched, and military efforts to 
defeat the LRA in southern Sudan were redoubled.  However, as 
previously described, the LRA was by now considerably weakened by 
the Ugandan return process, which was gaining momentum.  The way 
was cleared for almost all LRA members to return to civilian life, under 
the legal protection of the Amnesty Law, and with increasing contacts 
making this possible there was optimism in northern Uganda that the 
conflict might end (UNOCHA 2004: 1).   
 
By May 2004 Bigombe had once again become involved, moving between 
Kampala, Juba, Gulu and other more remote destinations in order to 
communicate with LRA negotiators.  In November that year she was able to 
secure a seven-day cessation of UPDF military operations to facilitate contacts, 
and contacts had intensified by the year end with another truce.  Further talks 
continued into 2005, with a longer ceasefire in February (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 
230-246).  However, this promising momentum was not sustained.  Two LRA 
commanders, Onen Kamdulu and Sam Kolo (who had a prominent role in the 
negotiation process on the LRA side), defected from the LRA (Allen and 
Vlassenroot 2010: 17), and amidst warnings from Bigombe that ICC warrants 
could threaten the talks (ICG 2005a; ICG 2005b; ICG 2005c: 5), security 
deteriorated and the war resumed (UNOCHA 2005b).  Significant efforts by 
Bigombe continued through much of 2005, though her contacts with LRA 
representatives were intermittently obstructed by the UPDF (Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 246).  The Bigombe process was to close later that year, under 
circumstances to be discussed later in this thesis (6.3.1). 
 
However, the opening for negotiations remained at this time, presented by the 
difficult situation for the LRA on the ground and further developments in Sudan.  
In January 2005 the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (SCPA) was 
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signed in Nairobi (UN Mission in Sudan - UNMIS 2005), and SPLA forces were 
able to turn their attention to securing their newly defined territory.  Within the 
year the LRA had transferred their main bases into the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), principally in the Garamba National Park (ICG 2006b), and face 
to face engagement with them was soon resumed.  In May 2006 Riek Machar, 
South Sudan’s Vice President, met with Kony in Garamba—an event that was 
filmed and broadcast by Reuters.  Events rapidly gathered pace, and a month 
later the Juba talks commenced with significant international support, mediated 
by the Government of South Sudan and the Community of Sant’Egidio, and 
attended by the Ugandan Government and a delegation of LRA representatives 
(Rodriguez Soto 2009: 247-266).  The ICC’s influence on these and subsequent 
events will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
  
4.6  Recent events from December 2008 
 
While this thesis focuses upon the conflict and the intervention of the Court, 
primarily covering the period from 2000-2010, it is useful to outline the trajectory 
of the conflict from 2010 up to the present day, so that the discussion is 
understood in relation to later events.   
 
On the collapse of the Juba talks in December 2008, Operation Lightning 
Thunder was launched by the Ugandan, South Sudanese, Congolese and 
Central African Republic armies against the LRA headquarters in Garamba.      
Following this assault, which like those before failed to deliver a knock-out blow 
to the group, the LRA demonstrated its continuing potency in its usual manner, 
by brutally massacring civilians.  During the Christmas period in a series of 
outrages it killed well over 800 people in the DRC’s Haut-Uele District (HRW 
2009a).  The period up to 2011 then saw the dispersal of LRA groups over a 
wide area, including within DRC, along the South Sudanese border, and widely 
into the Central African Republic (CAR).  Very significant levels of LRA violence 
towards civilians continued, including killings and widespread abductions (HRW 
2010b).    
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Since 2011, according to the LRA Crisis Tracker web site which seeks to 
compile a comprehensive record of LRA attacks over the region, activities by 
the group are ongoing.  Their records indicate that the group has for the past six 
years been spread over a vast area, perhaps 1,500km by 500km, many times 
that of its former focus in northern Uganda and southern Sudan.  It is not easy 
to assess how comprehensive data on their activities is, and thus what the 
LRA’s current activities amount to, however it may be that LRA activities are 
taking place at a much lower level.  The site records fewer than 100 killings and 
650 abductions annually—a portion of the latter may of course be resolved 
through return (Invisible Children 2014).  Displacement of populations has been 
recorded in DRC, particularly following the major massacres, but there is no 
comprehensive picture of this, and permanent mass displacement on the scale 
of the Ugandan experience has not been observed.  Return from the LRA is 
reported to be a lower levels too (IRIN 2015).  Clearly then, the LRA continues 
to have a devastating effect on civilian populations who remain largely 
unprotected, while the extent of the suffering caused remains unclear, partly 
due to the remoteness of the area.  Kony of course remains at large, and the 
failure to pacify the group continues to have serious but hidden consequences 
for communities (Shepherd 2015). 
 
In Uganda there have been no LRA attacks since the Juba talks process.  
People have been released from the camps and have returned to rebuild their 
homes and livelihoods.  The LRA’s activities then, far from being over, have 
been displaced from Uganda into much larger and more remote territories (ICG 
2010).  
 
4.7  Review 
 
This chapter has used the available evidence to give an account of the 
emergence of the LRA war, and highlight aspects of the conflict that, because of 
their severity and widespread nature, were central to the civilian experience of 
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the war in the period prior to the ICC intervention.  In particular these were as 
follows: 
1. The historical and political underpinnings of the conflict, that place it 
within the context of inter-ethnic economic, social and political 
grievances, and deep animosities generated as a result of past 
atrocities and other wrong-doings committed by all sides. 
2. The violence and brutality of both armed parties to the conflict towards 
the civilian population, particularly by the LRA which is guilty of many 
vicious attacks and atrocities. 
3. The three (or more) sided nature of the conflict, in which civil society 
interests were not represented by either armed faction, but rather 
subordinated to their strategic political or military considerations. 
4. The violent creation of the camps at the hands of the army and in 
response to LRA atrocities as central to the civilian experience of the 
war, and their association with extraordinary levels of suffering and 
most of the war-related deaths. 
5. The central military dynamic of the conflict involving abduction of 
civilians (often children) by the LRA, and their killing by the UPDF as 
LRA combatants.  This was a stable and central feature of the war for 
over a decade in the run up to, and after, the ICC intervention. 
6. Civil peace activism arising from the community that through a strategic 
approach sought to draw the conflict to a close by non-violent means, 
and which despite being greatly under-resourced and often opposed by 
the two armed protagonists, showed significant signs of success by 
2004. 
 
The key insight and contribution in this chapter is the framing of the conflict as a 
three-sided war.  Others have documented both Government and LRA brutality 
towards the civilian population (Dolan 2000b; HURIFO 2002; Dolan 2005; 
Finnström 2006a; Finnström 2008), and recorded the peace efforts of civil 
society actors (ARLPI and JPC 2001; Rodriguez 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; 
Rodriguez Soto 2009).  The claim for its triangular nature is established based 
on three observations: the widespread civilian experience of violence by both 
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other parties; community agency and a non-violent strategy for ending the 
conflict (opposed by both other sides); and distinctly different civil society 
objectives in the war (the return of abductees, release from the camps, and 
peace).  
 
The second key understanding is related issue of the war’s perception, 
(articulated in 4.0.1).  The official discourse, though thoroughly discredited by 
the evidence and literature, remained prevalent nationally and internationally 
and was highly influential.  On the basis of this view, significant elements of the 
international community sensed a responsibility to intervene to assist the victims 
(the local population), to address the mindless violence of the LRA, as if the 
conflict was simple, bipolar, and resolvable through military violence.  Believing 
that the affected African population had no agency or capacity and could only 
occupy the role of victim, they envisaged the Ugandan government and UPDF 
as their proxy for intervention.  This was the context prior to the ICC 
engagement. 
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Chapter 5  ICC intervention—the dominant 
narrative 
 
The preceding chapter indicated some of the complexity of the conflict—its 
roots in a history of grievance on all sides, and the record of extreme brutality 
by the LRA accompanied by the displacement of the population to camps by 
both sides.  It contrasted military efforts to prosecute the war, which had 
resulted in well over a decade of catastrophic stalemate for the affected 
population, with emerging non-violent community efforts for dialogue and the 
return of their relatives alive.  Using both evidence from the ground and the 
literature, the three-sided nature of the war was clearly demonstrated. 
 
Into this volatile environment the principled clarity of the ICC was brought to 
bear.  Yet this clarity itself presents theoretical and practical issues, outlined in 
Chapter 3.  An end to impunity involves a retributive approach in which 
enforcement (often military) is necessary.  This demands political 
accommodation, and potentially a measure of violence itself.  The application of 
normative standards and approaches implies a wresting of power away from the 
warlords, but also away from affected communities, and a belief in the efficacy 
of universal measures applied to diverse and complex contexts.  Legal process 
entails a departure from consideration of context and consequences of a 
dispassionate application of the law (Schiff 2012). 
 
The Court’s first case was one in which the risks of potentially severe 
consequences for the affected population, desperate for an end to the violence, 
were high; but it was also a critical moment for a new institution, charged with 
an international mandate to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most 
heinous crimes.  Much was at stake.   
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5.1  The narrative of initial intervention 
 
The ICC’s early engagement in the LRA war is well documented from 
authoritative institutions including the Court itself, its reports to the UN Security 
Council, the Ugandan Government, and legal scholars writing in highly 
respected academic journals.  Schabas gives a succinct summary (Schabas 
2006: 29-32).  These sources are complemented by reports from international 
institutions with expertise in human rights, justice and conflict resolution such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, and the International Crisis Group.  These accounts are not 
unanimous in every respect, but they display sufficient common elements for a 
shared interpretation of events to be articulated and disseminated (HRW 2005; 
Pham et al. 2005; AI 2006; ICG 2006b; AI 2007; ICG 2007; Pham et al. 2007; 
HRW 2009a; HRW 2009b; Roth 2010; Schabas 2011: 39-44).  Not all other 
scholars concur, and quite a number differ in important respects (Dolan 2005; 
Rodriguez Soto 2009; Mamdani 2010; Branch 2011; Dolan 2011; Rodman and 
Booth 2013).  However, a predominant narrative concerning the efficacy of the 
engagement emerged.   
 
Chapter 5 articulates this widely promoted account: examination of the research 
basis upon which the narrative rests will follow later.  Each section of this 
chapter identifies a key claim prominently asserted as part of the account.  
These elements are summarised at the end of the chapter, each one referenced 
back to the preceding section that demonstrated its place within the whole.  This 
allows the application of evidence and analysis that commences in Chapter 6. 
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5.1.1  Referral, investigation, and issuing of arrest warrants 
 
Following its creation in 2002 the Court’s first Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, was sworn in during June 2003.  Within only a few months he had 
invited states to refer situations to him voluntarily, a strategy not originally 
envisaged by the drafters of the Statute, but intended to strengthen the 
possibility of state assistance on the ground (Ocampo 2006c: 2, 22; Schabas 
2007: 9).  The LRA case was prominent amongst them, and accounts indicate 
that Payam Akhavan,32 whose understanding of the war has been influential, 
was involved in behind-the-scenes engagement with the Government of 
Uganda to facilitate this development (Akhavan 2005; Nouwen and Werner 
2010: 947).  As indicated in Chapter 3, the LRA case is likely to have presented 
a promising opportunity for intervention in which numerous atrocities and violent 
outrages against civilians were well documented, carried out by a group with 
little political support, and led by individuals carrying significant personal 
responsibility—prominent potential suspects.  Ugandan Government referral of 
the LRA situation to the Court followed in December 2003, and the Prosecutor 
accepted the referral on the understanding that crimes within its jurisdiction by 
any party could be investigated (Ocampo 2003; Republic of Uganda 2003; AI 
2004; ICC 2004a; ICC 2004b; Allen 2005: 45; Schabas 2007).  He anticipated 
that his efforts for international criminal justice would complement the 
furtherance of human rights for the civilian population: 
 
The LRA has mainly attacked the Acholis they claim to represent. For 
nineteen years the people of northern Uganda have been killed, 
abducted, enslaved and raped […] Let me turn to the alleged crimes 
committed by the LRA in northern Uganda since July 2002, when the 
ICC jurisdiction begins. Two of the most serious types of crimes alleged 
in the warrants are numerous acts of murder and enslavement, both 
constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity[…] the killings and 
                                            
32 Payam Akhavan, Associate Professor of International Law at McGill University in 
Montreal, and prominent proponent of the ICC and its intervention in Uganda. 
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abductions numbered in the thousands, often reaching into the 
hundreds within single months.  (Ocampo 2005b: 1-2) 
 
At the outset it was the intention that through the action of the Court the 
principal crimes of the LRA—killings, abductions and other atrocities—would be 
addressed. 
 
Just as the Court’s process could be enhanced by Ugandan government 
support, so too the Ugandan authorities may have perceived their hand 
strengthened and their cause legitimised by ICC involvement, holding the 
promise of international backing for its military effort as it did.  During the 
following month, in January 2004, the ICC Prosecutor and President Museveni 
carried out a joint press conference in London to announce the ICC’s 
involvement in the case (ICC 2004b; Allen 2005: 42; Drew 2010).   
 
At the time this was a move criticised by some, including some supporters of 
the Court, as compromising the Court’s independence (AI 2004; Seils and 
Wierda 2005: 10; Schabas 2007: 14).  The Prosecutor subsequently indicated 
that all crimes had in fact been considered, and that only those of the LRA met 
the required standard of gravity: 
 
The criteria for selection of the first case was gravity.  We analysed the 
gravity of all crimes in northern Uganda committed by the LRA and 
Ugandan forces.  Crimes committed by the LRA were much more 
numerous and of much higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by 
the UPDF.  We therefore started with an investigation of the LRA. 
(Ocampo 2005b: 2) 
 
In February 2004 the prominence of the case was tragically enhanced by the 
massacre at Barlonyo camp in Lira district, south of Kitgum.  This appalling act 
did not go unnoticed by the Prosecutor, and an investigation by the Court was 
formally announced at the end of July (HRW 2005: 10; ICC 2005c; Otim and 
Wierda 2010: 2).   
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In the period that followed, the Court conducted over fifty missions to Uganda to 
gather evidence, and by May 2005 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) applied 
for arrest warrants to the pre-trial chamber (PTC) for five LRA commanders 
(Ocampo 2005b: 3).  Although they were issued on 8th July by the PTC they 
remained sealed for security reasons.  Finally the identities of the five were 
revealed on 13th October 2005, the Prosecutor indicating by this stage that he 
had been patient enough.  The warrants named Joseph Kony and his deputy 
Vincent Otti, and commanders Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen (Ocampo 2006c).  Perhaps anticipating their relatively rapid 
apprehension, notwithstanding the near 20-year history of the war, the 
Prosecutor stated: 
 
The next step is arrest.  Arrest warrants of the ICC will help galvanize 
international efforts to apprehend the suspects.  The responsibility to 
execute the arrests is a responsibility of States Parties and the 
international community.  Reports indicate that the fugitives are moving 
between three countries: Uganda, DRC and the Sudan. These 
countries must work together, with the support of the international 
community, to carry out the arrests.  (Ocampo 2005b: 7) 
 
The means by which the persistent course of the war could be altered and 
arrests thus achieved were not elaborated upon, but at the press conference on 
the same day Ocampo indicated his belief that ‘justice efforts will help to 
integrate military and dialogue efforts to protect people’ (Ocampo 2005a).  
These moves  signalled collaboration between the Court and the Ugandan 
State, alongside other regional powers, with a view to the military apprehension 
of the LRA leadership (Ocampo 2010a). 
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5.1.2  Intervention on behalf of the abducted children and their 
communities 
 
If enforcement of the ICC’s warrants on the ground was anticipated to be 
military, a central motivation of the Prosecutor was undoubtedly humanitarian.  
The ICC envisages its interventions as of benefit to communities affected by 
atrocities, and as the Prosecutor has come to articulate it, ‘victims have been 
the drivers and the pushers of the Court.  We are their Court’ (Ocampo 2010a: 
11).  This was the case from the outset, when the Prosecutor viewed his 
intervention as associated with the interests of the abducted children and the 
affected communities, as the following statements demonstrate: 
 
Jan Egeland of the United Nations has called the situation in northern 
Uganda ‘the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in 
the world today.’  Almost fifty per cent of the civilian population of 
northern Uganda have lost their freedom and now live in camps for 
internally displaced persons.  In this context our mandate is to 
investigate and prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility.  
We found evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes […]  
 
The International Criminal Court was established to demonstrate the 
determination of the international community to put an end to impunity 
for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes.  Civilians in northern 
Uganda have been living in a nightmare of brutality and violence for 
more than nineteen years.  I believe that, working together, we will help 
bring justice, peace and security for the people of northern Uganda. 
(Ocampo 2005b: 1-2, 7) 
 
Ocampo was intervening on the basis of the overarching mandate conferred by 
the Court’s Statute to extend the rule of international criminal law; anticipating 
the association of this purpose with context-specific objectives relating to the 
interests of victims.  The Prosecutor was expecting that his actions would 
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contribute to an end to the violence, and the reconciliation of communities.  He 
also perceived the interests of the Court, the community, and the Ugandan 
Government and military as being aligned.  This view was internationally 
widespread at the time, and proponents of international criminal justice outside 
Uganda anticipated military enforcement (AI 2002b: 97-131; HRW 2002b; AI 
2004; HRW 2005; AI 2006; HRW 2009b; Mendes 2010).  One advocate for the 
ICC observed that ‘eliminating or at least neutralizing the LRA was a matter of 
common interest’ (Akhavan 2005: 404).  
 
In 2007 the Prosecutor went further, indicating how the Court’s process takes 
the interests of victims into account specifically, stating that in view of the 
instability of the environments they were working in, the Court had established 
‘internal guidelines that provide for an ongoing risk assessment for victims and 
witnesses’, and stating that ‘the OTP’s activities in relation to Uganda exemplify 
this approach’ (Ocampo 2007b: 6).  As he noted, this is in line with Article 68(1) 
of the Statue, which places responsibility for protecting the safety, physical and 
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses upon the 
Court(Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: Article 68(1); 
Ocampo 2005b: 3). 
 
A secondary purpose of the ICC’s intervention relates to its intention to enhance 
the national legal processes and systems of the states where it intervenes.  The 
intention is that through ICC engagement the capacity of the host nation to 
prosecute its own war criminals will be enhanced, and that as the norms of the 
Court are extended there will be less need for the ICC itself to intervene.  As 
Schabas has commented, this is very much within the spirit of the Rome Statute 
itself, and the Prosecutor had indicated his belief that ‘the absence of trials 
before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions, would be a major success.’ (Ocampo 2007b: 2; Schabas 2007: 1; 
and see also Nouwen 2013 for an in-depth discussion).   
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5.1.3  The UPDF as the means for enforcement of the warrants 
 
Violent or volatile contexts demand the collaboration of those best able to 
operate under such circumstances, and the Prosecutor’s approach reflected this 
understanding.  In relation to the role of the military the Prosecutor had 
indicated his vision of international action to bring perpetrators to justice: 
‘armies all over the world[…] prepare plans to arrest militia leaders such as 
Joseph Kony’ (Ocampo 2010a: 11).  Augmenting the military efforts of the 
previous decades, with warrants issued, the UPDF through its ongoing war, or 
other military forces, would be instrumental in effecting arrest.  Their efforts to 
this end would be enhanced by the legitimisation conferred by the Court, the 
strengthened collaboration with security forces across the Sudanese and 
Congolese borders, and increased international support for engagement. 
 
While seeking to effect arrest, it was also envisaged that the Government of 
Uganda would ensure security on the ground, allowing for witnesses’ and 
victims’ protection. 
 
The Government of Uganda has the main responsibility for security on 
the ground. Working with the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the Registry 
we have been preparing and implementing protective measures for 
victims and potential witnesses.  (Ocampo 2005b: 3) 
 
Notwithstanding the evidence-based analysis of the community’s experience 
documented in Chapter 4, prosecutorial expectations concurred with a different 
and contradictory understanding of the war put forward at the time by some 
legal scholars in the academic literature.  One frequently-cited view holds that: 
 
Hundreds of thousands of civilians have simply abandoned their homes 
and sought shelter in ‘protected villages’ where the UPDF provides 
security. The socioeconomic impact of this massive dislocation and the 
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resulting need to provide humanitarian aid has been catastrophic for 
northern Uganda.  In 2003, the population of IDP camps in the Gulu and 
Kitgum/Pader districts of northern Uganda doubled from approximately 
four hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand—a figure that 
represents approximately 75 percent of the region's population of 1.1 
million […] by 2002] The government’s focus was on protecting its 
civilian population against further LRA attacks.  (Akhavan 2005: 409-
410) 
 
This understanding of the conflict, closer to Finnström’s discredited ‘official 
discourse’, and contrary to Dolan’s analysis and the evidence on the ground, 
was apparently known in legal circles at the time (Finnström 2008; Dolan 2011). 
5.1.4  Intervention as the only means to end the conflict 
 
Again setting aside the evidence of Chapter 4, the case for the ICC’s 
intervention was stronger still because the conflict was apparently frozen, efforts 
to end it being essentially moribund.  Akhavan again claimed that by 2003 the 
amnesty and return process had failed, even aside from legal and ideological 
objections to its potential to deliver impunity to perpetrators: 
 
As the tragedy unfolded in Acholiland, there was little international 
willingness to help Uganda confront the LRA.  Despite the catastrophic 
human toll of the atrocities, there was simply no sufficiently vital interest 
to prompt action by powerful states33.  Uganda could not militarily thwart 
the LRA, primarily because of Sudanese support.  Short of invading 
Sudan's territory and igniting an international war, the UPDF was 
seriously impaired in its counterinsurgency operations.  Efforts at 
negotiation with LRA leaders were fruitless.  Although the vast majority 
of LRA soldiers were forcibly conscripted children with no interest in 
continuing the war against the Ugandan government, the LRA's top 
                                            
33 In making this observation, Akhavan is setting aside involvement of the US, UK and 
other powers, in providing military assistance to the UPDF and significant financial 
support to Uganda’s economy, including its military (see sections 4.1.5, 4.2.3, 4.3.2). 
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leadership ensured that ruthless discipline was maintained in the ranks.  
The conflict continued with no end in sight […] Despite defections by 
foot soldiers - who were largely abducted children - the amnesty policy 
failed. Not a single senior LRA commander took advantage of it. Indeed, 
as the LRA's abductions continued into 2002 and 2003, it became clear 
that nothing short of effective military action against the LRA would 
drive its leaders to opt for negotiation.  (Akhavan 2005: 409) 
 
Notwithstanding the view of the community then, military action was favoured by 
some.  Amnesty International observed that, ‘in northern Uganda, an existing 
Amnesty Law has failed to stop crimes or to bring about peace.  Despite the 
action of peace committees across Acholiland in its support, Amnesty 
International called for that law to be repealed.’  (AI 2006).  Human Rights 
Watch later brought this clear understanding to the wider human rights 
community:  
 
Efforts to end the conflict [militarily] decisively failed, and in 2000, 
following lobbying efforts by ‘elders and religious leaders from the 
(worst affected) Acholi region,’ the Ugandan Parliament passed a 
blanket amnesty for rebels who renounced violence and surrendered to 
the government […] Although a significant number of people benefitted 
from the amnesty, violence against civilians continued to worsen in the 
years following the Amnesty Act, particularly after each effort by the 
Ugandan armed forces to wipe out the LRA […]  In December 2003 
Museveni tried a new tack. He invited the International Criminal Court to 
investigate the LRA. (HRW 2009b: 28) 
 
As demonstrated, these interpretations were not based upon the evidence, but 
with this understanding of events, including the local and national failure to end 
the violence, the way was cleared for international action.  Advocates perceived 
that the ICC could play a vital role in isolating the LRA leadership from its 
forces, through stimulating broader military engagement.  The possibility that 
such an intervention might obstruct alternative approaches or trump local 
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initiatives to end the conflict was made much less relevant by a disseminated 
belief in the ‘exhaustion of available alternatives’ (Akhavan 2005: 410).  The 
Prosecutor hoped a trial would begin within six months (Apps 2005; Clark 
2008c: 42).  
 
5.1.5  The addressing of local concerns  
 
Following the announcement of an ICC investigation in January 2004 (Allen 
2005: 42; Drew 2010: 24), and even prior to the Prosecutor indicating that there 
was a case to answer in June (Ocampo 2005b; Schabas 2006: 29), at a local 
level there was both support and some concern at the Court’s engagement 
(Allen 2005; Tolbert and Wierda 2010).  People affected by the violence were 
desperate to see an end to the war (HURIFO 2002; Dolan 2005; Worden 2008: 
4), and while many were worried about the impact of arrest warrants on peace 
efforts, others believed that this new form of international engagement would 
one way or another precipitate arrest (Allen 2005; Ocampo 2005a; Pham et al. 
2005).  As already mentioned, safeguards in relation to security had been 
considered by the Prosecutor and were to be implemented by the Government 
for the benefit of the affected communities.  From the Court’s perspective, the 
VWU was to provide aid to immediate individual victims and witnesses, which in 
some cases could represent a significant contribution to their wellbeing.  
Additionally, as indicated in Chapter 3, in relation to the Court’s own process the 
Statute represents a great advance for victims in relation to their role in Court 
proceedings (HRW 2008: 149-208). 
 
A second strand of the Court’s engagement with the victims and their 
communities was the ‘sensitisation’ and outreach meetings carried out by the 
Court to address local issues and concerns.  The Court and its supporters 
perceived these apprehensions as understandable: local systems of justice 
were to be set aside by an intervening international institution, and with 
insufficient information there would be anxiety concerning this move.  For 
example, Human Rights Watch recorded in 2005:    
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 […] Due to lack of an effective outreach strategy by the ICC, its 
potential role in ensuring justice and ending impunity in the conflict has 
been largely misunderstood[…] 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor has only recently begun engaging in 
greater dialogue with civil society in northern Uganda.  Several northern 
Ugandan leaders travelled to The Hague in February 2005 and on April 
14-16, 2005 to urge the ICC Prosecutor not to issue arrest warrants 
while peace negotiations were ongoing.  They included a member of 
parliament who has been a supporter of the ICC.   
 
The ICC needs to take immediate action to reach out to the people and 
civil society groups in northern Uganda. This will help the population 
understand the mandate of the Court. The ICC badly needs to regain 
the confidence and trust of the people whose interests it is pursuing. It 
must correct the image it has acquired of an institution subject to 
manipulation by the Ugandan government for political expediency.  It 
must restore the image of a credible international institution and seek to 
work with victims of human rights crimes to achieve the ends of justice. 
 
The ICC needs to put in place a robust plan to clarify its mandate, 
explain its role and clearly outline to the people of northern Uganda 
what it can and cannot do […] 
 
It is also vital that the Prosecutor quickly act to demonstrate the Court’s 
impartiality.  Civil society remains concerned that the ICC is being 
manipulated by President Museveni […] 
 
The ICC must also put in place adequate witness protection measures 
[…]     (HRW 2005: 56-57, This quote will be returned to in 6.2.4).  
 
The International Center for Transitional Justice recommended:   
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To the International Criminal Court: Implement an outreach strategy that 
fosters greater awareness among Ugandans of the Court’s mandate 
and mode of operations. This effort should aim to disseminate more 
information about the Court and engage the public in dialogue. Such a 
strategy should also seek to manage the expectations of victims, many 
of whom believe the ICC can deliver more than it is able (Pham et al. 
2005: 42). 
 
The International Crisis Group shared this analysis.  In response to concerns 
about the ICC’s possible effects it urged ‘a campaign to improve understanding 
of the ICC among the concerned communities and groups’ (ICG 2005c: 6).  
These institutions thus shared the perspective that the issues raised by the 
populace could be addressed by educating local people. 
 
Perhaps assisted by its supporters, the Court determined that a process of 
engagement with the affected community was advisable.  Across the LRA-
affected areas of Uganda sensitisation sessions provided the participants with 
an improved understanding of the Court and its purpose.  Elements of the 
message included the Court’s relatively restricted mandate in relation to only 
the most senior commanders, the possibility of international justice being 
applied alongside local efforts on the ground, the priority placed upon the 
interests of victims within the ICC’s process, and later, the assistance that 
would be provided to victims.  Local concerns about the likely consequences of 
the ICC’s intervention were thus perceived to be due to local misunderstanding 
or ignorance, to be dealt with through education.  This may have addressed a 
certain lack of information, though its impact on the understanding of the ICC’s 
likely strategic impact upon the conflict dynamics (which was the principal cause 
of local concern) remained of concern.  Anxiety and even opposition to the 
Court persisted on the ground (ICC 2009a; ICTJ 2009). 
 
A third route through which civil society concerns were ostensibly addressed 
was the engagement of the Prosecutor and Court with these local 
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representatives directly (ibid.).  As the Prosecutor has stated: 
 
In all our work we are guided by the interests of the victims and we will 
always be respectful of local traditions.  My team made over twenty 
missions to Uganda to listen to the concerns of local community leaders, 
including religious and traditional leaders, local government officials, 
Members of Parliament and local and international non-governmental 
organisations.  I also had meetings here in The Hague with leaders of 
the Lango, Acholi, Teso and Madi communities.  We agreed we are 
working together as part of a common effort to achieve justice and 
reconciliation, the rebuilding of communities and an end to violence in 
northern Uganda.  (Ocampo 2005b: 6) 
 
Their meeting culminated in a joint statement by the Prosecutor and Ugandan 
community leaders which summarised the issues upon which they could agree:  
that the LRA should end its violence; that the Governments of Uganda and 
Sudan and the ICC should cooperate to bring peace; and that international 
actors should enhance their interventions to alleviate the humanitarian situation 
(ICC 2005a).  Some even perceived that the strategic concerns of local 
communities were resolved through this process; in any event, the issuance of 
a joint statement helped to secure credibility for the Court’s engagement (Seils 
and Wierda 2005: 10-11).  
 
Many of those who questioned the ICC’s intervention suggested alternative 
approaches to justice, emphasising that forgiveness may be more culturally 
appropriate, and this was promoted by some community leaders in Uganda.  
Contrary to this view, supporters of the Court identified interviews carried out by 
organisations such as Human Rights Watch and the International Center for 
Transitional Justice which indicated that few victims desired forgiveness for the 
perpetrators, and many sought their punishment.  Using a population-based 
survey, the ICTJ reported that when asked about peace and justice  ‘given the 
opportunity, many would like to have both’ (Allen 2005; HRW 2005: 60; Pham et 
al. 2005: 4; HRW 2011b: 29).  These issues will be examined in Chapter 6.   
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Aside from these situation-specific measures, there are also the safeguards in 
the Statute already outlined in Chapter 2.  These ensure that the Prosecutor 
(subject to the Court’s processes) could withdraw if he did not consider the ICC 
intervention to be in the ‘interests of justice’ (Akhavan 2005: 415-416).  This 
provided reassurance to concerned international institutions (ICG 2005c: 6). 
 
[…] the Prosecutor shall consider whether, ‘taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice.’  Instead of a purely mechanical determination that 
jurisdiction exists, the Prosecutor must take into account the broader 
context within which international criminal justice operates.  This aspect 
of prosecutorial discretion is particularly important when investigations 
or prosecutions may arguably prolong or aggravate ongoing conflict or 
undermine a fragile peace process.  (Akhavan 2005: 416) 
 
Additionally, the UN Security Council itself has the power to suspend an 
investigation on a twelve month renewable period, according to Article 16 of the 
Statute, if it is necessary to prioritise peace for humanitarian reasons (ICG 
2006a: 1; 2.2.3).  As Grono states:  
 
If a policy decision needs to be made to give primacy to peace—for 
example, if there is strong and credible evidence that this will save 
many lives—it should be made by the institution with political and 
conflict resolution mandate, namely the UN Security Council.  The 
Security Council has the authority under Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
to put ICC investigations on hold for renewable periods of 12 months. 
Such authority should only be exercised as a last resort, when there is a 
compelling case that the benefits of peace will outweigh the harm done 
to the cause of accountability.  (Grono 2006: 2, see also 5-6) 
 
These measures were seen by advocates for the Court to provide a 
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comprehensive approach that would address the concerns of affected 
communities. 
 
5.2  The narrative of positive impact on peace talks  
 
5.2.1  The build-up to the Juba talks 
 
The narrative of the Court’s positive influence on events continued beyond its 
initial intervention.  In the run-up to the commencement of the Juba talks in mid-
2006, further significant positive effects were observed by international experts.  
The International Crisis Group identified the ICC’s positive influences by April 
2005, stating:   
 
The ICC has already had a positive impact on the peace process by 
sobering the LRA and influencing Khartoum to reduce support.  
Because of increased contact between Acholi leaders and ICC officials, 
including Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a spirit of cooperation has 
replaced suspicion in northern Uganda about the Court's intentions. […]  
The speed and efficiency of the investigation have heartened human 
rights advocates looking for evidence of the ICC's relevance to 
accountability worldwide.  (ICG 2005c: 5)  
 
Others went as far as citing evidence for the ICC referrals contributing to the 
LRA’s incapacitation, and even its role in bringing the LRA to the Bigombe 
negotiations, which began in January 2005.  The following was published later 
in 2005, well before the LRA attended talks in Juba the following year: 
 
Thus far, the empirical evidence suggests that international commitment 
to the referral’s success has contributed to the LRA’s incapacitation.  
Sudan has been persuaded to end its support for the LRA, culminating 
in a March 2004 Protocol allowing Ugandan People’s Defense Forces 
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 (UPDF) to attack LRA camps in southern Sudan.  This unhindered 
access has measurably weakened the LRA’s military capability, 
encouraging significant defections among LRA commanders, and 
forced otherwise defiant leaders to the negotiating table.  All of these 
developments are in sharp contrast to the period preceding the referral, 
during which LRA atrocities reached a new peak.  This recent 
willingness to negotiate is linked to the LRA’s political isolation and 
military containment—both of which are linked to the new context 
created by the ICC referral.  In this respect at least, it would not be 
unreasonable to suggest that even without a single prosecution, the 
LRA referral has already been a success […] (Akhavan 2005: 404-
405)34 
 
In October 2005 the OTP signed an agreement with Sudan, and following the 
killing of ICC suspect Raska Lukwiya by the UPDF during a military 
confrontation in August 2006 the International Crisis Group observed:  
 
The ICC unsealed warrants against five LRA commanders on 13 
October 2005.  These rattled the indicted commanders, reduced their 
opportunity to emerge from the conflict with impunity and put pressure 
on Khartoum to cut its umbilical cord to the LRA.  They gave the rebels 
an incentive to start talking about a peace agreement that might bring 
them immunity from prosecution.  (ICG 2006a: 15) 
 
The extent of the ICC’s impact was outlined by the Prosecutor to the Assembly 
of States Parties in 2006 as follows: 
 
While the four remaining LRA commanders are still at large, the Court 
has made a significant impact on the ground.  This case shows how 
arrest warrants issued by the Court can contribute to the prevention of 
atrocious crimes.  The Court’s intervention has galvanized the activities 
                                            
34  This passage references the UNOCHA Consolidated Appeals Process 2004 
document, and its claim of empirical evidence will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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of the states concerned.  Uganda and the DRC, parties to the Rome 
Statute and legally bound to execute the arrest warrants, have 
expressed their willingness to do so.  The Sudan, a non-State Party, 
has voluntarily agreed to enforce the warrants.  Thanks to the unity of 
purpose of these states, the LRA has been forced to flee its safe haven 
in southern Sudan and has moved its headquarters to the DRC border.  
 
As a consequence, crimes allegedly committed by the LRA in northern 
Uganda have drastically decreased.  People are leaving the camps for 
displaced persons and the night commuter shelters which protected 
tens of thousands of children are now in the process of closing.  The 
loss of their safe haven led the LRA commanders to engage in 
negotiations, resulting in a cessation of hostilities agreement in August 
2006.  
 
We do not know yet the outcome of these negotiations, but any solution 
can and must be compatible with the Rome Statute.  (Ocampo 2006a: 
2)  
 
These claims have been influential, and were quoted by William Schabas during 
his presentation at the 20th Anniversary Conference of the International Society 
for the Reform of Criminal Law during the following year, in order to introduce 
the audience to the context of the Ugandan warrants (Schabas 2007: 15).  
Though he is far more cautious and the paper is unreferenced, O’Brien’s expert 
opinion on the impact of international justice on local peace initiatives reflects 
aspects of this analysis.  
 
In sum, we shouldn’t unquestioningly accept a false dichotomy and 
perceived antagonism between the simultaneous pursuit of justice and 
peace. Ultimately there may be tensions […] But so far in northern 
Uganda the two have coexisted and supported one another.  (O'Brien 
2007: 4)   
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Subsequently, Human Rights Watch offered a more complete picture of events. 
 
[…] The warrants have contributed to a number of fairly positive events, 
including isolating the LRA from some of its support base, bringing 
international attention to the plight of the northern Ugandans, 
encouraging the most promising talks since the start of the 20-year 
conflict, and ensuring that accountability formed a major part of the 
agenda for those talks. 
 
Some analysts argue that Uganda’s referral contributed to the LRA’s 
isolation.  Since the mid-1990s the LRA’s only state supporter has been 
the Sudanese Government in Khartoum, reportedly in retaliation for the 
Ugandan Government’s support of the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army (SPLM/A).  Not long after the referral was announced, 
Sudan agreed to a protocol allowing Ugandan armed forces to attack 
LRA camps in southern Sudan.  This access weakened the LRA’s 
military capability. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in January 2005, which ended hostilities between the 
Khartoum Government and the SPLA, Sudanese armed forces 
withdrew from southern Sudan, further weakening the LRA by depriving 
it of bases and support that it had enjoyed for years.  The International 
Crisis Group (ICG) notes that the ICC’s involvement raised the stakes 
for Khartoum as it could fall within the ICC’s criminal investigation in 
Uganda for supporting the LRA.  In October 2005 the Government of 
Sudan signed a memorandum of understanding with the Court agreeing 
to cooperate with arrest warrants issued against LRA commanders.  
Though Sudan continued to support the LRA to some degree, it did so 
in a much more surreptitious manner.  By severing most of its ties, 
Sudan significantly weakened the group, forcing it into ‘survival mode’ 
at least temporarily.  (HRW 2009b: 31-32)   
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Similarly bold assertions were repeated by Akhavan (2009).  Drawing on these 
observations and interpretations of events, some have made the case that the 
Uganda warrants are an expression of not only the Court’s right to intervene, 
but also of the international community’s responsibility to act (AI 2007; AI 2008; 
HRW 2008; ICC 2010a: 1; HRW 2011b: 2).  Even before the conclusion of the 
Juba talks, the Uganda warrants had entered the evidence base for the efficacy 
of international criminal justice interventions. 
	
5.2.2  Kony brought to negotiate 
 
The view that the ICC played a significant role in bringing the LRA to the 
negotiating table is widely held.  It is believed that this took place through a 
number of mechanisms: personal concern on the part of the ICC suspects and 
their desire to avoid arrest or trial (Allen 2006b: 114-117; Grono and O'Brien 
2008: 19); a process through which the ICC’s warrants facilitated the withdrawal 
of co-operation of Sudan with the LRA, leading the LRA’s increased willingness 
to negotiate (Hanlon 2006; O'Brien 2007; Worden 2008: 5; HRW 2009b: 32-33; 
Schabas 2011: 39-44); and a more all-embracing view that the multiple effects 
of the ICC’s engagement in addition to the above were significant contributory 
factors (Akhavan 2005; Ocampo 2006c: 17).  It is the Prosecutor’s view, 
expressed at the ICC review conference in 2010 and repeated, that the ICC 
also contributed to the LRA’s displacement not only from Uganda to Sudan, but 
then to the DRC (ICC 2010a: 6). 
 
5.2.3  The talks collapse 
 
Contrary to fears expressed, that the warrants might obstruct peace talks, many 
asserted that this was not the case.  They held that the Juba talks themselves 
would likely not have commenced without the input of the ICC, and that the 
Court played a considerable part in bringing the LRA to the table in the first 
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place (HRW 2009b: 3; Otim and Wierda 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010).  In 
such a circumstance, unlikely though a negotiated settlement might have been, 
there was little to lose by seeking a deal. 
 
The inclusion of provisions for justice in negotiations with the LRA in 
Uganda that resulted from the ICC’s pursuit of LRA leaders likewise did 
not scuttle those peace talks, despite the concerns of many who 
advocated an amnesty. 
 
In Uganda […] many commentators feared that justice and the 
involvement of the International Criminal Court would prove an obstacle 
to peace […] the warrants did not have any immediate devastating 
impact. The ICC’s involvement may even have yielded unexpected 
short-term positive benefits including encouraging the parties to engage 
in peace talks, prompting some LRA defections, and raising the political 
costs to those supporting the LRA.  (HRW 2009b: 28-29) 
 
Secondly, they hold that it is quite possible that the LRA was simply using the 
hiatus created by the talks to regroup and rearm (Akhavan 2009: 644).  As the 
Prosecutor observed: 
 
In the past, Joseph Kony has used negotiations to buy time, regroup 
and attack again.  Securing the arrest of the four remaining  LRA 
commanders would prevent recurrent violence and provide justice to 
the victims.  This is  a core challenge facing the Court and you as 
States Parties to the Court.  You must ensure that the principles of 
justice and deterrence underlying  the Statute are upheld.  The victims 
have a right to peace, security AND justice.  (Ocampo 2006a: 3)  
 
Additionally, the narrative asserts that there always were multiple possible 
reasons for the talks to fail, including the likelihood that the LRA would not 
engage in them in good faith in the first place, and evidence of the LRA’s past 
failure to see such processes through (Otim and Wierda 2010: 5).  It is also 
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possible that Kony is a ‘total spoiler’ himself—that he would never come to a 
negotiated deal, and that his removal ideally through the Court’s process, could 
itself pave the way for a deal (Struett 2012: 87-88). 
 
With so many possible influencing factors, proponents of this view hold that the 
presence of ICC warrants may or may not have been a significant contributory 
factor in the talks’ collapse, and given the many uncertainties it is not possible 
to attribute the outcome to any one factor alone. 
 
5.3  The narrative concerning the subsequent ongoing war  
 
Following the collapse of the Juba talks, the positive account of the ICC’s 
influence upon the conflict has been sustained.  In mid-December 2008, at the 
conclusion of the Juba talks, a military offensive was launched by the Ugandan, 
DR Congolese and southern Sudanese forces against the LRA in Garamba.  
Operation Lightning Thunder failed to decapitate the LRA, and their familiar 
pattern of reprisals and atrocities resumed, most notably and tragically at the 
end of December 2008 and into January 2009, when they massacred over 850 
civilians in DRC (HRW 2009a).  The years since these events have brought the 
dispersal of the LRA into small groups across a wide area, principally of DRC 
and CAR.  Although abductions and killings have continued the organisation 
may be weaker than it was, perhaps due to the international isolation 
associated with the warrants (Invisible Children 2014). 
 
Some go so far as to identify the talks as a success.  As they point out, peace 
has returned to northern Uganda and people have been able to go back to their 
homes; and the LRA leadership were provided with a final opportunity to end 
their murderous campaign before international military pressure was brought to 
bear (Otim and Wierda 2010: 5; Kersten 2012: 74-75).  The LRA are now 
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scattered and diminished, much less capable of posing a realistic threat to the 
civilian population thanks in part to the Court’s intervention.35 
 
5.3.1  Review Conference findings—a paradigm shift 
 
The Rome Statute stipulated that the Court undergo a review process following 
its establishment, and this duly took place in Kampala in 2010 hosted by the 
Ugandan Government (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: 
Article 123).  This was perhaps the best opportunity for an evaluation of the 
Court’s impacts to be examined, concerns raised, and lessons learned on an 
international stage.  In relation to the LRA warrants specifically, material 
presented at the review relating to Uganda indicated a dramatic fall in LRA 
violence.  It also highlighted the achievement of peace in the country’s formerly 
LRA-affected areas, following the Court’s intervention (ICC 2010a; Otim and 
Wierda 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010). 
 
Civil society representatives from the LRA-affected areas of Uganda and Sudan 
were also represented at that event, and the work of the VWU was showcased 
so that delegates could gain a measure of the breadth of the ICC’s 
humanitarian engagement.36 
 
More significant perhaps than the individual findings were the broad conclusions 
that were drawn (ICTJ 2010).  Notwithstanding the failure of the talks and the 
resumption of violence, the ICTJ presented the following assessment in its 
Conference briefing paper on the Uganda case:   
                                            
35 This view emphasises the LRA’s impact in northern Uganda particularly, and the very 
significant decline overall in its activities.  Individual communities in DRC and 
elsewhere continue to experience LRA violence. 
36 Community representatives from the areas more recently affected by the LRA, 
including the DRC, were also present.  I witnessed testimonies from them expressing 
dismay at becoming victims of LRA violence—embroiled in a war in which they had no 
part.  Though their suffering was clearly associated with the move of the LRA from 
Uganda, their experience has been less prominently emphasised in the dominant 
narrative. 
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The Uganda experience demonstrates that an ICC intervention need 
not prevent the peaceful settlement of a conflict.  Instead, the 
international pressure resulting from the arrest warrants was carefully 
utilized at Juba in order to negotiate a solution that would seek to 
achieve a comprehensive approach to justice at the national level.  
(Otim and Wierda 2010: 6) 
 
This perception of success became evidence to support wider positive 
conclusions, and the interaction of peace and international criminal justice 
issues was dealt with specifically in the deliberations.  The submission of written 
material was followed by presentations from a panel of prominent practitioners 
from legal justice, peace and human rights disciplines.  The subsequent 
discussion involved States Parties, prominent NGOs and civil society 
organisations.  The ICTJ’s view concurred with those of the moderator of the 
session.  Introductory remarks to the assembled States Parties by Kenneth 
Roth (then Executive Director of Human Rights Watch) framed the debate:  
 
In introducing the topic, the moderator affirmed that justice is an 
important end in its own right.  Mr Roth also pointed out that there were 
already quite a few examples of the interaction between peace and 
justice.  From these examples, it was possible to extract some 
preliminary lessons learned: 
(a) In the short term 
(i) The dire consequences that had been predicted would 
occur from pursuing justice had fortunately not materialized. 
(ii) Issuing warrants for suspected war criminals had helped 
move forward peace processes by marginalizing detrimental 
actors. 
(iii) In contrast, incorporating those with records of past 
abuses into governments in an effort to secure peace often 
had had unanticipated negative long-term effects.   
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(iv) Amnesties (implicit or explicit) also often did not lead to the 
hoped-for peace. Instead, in several cases, they had sent a 
dangerous message that abuses would be tolerated and 
therefore had encouraged more violence.  (Roth 2010: 1) 
 
The official report on the session concluded decisively in favour of the Court’s 
interventions, with respect to the attainment of peace with international criminal 
justice, in a new positive relationship: 
 
Among the conclusions of the debate, the discussions made clear that 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court had brought about 
a paradigm shift, in which amnesty was no longer an option for the most 
serious crimes under the Rome Statute.  There was now a positive 
relationship between peace and justice although tensions between the 
two remained that needed to be acknowledged and addressed.  Other 
issues debated at the panel were the sequencing of peace and justice, 
the role of mediators in peace processes, the effects of international 
justice, non-judicial mechanisms, and the views of victims. (ICC 2010b: 
5)  
 
In part informed by these events, this narrative holds that, in relation to peace 
and justice, a paradigm shift has occurred.  Far from obstructing peace in the 
short-term, justice measures have tentatively been observed to enhance its 
prospects, while in the longer term the alignment of these issues has been 
established.  This view proposes that events have unfolded to the benefit of 
affected communities, who deserve to receive international standards of justice.  
Other approaches have been characterised as ‘Selling Justice Short’ (HRW 
2009b; ICTJ 2009). 
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5.3.2  Successes and failures of enforcement 
 
The delay in achieving arrest is addressed in the narrative, and noted as a 
significant shortcoming.  It observes that there has been a failure of the 
international community to act with sufficient commitment.  With Lukwiya dead 
at the hands of the UPDF in August 2006 (Mukasa 2006); Otti apparently dead 
following a disagreement with Kony in October 2007 (Mwakugu 2008), three of 
the suspects remained at large for nearly a decade.  Odhiambo was then 
confirmed dead in March 2015 (ICC 2015e).  Only Dominic Ongwen has been 
arrested, captured in CAR and handed over to the Court in January 2015 by US 
forces.  His trial before the Court was hailed as real progress.  Of the 2005 
suspects only Kony remains at large (BBC 2015c).   
 
The former Prosecutor asserted, it is the failure to enforce, not a shortcoming of 
the Court, that has led to the continuation of the war and the failure to 
apprehend the accused.  It reflects a lack of commitment on the part of the 
international community to deliver on its commitments to the enforcement of 
international criminal justice.  In this context the ICC Prosecutor continued to 
call for robust enforcement of the Court’s warrants, so that the accused may be 
brought to justice (Ocampo 2007a). 
 
5.4  Review 
 
We can now see that a positive account of the Court’s impacts was sustained 
from prior to the issuance of its warrants, through its effect on the military 
dynamic of the conflict and the commencement and collapse of the Bigombe 
and Juba peace processes, and on to the present ongoing violence.  Within this 
narrative there are a number of prominent claims or positions that apparently 
secure the legitimacy and establish the efficacy of the Court’s intervention.  In 
order to test the basis in evidence of these claims it is useful to articulate them 
briefly, indicating prominent or principal proponents:   
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1. The ICC intervened on behalf of the abducted children and their 
communities (Ocampo 2005b: 6; Ocampo 2006a); 5.1.2). 
2. The ICC was intervening in a frozen conflict, in the absence of effective 
alternative strategies likely to bring it to an end (Akhavan 2005); 5.1.4). 
3. The ICC might withdraw (or be withdrawn) at any time in the interests of 
justice, should it be absolutely necessary (Grono 2006); 5.1.5). 
4. The UPDF was an appropriate means for enforcement of the 
warrants—indicated by the Prosecutor’s joint statement with President 
Museveni in London on 29th January 2004 (HRW 2004a; ICC 2004b; 
5.1.1, 5.1.3) 
5. The ICC, with others, brought Kony to the negotiating table (ICG 2006a; 
Ocampo 2006a; Grono and O'Brien 2008; Akhavan 2009; author’s 
article now being revised prior to resubmission; 5.2.2). 
6. The ICC was not responsible for the collapse of the talks (Ocampo 
2007a; HRW 2009b: 3; Ocampo 2009; 5.2.3). 
7. The LRA were in any case preparing for a resumption of the war, so 
they were not negotiating in good faith (Ocampo 2009; 5.2.3). 
8. The ICC’s impact reduced the intensity of the conflict, and the 
associated suffering, whether through the deterrence its warrants 
conferred or other means (Akhavan 2005; Ocampo 2006c: 17; 5.2.1, 
5.3, 5.3.1). 
9. Local communities deserve international standards of justice.  Other 
approaches are selling justice short (AI 2006; HRW 2009b; ICTJ 2009; 
5.3.1, 5.3.2). 
10. It is now only a matter of time before Kony is apprehended and tried in 
a court of law to international standards, with the implication that 
enforcement efforts will have been worth it (Apps 2005; Ocampo 2005a; 
Ocampo 2009; 5.3.2). 
11. The interests and actions of the ICC are aligned with those of 
communities affected by conflict (Ocampo 2005b: 6; Ocampo 2006a: 1-
3; Ocampo 2007b; 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.3).   
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In many respects the narrative proposed by this account is an extension of the 
official discourse outlined in (4.0.1).  International intervention, this time in the 
form of the Court, was perceived to be of benefit to the population who were 
understood to be in great need of humanitarian assistance.  While being more 
protracted than originally envisaged, the narrative holds that the ICC’s 
engagement itself was and remains appropriate and beneficial to the people 
concerned.  Each element in this account is amenable to scrutiny.  The next 
chapter will critically examine these points for their foundation in evidence. 
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Chapter 6  ICC intervention—an evidence-based 
assessment 
 
Because the consequences for people at risk are so great, decisions on 
these important issues need to be fully informed.  (HRW 2009b: 9) 
 
This chapter is not the first to challenge the dominant narrative; that has already 
been done in some significant specific respects (ARLPI and JPC 2001; ARLPI 
et al. 2003; Finnström 2008; Branch 2011; Dolan 2011; Talebpour 2012).  
Instead, this section will more comprehensively test the dominant narrative’s 
reasoning and relationship to the evidence as a whole.  Founded upon the 
author’s work with local peacebuilding organisations in the affected region 
indicated in the introduction, the analysis draws upon data and experience 
collected from the ground at the time in question, including that undertaken by 
academics, community-based organisations, and other agencies based in the 
field.  The emerging interpretation rests solidly upon data collected from the 
community, lived experience in the war-affected area, and accounts drawn from 
community-informed observes active on the ground.  The intention is to reveal 
whether the dominant narrative is corroborated, uncorroborated, or 
contradicted, and whether it is soundly adduced.  It is only through such 
independent analysis that an understanding of events consistent with the local 
experience can emerge, future decisions be appropriately informed, and 
adverse consequences for people at risk be avoided.  In particular, this analysis 
will form the basis for findings of relevance to the Court itself, beyond the 
specific circumstances of these warrants. 
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6.1 Analytical errors and the accommodation to military 
power 
 
At the outset it is necessary to acknowledge a disjuncture between the 
dominant narrative and the evidence-base from the ground previously outlined 
in Chapter 4, which relates to the fundamental structure and dynamics of the 
conflict itself.  Founded upon this body of work (which remains very largely 
unchallenged on the basis of evidence in the literature) it has already been 
demonstrated that the civilian interests were in many cases not promoted by the 
Government of Uganda, nor was the population afforded protection (ARLPI and 
JPC 2001; Baines 2003; Branch 2004; Rodriguez 2004a; Branch 2005; 
Finnström 2006a; Finnström 2006b; Finnström 2008; Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
 
The ICC engaged with the conflict allied to a significant perpetrator, the UPDF.  
In multiple cases before and after the arrest warrants were issued, and for much 
of the preceding two decades as has been shown, the community was a victim 
of the UPDF and the Government, as well as of the LRA.  Government conduct 
was characterised by some as ‘social torture’ (HURIFO 2002; Dolan 2005; 
Dolan 2011).  Government abuses were documented even by institutional 
supporters of the Court and the UPDF (AI 1999; HRW 2002a; ICG 2004; HRW 
2005; Hepple 2010; HRW 2011b: 24-27).  Abuses by the UPDF and 
Government, both individual and en masse at a policy level, included forced 
displacement, which continued after ICC warrants were issued.  These general 
observations rest upon the material of Chapter 4; however, a more detailed 
analysis of each of the Court’s principal claims is required. 
 
We have already encountered the evidence that the UPDF’s strategy to end the 
war had for many years largely entailed seeking to kill LRA fighters, who were 
for the most part abductees, faster than the LRA could abduct and train new 
ones.  Chapter 4 also provided evidence that abduction by the LRA was in 
effect unhindered.  They were able to abduct thousands of young people when 
needed, to meet their requirements (UNOCHA 2004: 1).  Also as noted, 
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 ‘success’ as evidenced by the UPDF’s own statements reported in the press, 
was measured by the number of LRA (mainly abductees) remaining, a smaller 
number implying greater UPDF accomplishment.  This was apparent prior to the 
ICC’s full engagement, and observed by the International Crisis Group:  
 
The army’s main measurement of success seems to be the body count, 
which is misleading as it ignores the lack of importance the LRA places 
upon the abductees it has turned into combatants. Whenever the army 
kills a number of LRA, more are abducted.  Many commentators have 
suggested that the army is mostly killing recent abductees, not the 
LRA’s hard-core fighters.  At times abductees are tied together to 
prevent escape; when the army fires rockets and heavy artillery, most of 
the casualties are child soldiers.  The government gave assurances that 
Operation Iron Fist would not affect its efforts to rescue abductees but 
military operations often continue to be clumsy, bloody and 
indiscriminate.  (ICG 2004: 14) 
 
While this reference does not quote evidence, its observations are consistent 
with first hand accounts and local research (Dolan 2000b; ARLPI and JPC 
2001; HURIFO 2002; ARLPI and Justice Resources 2003).  Casualties were not 
limited to child soldiers, and included new abductees.  Rodriguez Soto observed 
the pattern of the war when he recounted the following: 
 
‘UPDF kills 19 rebels’ was the main headline of the New Vision on 7th 
January 2003.  Quoting the army’s spokesman, the government 
newspaper assured its readers that four days earlier two helicopter 
gunships had bombed a large group of rebels in Pella, a few kilometres 
from Namukora [sic], in Kitgum District, putting 19 of them ‘out of 
action’[…]  Parents of children who had been abducted a few days 
earlier confirmed their worst fears when they found the corpses of their 
children.  (2009: 116-117)   
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As outlined in Chapter 4, the failure of the UPDF to kill the LRA abductees/ 
fighters faster than the LRA could abduct more had led to a war in which the 
central dynamic between the two militarised parties was of abduction (by the 
LRA) and killing of abductees (by the UPDF).  These observations were made 
on the ground, known within informed elements of the diplomatic community, 
and reflected in local reports. 
 
Notwithstanding calls to investigate the Ugandan authorities as well, supporters 
of the Court’s intervention in Uganda have made the same error, citing 
abduction of the youth by the LRA to legitimise the Court’s intervention, and by 
extension its violent enforcement (HRW 2004a; Akhavan 2005; AI 2006).  When 
the Prosecutor issued the warrants and charged the Ugandan Government with 
the task of arrest (Ocampo 2005b; Ocampo 2005a; Ocampo 2007a), which 
could only be achieved by military means through the war, he inadvertently 
further legitimised the long-standing UPDF strategy and conduct, including the 
killing of abductees. 
 
The dominant narrative also fails to appreciate the evidence presented in 
Chapter 4 that, acknowledging the horrors of the LRA attacks, it was 
displacement of the population from their homes to the camps that precipitated 
the destitution of the population, and was the principal cause of death amongst 
them.  This was a result of communities obeying government orders, often 
enforced with violence, and fleeing LRA atrocities.  By the end of 2001, both 
armed parties were responsible for very significant levels of displacement in the 
region, amounting to approximately 500,000 people (ARLPI and JPC 2001).  
Following the launch of Operation Iron Fist in April 2002, LRA attacks on 
civilians intensified from mid-2002, and the numbers of displaced rose to 
800,000 by June 2002 (UNOCHA 2003).  In September/October 2002 the 
Government made a third order for people to abandon their homes, and 
displacement rose again (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 105-107).  At the hands of both 
sides communities were removed from access to their land and prevented from 
returning by the threat of encounters with the LRA or UPDF (since those found 
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in the countryside could be shot as suspected LRA sympathisers).  By 2004 the 
number displaced in the Acholi districts peaked at approximately 90% of the 
Acholi population (over 1.1 million people) (UNOCHA 2004; UNOCHA 2005a).  
In the following 6 months to July 2005 excess deaths amongst those displaced 
were running at approximately 1,000 per week.  As indicated in Chapter 4, less 
than 10% of these were due to violence—still fewer due to violence by the LRA 
(Ministry of Health of Uganda and World Health Organisation 2005).  These 
human rights breaches fell squarely during the ICC’s intervention, the warrants 
being issued under seal in July 2005, the same month as the WHO’s report was 
published.  By any measure, while not discounting LRA atrocities and 
responsibility for displacement, the UPDF was also a significant killer before 
and during the ICC’s engagement (ARLPI and JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; 
Baines 2003; UNOCHA 2003; UNOCHA 2004; UNOCHA 2005b).37 
 
Aside from observing the death rate amongst the displaced population and 
urging a peaceful resolution of the conflict as the most crucial step, the WHO 
recommended IDP camp ‘decongestion’ (i.e. allowing people to leave) as the 
first measure to address the underlying causes of the high death rate.38  This 
call came four years after the publication by local religious leaders of the 
ARLPI/JPC research report Let My People Go.  This drew public attention to the 
suffering in the camps (then holding over 50% of the population), and called 
upon the Government to allow their return home (ARLPI and JPC 2001; 
Rodriguez 2004b).  
 
Also inconsistent with a binary view of the conflict, indicated in 4.0.1, was the 
government’s opposition to, and obstruction of, community-led measures 
designed to address the war through the return process.  In particular the 
hindrance of the Amnesty Law and its institutional implementation, and the 
                                            
37 Article 8 of the Rome Statute itself, sub-section 2,(e) viii in fact defines such enforced 
displacement as a war crime, except where demanded by the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative to military operations.  It seems questionable whether a defence 
on the basis of civilian security could be made, given the violent attacks by the UPDF 
against civilians in the process of enforcing the displacement. 
38 Stepping up efforts to protect the IDP camps from violent attacks was second.   
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undermining of civil society efforts to de-escalate the conflict through its 
function, are notable (Armstrong 2010: 274).  The dominant discourse fails to 
acknowledge these occurrences, which are well documented.  The observation 
that the UPDF’s military was hugely more expensive and far less effective at 
extracting the abductees from the LRA than the return process, despite some 
interaction between these elements, further underlines this divergence.  
Additionally, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the UPDF’s methods generally 
involved killing the abductees, while civil society efforts secured their exit from 
the LRA alive (Rodriguez 2004a; Rodriguez Soto 2009: including 38-39). 
 
With these understandings rooted in research from the ground from multiple 
community-based or community-informed sources, and first hand accounts, a 
view of the conflict as two-sided is untenable.  It ignores the Government’s (and 
its military’s) complicity in the deaths of many thousands of civilians through 
displacement, its strategy of fighting the war without preventing abduction which 
implies the killing of the stream of abductees over some decades, and its 
obstruction of the community-based return processes to bring abductees back 
alive.  These were not peripheral issues but the central long-term dynamics of 
the conflict, ample documentation associating them with the main causes of 
death and suffering of the population.  The bipolar view of the conflict is one that 
ignores the fate of the affected civilian population over two decades.  According 
to the evidence base, the view that civil society interests were in some way 
represented by the Government and furthered by the military, is thus profoundly 
mistaken.  Field-based research provides a solid body of evidence to discredit 
the binary view, and clearly identifies that the conflict had three (or more) 
principal parties—the Government/UPDF, the LRA, and (arguably as a more 
disparate entity) the community. 
 
The evidence upon which a three-sided interpretation of the conflict is based, 
which largely precedes the ICC’s intervention and was thus available to the 
Court prior to its engagement, is not in any case significantly opposed.  There 
are no studies at the community level based on witness testimony that propose 
that the camps were mainly created by the LRA; no studies that challenge the 
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view that the camps were the main cause of excess deaths; and 
(notwithstanding the complexities of the issues), no studies that indicate the 
LRA was not comprised of abductees to a significant degree.  Nor has any 
evidence been proffered to suggest that killing the abductees once integrated 
into the LRA was more effective or cheaper than getting them out alive.  There 
is a wealth of evidence from the conflict context, and none of it serves to sustain 
the belief that the Government/UPDF’s conduct was somehow consistent with 
the interests of the war-affected population, in a two-sided conflict against the 
LRA.  The evidence of survey data from organisations and researchers on the 
ground, and the lived experience of the author and others, demonstrates this 
(HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et. al. 2003; ARPLI 2004; Dolan 2002, 2005, 2011; 
Finnström 2006b, 2008; Rodriguez Soto 2009).  On the basis of this material 
and outlined in section 4.4, communities were working for a different outcome in 
the war (peace, and return of the abductees alive), by means opposed by 
government, LRA and ICC (mass amnesty and return precipitating 
unconditional negotiation by all sides), while they were being targeted violently 
by LRA and government.  On this basis, it was a three-sided war.   
 
This evidence enables the examination of the dominant narrative from a more 
informed perspective; understanding the community as victim of both militarised 
factions, but also as a party with agency, deploying its own strategy (or 
strategies) for coping with and ending the conflict—strategies that were actively 
opposed and disrupted by the other main parties.  In this context the 
intervention of the ICC on the side of the Government and its military approach 
is notable (Ocampo 2005b).  In doing so they engaged with the only party to the 
war that shared its overriding institutional commitment to the prioritisation of 
retributive justice for the LRA leadership, and (as they hoped) the capability to 
enforce it.  The ICC entered the war on the side of the Government’s military 
campaign, perceiving that through doing so it could further international criminal 
justice.   
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6.1.1  UPDF as perpetrator, protector and enforcer 
 
Regardless of the issue of conflict analysis, the Court would have been 
cognisant of significant practical concerns bound to its wider purpose, for which 
collaboration with the Ugandan Government/military might have seemed logical 
or even necessary.  The retributive approach to justice required by the ICC 
demands enforcement, and in the violent context of war in northern Uganda 
such enforcement against the LRA leadership was inevitably not a civil but a 
military process (5.1.3).  At the time, and subsequently, there had been little 
appetite internationally for Western military intervention on the ground, though 
small numbers of external military advisors had been present from time to time  
(author’s observation).39  In the short- or medium-term, ICC enforcement on the 
ground in Uganda implied action by the UPDF.   
 
The UPDF was already internationally known for perpetrating crimes against 
civilians.  The International Court of Justice in The Hague was already 
considering charges against Uganda’s armed forces for killing, torture and 
inhumane treatment of civilians, training child soldiers, inciting ethnic conflict, 
destroying villages and civilian buildings, and plundering and exploiting the 
resources within the DRC.  In 2005, the same year as the warrants were issued 
and two months after they were unsealed by the Prosecutor, Uganda was found 
guilty of these crimes (ICJ 2005a; ICJ 2005b).  UPDF abuses were not 
restricted to the DRC.  Human Rights Watch and others had already published 
material documenting UPDF brutality in Uganda (AI 1997; Gersony 1997; HRW 
2002a; HRW 2003a; ICG 2004; HRW 2005).  As demonstrated by its storming 
of Gulu prison in 2002, and the execution of youths outside Gulu police station 
in the same year (4.2.3), the UPDF’s role in relation to Uganda’s legal system 
                                            
39 I encountered or heard of US or other expatriate military personnel were present in 
Gulu from time to time after my arrival in 2000.  My informal enquiries to UK diplomats 
from DFID and the Foreign Office in Kampala suggested this at the time.  The UK’s 
military engagement in Sierra Leone from (2000), Afghanistan (2001) and later Iraq 
(2003) were offered as reasons for reluctance on behalf of the former colonial power to 
intervene. 
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was also questionable.  If the Prosecutor had legal or humanitarian concerns, 
these must have been outweighed by practical considerations relating to ICC 
enforcement. 
 
As indicated in Chapter 5, the prevalence of human rights abuses by both sides 
but the action against the LRA alone was criticised by some.  However, (and 
importantly), according to the Prosecutor the measure of the gravity of the 
crimes includes assessment of their scale, nature, manner or commission, and 
impact (AI 2004; HRW 2004a; Akhavan 2005: 411; Ocampo 2006b: 5; HRW 
2011b: 25-26).  The threshold that triggered the warrants was in his assessment 
met by the LRA only, and not the UPDF; LRA crimes were seen as ‘much more 
numerous and of much higher gravity’ (Ocampo 2005b: 2-3).  Certainly LRA 
crimes were generally more eye-catchingly gruesome and horrific.  However, 
the measure of ‘gravity’ seems not to have related to the actual number of 
deaths resulting from the actions of a party, as with the death rate from 
displacement the UPDF would then be brought back into the frame (ARLPI and 
JPC 2001).  The Court had failed to publish any measure by which attribution 
should fall upon one party or the other, apparently ignoring the issue despite its 
centrality in relation to most of the deaths.  It seems likely that the manner of 
LRA crimes, the conspicuously pitiless attacks and mass atrocities on 
defenceless civilians, is what prompted its unique selection for warrants in this 
context.  However, these distinctions are not clear: the lack of transparency of 
the Prosecutor’s assessments of what is meant by ‘gravity’ in this context is 
concerning. 
 
The Court faced a further challenge—how to adequately discharge its 
responsibilities to consider witness and victim protection - a requirement 
imposed by the Statute (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998; 
Ocampo 2005b: 6).  This duty was apparently fulfilled through an ongoing risk 
assessment process.  However, security had already been placed in the hands 
of the Government of Uganda and the UPDF.  There would have been few 
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alternatives perhaps40, but to overtly place security in the hands of forces 
whose strategy had resulted in thousands of deaths was a move that caused 
local concern.  To do this, knowing that all LRA atrocities up to that point had 
taken place under the ‘protection’ of the UPDF, further underlines the 
inadequacy of this response.  The Prosecutor implicitly acknowledged this issue 
in 2007, when he identified witnesses as having taken ‘tremendous risks to tell 
their stories’ (Ocampo 2007a).  These inadequacies of security were addressed 
solely through consultations, in this case with the local civil society leaders, and 
were hailed by the Prosecutor as exemplifying his approach (Ocampo 2005b: 3; 
Ocampo 2007b: 5-6).  
 
In the context of the war as a three-sided conflict, and awareness of the 
abundance of evidence indicating UPDF brutality at the local and strategic level 
over the preceding decades, local anxieties were well-founded.  They were 
based upon their experience of LRA and UPDF violence towards them, and the 
Court’s association with violent enforcement methods.  Failing to perceive 
community concerns as material, indeed apparently assuming they were based 
upon ignorance, the Court addressed them through information dissemination 
(ICG 2005c: 5-6).  As its annual Outreach Reports demonstrate (2007; 2008; 
2009a), following a familiar pattern of external intervention, these were intended 
to educate the populace about the Court.  In these reports the ‘lessons learned’ 
in relation to the Uganda cases from 2007-2009 were entirely focused around 
establishing how to improve the outreach work itself, rather than on any 
knowledge gained by the Court from civil society about the war.  The Court’s 
efforts were hailed by some supporters as a positive step forward, though by 
2008 ‘misinformation and negative perceptions’ were identified as remaining 
(ICG 2005c, 5-6; HRW 2008: 36,116-125,126). 
 
Findings from an ICTJ survey carried out over two weeks in 2005 in Gulu, 
Kitgum, Lira and Soroti, though flawed in various respects to be discussed, 
indicate that communities had significant issues with the UPDF.  A higher 
                                            
40 The issue of witness protection measures and means to address local anxieties are 
discussed in the next section. 
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proportion of those surveyed believed that UPDF rather than LRA offenders 
should be put on trial.  Despite its weaknesses and the profusion of possible 
confounding variables, the survey indicates civilian distrust of the army, to 
whom the Court entrusted security arrangements (Pham et al. 2005: 5; Pham et 
al. 2007). 
 
In summary, the case study has so far revealed operational challenges for the 
Court relating to its engagement of the UPDF as a key enforcer of its warrants, 
protector of the people, and as significant perpetrator of war crimes below the 
ICC’s threshold level.  These matters, relating to both local and strategic levels 
of the conflict, are essentially case-specific.  However, they are associated with 
the Court’s institutional prioritisation of retributive justice, and the related 
requirements for political and military accommodation in order to achieve its 
purposes—matters of wider significance that have been touched upon by other 
authors that will be further considered in Chapter 7 (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004; 
Rodman 2006; Branch 2007b; Branch 2007a; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2007; 
Nouwen and Werner 2010; Rodman 2012; Struett 2012).  For now it is sufficient 
to observe that the case raises questions about the means by which 
international criminal justice is pursued in volatile contexts—ones that concern 
potential trade-offs between international criminal justice enforcement and the 
human rights of those who may fall victim to enforcement efforts.  Overtly, it 
highlights operational matters of enforcement. 
 
6.2  The misalignment of interests 
 
Extending this theme, the study now examines the proposed association of the 
Court’s purpose with the interests of communities affected by violence.  Issues 
of misalignment of Court and community interests began to emerge from the 
earliest stages of the ICC’s intervention (Armstrong 2010).   
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6.2.1  Failures of complementarity and deterrence 
 
[…] The Prosecutor adopted the policy of inviting and welcoming 
voluntary referrals by territorial states as a step in triggering the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  This policy resulted in the referrals for what 
would become the Court’s first two situations:  northern Uganda and the 
DRC.  The method of initiating investigations by voluntary referral has 
increased the likelihood of important co-operation and on-the-ground 
support.  (Ocampo 2006c: 7) 
 
A notable feature of the acceptance of referral and subsequent issuance of 
warrants relates to the legal purpose of ICC intervention.  The Statute 
anticipates that the Court’s engagement will help to strengthen domestic state 
legal processes, and indicates that referral to the ICC should be associated with 
the need to enhance the legal processes of the domestic courts, and thus 
enable prosecution.  The ICC is not intended to displace functional civil/ legal 
processes in signatory states (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
1998: Article 1).  Alongside the ICC’s intervention, considerable efforts took 
place to strengthen the Ugandan legal apparatus, and a War Crimes Division of 
the High Court of Uganda was established in 2008 (Otim and Wierda 2010).  
 
However, it has been noted that the Ugandan legal system did not require 
assistance in this regard, being quite capable of carrying out a trial should the 
leadership of the LRA have been apprehended, and already having a duty to do 
so (Schabas 2007: 13).  Without evidence of the need for the ICC’s intervention, 
it has been suggested that the ICC might instead have strengthened the 
Ugandan judicial system not by relieving it of its task, but by reminding it of its 
responsibilities.  There may be more effective and cheaper ways to strengthen 
local capacities than through the Court (Nouwen and Werner 2010: 947; 
Schabas 2011: 164-167; Franceschet 2012a).   
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In any case, legal challenges were never the principal issue.  As previously 
described and as indicated in the Prosecutor’s statement above, the Court 
sought Ugandan assistance to effect arrest on the ground; the Ugandan 
government too perceived a mutual interest, not because of inadequacies it 
perceived in its own legal system, but because it determined that ICC 
engagement could legitimise its military effort and enhance international military 
support.  It was the desire to militarily apprehend the leadership of the LRA that 
motivated Uganda’s self-referral; the opportunity for enforcement that prompted 
the Court (ICC 2004b; Schabas 2011: 167; Rodman and Booth 2013: 285-286; 
Freeland 2015). 
 
If the positive impact of referral on the complementarity of legal systems has 
been questionable, some other anticipated benefits from the early stages of the 
Court’s intervention have been disappointing.  Internationally, and from the 
outset, it had been anticipated that a primary impact of the Court would be 
through the deterrent effect it would bestow.  Associated with the establishment 
of an ‘era of enforcement’ of international criminal justice anticipated by 
Robertson, it was hoped that the expectation of apprehension and trial will one 
day stay the hand of would-be perpetrators worldwide (Grono 2006; Robertson 
2006; Grono and O'Brien 2008).  This may be so.  In the short-term, as a first 
step towards this goal, some degree of deterrence may be hoped for in relation 
to individual cases.  Once a situation has been referred to the Court, and before 
warrants are issued, perpetrators might moderate their behaviour in an effort to 
avoid the attentions of the Prosecutor (Ocampo 2006b: 6).  This effect could 
even endure beyond the issuance of warrants, though rationally, the opportunity 
to influence suspects is greatly reduced once their arrest warrants are issued 
and unsealed.  They may no longer escape attentions of the Court, which itself 
anticipates a successful prosecution on the basis of crimes already committed 
(Grono and O'Brien 2008: 18). 
 
There seems to have been no deterrent effect in the Uganda case, even during 
the window following referral, prior to the Prosecutor formally opening his 
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investigation.  The Barlonyo massacre previously mentioned—one of the worst 
atrocities committed by the LRA up to that time—followed less than two months 
after Uganda’s self-referral to the Court, and well before warrants were issued 
or unsealed, in the period when deterrence might be hoped to be at its peak.   
 
Anyone still optimistic that the Court’s intervention might instead moderate the 
LRA’s behaviour after issuance of warrants will also have been disappointed.  
The Christmas Massacres, in which over 850 civilians were killed by the LRA 
from 24th December 2008 to 17th January 2009, were the most intense period of 
LRA violence to date.  It must surely have been these grotesque atrocities that 
the Court was intended to deter, and it is most regrettable that this was not the 
case.  The hope and expectation that, despite showing no deterrent effect when 
focused on individuals under investigation, it will deter others elsewhere in the 
longer term, remains.  
 
Thus, in relation to complementarity, the Court addressed a problem that may 
not have existed, with questionable effect; and in relation to deterrence, it failed 
in both a specific and general sense to deter atrocities before and after arrest 
warrants were issued. 
 
6.2.2  Implementation of the Statute trumps assistance to communities 
 
From an early stage there was a widespread expectation, at least in general 
terms, that the interests of the Court and communities affected by violence 
would be similar.  According to the Rome Statute the Court is intended to 
benefit present and future generations through its work to extend the rule of 
international criminal law (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
1998: Preamble).  According to the Prosecutor it is also anticipated to benefit 
the current victims of conflict: ‘we are their Court’ as the Prosecutor has stated 
(Ocampo 2010a: 11).  This claim merits consideration.  Bound by its Statute, 
the ICC cannot intervene for a purpose it is not mandated to act upon.  But the 
hope that it will intervene for affected communities will be borne out only in 
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instances where community interests are aligned with those of the Court in 
implementing the Statute—that is, with the specific approaches to justice that 
the Court implies as outlined in Chapter 3.  Where the interests of the war-
affected population diverge from the purposes of the Statute the wider interests 
of ‘justice’ as interpreted in law must prevail and will be imposed.  Evidence 
from this case study is instructive. 
 
The first point of note is already substantiated.  The ICC, driven by its retributive 
priorities, issued warrants following the Government’s self-referral, and through 
that process legitimised the UPDF as its principal enforcer.  Some even invoked 
the plight of the population in the camps, misattributed their displacement as the 
work of the LRA, and called for justice (Akhavan 2005: 409; Ocampo 2005b: 1).  
Thus, from the announcement of the warrants the interests of the Court and the 
community had begun to diverge.  
 
Secondly, also in relation to the preceding evidence, the ICC was apparently 
intervening on behalf of the abductees who were (and are) some of the principal 
victims of the LRA.  Many of them were the abducted children41 who had 
inadvertently become the LRA’s foot-soldiers, whose plight had galvanised 
concern worldwide (AI 1997; HRW Africa and HRW Children's Rights Project 
1997; Omona and Matheson 1998; Egeland 2003; HRW 2003a).  
Commentators explicitly noted their plight, one even perceiving in the same 
paper their interests as justifying the Court’s intervention, having previously 
stated the need for their ‘neutralization’.  Abductees, as LRA fighters, were 
targeted by the UPDF, the ICC’s enforcer, and yet: 
 
[…] the vast majority of LRA soldiers were forcibly conscripted children 
with no interest in continuing the war against the Ugandan government, 
[…]  (Akhavan 2005: 409, see also 407)   
                                            
41 The human rights literature often refers to ‘abducted children’, and although it was 
mainly children who were retained by the LRA following abduction, this term is not 
entirely accurate as many adults were also abducted.  Additionally, quite a number of 
those abducted as children became adults while in the LRA.   
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However: 
 
Despite colonial-era tensions between northern and southern Uganda, 
eliminating or at least neutralizing the LRA was a matter of common 
interest.  (Akhavan 2005: 404) 
 
Akhavan’s notion mirrors the Court’s apparent misunderstanding about the 
conflict dynamic, articulated with evidence in Chapter 4.  Many or most of the 
LRA fighters were the abductees from the community; they were amongst the 
victims the Court was seeking to benefit.  Their killing by the UPDF, without 
preventing further abduction by the LRA, was a central long-term dynamic of the 
war; and ICC warrants were intended by the Government to strengthen 
international support for the UPDF’s combat operations.  Akhavan’s article was 
timed to explain the Court’s sanctioning of military action against the LRA, and 
its entry into the devastating conflict dynamic.  Victims of the LRA as abductees, 
who became victims of the UPDF as LRA foot-soldiers, became victims of the 
enforcement operation for the Court’s warrants. 
 
In the same period, research was carried out that indicated the people’s desire 
for accountability,42 including in some cases for Kony’s arrest, which was 
unsurprising given the atrocities perpetrated. 
 
Very few victims of LRA abuses interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 
the camps expressed any desire for ‘forgiveness’—many asked for 
‘punishment’ of the commanders.  One activist reported that the people 
of his community, Atiak in Gulu, would not be happy to have its native 
son, Vincent Otti, the LRA’s number two, return home.    
                                            
42 They also noted that ‘reconciliation’, a necessary requirement to facilitate the return 
process, was far more widely aspired to than ‘forgiveness’.  The former was perhaps a 
more realistic aspiration too, in the aftermath of the widespread violence by both armed 
parties. 
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[…] A formal survey of attitudes of ordinary northern Ugandans and 
victims published in July 2005 reveals that many more than previously 
thought support prosecution of LRA leaders and some also want the 
UPDF held accountable for their crimes (76 percent).  A majority of 
those surveyed wanted both peace and justice, and did not think they 
were mutually exclusive.  (HRW 2005: 60) 
 
Human Rights Watch were here selectively quoting from the influential ICTJ 
survey, which in fact overwhelmingly highlighted the community’s immediate 
desire for food (33%) and peace (31%), relative to justice (less than 1%) (Pham 
et al. 2005: 4-5).  The 76% figure used is in relation to whether or not individuals 
should be held accountable for their crimes, and was without regard to the 
practical issues implied by enforcement—the need for continuation of the war 
(ibid: 39).  
 
There are multiple methodological issues regarding the survey.  Amongst these 
were the nature of choices put to camp residents, in which for example, largely 
destitute people in considerable physical danger were asked to prioritise issues 
of feeding themselves and their families, or the provision of their security (from 
killing, abduction and other atrocities).  Alongside this choice they were asked 
how they prioritised justice.  However, the question was further complicated by 
issues of what ‘justice’ might mean in this context.  The report fails to unpack 
the term ‘justice’ and properly define it; a curious oversight for an organisation 
promoting itself as having international expertise in the transitional justice 
arena, and a particularly grave error in the challenging linguistic and cross-
cultural context of the survey in which multiple justice issues were apparent.  In 
any event even without this clarification, and conflating all aspects of ‘justice’, 
the community did wish for it, including accountability for the LRA leadership,43 
but with less than one per cent naming it as their most immediate need.44   
                                            
43 This survey covered regions recently affected by the LRA’s violence, and included 
extensive areas that had recently been relatively unaffected by the 20-year war.  Some 
areas were outside the Acholi region, where the population had not been forced into 
camps by the Government and UPDF violence against civilians was far less common.  
Helpfully this distinction is made in the listing of responses in the report, but the far 
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Respondents were also asked to choose between peace with amnesty and 
peace with trials, and the results were used to indicate a balance of support for 
each approach.  A more contextually relevant choice might have been between 
two different options: peace with amnesty; or peace attained through a war of 
sufficient length and ferocity to secure arrest and subsequent trials.  This choice 
was not presented.  With peace as a given in either option, people were free to 
choose between trial or amnesty.  The options ignore the necessary means to 
attain peace with trials—sustaining the war, which was the antithesis of 
respondents’ prioritisation of peace.  Equally, the ICTJ ignore the role that 
amnesty might play in a strategic approach to securing peace by creating a 
route out of the LRA for most of its fighters.  The profound strategic nature of 
that choice in the regional context, between peace through amnesty or through 
continuation of the war to secure arrest, is understood by the authors instead as 
a choice of justice methods alone.  The survey results were interpreted as 
leaving plenty of scope for military-backed international criminal justice 
enforcement—a cause to which the ICTJ is institutionally committed (ICTJ 
2009; ICTJ 2010), but to which the local community was according to their own 
survey clearly opposed. 
 
The authors interpreted these ambiguous findings in a particular manner.  
Having removed the contextual issues of the required war of enforcement from 
                                                                                                                                
lower levels of Government-backed violence in these areas is not fully acknowledged 
in the analysis, so the interpretation lacks some depth. 
44 The authors state that the de-prioritisation of justice ‘does not reflect the overall 
importance attached to it’ (page 25).  It is not clear why the authors make this bold 
claim.  The population’s need for food and peace most immediately is clearly stated by 
respondents without ambiguity.  Furthermore, the term justice in the report is used at 
times in its wide sense, and at other times indicating criminal justice, or even more 
narrowly international criminal justice for the LRA leadership alone.  Given these 
considerable ambiguities, which would be all the greater in a cross-cultural context, the 
findings in relation to the ICC intervention should be treated with great caution.  
Additionally, it is instructive that when asked to prioritise issues after peace was 
attained, a majority of the IDPs prioritised being allowed to return to their villages.  This 
is consistent with the view that displacement to the camps was experienced by them as 
enforced incarceration, and not their own voluntary response to the war which they 
might address themselves.  It was an additional burden placed upon them that they 
wished to have lifted.  
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the survey when the questions were asked, and having been unclear about 
whether questions referred to broad concepts of justice or to narrow 
international criminal law enforcement, the relatively positive results secured 
through this abstraction could then be re-applied back into the specific context 
of the war where they clearly did not apply, thus achieving apparent 
endorsement of the military violence to which the affected community were 
overwhelmingly opposed.  The ICC was recommended to disseminate more 
information about itself to assuage local concerns, and the issues of peace and 
justice (now reinterpreted as narrow criminal justice enforcement) were 
understood to be pursued together through the war, presumably as there was 
no other option.  The ICTJ then, faced with people’s overwhelmingly expressed 
wish for food, peace, and security as their most immediate needs (totalling 
72%), made recommendations that led to the opposite—a continuation of the 
war in favour of criminal justice (with less than 1% support) (Pham et al. 2005: 
25,42).  At the ICC review conference in 2010 the ICTJ ignored all the 
inconvenient findings entirely, and summarised the local position in 2005 as 
being 66% in favour of hard options to deal with the LRA leadership, falling to 
41% two years later.  The locally overwhelming prioritisation by the affected 
population of peace and food was not mentioned (Otim and Wierda 2010: 6).  
Human Rights Watch then used this recommendation as an endorsement of the 
war to secure prosecution, and in this way also find support for their institutional 
position, thus ‘displacing’ human rights as Branch has observed (HRW 1998; 
HRW 2002b; HRW 2004b; HRW 2010a; Branch 2011).   
 
From a more informed perspective on the conflict it emerges that peace and 
international criminal justice for certain perpetrators are not mutually exclusive 
in principle, but may require some contextual understanding to be achieved in 
practice (Armstrong 2010). 
 
The Court’s process sets the overarching requirement of the international 
community as the implementation of international criminal justice, and the trial 
of suspects.  The ICTJ findings, contrary to their interpretation and despite the 
inadequacies of their methodology, indicate that the ICC is committed by its 
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Statute to very different priorities than those of the affected population.  With 
such a stark difference in the priorities to those of the Court and the affected 
civilian population, situations in which the Prosecutor would have to choose 
between institutional commitments and an aspiration to be the Court of the 
victims will sometimes arise.  Should this happen, the Prosecutor must select a 
course of action consistent with his/her institutional position: s/he may be 
obliged to set aside the immediate interests of communities, perhaps in favour 
of future populations as some have observed (Branch 2011: 209).  Evidence 
indicates that the hope that the Court’s interests would necessarily be aligned 
with those of the community were not borne out, even by 2005. 
 
There is a strong case for arguing that this should have been anticipated?  
Approaches founded upon legal principles that set aside consequentialist 
considerations may become problematic in situations where thousands of lives 
are at risk.  This issue is taken up in Chapter 7.  
 
6.2.3  Failure to recognise the dynamic new context 
 
If the issue of benefit to the community was problematic, there was at least the 
notion that the Court’s intervention would make nothing significantly worse.  The 
people were already suffering at the hands of both sides: the LRA was 
committing atrocities, the UPDF’s tactics were already brutal, and the IDP 
camps were there regardless of the ICC’s presence.  Aside from the evidence 
presented above, if there had been no other efforts to end the violence then the 
Court might argue (though not un-controversially) that the international 
community, in this case on the basis of the Court’s legitimacy, had a 
responsibility to act (HRW 2011b: 2).   
 
But as we have seen in Chapter 4, the notion that there were no other 
significant efforts to end the war was not correct.  Having dismissed the return 
process as finished by 2003, advocates for the Court had to explain why it was 
apparently gaining momentum in 2004, with the defection of significant 
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commanders with their fighters.  In that year the number of amnesties claimed 
by returnees from the LRA rose to 5,000 (ARLPI 2004: 2; ICG 2005a: 2; ICG 
2005c; ICG 2005b: 6; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 233; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010: 
15).  Numbers like this signalled a significant development in the conflict 
dynamic. 
 
The Court’s supporters proposed that this success should be attributed to the 
Court itself (Akhavan 2005: 417-418; HRW 2009b: 32).  Thus when defections 
did not take place it was because the community efforts to foster return had 
failed, thereby legitimising the Court’s intervention in a frozen conflict.  When 
defections did take place (even before the ICC warrants were issued) and the 
process was increasingly successful, it was because of the effects of their own 
intervention, further legitimising their efforts.  
 
Adducing the effectiveness of the Court from these observations rests upon a 
number of logical errors:   
1. The failure to re-examine a conclusion, and inferences drawn, when 
contrary evidence emerges. 
2. The failure to identify and assess competing possible causes for an 
observed effect prior to ascribing responsibility for that effect to one of 
them. 
3. Adducing evidence for a belief from an observation, and later from the 
contrary observation, adducing evidence for the same belief. 
 
Notably, both interpretations of events exist not just from the same author, but 
in the same article (Akhavan 2005).  The independent academic peer review 
process did not apparently identify these logical issues internal to the article 
itself.  It is disappointing that Akhavan was not required to provide evidence or 
explain the basis for this claim, though such instances are not isolated (see for 
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example the claims of the Prosecutor to the Assembly of States Parties 
(2006c).45 
 
Community-based efforts to end the war were not the only structural changes 
taking place at the time, that have gone largely unacknowledged as impacting 
on the war.  The signing of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(SCPA) in South Sudan nine months before the ICC warrants had been 
unsealed had dramatically changed the political and geographical context of the 
LRA’s war (UNMIS 2005).  The support of the Sudanese Government for the 
LRA from about 1993 is well documented—a tit-for-tat response to the Ugandan 
Government and Western support for the SPLA (Gersony 1997: 36-42).  The 
SCPA significantly changed the LRA’s political context (ICG 2005c: 3; Flint and 
de Waal 2008).  At the same time it was also facing a transformed military 
scenario.  The SPLA, with whom the LRA had clashed on many occasions, now 
had secured uncontested control of South Sudan and was no longer at war with 
the Sudanese army.  The relative safety of territory held by the northern 
Sudanese army previously in southern Sudan, where the LRA could be based 
and could train abductees to fight, and where the Sudanese had been able to 
assist with logistics on occasion, was now much further north towards Khartoum 
(CR and QPSW 2006; ICG 2006a).  Interposed between Sudanese 
Government territory where the LRA could be based, and the LRA’s home area 
for operations and abduction in northern Uganda, were now hundreds of 
kilometres of SPLA-held enemy territory.  The LRA’s operational context was 
profoundly altered (Mwenda 2010: 56-57). 
 
There were other respects in which the conflict dynamics may have shifted.  
After nearly a decade of LRA operations being launched from Sudanese 
territory, UPDF operations north of the Uganda border in Sudan had been 
facilitated by protocols between the two governments in 2002 and 2004, prior to 
                                            
45 Any assumption that the Assembly of States Parties and the Am. J. Int. Law were 
receptive audiences wanting to be reassured about the impacts of the Court and 
unprepared to critically examine the claims of its advocates would be inaccurate - a 
fallacy of type B above.  However, it should be acknowledged as one possible 
interpretation. 
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the ICC’s engagement.  While LRA numbers had not apparently dipped in 
response to increased military pressure up to 2003, military activity in Sudan 
against LRA bases, which began in 2002, may have begun to have an effect 
(UNOCHA 2004; UNOCHA 2005a: 2; UNOCHA 2005b: 1).  There was some 
speculation that by early 2005 the LRA had been significantly weakened (HRW 
2005: 3; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 230-246).  This is reflected in a presentation 
about the peace-through-return process given to members of the diplomatic 
community in Kampala by the author at the time (author’s records).46 
 
These factors—the strengthening return process, the changed political, military, 
and geographical context for the LRA, and military pressure from the UPDF, as 
well as the mass displacement of almost all the Acholi population—are all well 
documented, and they were all new.  Additionally, by September 2005, before 
the ICC warrants had been unsealed, the LRA had already established bases in 
Garamba, DRC (Drew 2010: 25).  The ICC was intervening in a dynamic 
situation in which numerous factors had recently come to bear.  The perception 
of a frozen conflict in which all options had been exhausted fails to acknowledge 
the profound structural changes that had taken place in the previous few years.  
It was a new context. 
  
6.2.4  Local concerns were well-founded and ignored 
 
Fundamental practical and theoretical problems in relation to the Court’s efforts 
to reassure the Acholi population have already been considered.  The Court, 
having intervened in the conflict as a supporter of the Government’s war rather 
than community-based peace efforts, and having interests closely associated 
with the UPDF’s military campaign, was poorly placed to reassure the 
population about their concerns for peace and security.  Evidence including 
                                            
46 I was presenting the local analysis, partly to support the case for stronger 
international financial support for the return process, given its local support, gathering 
momentum, and strategic nature.  DFID and other donors did in fact back the process 
with additional funding, though this of course remained minimal relative to military 
spending. 
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extensive survey data, in-depth on-the-ground interviews and lived experience 
already presented demonstrates the UPDF had failed to protect people over 
preceding decades (4.3); was actively engaged in their displacement to the 
camps at the cost of thousands of lives (4.2); and despite this was explicitly 
entrusted by the Prosecutor with their security (5.1.3).  There was clearly a 
danger that the Court’s interest in furthering arrest might override 
considerations of civilian safety.  Former Chief Prosecutor for the Bosnia and 
Rwanda tribunals Richard Goldstone anticipated such a possibility in general 
terms (McGreal 2007; 3.1.5), in order to move towards the ‘era of enforcement’ 
(Robertson 2006: ix-xxxiv).   
 
A second fundamental point to make at this stage is that this study is not 
dealing in hindsight.  Voices were repeatedly raised at a community level and 
elsewhere that anticipated the conflict dynamics and implications of the ICC 
intervention before the Prosecutor made the decision to intervene (Dolan 
2000b; ARLPI and JPC 2001; HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; ARLPI 2004; 
Dolan 2005; Armstrong 2010).  In February 2005, four years after ARLPI 
published its plea for people to be released from the camps, but nearly three 
months before the Prosecutor applied for his warrants and six months before 
the WHO/Ministry of Health published its mortality survey, this researcher’s view 
from the ground was reported by CNN: 
 
‘[The] ICC has committed a terrible blunder,’ says Bryn Higgs, Uganda 
Programme Development Officer for Conciliation Resources.  ‘To start 
war crimes investigations for the sake of justice at a time when war is 
not yet over risks having in the end neither justice nor peace delivered.’ 
 
According to Britain’s UN Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones Parry the 
problem lies with the unfortunate timing of the ICC’s investigation: ‘This 
is about sequencing.  First you need to put an end to the conflict and 
move into peace.  After this comes justice and reconciliation.’   
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Both are worried that the prospect of being convicted of war crimes at 
the ICC will drive the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army away from peace 
talks with the Ugandan government.  
 
Bryn Higgs: ‘The irony is that the ICC is there for a humanitarian 
purpose, it wants to discourage terrible impunities, but instead it pushes 
the LRA back in the bush and this leads to a continuation of the 
atrocities.’  
[…] 
‘It’s an ongoing humanitarian disaster,’ says Bryn Higgs of 
Reconciliation Resources [sic].  ‘Almost the whole farming community 
has been displaced.  People in the region are destitute […].’  (Volqvartz 
2005) 
  
The ICC entered the conflict despite the case put by communities and those 
working on the ground (Armstrong 2010).  The government was a known 
perpetrator, and prior to the point of ICC intervention experts on the ground, as 
well as the communities themselves, were already predicting the outcome.  
These warnings were read and quoted prior to being disregarded (Akhavan 
2005: 416).  
 
Instead, legally sound but practically untenable assurances were offered to the 
populace by the Court and its supporters.  The first of these is simple to refute.  
Stakeholders were assured that since the ICC’s warrants applied to five 
commanders only, other LRA members could continue to return under the 
amnesty process (Akhavan 2005).  This was true, but it ignored the strategic 
significance to the conflict dynamic of the five warrants, and the associated 
structural shift to militarily enforced retributive justice priorities (ICC 2005c; ICC 
2005b; ICC 2005c; ICG 2005c: 1).  As already indicated, and explored more 
fully in the next section, this change was profound.  An leadership singled out 
by the Court for trial would (and did) lead, or more accurately coerce, its fighters 
back to the bush.   
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This assurance was also flawed because the ICC’s efforts were accurately 
perceived as an effort to end impunity.  As such they were associated with the 
government and Museveni’s opposition to amnesty in favour of criminal justice 
enforcement (Branch 2004; Museveni 2005).  The Court’s efforts were not only 
ideologically counter to the amnesty process, but anticipated by the Prosecutor 
(and intended by the Government) to strengthen the military approach, as we 
have seen in 6.2.1 (Egeland 2008: 211; Rodman and Booth 2013).  There were 
even some suggesting that the ICC might issue more LRA-focused warrants, 
which would have further undermined the return process (HRW 2010b: 11; 
HRW 2011b: 29-30).  The ongoing government undermining of the Amnesty 
Law (and with it civil society efforts for peace) as described by Rodriguez Soto 
was further exemplified by the long-running issue of the trial or amnesty of 
Kwoyelo, promoted extensively in the government-controlled newspaper, the 
New Vision (Rodriguez Soto 2009; HRW 2010b: 49; Cakaj 2011: 9-11; Opongo 
2011: 215; Talebpour 2012: 102).  In this case the Ugandan Government and 
legal system vacillated over trial of a prominent LRA returnee who had escaped 
and sought amnesty (Cakaj 2011; Opongo 2011; Kersten 2014; Ogora 2016b; 
Ogora 2016a).  Such prolonged public debate about whether the Amnesty Law 
could be overturned in his case served to damage the credibility of the entire 
amnesty process that communities had worked hard over many years to 
promote (Otim and Wierda 2010).47  Similar dynamics have been observed by 
others (Armstrong 2010: 273-274).  It is plausible that ICC and government 
actions to end impunity, by damaging the return process, could have served to 
sustain the LRA’s numbers by discouraging return from the bush.  Further 
research is needed in this area. 
 
A more widely acknowledged assurance was derived from the belief that the 
Prosecutor might withdraw the warrants in the interest of justice.  This notion, as 
promoted by Akhavan, depends upon an ambiguity concerning the term ‘justice’ 
                                            
47 The Kwoyelo case is continuing, and thus its impact on the amnesty process has 
been sustained  https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/07/kwoyelo-trial-postponed-again-in-
ugandan-court-causes-and-ramifications/ . 
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(see 5.1).  Those on the ground seeking reassurance naturally interpreted 
‘justice’ as concerning a just outcome for themselves, the affected community.  
The Prosecutor, as we have seen, also promoted this notion (Ocampo 2005b).  
But when engaging audiences elsewhere the Prosecutor was more explicit, 
explaining that ‘justice’ should instead be interpreted in a narrow sense that 
excluded consequential issues, such as the achievement of peace and other 
moral and practical considerations.  The further implications of this position are 
dealt with in 6.3, but at this point it is important to note that justice for the 
Prosecutor concerned the application of the law.  Applying the ‘interests of 
justice’ criterion thus sets aside the interests of the communities concerned 
(Ocampo 2007a; Ocampo 2007b).  Akhavan, a prominent Professor of 
international law closely associated with the ICC’s Uganda warrants, himself 
made statements to academic audiences revealing that although aware of the 
assurances offered, he was also clear that the interests of the people affected 
were subordinate to the interests of international criminal justice: 
 
Although it may be desirable to take into account the concerns of local 
communities, the constituency of international criminal justice extends 
far beyond this local level.  (Akhavan 2009: 31)  
 
So while the Prosecutor characterised the ICC as ‘their [the communities’] 
Court’, he was apparently aware that he might have to disregard their interests 
as they defined them, in matters concerning their survival (such as food, peace 
and security), in favour of the cause of future international criminal justice 
enforcement.  Furthermore, some have emphasised that the setting aside of its 
first warrants would have been highly damaging for the new Court.  Richard 
Goldstone again, an outspoken advocate for international criminal justice, had 
anticipated that even if Museveni were to grant a limited amnesty within the 
Ugandan State it would be ‘fatally damaging to the credibility of the international 
Court’ (and, one might add, the Prosecutor) for the Court to withdraw (McGreal 
2007; Schabas 2007: 16).  How much more damaging, then, the possibility of 
the Prosecutor himself withdrawing his own warrants?  The notion that the 
warrants could be withdrawn in the interests of justice is legally enshrined; but 
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equally the option is almost completely prohibited by the circumstance of the 
warrants having been issued, lest the ICC itself be damaged.  The assurances 
based upon it were always illusory (Articles 53, 61). 
 
Assurance was also offered on the grounds that according to the Statute the 
warrants could be withdrawn for a period of 12 months, thus permitting local 
processes for reconciliation to come to fruition (see 5.1.5).  This power resides 
with the UN Security Council (Article 16).  Community leaders on the ground 
had no means to effect such a provision, even if they had had the backing of 
the Ugandan State.  Without it, and with the opposition of the ICC itself, there 
was no prospect of their overturning the UN’s commitment to the new 
machinery of international criminal justice.  Such a provision would need to be 
indefinite in order to reassure nervous LRA commanders of the wisdom of 
laying down their arms.  The possibility that this provision could be enacted not 
once, but annually as would be necessary, and that such a feat could be 
secured with sufficient certainty to influence the LRA command to believe that 
the warrants were no longer an active threat, stretches well beyond the 
implausible.  Yet despite this a number of commentators have cited the notion 
that the 12 month suspensions of the warrants might help to ease the 
negotiation process (Grono 2006).  None has addressed the central issue of 
why warlords with an active army might permanently relinquish their security 
through talks in favour of a twelve-month suspension of arrest.  Without 
supporting reasoning, these arguments are flawed.  The warrants, once issued, 
became an intractable feature of the conflict (Hovil and Lomo 2005; Souare 
2008: 109). 
 
The situation was one in which security of the civilian population had been put 
in the hands of a perpetrator of multiple crimes against it, and where divergent 
justice priorities and beliefs were coming to the fore.  Sensing local concern, but 
failing to understand the divergent interests of the Court and the affected 
population in this perilous scenario, some international observers wrongly 
assumed this popular unease was principally due to a lack of understanding 
about the benefits of the ICC’s engagement.  They advocated that local concern 
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about safety from mass violence associated with the Court’s intervention could 
be addressed through outreach work alone (HRW 2005: 56-57 quoted in 5.1.5).  
For those who identified the problem as essentially one of local mis-perceptions 
or lack of information, the solution lay in explaining the remit, purposes, and 
good intentions of the international institutions concerned, allied with the 
Government and military.  Even Court strategy documents seem to have been 
influenced by this belief (ICC 2006b: 3).  The ICG articulated these issues as 
follows:  
 
The Court risked becoming the target of recriminations from 
humanitarian groups and Acholi community associations, whose 
overriding interest was to give negotiated peace a chance, even at the 
cost of [prioritisation of retributive international criminal] justice [for the 
most prominent perpetrators on the LRA side].  Spokespersons for 
northern Ugandan civil society groups, traditional leaders, local 
politicians and religious leaders argued in a joint statement that, ‘the 
ICC should suspend its investigation and refrain from planned issuance 
of arrest warrants until peace is achieved in northern Uganda’. 
 
Instead, they suggested, ‘the ICC must first engage in a public 
information program to create awareness and to popularise their role 
among the local community in northern Uganda and the whole 
country . . . so as to be better understood.’ 
 
The Office of the Prosecutor responded constructively with a campaign 
to improve understanding of the ICC among the concerned 
communities and groups.  It invited a search for common ground 
around a more comprehensive and collective response to the conflict, 
received a delegation of Acholi traditional, religious and civil society 
leaders and local politicians at The Hague in mid-March and expects to 
receive another large delegation of local officials in April […]  
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This dialogue has offered the Prosecutor an opportunity to explain the 
ICC's responsibility under the Rome Statute to investigate and 
prosecute serious international crimes, taking into account the interests 
of victims and justice.  By indicating that the investigation is 
concentrated on those senior commanders who bear the greatest 
responsibility, he acknowledged that traditional and national 
reconciliation and justice processes also have a vital role to play in 
achieving accountability.  The open discussion of concerns, 
responsibilities and limitations that is now underway with communities 
throughout northern Uganda appears to be resolving initial 
misunderstandings and can produce a better coordinated, mutually 
reinforcing accountability effort.  (ICG 2005c: 5-6) 
 
Thus, with research indicating priorities such as peace and release from the 
camps on the minds of the community, and the ICC’s warrants intended to defer 
peace and legitimise pre-existing UPDF military action against the abductees, it 
is not clear how these meetings might allay their fears.  Given the divergence of 
interests between the Court and civil society, this was a weak strategy, as will 
become apparent.  The issue of the mechanisms by which communities may 
put their case, when faced with the prospect of militarised enforcement of 
international criminal justice and prolonged violence against them, will be 
returned to in the next chapter.  
 
It is clear that the affected population should have been alerted to the 
Prosecutor’s position, as indicated by his own statements to other audiences:  
that the ‘interests of justice’ upon which his judgement rested concerned a 
narrow set of issues relating to the furtherance of criminal justice rather than 
humanitarian considerations (Ocampo 2007b); that broader practical and 
consequential justice matters such as people’s access to food or peace were 
beyond his remit (Ocampo 2007a; Branch 2011: 208-209); that the enforcement 
of warrants promoted the legitimisation of UPDF activity including the killing of 
further ‘victims’/abductees (see 4.3); and that in other circles it was broadly 
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understood, including by the Prosecutor himself, that the interests of 
international criminal justice might necessitate some sacrifices on the part of 
communities affected by violence for the greater good internationally in the 
longer term (McGreal 2007; Branch 2011: 207-215).  With these clarifications it 
is not clear how reassured they might have been.  The Court’s outreach 
programme did not extend to these pertinent issues. 
 
The Prosecutor’s engagement with the local community leadership has been 
emphasised, and his accounts indicate the number of visits made and the 
extent of the discussions (Ocampo 2005b: 3; Ocampo 2006c: 16; Ocampo 
2007b: 6).  The substantive issues relating to the divergent interests of the 
affected population and the Court were irreconcilable: the one wished to see an 
end to the violence as a first priority; the other sought enforcement of arrest 
warrants which required its continuation.  These efforts thus culminated in a 
joint statement in April 2005, which communicated little of substance, but by its 
issuance lent legitimacy to the Court’s intervention.  With no bargaining power 
at their disposal, the community leadership secured only the continued line of 
communication to the Court through which to plead their case.  The statement 
smoothed the way for the imposition of the Court’s will, with or without 
community support, while the extent to which the interests of these two parties 
had diverged was revealed, not by discord, but by the rudimentary nature of the 
points upon which they could agree (ICC 2005e).  
 
Security remained a further issue of concern.  An even-handed consideration of 
the problem of witness (or community) protection, as described in the Statute, 
should emphasise that it is outside the Court’s power to grant absolute 
protection to the communities from the effects of the war.  This level of security 
was not available to them prior to the ICC’s intervention, and it would not be 
reasonable to expect it to be delivered by the Court’s activities.  It is important, 
though, that the Court should carefully weigh up whether its actions increase 
the risks faced by communities.  In this context it is concerning that the 
language of the Statute implies ‘witness protection’, as if attacks may be limited 
to specific witnesses alone (Article 68).  Actors in conflict-affected regions may 
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not feel obligated to deliver their retributions, or warnings, to the individuals 
concerned.  A witness or group of witnesses may be silenced by an 
indiscriminate attack, delivered and understood as a warning.  This behaviour 
was exhibited by the LRA itself.  There were instances of relatives being singled 
out for execution (HRW 2005: 58), but it was not necessary for the LRA to 
locate individuals as they could administer collective punishment.  Accounts of 
their atrocities include instances of individuals killed as collective punishment, 
even for the perceived misdeeds of the Acholi people as a whole (Gersony 
1997; Allen 2006b).  Thus, aside from the concerns about the UPDF’s own 
violence against the population, it was not able to deliver protection from such 
LRA attacks in the past, and it was not reasonable to expect that situation to 
change.  The Court was thus operating in an environment in which both 
Government and LRA might commit violence against the civilian population, and 
LRA violence in response to the Court’s activities could not be prevented.  The 
Prosecutor faced difficult decisions in relation to witness protection, because it 
was clear that witness (or community) protection could not be achieved.  As 
noted in 6.1.1, he observed the risks taken by some in telling their story to be 
‘tremendous’ (Ocampo 2007a: 9). 
 
In conclusion, far from being closely associated, the interests of the Court in 
effecting arrest were linked to the military process of fighting the LRA, who 
largely comprised abductees.  The interests of the affected population were 
clearly in survival, both of themselves and their abducted relatives, under the 
principal threats of camp life and violence of both sides (HURIFO 2002; Branch 
2011: 208).  The portrayal of the Court as being dedicated to the victims of the 
conflict does not reflect its conduct or strategy, reliant as it was on violent 
enforcement by the UPDF.  In this instance the Court was not ‘their Court’, but 
one committed to the political and military instruments necessary for the 
enforcement of international criminal justice, as determined by the strategy of 
the Prosecutor.  The ICC was instrumentalised as the Ugandan Government’s 
court, against the other two parties to the war: the LRA and the civilian 
population (Branch 2007b; Rodman and Booth 2013).   
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The emergence of differing Court and civil society interests was associated with 
a competitive relationship between the two.  Community peace-building efforts 
offered a challenge to the military process of apprehending the suspects; an 
alternative vision for how the conflict might be resolved through bottom-up 
dissolving of the LRA forces back to the civilian life, rather than top-down 
decapitation achieved through a lengthy war of attrition.  Peace through return 
and reconciliation challenged the Court’s enforcement paradigm and retributive 
view of justice.   
 
If the misalignment of the ICC’s interests with those of the people had become 
increasingly evident on the ground from 2002 onwards, the extent of their 
divergence was not apparent internationally until the close of the Bigombe 
process in 2005, and the Juba peace talks from 2006.  This is the focus of 
section 6.3. 
 
6.2.5  Local peacebuilding and justice strategies overruled 
 
As has previously been indicated, researchers have identified differences in 
conceptions of justice held by the (Acholi) community and external criminal 
justice interveners (Pain 1997; Baines 2003; Baines 2007).  Others have 
challenged this point, as if by refuting the idea that community reconciliation 
processes were ‘authentic’ or by disputing that the community was homogenous 
in its desire for peace over retribution, the case for a community-based 
approach to addressing the war would be weakened (O'Brien 2007: 1; Allen 
2010).  A number of observations can be made about these perspectives. 
 
Community-based concern about the ICC’s intervention was certainly due partly 
to different local and international concepts of justice, and a weaker local 
commitment to a retributive system as Baines outlined.  But within the Court’s 
specific justice frame, the situation of northern Uganda presented a particularly 
problematic case.  The history in Uganda of inter-ethnic violence was decades 
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or centuries long, and had been fuelled by bouts of retributive justice-seeking.  
Communities felt themselves to be the victims of atrocities, which indeed they 
were, but often failed to adequately recognise the deeds perpetrated by their 
own members against others.  The path towards justice for each had involved 
retribution meted out against one another, with the result being mutual mistrust, 
fear, and occasionally inter-ethnic violence (Gersony 1997: 7-14; Museveni 
1997; Mwakikagile 2013).  The ICC resolved this (at least in theory) in an 
arbitrary manner according to its Statute, by sustaining the retributive element 
but considering only the period since its founding in 2002.  During the recent 
period of the LRA war, community approaches to addressing inter-community 
justice issues took a longer view and sought to limit the retributive element, 
instead adopting methods more reliant on dialogue and the rebuilding of 
relationships (widely observed by the author, but also shown in for example 
Pain (1997), ARLPI et al. (2003), and Baines (2007)).  Given the prevalence of 
perpetrators on all sides and the effect of military enforcement in delivering only 
reciprocal bouts of violence under successive regimes, local methods may not 
only have been a cultural preference, but a pragmatic and humanitarian 
necessity.  Inter-community reconciliation efforts during the previous decade 
had reflected this belief (author’s observation).   
 
In the conflict-affected area, similarly pragmatic choices were at play.  Situated 
between two violent military forces, each with a history of killing, torture, rape 
and victimisation of the population, local community advocacy for peace through 
return and amnesty, and tolerance of returnees, was in part pragmatic.  It has 
been clearly established that neither armed party to the conflict represented the 
community interests, and that the strategy of each side to win the war (and 
mete out retribution against the other) involved killing civilians or depriving them 
of the means to live.  As some have argued, those who observe the affected 
population to be equivocal about forgiveness are missing the point (Branch 
2011: 207-212).  The case for amnesty and return was led by the community, 
and sought to acknowledge and harness local ideas of justice that included 
retribution, tolerance, reparation, and forgiveness.  But, unlike the campaigns of 
the LRA and UPDF, it was a pragmatic approach to ending the war that did not 
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involve killing civilians.  People had little choice—an end to the violence 
necessarily entailed acceptance back amongst themselves of those who had 
been in the LRA, despite their involvement in atrocities.  To reject them was to 
push them back to the LRA, and risk further violence.  But most of these 
individuals were also the abductees, and many or most people understood the 
complications of their innocence and guilt.  The case for a civil society-led 
approach to justice never rested upon cultural authenticity, nor on philosophical 
considerations of justice alone; nor on unquestioning adherence to a Western 
retributive model, or an exaggerated enthusiasm for forgiveness even of the 
most vile crimes.  Instead, the case relied significantly upon local communities 
understanding the history and dynamics of their own conflict, their views on 
justice beyond retribution, and their agency in relation to the resolution of the 
war.  Fundamentally, it rested upon their understanding the prevailing 
constraints and being able to determine their own solutions (Mani 2002; Branch 
2004; Branch 2007b).  It was this approach—contextually informed; 
participative; sophisticated; complex in its understanding of justice; incomplete 
and imperfect; highly practical; inexpensive; non-violent; locally led; and 
apparently increasingly successful, that was anathema to the LRA, the 
Government, and the ICC. 
 
From 2005 onwards the conflict dynamics revealed the divergence of 
community and international criminal justice interests even more starkly.  The 
course of the conflict more clearly illustrated the Court’s ability, through its 
warrants issued against a small number of individuals, to wrest power from local 
(and national) leaders and decisively to determine that certain paths to conflict 
resolution be discontinued.  These developments are outlined in the next 
section.  
 
6.3  The ICC’s profound impact on talks  
 
The fundamental problem facing calls for international criminal justice in the 
context of peace processes is that those most responsible for atrocities may 
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well have influence on the talks or hostilities themselves.  Setting a requirement 
that these individuals agree to their own arrest as a binding condition for the 
successful conclusion of talks risks further violence.  Yet the notion that 
insistence on trials for the LRA leadership might be an obstacle to peace 
negotiations was opposed by supporters of the Court’s intervention in relation to 
the Juba process.  As previously shown, claims made for the Court included 
assertions of its role in precipitating the talks in the first place, the unlikelihood 
of the LRA engaging constructively in any negotiation process, and the 
numerous alternative reasons to which failure could be attributed (see 5.2).  
This assessment was sustained throughout the period of the talks, and after 
their collapse.  It was strengthened at the ICC Review Conference in June 2010 
(AI 2004; HRW 2004a; HRW 2005; AI 2006; HRW 2010a; ICC 2010a; ICC 
2010b; ICTJ 2010).  The next section argues that this interpretation of events 
was not made on the basis of evidence or sound reasoning, and though widely 
asserted and disseminated, it does not hold up under careful scrutiny and is 
clearly untenable (Afako 2010; Armstrong 2010). 
 
6.3.1  The ICC precipitated the collapse of the Bigombe process 
 
The efficacy of the ICC in relation to Ugandan peace processes was first 
asserted prior to the commencement of the Juba talks; indeed, over a year prior 
even to the ICC’s issuance of warrants.  The Ugandan Government referred the 
situation to the ICC at the end of January 2004.  Before the Prosecutor 
announced that there was a case to answer in June, that is, before the ICC had 
engaged, Akhavan claims that Sudan had ended its support for the LRA and 
signed the March 2004 protocol in part as a result of the ICC intervention  
(Akhavan 2005: 404).  Both elements of this assertion seem doubtful.  Even two 
years later, from 2005 to 2006, observers were suggesting that Sudanese 
support had continued, including the ICG, who suggested that the withdrawal of 
the Sudanese army from the Juba area in May 2006 caused the links to be 
severed (ICG 2006b: 5; ICG 2007: 11; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 250-251).  It is not 
clear even then that Sudan had ended its support for the LRA.  Secondly, even 
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if it had, no evidence is offered for the astonishingly bold assertion of the ICC’s 
potency in this respect.  The claim is all the more surprising when the context is 
understood.  The protocol which Akhavan claims was a result of ICC 
engagement was in fact an extension of the previous protocol signed in 
September 2003.  Furthermore, that one was itself preceded by one in early 
2002, following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Uganda and 
Sudan in 2001.  These developments took place well before the establishment 
of the ICC (Lucima 2002: 91-93; Neu 2002; UNOCHA 2003: 1,11; Drew 2010: 
24-26).  Akhavan makes no mention of these precedents, nor explains his 
reasoning for why the 2004 protocol renewal required ICC intervention when its 
predecessors did not.  These agreements may have influenced the conflict, but 
there is no evidence that they are linked to the ICC’s engagement, which to a 
large extent came afterwards. 
 
Undeterred by the sequencing issue, this claim was then used by Akhavan to 
attribute the strengthening return process to the ICC (a claim without evidence, 
as established in 6.2) and to the military successes promoted by the Court’s 
engagement (notwithstanding the implication that the ICC would thus be 
associated with the deaths of the abductees as discussed above).  Further 
asserting the effects of the referral, he also made a claim about the origins of 
the Bigombe peace process by stating that the referral ‘forced otherwise defiant 
leaders to the negotiating table’ (2005: 404).  Bigombe had travelled to southern 
Sudan seeking to further her talks process in June 2004, even before the 
Prosecutor announced his investigation (ICG 2005c: 3).  Only the referral by the 
Ugandan Government itself preceded the Bigombe process.  No evidence is 
offered for the ICC’s rapid and decisive influence.  It is conjecture.  
 
It is surprising that before the Juba talks process had come into being, and 
before the ICC had started to investigate, the Court was credited with such 
powerful international influence.  Yet no evidence for this dramatic assertion 
was considered necessary.  After the signing of the Uganda-Sudan protocol, 
and the surge in the community-led return process, the claim for responsibility 
for the instigation of the Bigombe process was a third instance of the assertion 
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of positive impact supported neither by evidence nor, some might add, 
plausibility.  It was also the first claim for the ICC of having brought rebels to the 
table, but not the last. 
 
Yet the ICC did have influence on the Bigombe process, albeit negative, at least 
according to Bigombe herself.  In February 2005 Bigombe indicated that she 
would end the mediation if the Prosecutor insisted upon issuing arrest warrants. 
(Pham et al. 2005; Ross 2005; Pham et al. 2007; ICTJ 2009; Allen 2010).  As 
the LRA had always asserted that they would under no circumstances offer their 
leadership up for trial, and as the position of the Court had always been that 
talks must deliver them to trial, mediation post issuance of warrants was  always 
problematic.  No analyst has articulated a post-warrant narrative for talks that 
would deliver the LRA leadership into ICC custody.  Indeed, one can argue that 
successful peace talks would pose a significant threat either to the LRA 
(through arrest) or to the ICC (through failure to arrest).  Both parties, on the 
other hand, could continue to coexist if the war were to be prolonged.  In the 
absence of the possibility of a negotiated settlement that would be acceptable 
to the ICC and the LRA, continuing the violence may have been tolerable or 
preferable for both, because it sustained the possibility for each that their will 
would prevail over the other.  Trials (anathema to the LRA), and impunity 
sanctioned by a peace deal (anathema to the ICC), could both be avoided. 
 
Despite this clear line of reasoning, and the threat to talks that warrants would 
pose, Bigombe’s insistence that the Court should hold back was interpreted by 
the ICC as ‘unnecessarily provocative’ according to the ICG (ICG 2005c: 5).  
Failing to understand the opposing interests of the Court and the affected 
population, the ICG overlooked the problem, stating ‘[…] the ICC is well aware 
of the risk and is undertaking a series of activities which have increased mutual 
understanding with northern Ugandan civil society’ (ICG 2005c: 1).  Addressing 
the superficial issue of mutual understanding was now somehow expected to 
address the structural problem that warrants would scupper talks.  Shallow 
international analysis trumped both local knowledge and compelling logic.   
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Events during subsequent months unfolded as many local observers expected:  
in March 2005 Bigombe’s peace efforts were as before obstructed by the 
Government (ICG 2004; Rodriguez Soto 2009: 230-246)48; and in May, the 
Prosecutor applied for the warrants, which were issued in July and unsealed in 
October (ICC 2005b; Ocampo 2005b; Drew 2010: 25).  On receiving this news 
Bigombe stated:  ‘There is now no hope of getting them to surrender.  I have 
told the Court that they have rushed too much’ (New Vision 2005; HRW 2009b: 
30).  The warrants precipitated the talks’ immediate collapse. 
 
One cannot draw the conclusion that the ICC destroyed the talks; many factors 
were at play, and the talks might well have failed in any case.  But with the 
warrants issued their failure was assured.  The question that remained was 
whether it was simply the Bigombe process that was finished, or the possibility 
of a negotiated peace per se; the answer to this question emerged through the 
Court’s response to the Juba process itself. 
 
6.3.2  No evidence of positive impact prior to the Juba process 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the incompatibility of the Bigombe process with 
the Prosecutor’s warrants, supporters of the Court were keen to assert that 
peace-making and arrest warrants were compatible.49  One original claim, 
because of its bold nature and the influence it has had, merits restating (it was 
more fully quoted on p49) and deserves specific attention, and refutation:   
                                            
48 Rodriguez, who was present in the region at the time of the previous Bigombe 
process in 1994, articulates his view, and the widespread local perception, that 
Government pressure caused by a hastily imposed seven-day ultimatum imposed upon 
the LRA contributed significantly to the failure of peace talks at that time. 
49 Assertions such as the local belief that peace and justice are compatible, by HRW 
and ICTJ for example (see 6.2.2), deploy the now familiar device of using the term 
‘justice’ as a double entendre, making the self-evident (though simplistic) claim with 
reference to its wider meaning, while later using it to  endorse the narrower purpose of 
retributive military criminal justice enforcement.  The local belief that peace and justice 
are compatible is reasonable.  The international assertion that peace and military 
enforcement of international criminal justice priorities in the LRA war context is 
compatible, is not. 
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Thus far, the empirical evidence suggests that international commitment 
to the referral’s success has contributed to the LRA’s incapacitation.  
Sudan has been persuaded to end its support for the LRA. (Akhavan 
2005 p404) 
 
The passage goes on to assert multiple inaccuracies already discussed.  There 
is no evidence that the ICC contributed to the renewed protocol with Sudan 
(section 6.3.1 above).  There is no evidence that the ICC was responsible for 
encouraging the return process (indeed there is some evidence to the contrary); 
and as previously stated this claim is beset with logical fallacies (see 6.1, 6.2.3, 
6.2.4).  There is evidence that ICC warrants precipitated not the 
commencement but the collapse of the Bigombe talks (6.3.1).  LRA violence 
against civilians increased in the first half of 2005 while the Prosecutor was 
investigating, when deterrence should in theory have caused it to fall (see 
6.2.1), and indeed there was a return of the LRA’s intermittent practice of 
mutilation (UNOCHA 2005a).  Later, after the referral with the ICC fully 
engaged, mass atrocities peaked at levels higher than ever (6.2.1).   
 
What remains to refute, and what may have contributed to the widespread 
dissemination of these unfortunate misperceptions, is the claim of empirical 
evidence.  The reference offered is the UNOCHA Consolidated Appeals 
Process 2005 report, published in November 2004, which contains empirical 
data, but does not provide evidence for the ICC’s impact.  In fact, on the 
contrary, it indicates local concerns about the ICC’s effect on the peace process 
(UNOCHA 2004: 6-7).  Furthermore, its subsequent mid-year report indicates 
that the ICC had complicated the search for peace against the wishes of local 
representatives, and that violence had increased following the collapse of the 
Bigombe talks.  UNOCHA itself indicates the Court’s negative impact for peace 
and community priorities (UNOCHA 2005a: 2).  Akhavan’s suggestion that the 
referral was a success was not grounded in evidence, empirical or otherwise.  It 
is regrettable that these unsupported claims have been so widely referenced.  
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These issues are discussed in more detail elsewhere (article by the author 
under revision prior to resubmission).  
 
There was a further claim by the Prosecutor in November 2006, widely repeated 
at the ICC review conference in 2010 (author’s observation), that the UPDF 
backed by the ICC was in significant part responsible for the LRA’s move of its 
headquarters to the DRC (Ocampo 2006a: 2; HRW 2011b: 29).  This is also un-
supported (6.2.3).  No evidence is provided for the view that it was UPDF 
operations or the ICC influence, rather than the transformed situation in Sudan 
or the Ugandan return process (4.4, 6.2.3).  The LRA had entered north-eastern 
DRC by September 2005, before the ICC warrants were unsealed in mid-
October (ICG 2006b: 5).  Additionally, whether the LRA’s move to the DRC was 
positive or negative in relation to its impact on civilian populations and efforts to 
end the war is questionable, and not discussed.  The principal means of 
depletion of the LRA, the return process, (4.3.4), was not operational in DRC at 
the time, while civilians remained endangered in the new context: the LRA 
continued to perpetrate atrocities and abduct. 
 
In summary then, no evidence is provided for the various claims for positive ICC 
influence prior to the Juba talks.  The rationale for these claims is not expressed 
or tested, and alternative explanations more apparently consistent with the 
events and their timeframe are never mentioned.  Because the presented 
narrative is not based on data, the claims made for the Court are best 
understood as advocacy work on its behalf, rather than informed situational 
analysis.  It is regrettable that in both academic and policy circles these views 
have largely supplanted evidence-based analysis which draws upon amnesty 
figures, survey-based results, and the lived experience from the community 
level (section 4.4). 
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6.3.3  The ICC did not bring Kony to the negotiations 
 
The notion that the ICC brought, or played a significant part in bringing, the LRA 
to the negotiating table in Juba has been thoroughly analysed as an element of 
this research, and previously submitted for publication as a journal article (now 
pending resubmission).  Some key elements of that analysis are now 
highlighted.  The literature contains multiple assertions of this idea, from 
eminent individuals and institutions with considerable standing, including those 
referenced here (Schabas 2007; AI 2008; Apuuli 2008; Grono and O'Brien 
2008; Otim and Wierda 2008; Souare 2008; Akhavan 2009; HRW 2009b; ICTJ 
2010; Schabas 2011).  In order to investigate this view the referencing of each 
occurrence (not limited to those above) was traced back through its sources to 
the preceding claims.  By following each claim to its origins, it was possible to 
identify the principal primary proponents of this view, and reveal the evidence 
base for their analysis (Akhavan 2005; Egeland 2006; ICG 2006a; Ocampo 
2006a).50 
 
In the event, none of the sources presented critical analysis.  Of the original 
sources, the Prosecutor’s claim might be regarded as an advocacy message as 
it was given verbally without accompanying analysis (Ocampo 2006a).  
Akhavan’s claim fails to proffer evidence (2005). The third was an un-supported 
statement, referenced in subsequent publications by the same organisation, as 
if providing evidence of more than a prior assertion (ICG 2005c, 2006a), while 
the fourth from the UN’s Under-secretary General, was an equivocal verbal 
statement, misconstrued as supportive of the notion (Egeland 2006).  These 
issues are fully discussed in the article. 
 
The analysis presented in this Section has already indicated the profound 
changes taking place in the conflict at this time.  Yet none of the sources 
identify this, nor the assumptions underlying the assertion of ICC efficacy, and 
none of them supply evidence for it.  None of them weigh up alternative 
                                            
50 Scholars will observe that one of these references predates the Juba talks, though it 
was later widely construed as applying to the Juba process which followed.   
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possible reasons for the LRA to have attended talks, for example the advent of 
peace in southern Sudan and the transformed political and military context, the 
military pressure that the LRA was under from UPDF and then also the SPLA, 
or the return process and defections that were by that time taking place.  Claims 
were made for the ICC’s role in promoting military pressure, but these articles 
and statements make no attempt to critically examine this notion. 
 
All that can be found is some evidence that the LRA commanders were 
influenced to engage in talks in part to have the warrants lifted.  Unfortunately, 
as ICC withdrawal was not a possibility, this plausible impact provided no 
options for a peaceful settlement (6.3.1).  Despite the lack of a basis for this 
belief, the idea that the ICC somehow contributed to the instigation of the Juba 
process is widely disseminated by supporters of the Court as if it were more 
than conjecture.  Today, scholars wishing to present a balanced view now feel 
obliged to repeat this notion based on the weight of literature repeating it, as if 
there were evidence on both sides of the argument (Talebpour 2012: 103-
104).51  This is not the case.  A community of belief has formed around this 
dubious contention, which is now disseminated uncritically. 
 
Akhavan’s unsubstantiated claim that the referral was instrumental in the 
creation of the Bigombe peace process, which collapsed with the issuance of 
the warrants, has become influential again for the Court’s credibility at Juba 
(5.2.2, 6.3.1, 6.3.2).  Yet further arguments remain to be considered in defence 
of the Court’s intervention in Juba, prior to drawing any conclusions about their 
collapse. 
 
6.3.4  ICC engagement during the talks helped prevent a deal  
 
In April 2005 the International Crisis Group made a clear observation regarding 
the LRA commanders’ requirements of negotiations for themselves:   
                                            
51 Talebpour’s thesis is a case in point.  Unfortunately and additionally, Afako is 
misrepresented here as supportive of the Court’s engagement. 
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Kony will not agree to a ceasefire that does not address the LRA's two 
central concerns—[LRA commanders’] post-settlement physical security 
and livelihoods. (ICG 2005c: 1) 
 
None have challenged this observation in the literature.  Yet if it is true the 
issuance of ICC warrants later that year rendered not only the Bigombe talks, 
but also the Juba talks redundant.  Through the warrants, the region would be 
committed to war. 
 
Having refuted the claim that the Juba talks might not have taken place without 
the ICC, and observed that the warrants would not be withdrawn, (5.2.1, 5.2.2, 
6.3.2, 6.3.3), this study now considers the two remaining assertions: that the 
ICC had no impact in relation to the collapse of the talks because they were 
always bound to fail; and that their failure could have been for multiple reasons 
other than the intervention of the Court (5.2.3). 
 
6.3.4a  Preparations for war took place on both sides 
The arguments put forward by supporters of the Court that the Juba talks were 
always bound to fail focus upon the LRA, despite the Government’s record of 
repeated disruption of peace efforts as discussed in Chapter 4 (Rodriguez Soto 
2009).  The notion that the LRA was preparing for war and was thus not 
negotiating in good faith is founded upon a logical flaw: that such preparations 
necessarily indicate bad faith.  The preparation for both scenarios does not in 
itself indicate a preference for one over the other.  In this case, from early to 
mid-2008 the talks were clearly faltering, and the LRA was observed to resume 
abductions and be in receipt of weaponry (BBC 2008; Izama 2008).  Yet they 
were not the only party carrying out preparations for war: the UNSC backed 
further efforts for talks in December 2008, while preparations for an international 
military offensive were underway (Kersten 2012).  Then on 14th December 
SPLA, DRC and Ugandan forces, backed by the international community 
including the US Africa Command, launched Operation Lightning Thunder in an 
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attempt to decapitate the LRA, while putting a decisive end to any lingering 
hopes of dialogue. The LRA bases were destroyed with overwhelming force in a 
surprise ground and air attack (HRW 2009a: 28-29; Schomerus and 
Tumutegyereize 2009).   
 
Clearly military preparations and plans were being drawn up for this attack even 
while the Ugandan Government and international community were 
simultaneously engaged in the talks, apparently in good faith.  Both sides were 
preparing for a resumption of the war while negotiating.  It is not logical to draw 
opposite inferences concerning Government and LRA intentions from the same 
behaviour. 
 
6.3.4b  ‘Kony was never serious about peace’ is conjecture 
The misguided suggestion that the preparations for further conflict were a sign 
of negotiation in bad faith has been linked to the wider claim that Kony was 
never serious about peace, as Rodman and Booth note (2013: 295).  This may 
be the case, though it is pertinent that both Bigombe peace processes ended 
after decisive Government/ICC interventions (4.1.6, 6.3.1).  Furthermore, the 
idea that Kony’s lack of interest in peace was demonstrated by the failure of 
preceding attempts to negotiate with him suffers from another error of logic.  
Peace negotiations only take place where preceding efforts to resolve a conflict 
have failed.  The argument that talks should not be used or are bound to fail 
because preceding efforts have failed, is an argument against peace talks per 
se; an extreme position indeed.  Additionally, the failure of peace talks does not 
imply that one side or another is not serious about peace, nor that one side was 
serious while the other was not.  Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge 
that the preceding failure of talks is consistent with the view that Kony was 
never serious about negotiations.  The problem is that it is also consistent with 
the view that the Ugandan Government was not serious about talks, or that both 
sides were not serious, or that both sides were serious but unable to come to an 
agreement (Kersten 2012).  It is another a speculative assertion by supporters 
of the Court.   
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On both counts then, the claim that, aside from the impact of the ICC, the Juba 
talks were moribund from the start is not supported. 
 
6.3.4c  The ICC warrants ensured the talks would fail 
There remains now only the observation that there were many possible reasons 
for the Juba talks to fail, and thus no reason to suppose that the ICC’s warrants 
were of particular significance in relation to their failure.  Though apparently 
powerful, this notion fails on two counts.  The first is that the LRA leadership 
itself indicated that they would under no circumstances sign a deal that 
delivered them to a trial (Fisher 2006).  The issue was a very significant 
obstacle to the talks and has been cited as the ultimate reason for their failure 
(Eichstaedt 2008).  In this context, the Ugandan Government even considered 
requesting withdrawal of the warrants in favour of national and local justice 
mechanisms; however, the Prosecutor clarified that this was neither legal, nor 
acceptable to the Court (Ocampo 2007a; Ocampo 2007b; McGreal 2008; 
Museveni 2008; Ssenyonjo 2008). 
 
6.3.4d  The arrest warrants precluded successful negotiations 
Supporters of the Court’s intervention hold that the warrants did not preclude 
the possibility of successful negotiations.  They knew that the ICC would not 
withdraw the warrants, and held that it should not.  They also knew that the LRA 
leadership had stated that it would not sign a deal that delivered itself to trial.  
By logical deduction then, if in their view the warrants did not preclude 
successful talks, they must have believed that the LRA leadership was or would 
in fact be willing to go to trial after all; that it was lying or deceiving itself when it 
said that it would not.  Even before the evidence is applied, this seems a 
curious belief.  
 
In the event, it was the issue of ICC warrants that the LRA identify, and 
evidence indicates, was a very significant stumbling block.  In the final analysis 
Kony himself stated that it was the warrants that made a deal impossible (BBC 
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2006; Fisher 2006; Eichstaedt 2008).  In this context supporters of the Court 
have failed to articulate why the LRA might lie about such an issue.  None have 
suggested a scenario in which the LRA leadership was willing to go to trial, but 
unwilling to say so.  In the absence of any plausible articulation of an alternative 
view it seems that the LRA leadership were in fact telling the truth.  They 
undoubtedly were not prepared to deliver themselves for trial. 
 
This may seem self-evident, but the rationale for the dominant narrative’s view 
and the Court’s assertion that it did not ensure the failure of the Juba 
negotiations, rests upon believing the opposite—that the LRA leadership might 
through talks deliver itself to ICC trial despite their assertions to the contrary 
(HRW 2009b: 30-33).  Post issuance of the warrants, with the insistence of the 
Prosecutor that talks must subsequently deliver a trial, and LRA high 
command’s bottom line that they would not, the Juba peace negotiations were 
finished before they started.  The 2005 observation by the International Crisis 
Group, aligned with the views of many local observers, was of course still 
correct (ICG 2005c: 1; Rodman 2012: 68). 
 
Just as the warrants underwrote the collapse of the Bigombe talks, whatever 
other issues they faced, so too they ensured that the Juba process could not 
succeed.  Far from having an uncertain impact, Juba was the second instance 
from the same case in which the evidence indicates that the ICC precluded the 
possibility of successful peace negotiations.  While there is only conjecture 
concerning other obstacles to peace, it is clear that the warrants ensured the 
failure of talks from the outset. 
 
By this stage, the interests of the Court in ensuring a return to the war of 
enforcement that could one day lead to arrest, and of the community in seeking 
peace without the killing of the LRA abductees, were diametrically opposed.  In 
the prevailing context of LRA refusal to go to trial, the ICC’s engagement 
committed the region to a war in which the community was the major victim of 
both sides.   
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6.3.5  Court interests prioritised over community rights 
 
Although the Prosecutor’s rhetoric of alignment of the Court with the interests of 
communities experiencing atrocities continued even beyond the Juba process 
(ICC 2010a; Ocampo 2010b: 6,16; Ocampo 2010a: 6,11), his communications 
during the talks clarified in a much more public way how the Court would 
prioritise its activities when the interests of international criminal justice 
prosecutions conflict with those of affected communities.  In June 2007 he 
stated: 
 
It is the lack of enforcement of the Court’s decisions which is the real 
threat to enduring Peace.  Allowed to remain at large, the criminals 
exposed are continuing to threaten the victims, those who took 
tremendous risks to tell their stories; allowed to remain at large, the 
criminals ask for immunity under one form or another as a condition to 
stopping the violence.  They threaten to attack more victims.  I call this 
extortion, I call it blackmail.  We cannot yield.  (Ocampo 2007a: 9) 
 
Enforcement, through the war on the LRA, though it was made up principally of 
abductees, was apparently the way to enduring peace.  The prevention of 
abduction was still not an emerging issue, while direct threats of violence by the 
LRA to the local population would not deter the Court.  Three months later, the 
Prosecutor strengthened this position in a written paper, stating the following: 
 
The situation of Uganda has perhaps attracted the most attention, given 
the attempts by various parties to resolve the conflict between the 
Government of Uganda and the LRA.  This situation demonstrates well 
the exceptional nature of the provision on the interests of justice as well 
as the differences between this concept and the interests of peace.   
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With the entry into force of the Rome Statute, a new legal framework 
has emerged and this framework necessarily impacts on conflict 
management efforts.  The issue is no longer about whether we agree or 
disagree with the pursuit of justice in moral or practical terms: it is the 
law.  (Ocampo 2007b: 4) 
 
Bound by its Statute, threats of violence to the community even including 
anticipated future atrocities that might be associated with its own intervention 
must be ignored by the Court because of their moral and practical nature.  
Regrettably, such consequential considerations fall clearly outside the 
parameters of prosecutorial concern in furthering ICL.  The militarily backed 
application of the legal imperative has perhaps led to far more violent 
consequences than were anticipated by the architects of the Court, even if they 
were clearly anticipated before the arrest warrants were issued. 
 
6.3.6  Conclusion in relation to the talks 
 
With the misalignment of interests of the ICC and the people on the ground 
established, the Court emerged not as an advocate for their interests, but as a 
fourth party to the conflict with its own priorities and perspectives.  At Juba it 
revealed itself as the third party, after the Government and the LRA, with pre-
conditions to be met before the violence could end—principally the 
apprehension of the ICC suspects.  This requirement was encapsulated at the 
Review Conference in 2010, when the slogan ‘No peace without justice’ was 
widely promoted (author’s observation).  The possibility of peace without arrests 
had been averted, and through the continuing violence (though ineffective in 
relation to achieving arrest), the Court had in its own terms succeeded in 
preventing impunity through talks, by ensuring that it was not enshrined in the 
terms of a settlement.   
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6.4  The era of enforcement 
 
Far from failing to have an impact, even up to the present the ICC is having a 
profound impact on this conflict.  Its warrants have ensured that two peace 
processes that were delicate and uncertain at best could not succeed, and a 
decade later the Court continues to ensure that no peace deal can be achieved 
while the LRA remain undefeated and their leadership remain averse to trial.  It 
has ensured that an ‘era of enforcement’ is imposed on LRA-affected 
communities.  This is characterised by an internationally-supported war for legal 
enforcement, in which innocent civilians have continued to suffer, and 
negotiated routes to end the violence are precluded.  The human rights of 
communities affected by atrocities have been subordinated to the requirements 
of legal principle.  The region is undergoing a continuing period of influence by 
the ICC, locked into a war that is legitimised by the Court. 
 
6.4.1  Justice delayed 
 
In this context it is clear to see that the claim that ‘justice delayed is justice 
denied’, proposed by some at the Review Conference, is simplistic (AI 2008; 
Akhavan 2009: 631; ICC 2010a: 6-7; Vinjamuri 2010).  The application of 
international criminal justice in the LRA-affected region is ongoing, and to the 
extent that justice is perceived as pertaining only to the narrow remit of effecting 
ICC warrants, it is partially successful.  Through the Court’s insistence that the 
warrants not be withdrawn and that the negotiations lead to retributive 
punishment, all talks have collapsed indefinitely and the suspects are thus 
barred from securing impunity for themselves.  Some aspects of justice, that 
might be achieved through an end to the violence, are thus delayed by the 
military pursuit of others—in this case now the arrest of one man alone, the 
LRA’s leader Joseph Kony.  
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The cost of this projection of the standards of international criminal justice for 
the LRA high command has been borne principally by the communities who 
continue to be caught up in the violence.  Justice for them is a broader issue, 
encompassing their own security and access to the most fundamental human 
rights (Armstrong 2010: 191-213).  Analysts from outside the region will differ 
about the merits of the sacrifice those communities are obliged to bear, and 
whether international criminal justice itself is well served by this principled but 
impractical and morally contentious approach. 
 
6.4.2  Rediscovering consequences—claiming success 
 
The ICC review conference in 2010 presented a chance for critical evaluation of 
the LRA warrants.  The Prosecutor and supporters of the Court continued to 
claim positive consequentialist successes on the basis of the Court’s principled 
approach (HRW 2010a; ICC 2010a; Tolbert and Wierda 2010).  The ICC itself 
highlighted the dramatic reduction in killings in Uganda (and elsewhere) that 
took place in the years after its intervention, as support for its cause.  In its 
material it appears not to show all LRA-related killings in DRC at the end of 
2008, (nor indeed many other killings that took place in that country at the time, 
concurrent with its DRC interventions).  In relation to the Uganda figures, it 
presented them without any contextual analysis or discussion of the possible 
causes of violence reduction—such as the Sudanese CPA, the return process, 
and developments in the UPDF’s war, and the LRA’s departure from Uganda.  
Graphs of killings in Uganda were included as if they represented evidence for 
ICC efficacy.  As we have seen, in Uganda the proportion of conflict-related 
deaths that were killings by armed groups was less than 10% of the total, and 
thus a focus on killings is misleading (ICC 2010a).  Some will question whether 
such material is intended to inform. 
 
Other misrepresentations have included the presentation of the geographical 
shifting of the war due to the movement of the LRA as the achievement of 
‘relative peace’ in northern Uganda (without mentioning the displacement of the 
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war to the DRC and CAR), characterising the LRA as defeated, and asserting 
that the ICC has contributed to a ‘peaceful settlement’ of the conflict (Akhavan 
2009: 641; Otim and Wierda 2010: 5,6). 
 
As these unsubstantiated assertions and misrepresentations were being made 
at the highest international levels, including at the conference itself and in 
authoritative academic journals, they have continued to influence or frame the 
debate about the ICC’s impacts and future development (HRW 2010a; ICC 
2010a; ICC 2010b; ICTJ 2010; Tolbert and Wierda 2010; Schabas 2011). 
 
However, in relation to application of the warrants some success has been 
achieved since (5.3.2).  Dominic Ongwen, the LRA’s second in command at the 
time, has been captured and is now facing trial in The Hague (BBC 2015c; BBC 
2015b).  Even this measure of success presents complicating factors.  Ongwen 
was abducted aged between 9 and 14, and has been held by the LRA ever 
since (JRP 2008; Ross 2016).  Even if convicted of unspeakable crimes, as 
seems likely, there is the issue of the profound trauma he has suffered as an 
LRA captive, having been tortured and forced to watch violent killings as a child, 
and having remained within the LRA ever since.  The Acholi community is not 
united in celebrating his trial by the ICC (ibid). 
 
It may not be the Court’s responsibility to assess the effectiveness of its 
intervention at this point, but the war of enforcement has been a bloody one, 
and estimates suggest the LRA alone have been responsible for over 2,300 
deaths since the start of 2009, and over 5,300 abductions, 3,000 of them 
unresolved (Invisible Children 2014). 
 
6.4.3  Shifting the blame 
 
If the Court has succeeded in strengthening the principle that international war 
criminals may no longer expect to escape justice through negotiations, it has 
done so at the expense of considerations outside its remit—those of a moral 
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and practical nature.  And those issues, while immaterial in legal terms, include 
the continuation of the war and its consequences for communities. 
 
The Prosecutorial position is contradictory with respect to this suffering.  This 
thesis has shown how the Court’s interests clearly diverge from those of the 
affected population, when neither threats of violence nor the collapse of peace 
talks would cause its Prosecutor to waver in his resolve to set the imperatives of 
legal principle above community concerns.  When in 2007 he placed practical 
and moral considerations outside his remit, and determined to interpret justice 
narrowly within the Court’s interests and purposes, he was choosing not to 
consider the consequences of his actions, but instead to apply legal principle.  
Actions taken regardless of likely consequences will nevertheless have 
consequences, though these may be deemed immaterial to the application of 
the law.   
 
In the years subsequent to the collapse of the Juba process the war has 
dragged on, at a lower level but with thousands of casualties (Invisible Children 
2014).  The Prosecutor has sought to dissociate the Court from the war that it 
has helped to legitimise, identifying its ongoing tragic consequences as a failure 
of international commitment to apprehend the suspects, which in reality is a 
failure of commitment to military enforcement.  Military efforts were failing prior 
to the Court’s involvement, and so the principal impact has been the indefinite 
closure of negotiations as a possible route through which to end the violence.  
The consequences of ICC engagement for the communities affected are 
beyond the remit of the Prosecutor.  However predictable the negative 
consequences of intervention, the task of spanning the divide between high-
minded legal principle and preventing violence on the ground is apparently for 
militaries, states and the international community to resolve (Ocampo 2007a: 9; 
Ocampo 2007b; Ocampo 2009: 4). 
 
In short, the Court is mandated to intervene without regard to the broader 
consequences, and will identify others as responsible if there are negative 
outcomes.  As already noted, the period of enforcement was in any case 
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expected to be bloody.  Militaries from around the world were anticipated to 
participate, and it was thought that a price would have to be paid to establish 
the rule of ICL (6.1.1, 6.2.4).  The broader ramifications of the application of 
legal principle to violent contexts will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
6.5.  Review 
6.5.1  Summary in relation to the key points of the dominant narrative 
 
At the conclusion of this presentation of the evidence relating to the case study 
it is pertinent to briefly revisit the key claims made by advocates for the Court 
listed in 5.4, and assess which have withstood the analysis. 
 
1. The notion that ICC intervened on behalf of the abducted children and 
their communities (5.1.2) is contradicted by the evidence (6.2).  The 
Court, in accordance with its Statute, intervened to apply international 
criminal justice and bring an end to impunity.  The enforcement path 
that this entailed set aside community interests as they themselves 
perceived them, in favour of the priorities of international criminal justice 
(6.4).   
2. The perception that the ICC was intervening in a conflict that was going 
nowhere, in the absence of effective alternative strategies likely to bring 
it to an end (5.1.4), was entirely incorrect (4.4, 6.2.3).  There was an 
effective local community-based strategy for ending the conflict, well 
placed at the advent of peace in southern Sudan. 
3. The claim that ICC might withdraw in the interests of justice, should it 
be necessary (5.1.5), referred only to ‘justice’ as defined by the narrow 
interests of international criminal justice and the Court, and thus not to 
justice or security issues pertaining to the civil society which fall outside 
the Prosecutor’s remit to consider(4.2, 4.3, 6.2.2, 6.2.4, 6.3.4). 
4. The belief that UPDF was an appropriate means for enforcement of the 
warrants (5.1.3) ignored the fact that the UPDF was itself a mass 
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perpetrator of violence against the population in its own right (4.2, 4.3.4, 
6.1.1). It was appropriate only in the sense that, if the legal requirement 
for enforcement of the warrants were to be prioritised over all other 
considerations including community safety, it posed the most credible 
military threat to the LRA. 
5. The claim that the ICC, with others, brought Kony to the negotiating 
table (5.2.2), is not supported by any evidence and remains pure 
conjecture, though it is widely disseminated (6.3.2). 
6. The assertion that the ICC was not responsible for the collapse of the 
talks is misleading (5.2.3, 6.3.1).  Analysis clearly indicates that while it 
may not have caused the failure of these processes, it did ensure that 
they could not succeed (6.3.4). 
7. The notion that the LRA were not negotiating in good faith, based on 
observations that they were also preparing to resume hostilities, is not 
logical(5.2.3).  In reality both parties were engaged in this pragmatic 
activity while negotiating (6.3.4). 
8. The hope that the ICC’s impact would reduce the intensity of the conflict, 
and the associated suffering, whether through the deterrence its 
warrants confer or other means (5.1.1, 5.1.2) is not supported (6.2.1).  
LRA violence reached its highest peak after the warrants were issued, 
during the Christmas Massacres, so deterrence seems to have failed 
(6.2.1).  There is no evidence that the subsequent reduction in LRA 
violence is ICC-related, and violence continues in DRC and CAR. 
9. The notion that local communities deserve international standards of 
justice, and that other approaches are selling justice short (5.3.1) 
ignores the fact that the ICC has not delivered justice, even on its own 
limited and technical terms (6.4).  As a minimum, it has also denied 
local people a voice in determining what justice is, and in how it might 
be achieved (6.2.4, 6.3.5). 
10. The notion that enforcement efforts will have been worthwhile, whatever 
the cost in civilian lives, is central to the Court’s overarching mission, 
but highly controversial in this first context (5.1, 5.3.2, 6.3.5, 6.4).   
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11. The hope that the interests and actions of the ICC would be aligned 
with upholding the human rights of communities affected by conflict is 
clearly false (5.1).  In reality it subordinated community wishes for an 
end to the violence, and damaged their strategies for peace, justice and 
human rights (4.4, 6.2). 
 
We can now see that, of all these claims—asserted in the literature by the most 
prominent advocates for the Court’s Uganda intervention, and which underpin 
the ICC’s own understanding of its work—none are supported with evidence.  
Most are contradicted.  The Court’s narrative is not an evidence-based 
interpretation of events, but a collection of initially un-evidenced statements and 
conjecture that are then referenced and re-referenced in the literature to 
establish a community of belief.  The cornerstones of that narrative do not rest 
upon research, and pending any evidence-based defence of its interpretations, 
it should be set aside.  It is contradicted by a substantial body of work by local 
Ugandan human rights organisations, peace workers, researchers and 
international academics who were present on the ground during the conflict and 
ICC intervention.  The question of why such a baseless account should have 
been so promptly assembled and enthusiastically disseminated will be 
addressed in Chapter 8. 
 
The ongoing effect of the Court is significant.  The opportunity for successful 
peace talks was twice precluded by the ICC’s warrants, but the most decisive 
impact of the warrants in this case may have been neither ensuring the collapse 
of the Bigombe process, nor even the Juba talks.  The overarching effect of the 
warrants is that they prevent peace talks permanently.  While ICC suspects 
within the LRA leadership evade capture and sustains their aversion to trial, the 
region is committed to war.  Far from being ineffective, the ICC’s warrants may 
be have been decisive in delivering an ongoing impact on the conflict and the 
region.  They are upholding the international community’s principled 
prioritisation of the ending of impunity by sustaining the war.  Consequentialist 
humanitarian considerations aligned with the community desire for peace are 
indefinitely postponed.   
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6.5.2  Conclusion 
 
Founded upon an understanding of the situation that was less than fully 
informed, the Court intervened on the side of the Ugandan Government, 
anticipating that this route presented an opportunity for military enforcement.  
The Court’s analysis of the conflict dynamics did not extend to the material 
provided in Chapter 4.  It failed to appreciate that it was a three-sided war, in 
which the goals and interests of the community were not represented by the 
Government.  It also failed to adequately consider the alternative strategy to 
end the violence put forward by leaders of the affected community, which was 
at odds with the Court’s requirement for military enforcement.  Subsequently, as 
described in Chapter 5, an already discredited narrative of the conflict was 
further developed and disseminated in support of the Court’s intervention.   
 
Chapter 6 presented an evidence-based account that demonstrated this 
narrative to be flawed in multiple respects, and proposed an alternative 
understanding of events rooted in community accounts of the conflict.  The 
ramifications of the warrants within the region may continue, depending on the 
trajectory of the conflict; however, the lessons to be drawn extend far beyond 
the Ugandan situation.  Findings will now be drawn beyond the immediate case 
study context. 
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Section 3  Impacts and implications 
Chapter 7—The implications for international 
criminal justice 
 
Section 1 of this thesis culminated in the identification of assumptions, 
fundamental to the Court’s Statute and function, that would be tested in volatile 
contexts (3.3.1).  Section 2, has revealed the outcome of the Court’s 
engagement in the LRA case.  It concluded that the impact of the Court was 
severe in terms of its effect on human rights, peace, and self-determination of 
war-affected communities—outcomes on the ground predicted at the time.   
 
In this Section it is now possible to identify whether the case study results 
indicate case-related concerns alone, or whether the negative impact of the 
Court in the LRA war was due to false assumptions of its Statute and implied 
mode of operation.  If the issues revealed are rooted in the Court’s Statute and 
purpose, then the one case could indicate fundamental flaws.  If those flaws are 
emerging in other cases and situations, then the flaws in the ICC’s structure and 
function will be more strongly demonstrated. 
 
As previously outlined, the assumptions fall under four headings and concern 
the primacy of the Court, its specific interpretation of justice, enforcement 
issues, and its theory of change.  Considering matters ranging from practical 
and operational constraints to structural and conceptual underpinnings, using 
these themes this Chapter will move from case-specific and particular findings 
to determine their wider validity and institutional ramifications.   
   
277 
 
7.1  Primacy 
7.1.1 The Court’s primacy 
 
Implicit in the vision that underpins the Statute is the notion that the particular 
approach promoted by the Court will be appropriate in all contexts where the 
Statute applies.  The specificity of the ICC’s approach and mechanism belies 
the universal applicability of the solution that it proposes.  While the task of 
extending the ICC’s reach is ongoing, it is intended to set the standards for a 
global norm of international criminal justice; a one-size-fits-all response to 
international crimes.  This universality is central to its vision (3.1.2, 3.3.1a).   
 
With its first case, a precedent has been established—that pursuit of this task 
be independent of ‘moral and practical considerations’.  To do otherwise would 
threaten the standing of the Court itself (6.2.4).  The case study has clearly 
demonstrated that, even under extremely testing circumstances, issues 
concerning the ‘interests of justice’ enshrined in the Statute are narrowly 
defined to relate to the advancement of ICL.  The limits of prosecutorial 
consideration exclude most aspects of ‘justice’ as it is commonly understood. 
 
Any political or security initiative must be compatible with the new legal 
framework insofar as it involves parties bound by the Rome Statute (3.1.2).  
This is in line with its Preamble and Articles 86-87 of the Statute, which indicate 
significant powers of the Court to request assistance from a state, and the 
obligation of States Parties to co-operate.  States are not empowered to refuse 
to co-operate, nor to negotiate with the Court in relation to its requests.  The 
United Nations too is legally required to co-operate with the Court (ICC and 
United Nations 2004).  
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7.1.2  Evidence from the case study 
 
The notion that the interests of affected communities, international criminal 
justice, and the Prosecutor are aligned, as anticipated in the Statute, has been 
previously discussed (3.3.1).  In relation to ‘the interests of justice’, various 
Articles of the Rome Statute indicate that the Prosecutor is charged with the 
responsibility to decide how this is interpreted (2.3.2, 3.1.2-3, 5.1.5).  It was 
perhaps initially unclear whether this term included the interests of the 
communities affected by the crimes concerned.  There appears to have been an 
assumption by the drafters of the Statute, and initially by the Prosecutor, that 
there was an association between the interests of justice for the Court and for 
the affected communities.  Apparently the Prosecutor initially understood 
himself to be intervening in their interests; however, this misperception was 
short-lived.  The issue was unequivocally addressed when he clarified that in 
the Statute the ‘interests of justice’ referred not to the interests or human rights 
of the communities concerned, but to the process of the extension of 
international criminal justice in its legal sense.  His later statements 
underscored this interpretation, and specifically excluded concerns about 
security and peace as beyond his remit.  As these were explicitly central to the 
community’s interests as they perceived them, this was decisive.  While 
sometimes they might coincidentally be similar, as interpreted the interests of 
‘justice’ are not necessarily the interests of the community, and at times they 
may be opposed (6.2).  This is significant when concerns of the civil society 
relate to reasonable risk of mass killings or death from other causes, abduction 
of potentially hundreds of children, and population displacement from homes 
and livelihoods. 
 
This first ICC case then has raised a crucial issue.  With the interests of 
international criminal justice, Court and Prosecutor so very different to those of 
communities affected by violence, what mechanisms are there to uphold 
community interests?  The answer, as the case study has determined, is that 
there are no formal mechanisms as such.  Having no means to influence the 
   
279 
Security Council, communities may petition the Prosecutor, as they did, but no 
more.  The Court’s process has primacy.  
 
Other stakeholders were equally estranged from local interests.  The Ugandan 
Government was focused on its military process; the UN, and other international 
agencies associated with it, are obliged to uphold the purpose of the Court and 
are thus either actively or passively aligned with it; international human rights 
organisations who might normally seek to uphold human rights of war-affected 
communities, and are expected to do so by their public constituencies, were 
instead also institutionally committed to the Court.  There were in this instance 
no formal mechanisms or mainstream independent channels through which to 
promote local interests.  Astonishingly, while the Court, the Government, the 
UN, the international human rights community, and even the LRA all claimed 
the legitimacy of representing the interests of the community, it was the 
community and their representatives (and local human rights advocates) alone 
who expressed and continue to express their desire for the resolution of the war 
through talks without preconditions.  Such an approach remains unacceptable 
to all other parties (except possibly, and ironically, the Ugandan Government). 
 
The ramifications of this divergence of the interests of the Court and 
international institutions from those of the affected population, are profound.  
Far from lending protection, the Court leaves populations unusually vulnerable 
to the military violence that has become associated with international 
intervention.  Evidence from the case study indicates that the primacy of the 
Court’s process, bringing with it the overarching prioritisation of ICL grounded in 
the Statute, is associated with a requirement upon the international community 
to depart from the prioritisation of the interests of war-affected communities.  
The case also suggests that the Court’s primacy may serve to prolong conflict 
for significant periods, in anticipation that this will further ICL.   
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7.1.3  Observations from other situations 
 
Similar issues have been encountered in other diverse contexts.  Syria has 
signed but not yet ratified the Statute (ICC 2016).  Assad is likely to be 
responsible for international crimes, and were he to fall within the Court’s 
jurisdiction it is far from clear that the issuance of warrants would help to further 
ICL (see 2.2.2).  In the context of Russian military engagement in support of the 
Assad regime, legitimisation of efforts for his arrest could have highly 
unpredictable consequences (Buckley 2012; Al-Saleh 2013; Buchanan 2015).  
It is perhaps fortuitous that through the delay in ratification, the Court, with its 
deontological mandate, relatively weak capacity for conflict analysis, and 
potential to legitimise violent enforcement for retributive goals, cannot intervene. 
 
Two further examples that call into question the universal effectiveness of the 
principled application of ICL may reinforce this point (3.1.2).  In South Africa, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) contributed to the successful 
navigation of a dangerous phase in that country’s history.  The white community 
perceived itself as under great threat, and amongst them were groups seeking 
to defend their interests with violence (Clark and Worger 2013).  The black 
majority on the other hand had suffered enormously from the crimes of 
apartheid, and many harboured a desire for retribution.  Tensions within these 
communities were also severe, and the end of the apartheid era held the 
potential for violence.  Few now would dispute that the apartheid regime 
committed international crimes, yet it is far from clear that in 1994 a binding 
retributive justice frame imposed from outside would have been aligned with the 
broader interests of the affected population who had already suffered so much 
(Berat and Shain 1995; Wilson 2000).  Amnesties then granted through the 
TRC process would no longer be permitted.  Had the ICC been created a 
decade earlier, South Africa’s recent history might have instead reflected the 
requirement for a militarised and retributive application of justice, in place of its 
peaceful restorative justice approach.   
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In 1998, only two years before the ICC came into being, the Northern Ireland 
Good Friday Agreement permitted the release from prison of convicted 
paramilitary prisoners who had been tried and found guilty of violent crimes.  
Peace was achieved, and the interests of the population furthered, through 
negotiations that delivered a measure of impunity (Good Friday Agreement 
1998).  While the crimes they were convicted for fell below the ICC’s threshold 
for international crimes, the principle of primacy of ICL being aligned with the 
interests of communities affected by atrocities again did not hold.  Through 
setting aside criminal law in this instance, violent crimes have been greatly 
reduced and the rule of law advanced. 
 
The conclusion cannot be avoided, that the assumption embedded in the 
Statute, in favour of the primacy of the application of ICL by the Court, may 
prevent other approaches to justice by international or local actors.  The ill-
considered or premature application of retributive justice does not necessarily 
further the Court’s own purpose and the rule of law. 
 
7.2  Justice 
7.2.1  The Court’s conception of justice 
 
Based upon its Statute, issues concerning the Court’s less consequentialist, 
more deontological frame of justice, have been noted (3.1.3,3.3.1).  Previously, 
in assessing possible interventions, prior consideration of the consequences on 
the ground was often highly significant—even when associated with other less 
transparent agendas (Roberts 1993; Anderson 1999; Evans and Sahnoun 
2001; Seybolt 2007; Evans 2009).  The role of prior consequential assessment 
has now been significantly reduced.  In its place, the Prosecutor is mandated to 
apply a deontological frame.  In legally mandating this shift away from 
consequential assessment of humanitarian impact, the international community 
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has made a bold—some might say an astonishingly bold—move (3.3.1) (Schiff 
2012). 
 
This contrasts with developments in other fields of intervention.  The discourse 
concerning international development interventions has for at least three 
decades emphasised the importance of understanding the context in which an 
intervention is to take place.  The importance of accountability to the 
communities intended to benefit from interventions has been emphasised by 
many, and the evolution of the international development discourse has been 
influenced by such issues.  Externally contrived models unwaveringly applied 
have been criticised as inappropriate and ineffectual; in many instances a 
strong understanding of and engagement with the relevant communities, likely 
to include shared analysis informed by them, may be a prerequisite for success 
(Chambers 1983; Chambers 1997; Easterly 2007). 
 
The ICC is obliged instead to employ an approach which is both deontological 
and normative (3.1.3, 3.3.1).  The application of legal principle is explicitly not 
for adaptation to suit local circumstance.  The justice remedy brought by the 
Court is to a significant degree one developed elsewhere in generally stable 
situations, now to be applied in volatile contexts globally without context-specific 
adaptation.  The principles enshrined in the Statute, and the processes 
associated with it, are anticipated to be clear and unwavering; this uniformity of 
approach is perceived not as a shortcoming, but as a strength. 
 
If the solution to be applied by the ICC—issue of warrants, arrest, trial and 
punishment—is already determined, the need for understanding of the context 
to which it is to be brought is operational only.  The intervention itself is known 
from the start and rooted within the ICC’s purpose; it should not, indeed cannot, 
be redesigned.  The application of legal principle does not require a detailed 
prior understanding of context, and indeed the legitimacy of the Court may 
depend to some extent upon it not being (overtly at least) influenced by such 
matters (Vinjamuri 2010). 
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Perhaps because the requirement for contextual understanding was perceived 
to be limited to operational issues, the Prosecutor is empowered by the Statute 
to take the relevant decisions him or herself.  He or she is not expected, in 
addition to being a Prosecutor, to be highly informed in conflict dynamics, 
military strategy, international diplomacy, and also an expert in each volatile 
context into which the Court seeks to project its authority.  The relevance of 
contextual factors is anticipated to be limited to issues appropriate to the 
application of prosecutorial discretion relating to the Court’s process, and no 
more (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998: Articles 53-54).  
Additionally, the frame brought by the Prosecutor to volatile environments is 
retributive and, common to all other retributive mechanisms, it requires 
enforcement, often against the will of the transgressor. 
 
In summary, the Court brings a new understanding of justice and the means of 
its furtherance, rooted in its Statute and rules.  Because the form of 
engagement is known from the start and does not depend on context, and the 
judgement about the success of the intervention is not based on its 
consequences (except in a very narrow legal sense) but on the application of 
legal principle and retributive enforcement, there is relatively little need for the 
Court to engage thoroughly with the complexity of situations.  These are in any 
event areas beyond its expertise. 
 
7.2.2  Evidence from the case study 
 
Support for the Court from the international human rights community, including 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reflect a hope that application 
of ICL through the ICC will help to deliver positive human rights outcomes, even 
though the understanding of justice that it brings is different.  Based upon the 
evidence of the case study, it is also quite clear that those with an interest in 
human rights from the affected population itself, such as HURIFO, ARLPI, JPC, 
the religious and traditional leaders, held and continue to hold the opposite view 
(HURIFO 2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; ARLPI 2013).  The local 
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human rights community demanded that people on the ground to be allowed to 
seek an end to the violence, while the international human rights community 
held out instead for its continuation in furtherance of international criminal 
justice enforcement.  This international position was widely re-asserted at the 
ICC Review Conference in 2010, where human rights campaigners were 
prominent in advocating ‘no peace without justice’ (6.3.6) (HRW 2005; AI 2008; 
HRW 2009b; HRW 2010a; ICTJ 2010; Roth 2010; HRW 2015).  In this they 
have been successful, as negotiations to end the LRA’s violence have been 
precluded. 
 
Communities situated in violent contexts are of course likely to be highly 
consequentialist in their considerations.  Few will feel that they should be 
sacrificed for the greater good or the furtherance of a principle imposed upon 
them.  They are very unlikely to consider their interests represented by an 
institution that is coldly principled and unwavering in its search for retributive 
justice for a handful of individuals without regard to the costs. 
 
There is then a conceptual flaw running through the Statute, in which the 
interests of communities and the Prosecutor are not identified as distinct and 
likely to be opposed to one another.  Communities will be consequentialist; the 
Prosecutor will be deontological.  One result of this error is that there is no 
mechanism through which communities can protect themselves from 
prosecutorial decisions that are clearly against their interests. 
 
Recent events in relation to the LRA case further illustrate this point.  The arrest 
of Dominic Ongwen after ten further years of war against the LRA was hailed as 
a success by supporters of the Court (6.4.2).  The consequences of the 
violence that took place prior to his arrival in custody, and his likely replacement 
in the LRA’s hierarchy in any case, are beyond its remit.  With thousands dead 
and thousands more abducted since the resumption of the war after the Juba 
talks, there is no mention (for example by international human rights defenders) 
of balancing considerations in declaring ‘a major step for those affected by the 
LRA’s long history of crimes’(HRW 2015).  The announcement continues to 
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wrongly conflate the legal justice of the Court with justice as perceived by local 
communities. 
 
In the Uganda case then, international criminal justice was advanced, framed as 
the delivery of ‘justice’ for the affected communities, though their 
representatives requested and consistently petitioned for alternative justice 
approaches, and surveys indicated that international criminal justice was 
relatively unimportant to people on the ground compared to other issues (4.4, 
6.2.2, 6.2.4). 
 
Finally, in contrast to its relationship to consequences for the communities 
affected by its warrants, the Court, like all institutions, is mindful of the 
consequences for itself and furtherance of its cause, and this has already been 
witnessed (6.2.4).  It can be expected that the ICC will continue to pursue its 
own interests in a flexible, consequentialist manner, while having licence (or 
even the responsibility) to set aside consequential considerations in relation to 
communities it mistakenly claims to serve (Clark 2008c: 44). 
 
In conclusion, we can expect the Court and affected communities to have 
opposing interests, and opposing notions of justice, in other situations of the 
Court’s intervention.  Based upon assumptions that stem from the Statute, 
about the nature and universality of justice, the ICC’s capacity for situational 
analysis is too weak and its institutional antipathy towards adaptation for local 
contextual factors too strong.  Its normative and deontological assumptions 
about justice and how they can most effectively be furthered are not borne out.  
For those who prioritise human rights for war affected populations, Uganda 
case study has left no room for equivocation on this point. 
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7.2.3  Observations from other situations 
 
Observations from other contexts support these conclusions.  In Kenya ICC 
warrants were issued into a much less volatile context than northern Uganda; 
however, the possibility of violence against witnesses and their families was 
foreseeable in advance.  However, the Court’s deontological purpose triumphed 
over more cautious consequential considerations when it issued warrants into a 
situation where witnesses were vulnerable.  As it transpired, the violence that 
ensued caused the cases to collapse through lack of evidence.  The overall 
impact of the Court is debatable, but the notion that justice, or even the Court’s 
own narrow purposes, will be served simply by issuing warrants can not be 
easily assumed (Allen 2013; Bowcott 2014; Mueller 2014; Paisner 2014; 
Mathenge et al. 2015; Rosen 2015). 
 
The case of Syria is also illustrative.  Initially in response to Assad’s brutal 
crushing of popular protest, the West’s approach indicated a deontological 
emphasis on prompt trials.  This shifted to a tolerance of Assad’s role in the 
fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), when the West’s own 
consequentialist interests seemed threatened (just as communities threatened 
by violence prioritise consequentialism).  The West’s position now suggests a 
desire to strengthening of its deontological commitments, but only once 
sufficient stability returns and its own interests are secured (Traynor and 
Beaumont 2012; Black 2014; Hughes 2014; Riley-Smith 2015).  This is an 
implicit recognition of one of the research findings—that the Court’s emphasis 
on legal process is best applied when the consequences of doing so are 
brought under control.  Deontology does not guide engagements effectively in 
extreme environments—even in relation to the narrow task of advancing its own 
principles. 
 
In Rwanda too the limited nature of judicial approaches to diverse justice issues 
has also been recognised.  The ICTR brought a strongly deontological and 
retributive frame to the post-conflict situation.  Justice, interpreted narrowly and 
applied by that institution, was necessarily not an attempt to address the 
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profound societal needs of Rwandan communities.  Many aspects of justice fell 
beyond its remit, and in the event it proved to be a relatively ineffective means 
of furthering reconciliation (Clark 2007; Clark 2008a).  By contrast, and as in the 
case of Ugandan justice approaches, the locally influenced process—in this 
case gacaca—was far more nuanced.  This hybrid procedure encompassing 
legal and other responses to injustice, was a pragmatic response to diverse 
social needs.  With holistic goals that were physical, psychological and 
psychosocial, critiques of that system have failed to recognise its multifaceted 
and deeply personal nature (Clark 2010b).  The challenges of linking the narrow 
criminal justice process with broader post-conflict agendas has been recognised 
(Kamatali 2003).  
 
The situation in Darfur was referred to the Court by the UNSC in March 2005, 
and in March 2009 Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir became the first sitting 
president to be issued with an ICC arrest warrant, and the first person to be 
charged by the Court with genocide.  The impact of that warrant has been 
criticised by scholars, who believe that this has complicated efforts to promote 
human rights, some being concerned that far more extreme forces might come 
to the fore should he be arrested.  Once again the emphasis on narrow legal 
justice concerns central to the Court’s mission is perceived to threaten grave 
human rights consequences in a situation of great violence and instability (de 
Waal 2009; de Waal and Stanton 2009; Flint and de Waal 2009; ICC 2016).   
 
The Court’s intervention in volatile contexts has in the past been construed as a 
gift to communities affected by violence, even when they entreat the Prosecutor 
not to intervene (6.2.4).  If the Court continues to prioritise deontological justice 
in dangerous situations, its interventions will continue to be associated with 
negative humanitarian consequences, precisely because it is mandated not to 
consider them. 
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7.3  Enforcement 
7.3.1  The Court’s enforcement process 
 
The assumptions relating to the Court concerning enforcement are summarised 
in 3.3.1.  Enforcement of international criminal justice is integral to the vision for 
the ICC, and required in order that retribution can take place and impunity be 
addressed (Ocampo 2005b; Robertson 2006; Ocampo 2009).  It has been 
noted that in volatile contexts enforcement may be violent.  Administered by 
forces outside the Court’s control (but legitimised by it), there is an unstated 
assumption that the violence that ensues will not be disproportionate.  At the 
point when considerations of consequences are deprioritised, violent 
interventions are legitimised.  The means for civilian protection from any impact 
of the warrants are unclear or absent.  Issues of peace and security, as well as 
broader notions of justice, remain beyond the Court’s remit. 
 
7.3.2  Evidence from the case study 
7.3.2a  The military ‘era of enforcement’ 
The case study has presented multiple issues of concern relating to 
enforcement.  The issuance of the warrants was necessarily rooted in 
considerations of the crimes, the likely culpability of the prospective ICC targets, 
and the possibility of effecting arrest.  The warrants required military 
enforcement (3.3.1).  Realistically, the Ugandan military was the only credible 
means by which to seek arrest, and it is clear that from the outset the 
Prosecutor envisaged them as the principal enforcers for the Court.  With no 
apparent shift in military strategy, the central dynamic of the war, in which the 
UPDF sought to kill the abductees at a sufficient rate that the LRA be 
incapacitated (4.3), was harnessed in the cause of international criminal justice 
enforcement. 
 
Military enforcement in volatile contexts was always going to have costs.  
Warlords accused of monstrous atrocities are unlikely to acquiesce to arrest; 
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bringing them to book will require militarily engagement.  At times, the extension 
of international criminal justice into these contexts will be a violent process.  
These points are all clearly acknowledged by advocates for the Court, and 
Robertson’s vision of enforcement resonates with Goldstone’s anticipation of a 
cost associated with achievement of the new era (3.1.5); Ocampo’s call for the 
mobilisation of militaries around the world to arrest warlords attests to their 
shared understanding (6.1.1, 6.2.4).  International criminal justice enforcement 
in violent contexts is envisioned as military. 
7.3.2b  The risk of disproportionate violence 
In the Uganda case, where the UPDF was clearly envisaged as the principal 
enforcer, the process for evaluating its suitability for the purpose was not 
transparent, and it is not clear whether the Court even had the analytical 
capacity to understand what its selection of the UPDF implied.  The Court may 
not even have understood the dynamics of the war itself.  Certainly what 
analysis the Court did publish relating to the Uganda cases has since been 
withdrawn and withheld (4.3.3).52  Others acknowledge the UPDF’s well-
documented role in displacement of the Ugandan population in the early part of 
the enforcement period (4.2 and for example HRW 2009b: 28-30).  However, 
the centrality of UPDF violence to ICC enforcement efforts, which includes the 
deaths resulting from displacement and the killing of abductees as part of the 
UPDF’s war fighting strategy (4.2, 4.3, 6.2), is barely discussed by the 
international human rights community.  With hindsight it is hard to conceive how 
the violent consequences of enforcement can be seen as proportionate or 
acceptable. 
 
Even setting these matters aside, any enforcement process may go awry.  Had 
the UPDF’s strategy not involved killing the abductees, and instead been 
targeting military personnel, there is still no formal or comprehensive 
mechanism by which the Court can assess the likely impact of its warrants to 
ensure that the human rights consequences are proportionate and acceptable.  
                                            
52 It is not clear how the Court justifies its withholding of such information.  If it does not 
wish to investigate the impact of its interventions, it is important that it should not 
obstruct others from doing so.  This issue is discussed in 7.5.2. 
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Many will disagree with the fundamental assumption embedded in the Court’s 
process—that military enforcement in all instances and situations will 
necessarily be appropriate.  Certainly in this first case, with the detaining of only 
one suspect following a decade of war, the Court’s operational assumptions 
concerning proportional use of force are contradicted. 
7.3.2c  Unprotected witness communities  
The selection of the LRA commanders for warrants demanded the use of the 
UPDF, which in turn precipitated the Court’s entanglement in its violent strategy; 
but there were other assumptions revealed by these developments.  In complex 
and volatile contexts it may not be reasonable to assume that responsibility for 
security will be met by the State or other international actors.  This includes in 
circumstances of increased danger to civilians or witnesses resulting from the 
Court’s activities (3.3.1). 
 
The notion that the Court might endanger witnesses through its investigations is 
justified, as defendants or others (including governments) may wish to prevent 
their testimony being heard.  The Court’s intervention raises the stakes for 
wanted ICC suspects, and promotes the possibility of violence against those 
who pose a threat through the legal process.   
 
The Statute’s provision for the protection of witnesses does acknowledge the 
possible risk to them and at times their families (for example Articles 43(6), 
57(3c), 64(6e), 68, 70(1c), 87(4) and 93(1j).  It includes provision for various 
measures to protect them, their identities and their evidence through the trial 
process, and some mention of their protection more widely.  However, it does 
not indicate the possibility of whole communities, from which witnesses come, 
requiring protection, and as we have seen, such targeting strategies have been 
used by the LRA (6.2.4).  Indeed, collective punishment is not uncommon in 
war, and is named in the Geneva Conventions  (ICRC 1949).  Nor does it go 
into detail on the provision of security where a state is unwilling or unable to 
provide it, or indeed where a state (or prominent figures within it), may 
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be a perpetrator, as in the Ugandan, Kenyan and Sudanese cases (4.2, 4.3, 
4.4, 6.1). 
 
If the Court is intended to intervene in these contexts, its systems must offer 
credible means of protection to those put at risk by its process.  Clearly these 
issues might be considerable, relating to military deployment.  Yet without an 
army the Court can do little, and in the LRA case statements by the former 
Prosecutor, indicating that he had passed responsibility for security to the UPDF 
and Government, effectively washing his hands of the issue while failing to 
provide protection, did not constitute adequate protection (5.1.3).  Additionally, 
some will consider that assuring those at risk that they will be protected, while 
acknowledging to other audiences that community interests would if necessary 
be set aside by a Court unwilling to submit to blackmail, is disingenuous (6.3.5). 
7.3.2d  International criminal law and the alignment with superior force 
One of the most surprising assumptions embedded in the Statute is that 
superior military force will be aligned with the ICC’s criminal justice 
interventions, and/or that the violence or ongoing conflict associated with its 
enforcement is in some other way worth the associated suffering (3.3.1).  The 
notion of an ‘era of enforcement’ clearly anticipates coercion or violence, 
heralding arrest and trial; not defeat.  Enforcement actions, even if they involve 
military engagements or wars, are anticipated to be successful, and never to 
incur disproportionate suffering. 
 
This case study points to an accommodation with power that may be required to 
harness the necessary military enforcement capacity.  Having associated his 
intervention with the Ugandan Government at the point of referral, the 
Prosecutor was in a weak position to question the displacement of the 
population to the IDP camps which was soon to escalate catastrophically.  Nor 
could he easily question the UPDF’s longstanding military strategy of killing the 
abductees, with which he had chosen to associate the Court (4.2).  From the 
outset, the application of international criminal justice in the Ugandan context 
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was compromised: military force was not aligned to the implementation of 
international criminal justice, but the reverse. 
 
However, in the extremely violent situations in which the Court has chosen to 
engage, enforcement is likely to be violent.  The belief that justice will prevail 
through military enforcement wherever it is deployed is astonishingly naive.  Yet 
that seems to be the implicit assumption: the Court will intervene in volatile 
contexts primarily on the basis of the application of criminal justice principles; it 
is equipped to do so without a particularly strong capacity in context or conflict 
analysis (as has been shown); and through enforcement processes that are 
military and violent where necessary, it will extend international criminal justice 
and the rule of law. 
 
In the LRA case, over the past decades the balance of military power has been 
insufficient to deliver a victory to any party, or to deliver wanted LRA suspects to 
custody (with the exception of Ongwen).  Though displaced principally to the 
DRC and CAR, and dispersed over a large area, the LRA has continued its 
practice of abduction and killings. 
 
The inescapable conclusion from this case study is that, a decade on, justice 
even as narrowly defined by the Court itself has not been decisively furthered.  
One former abductee, himself a victim of terrible LRA violence as a child, is now 
standing trial for horrific acts.  In securing this achievement, the Court’s 
engagement of the necessary military capacity has embroiled it in the 
continuation of a bloody war, its own enforcement being heavily implicated in 
the deaths of those it was seeking to assist, even at the hands of its own 
enforcers.  The case study has revealed what should have been apparent at the 
outset, and was known to communities on the ground from the start: that 
simplistic notions about the association of superior military force with criminal 
justice ideals, and about the efficacy of military violence in delivering just 
outcomes, are not borne out.  This assumption, embedded in the Court’s mode 
of operations, and fundamental to its prospects for success, is incorrect.   
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7.3.3  Observations from other situations 
 
The Uganda example is not an isolated case, and there are other examples 
illustrating the complications of enforcement associated with ICC warrants, and 
related violence experienced by civilians.  The Court’s military-backed process 
that subordinates considerations of consequence has been deployed 
elsewhere.  However, wealthy and stable democratic states with a strong civil 
society, many of which are principled supporters of the ICC, would not tolerate 
violent military enforcement of the type seen in Uganda inflicted upon their own 
populations.  National armies would not target abductees and displace large 
elements of the population, while enjoying international support and legitimacy 
conferred by the Court.  On their own soil such nations are likely to 
accommodate a more nuanced approach to justice, including negotiated 
settlements that set retributive justice elements alongside other approaches, the 
better to establish broader justice goals encompassing peace, security and the 
opportunity to extend good governance and the rule of law through non-violent 
means.  Yet these wealthy states support the application of the rigid strictures of 
violent military ICC enforcement in other states—principally poorer and weaker 
states in Africa.  The notion that in doing so rich nations are applying a system 
to which they submit themselves, is another misperception. 
 
The Libyan situation was referred to the ICC by the UNSC, and the investigation 
opened in March 2011.  The warrant for Muammar Gaddafi followed and, 
aligned with UNSC resolution 1973, helped to legitimise NATO military 
engagement there until the end of October, following Gaddafi’s death (ICC 
2016).  Although the first phase of the Libyan civil war then closed, its aftermath 
led directly to the ongoing conflict in that region, in which the state has 
collapsed and rival militia vie for control.  Enforcement efforts for the 
advancement of ICL were not solely based upon the ICC’s involvement by any 
means, but military efforts for the enforcement of its warrants were a 
contributory factor in precipitating the political disintegration of that country, and 
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the current level of violence.  Enforcement efforts prioritising deontological 
justice norms have not advanced ICL.  A number of analysts offer more 
nuanced restorative or political solutions (Harding et al. 2011; Kersten 2014; 
BBC 2016; Fraihat 2016; Reardon 2016). 
 
Analysis of the situation in Liberia in the mid-2000s is also pertinent. The Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003, which contributed to the conclusion 
of Liberia’s second civil war, laid the foundations for an all-inclusive power-
sharing interim government.  With the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
established from 2002, Chief Prosecutor David Crane was amongst those 
calling for trials to be deployed in Liberia also (founded upon the claim to 
primacy).  For reasons as much concerning the potential consequences of 
enforcement efforts, analysts have identified such a move as dangerous and 
destabilising, and there is no assurance that it would not have been so.  In the 
event a court process was averted, and national elections were held in 2005 
(Harris 2012: 192-200; Harris and Lappin 2015).  
 
Even in cases where an international tribunal has apparently been most 
successful, such as the trail of Slobodan Milosevic, application of ICL was 
identified as a potential threat to political processes for peace and broader 
justice agendas.  Subsequent analysis has called into question the implications 
of its limited justice frame (Hearst et al. 1999; Vulliamy and Wintour 1999; Clark 
2008a; Clark 2009).   
 
The Kenyan case is illustrative of another issue—the misalignment of superior 
force with ICL.  The ICC issued warrants into a situation where power resides 
with the targeted suspects—a situation not specifically anticipated in the 
Statute.  As discussed (2.2.3, 6.2.4), there is no robust statutory mechanism to 
stay the Prosecutor’s hand in favour of consequentialist concerns in such 
situations.  Members of the Kenyan Government, including Uhuru Kenyatta 
himself, have been able to evade trial through the silencing or withdrawal of 
witnesses prepared to testify against them.  This has been brought about by a 
systematic campaign of killings and intimidation of witnesses triggered by the 
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warrants (Gekara 2014; Mathenge et al. 2015; Rosen 2015).  Thus in a context 
apparently less violent than that of the LRA war, the Court’s failure to ensure 
protection of witnesses has caused the case to be necessarily and inevitably 
abandoned, the ICC’s consideration of consequences once again inadequate.  
Once warrants have been issued in these contexts, without a strategy to 
prevent them, killings—either in the course of international criminal justice 
enforcement or associated with suspects seeking to evade trial—may take 
place.  The prospect of enforcement may precipitate rather than deter the 
violence of perpetrators. 
 
In the Court’s retributive mode, negotiations leading to peace with amnesty is a 
defeat; an ongoing war of enforcement is simply a delay—attributable to a lack 
of political will.  Such delays may one day lead to successful arrest.  The 
Court’s relationship to the violence of its own enforcement process is not 
identified nor defined by its Statute.  This conceptual lapse is understandable in 
the context of other courts.  Generally these have been conceived to operate in 
stable contexts, where crime is generally addressed through a civil process.  In 
the volatile contexts of ICC interventions the embedded assumption of stability 
and security is not safe.  The suffering or death of civilians in large numbers 
during criminal law enforcement has not generally been necessary before.  
Now, as the case study indicates, and other observations confirm, it most 
certainly is.  Operational implications of engagement have unveiled conceptual 
omissions of the Statute. 
 
7.4  Theory of change 
7.4.1  The Court’s theory of change 
 
The need for a theory of change has been discussed in section 3.1.7 and 
summarised in 3.3.1.  Following the appointment of the new Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda in 2012, the attention to strategy was significantly enhanced.  The 
focused approach to prosecutions was reformed; the possibility of a ‘build 
   
296 
upwards strategy’, deploying warrants moving up a chain of command, was 
indicated; open-ended in-depth investigations were announced.  Greater field 
presence was indicated as desirable, as were improvements for security or 
witnesses.  ‘Critical success factors’ were identified, though disappointingly they 
related primarily to Court process (Ocampo 2003; ASP 2006; Ocampo 2006b; 
Ocampo 2007a; Ocampo 2010b; ICC 2013b; ICC 2013e; ICC 2013c; ICC 
2015d).   
 
Despite these indications, strategic consideration of the link between the ICC’s 
activities and its goal in the new and dangerous contexts of its operations 
remains weak.  In these documents there is little mention of the likely obstacles 
to success, and how the desired impacts might be achieved while the dangers 
are avoided.  How can populations be made safer rather than less safe by the 
Court’s intervention?  How can militaries be influenced towards activities less 
likely to harm civilians, and more likely to achieve arrest?  How can the Court 
avoid legitimising or becoming embroiled in wars?  And how can its warrants 
improve chances for peace and conflict reduction, rather than prevent peace 
deals and sustain violence?  Clearly the Court’s interventions have the potential 
for either outcome, and these questions were widely asked by communities on 
the ground in northern Uganda.  Yet ICC documentation at the strategic level 
pays little attention to these questions, and fails to specify how the Court’s 
activities would lead to the desired impacts (ibid). 
 
Without the necessary underpinning, the link between the Court’s process and 
the vision it hopes to bring about is uncertain.  It is possible that ICC 
interventions are intended to cut through the complexities of context.  From the 
perspective of states with functioning legal systems, themselves most 
prominent in the development of the Court, there was perhaps a sense that 
international criminal justice at least was something that could simply be 
exported.  Given the terrible nature of the crimes involved and their near-
universal condemnation, the uncertainties that bedevil other forms of 
engagement might not apply.  And if the perceived imperative for criminal 
punishment is paramount, it should surely be implemented on the timetable and 
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terms of the Prosecutor, rather than negotiating its place amongst the many 
uncertainties of national and international efforts for security, stability, 
development and less clear-cut notions of justice.  The former Prosecutor’s 
strategy documents seem to suggest a linear approach of this type.  Most of all, 
it was asserted that the process should not be subjected to the vagaries of 
diplomacy, ‘the antithesis of justice’ (Robertson 2006: xxxii).  Within the legal 
context, the ICC’s interventions are justified.  The Prosecutor had a mandate to 
intervene. 
 
7.4.2  Evidence from the case study 
 
Retributive justice in an ongoing war will generally need to be applied by the 
victor, in order that it may be imposed upon the defeated party.  But if victory or 
enforcement cannot be achieved, then the Court can at least prevent the 
sanctioning of impunity, by ensuring that negotiations do not deliver amnesties, 
and thus sustaining its position and credibility.  The Court’s warrants are still 
having an impact on the LRA conflict, preventing options for negotiations while 
legitimising ongoing enforcement actions (should there be any).  The Court has 
successfully prevented talks that might deliver impunity and obstructed the end 
of perpetrator and enforcer violence.  Meanwhile, other approaches to the 
establishment of justice, good governance and the rule of law that might follow 
successful negotiations, must wait. 
 
Additionally, the Court’s theory of change anticipates that by addressing the 
crimes of a few prominent perpetrators it will contribute to addressing the 
conflict situation in which they were committed.  It is not envisaged that when 
those responsible for the most egregious crimes are removed, the violence will 
continue unaffected (Robertson 2006; HRW 2009b; Ocampo 2010a).  The 
evidence from this case is equivocal.  The LRA’s campaign has always been 
one in which the role of LRA commanders seemed pivotal to the war.  Yet the 
period of enforcement has been so protracted that it is quite possible to 
envisage a situation where the ICC’s process might be accomplished while the 
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war continues.  With Ongwen in custody by 2015, and Otti, Lukwiya and 
Odhiambo dead, only Kony remains (5.3.2).  Some will argue that international 
criminal justice has at least been progressed, if only at a rate of one individual in 
custody per decade of war.  Yet, with the LRA having abducted thousands in 
this period, it is not clear that replacement of a single commander—even one 
with experience—would present a particular challenge.  Arrests at this 
incremental rate may be largely immaterial to the conflict dynamic.  Crimes 
against civilians are continuing, but as a matter of security and peace this is 
beyond the remit of the Court and does not have a direct bearing upon 
assessment of its performance (6.2.4, 6.3.5).  The initially plausible assumption 
so central to the Court’s purpose, that by removing the most violent perpetrators 
the wider conflict would be addressed, remains questionable. 
 
7.4.3  Observations from other situations 
 
The Libyan case provides an instance where, although trials have not taken 
place, many of the priorities of the Court have been secured.  An head of state 
likely to be found guilty by the ICC of international crimes was removed during 
the process of attempted military enforcement of its warrant.  Yet with this 
partial success, as the Court might perceive it, ICL has not been advanced.  To 
the extent that the removal of key perpetrators is intended to positively affect 
human rights and good governance, the intervention has failed (as some 
predicted it would).  It has also failed to advance criminal justice.  The theory of 
change of the Court is not demonstrated (Beresford 2014; Kersten 2014; 
Reardon 2016). 
 
In Sudan it is not clear what the impact of the arrest of Bashir might be, should it 
be achieved, and the ICC has received significant criticism for its intervention 
from academics in the field.  Such an event could open the door to substantial 
political changes; however, given the nature of Sudanese politics and the 
destabilising forces in the region their nature is not easy to determine, and their 
positive impact on human rights and good governance is not assured (Flint and 
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de Waal 2008; de Waal 2009; de Waal and Stanton 2009; Flint and de Waal 
2009).  
 
Additionally, it is unclear whether the application of the frame of ICL to the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, legitimising an emphasis on retributive processes 
backed if necessary by violent military enforcement, will help to resolve that 
conflict.  The crimes committed are surely of sufficient magnitude, and legal 
action was prompted following the Israeli incursion into Gaza that began in 
December 2008.  The drive for the recognition of Palestine by the Court is 
underway, and reflects a belief in remedies proposed by the application of ICL 
(Quigley 2011; Bob 2015).  However, it is unclear whether the Court in this 
context can contribute to a resolution of that conflict.  Any warrant issued for the 
current or former Israeli leadership could legitimise a further cycle of violence, 
by perpetrator or enforcer, while subordination of consequentialist human rights 
considerations of the affected populations may not be beneficial. 
 
The apparent certainty that it would be better to see these perpetrators behind 
bars may have supplanted consideration of the complexities of how states 
change.  Analysis of the complex role of international criminal justice within that 
broader process, and alongside other measures, has become marginalised.  
Relative to assertions concerning the imperative to end impunity, which even 
appear in the Statute itself (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
1998: preamble), there is less clarity concerning the precise circumstances in 
which the violent pursuit of international criminal justice will advance rather than 
hinder the achievement of good governance.   
 
Being equipped with a mandate and a righteous conviction is not sufficient.  
Interventions must be founded upon evidence and reason.  The evidence 
concerning interventions in volatile contexts does not support a belief in 
overarching frameworks— particularly not ones imposed externally from above 
that set the parameters for all other engagement and further a single aspect of 
governance alone.  Nor are these debates settled in favour of standardised 
militarised interventions that set aside consideration of their consequences in 
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order to promote a clear principle.  The theory of change that underpins the 
Statute and the Court’s interventions in volatile contexts, and the framework it 
imposes on others, is not founded upon evidence (3.1.7).  The reasoning 
required for sound action to be developed has not taken place.  Multiple 
contexts including the case study indicate that in crucial respects the Court’s 
theory of change is under-developed. 
 
7.5  Remaining issues 
7.5.1  Restraints upon the Court 
 
The ICC may in future, on the basis of its mandate, intervene to bring a new 
retributive agenda to the Israel/Palestine conflict, or open cases following the 
ending of the war in Colombia (Brodzinsky and Watts 2016),  but in these 
instances and many others the Court has so far not acted.  All situations of its 
engagement outside Africa currently fall into this category, and they also include 
Iraq/UK, Ukraine and Georgia (ICC 2016).  Some claim this reflects a bias of 
the Court to focus upon Africa with regard to its own interests (Dugard 2013).  
Others may assert that the Court has learned from its earlier mistakes, even 
though they have not been acknowledged—that the Court has in fact 
recognised that its theory of change does not necessarily apply.  In that case, 
self-restraint of the Prosecutor might be sufficient.  However, this argument is 
weak. 
 
The Prosecutor is schooled in a particular, narrow, justice frame.  The role is 
intimately tied up with promoting the interests of the Court and ending 
impunity—a role that prosecutors may find it difficult to set down when faced 
with competing claims to justice from local communities or for the advancement 
of human rights.  In order to do this the Prosecutor would need to clarify the 
reason for allowing impunity to continue, to address accusations of political 
influence or institutional bias.  Perhaps this could be done by redefining the 
‘interests of justice’ in such a way that the extension of ICL into many volatile 
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contexts would be recognised as inappropriate and dangerous.  In practice this 
may indeed be taking place.  The Court has not intervened in Israel, Ukraine, 
Syria or Iraq despite the major crimes that have taken place.  These may well 
be examples of Prosecutorial restraint, because the consequences of 
intervention in these situations for the major powers (and thus the Court) could 
be considerable.  However, such a retreat by the ICC Prosecutor from the 
application of its Statute, postponing or setting aside its mission to end impunity 
and the primacy of its justice principles, remains unacknowledged.  We are left 
with a Court that accommodates itself to political and military power not only at 
a situational, but also at a global level.  This issue merits further research (see 
8.2.3h). 
 
Thus far by contrast in Africa, the Court’s poor analysis of context has been 
observed, and the view that it is not mandated to make decisions on the basis 
of their likely consequence is brought to the fore.  Yet further dangers relate to 
the ICC’s lack of transparency.  Interventions on that continent continue, where 
consequences on the ground—potentially profound for local communities but 
marginal for the major powers—are often hidden.  As in the Uganda case, 
populations not represented by their own governments and remote from the 
international spotlight, with relatively weak civil society mechanisms with which 
to put their case, will continue to have no way to defend themselves against the 
violence of perpetrators and enforcers.  There is a significant danger that it will 
be in these contexts that civilians will continue to have to pay the price for the 
Court’s era of enforcement.  This is demonstrated by the Court’s record on 
evaluation of its work. 
 
7.5.2  Stifling independent evaluation 
 
Given the radical nature of the ICC project in so many respects, it might have 
been prudent to establish a firm basis for the evaluation of its impacts.  Given 
the Court’s arm’s-length relationship to consequential and contextual evaluation 
before and after intervention, and the extreme violence sometimes associated 
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with its operations and their contexts, independent scrutiny and public access to 
its documentation should perhaps have been prioritised at the outset.  
Unfortunately this has not been the case. 
 
The ICC Review Conference, which was required by Statute to provide an 
opportunity for assessment of the Court, was not stipulated in the Statute to be 
independent.  In the event it was not.  NGO representation for example was 
managed by the ‘Coalition for the ICC’, a body dedicated to the effective 
performance of the Court that describes itself as the ‘Movement to end impunity’ 
(Coalition for the ICC 2016).  At the conference itself NGO participants were 
called to the hall to stand and swear their commitment to the Court’s principles, 
as a condition of inclusion in the deliberations, even as observers (author’s 
observation).  The pivotal plenary conference session evaluating the 
relationship between peace and justice, was moderated by Kenneth Roth, one 
of the most outspoken advocates for the Court with much of his own reputation 
at stake.  He used his position to energetically stifle the debate, indicating at the 
outset and again at its conclusion, that warrants had promoted peace while 
amnesties had not (Roth 2010).  He also characterised those who criticise the 
Court as enemies of justice53.  The Review Conference papers are made public 
on the ICC web site itself, giving the institution under review control of the 
findings, their recording and dissemination (ICC 2010c).  
 
Equally, the ICC has not made its own papers available to this researcher when 
requested.  ICC analyses of the situation relating to the LRA and the Uganda 
situation prior to its warrants have been removed from its web site, and 
requests for these have not been responded to between 2009 and 2015.  Such 
measures stifle independent analysis concerning the Court’s impacts.  Without 
public and academic scrutiny there is a danger that lessons may not be learned; 
that institutional interests may remain defended at the risk of further failings of 
the Court; and that communities may continue to be put at risk of violent 
enforcement.  This study has revealed a lack of attention in the Statute to the 
                                            
53 These were the author’s observations on attending the Review Conference in 
Kampala in 2010. 
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need for transparency of the Court’s processes, and independence of its 
Review.  In practice significant funds were expended in bringing international 
delegates from the Court’s global constituency to a luxury venue in Kampala, 
but this expenditure failed to deliver an evidence-based independent review 
even of its first case. 
 
7.5.3  Remaining legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy for the Court’s intervention in the LRA situation could originally be 
conceived as drawn from three levels.  Internationally the ICC can claim the 
authority conferred by its Statute, and the ratification of States Parties.  In the 
case of the LRA warrants, there was the additional mandate at a national level 
awarded by the referral by the Ugandan Government, while locally the 
Prosecutor saw himself as responding to calls from the ground for international 
humanitarian engagement (3.1.6, 3.3.1 and Buchanan and Keohane 2006). 
 
It was apparent to some on the ground at the outset that two of these three 
bases for action were unsound.  Locally, in relation to the communities involved, 
the Court is not conceived nor mandated as a humanitarian agency, as the 
military furtherance of its international criminal justice process in this context 
has borne out.  The case has demonstrated that military enforcement processes 
detached from consequential considerations may have highly negative 
humanitarian impacts.  As Akhavan has explained, the remit of the Court 
concerns the furtherance of ICL at a far higher level than that of local 
communities affected by war.  Local communities should thus beware of finding 
themselves caught up in its processes: consideration by the Court of their most 
fundamental interests is subordinate to global justice concerns (6.2.4). 
 
Equally, it is not clear what legitimacy the Court still claims at a national level for 
its intervention against the LRA.  The means of furtherance of the UPDF’s war, 
principally against the LRA abductees, and the enforced displacement of the 
population, should from the outset have raised profound barriers to the Court’s 
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involvement with the Ugandan military.  With respect to DRC and CAR, return is 
now seen as pivotal to ending the violence, although as it is not driven as it was 
in Uganda by wide-ranging local peace efforts this process is slow.  Statistics 
suggest that the capture of LRA members remains relatively uncommon, 
relative to the escape or death of abductees (LRA Crisis Tracker 2015).  The 
Court has not made any statements concerning Ugandan military violence 
perpetrated upon communities, some aspects of which extended into the period 
of international criminal justice enforcement.  It is hard to see how legitimacy 
conferred at the national level remains—except in relation to the Court’s narrow 
justice frame. 
 
Similar questions arise in relation to other ICC warrants.  When intervening in 
Sudan, without a developed theory of change or strong understanding of the 
possible consequences of its warrants, the Court’s legitimacy rests primarily 
upon its Statute.  In Kenya, its failure to give adequate prior consideration to the 
consequences of its warrants left its local legitimacy significantly damaged.  In 
Libya, having been associated with the toppling of one ruthless dictator, the 
Court is implicated in the subsequent disintegration of the Libyan state. 
 
What has remained is the legitimacy conferred upon the Court through its 
Statute.  Yet the analysis above indicates that both the Statute and mode of the 
Court’s operations are flawed.  In volatile contexts the primacy of the Court, 
resting upon its Statute and regulations, constrains other interventions and 
leads to situations where even ICL itself is not advanced.  Based upon its 
Statute and its interpretation, the Court’s limited notions of justice which are 
furthered through violent enforcement in wars and unstable situations, can be 
associated with devastating humanitarian impacts.  In volatile contexts, the 
Court’s theory of change which asserts a relationship between its interventions 
for arrest and trials on the one hand, and the advancement of human rights, 
good governance, and the rule of law on the other, is frequently contradicted.  
Concepts fundamental to the Court’s structure and function are flawed.   
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7.6  Review 
 
This chapter has taken the assumptions that underpin the operation of the Court 
that were articulated at the end of Section 1, and revealed that their validity is 
questionable in volatile contexts well beyond that of the case study.  
Suppositions upon which the Court’s activities rest were identified to concern 
the ICC’s primacy in bringing a binding new paradigm for international 
interventions; the narrow criminal justice frame, relative to the much broader 
justice considerations of communities affected by atrocities; the violence 
associated with ICL enforcement in volatile contexts, which may severely affect 
communities; and the theory of change applied by the Court, which may be 
relatively under-developed given its aspiration to be universally applicable.   
 
The finding that these foundational assumptions are unsound in volatile 
environments is significant.  In order for the Court to operate in the manner 
envisaged when the Statute was drafted, it may need to restrict its interventions 
(or have its interventions restricted) to environments in which suppositions upon 
which its engagement is based are valid.  Failure to do so is likely to lead again 
to grave human rights consequences for affected populations.  Additionally, 
other means by which unintended consequences are limited and controlled may 
be required.  These measure will need to address themselves to all four 
concerns—the Court’s primacy, its narrow justice frame, the violence 
associated with its interventions, and the weakness of its theory of change in 
volatile contexts.   
 
An analysis of the considerable reforms necessary to address these 
fundamental issues is beyond the scope of this research.  Given the weakness 
and lack of independence of the ICC review process, significant strengthening 
of the independent research effort on these issues would also be required.  The 
final chapter offers some concluding remarks and options for future analysis.  
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Chapter 8—Conclusions and research 
implications 
8.1  Conclusions 
8.1.1  Ideology and liberal interventionism 
 
The new mode of intervention associated with the Court, which is now being 
projected into volatile environments, has a global community of committed 
followers.  Yet evidence calls into question the assumption that ICC 
interventions will be reliably correlated with reductions in violence or the 
advancement of the rule of law (de Waal and Stanton 2009; Flint and de Waal 
2009; Armstrong 2010: 280-281; Allen 2013; Bowcott 2014; Höhn 2014; Murithi 
2015; Holligan 2016).  Faced with this challenge the Court has not been hungry 
for independent analysis, the better to understand and refine its processes for 
more beneficial impact.  Instead, as the Review Conference demonstrated in 
relation to issues of peace and justice, independent evidence-based discussion 
has been suppressed (7.2.7).  In place of a balanced discussion that weighs 
evidence, a narrative has been developed by the Court and its supporters 
articulating positions grounded in conviction and belief:  there should be ‘no 
peace without justice’; there must be ‘an end to impunity’; and ‘justice delayed is 
justice denied’.  Some who question the Court have even been cast as siding 
with those who commit atrocities.54  Evidence of the consequences of its 
interventions has not been sought or used, and has had little effect upon the 
ICC’s constituency of support.   
                                            
54 I observed these slogans prominently promoted in support of the Court at the Review 
Conference.  I also witnessed a distinguished figure from the Ugandan Amnesty 
Commission being caricatured as standing ‘for impunity’; and one academic whose 
scholarly work highlighted the perspectives of communities and their right to be heard 
in discussions concerning their future, was accused of being a supporter of the 
genocidaires. 
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A reason for this is that the case for the Court rests not upon carefully collected 
analysis of evidence for its universal applicability, but instead upon a ‘system of 
ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of a […] political theory 
and policy’—that is, an ideology (OxfordDictionaries.com 2016).  As we have 
seen, in the case of the Court the ideological conviction is so strong that even 
when peace deals are precluded in favour of ongoing war, and violent conflict 
thereby assured, in this instance for a decade culminating in the arrest of one 
individual, it is hailed as a success.  The ideology has been sustained. 
 
The ICC is not the only instance of ideologically based international 
intervention.  It is part of the larger liberal project, which seeks to further 
structures and practices developed and appropriate elsewhere into new 
contexts, with relatively little adaptation to context through local political 
process.  By applying universal measures, desired outcomes are expected to 
arise.  It may be seen as the revival of a belief in simple top-down solutions 
imposed on complex and diverse contexts, supplanting the slow and often 
troubled process of political change (Young 1995; Paris 1997; Duffield 2001; 
Paris 2010). 
 
In this instance a coherent theory of change is thought unnecessary—justice is 
anticipated to be advanced in the first instance by the simple imposition of ICL 
through military power.  It would in any case be impossibly difficult to derive a 
coherent theory of change that could apply in all circumstances—the examples 
indicated in Chapter 7 indicate as much.  Situations are too diverse to be 
successfully addressed through one universal process.  Yet a different theory of 
change for each context would challenge the ICC’s universalist approach (and 
aversion to consequentialism).  Therefore, it intervenes without a coherent 
theory of change, using prosecutorial discretion alone—a weak and 
inappropriate restraint (see 7.5.1). 
 
This research indicates that one misconception common to many who support 
the ICC project is the belief that the Court’s actions and interventions amount to 
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justice.  International criminal law is frequently equated to justice in the 
articulation of false dichotomies or imprecise maxims, such as ‘peace vs. 
justice’, ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, or notions that through the law ‘justice 
will be done’.  If the ICC were to be bringing justice itself, there would perhaps 
be less need to develop a theory of change for its application, or to understand 
its consequences; justice would be served simply by the Court’s activities.  But 
as this research has demonstrated, the ICC’s process and approach is not 
justice.  The Court is simply a tool through which in certain circumstances 
justice may be advanced.  Once that is understood, the legitimacy of the Court’s 
primacy falls away, and analysis and evidence are required to consider when 
and how justice may be advanced through the use of this mechanism, and 
when on the other hand it may not. 
 
8.1.2  Gradualism 
 
When an approach is driven by ideology, the need for incremental change 
based upon research and evidence is apparently reduced.  With such a daring 
new mode of engagement, departing from contextual complications and 
consequentialist concerns, one might expect and perhaps hope for some 
degree of caution.  Armed interventions based so heavily on principle rather 
than consideration of consequences represent a further paradigm shift for 
international engagement in volatile contexts (ICC 2010b: 5).  However, 
although the Court’s approach is determined by its legal process and driven by 
its mandate to address the gravest crimes, it could nevertheless have moved 
tentatively and incrementally: inviting independent scrutiny the better to 
understand its role and develop some sophistication in relation to decisions to 
intervene; working in situations most like those where similar courts have 
worked before; engaging initially in regions which are relatively stable and more 
amenable to civil governance processes to effect arrest; avoiding situations 
where consequences for witnesses or communities of ill-judged actions might 
be most grave.   
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Instead, the Prosecutor elected to do the opposite.  As the case study 
exemplifies, subject only to political and military considerations of the Court, he 
deployed this new institution in the first instance to one of the gravest 
emergencies of the time.  The greater the crimes being committed, the more 
outrageous the atrocities, and the more unspeakable the lengths protagonists 
were prepared to go to advance their ends or defend themselves, the more 
appropriate the Court apparently perceived its intervention, based upon the 
principled clarity of the law.  Propelled by the urgency to address criminal acts, 
and without regard to the moral and practical issues of peace and security 
incumbent upon others, it was and is driven to engage in situations of extreme 
violence where the risk of adverse consequences are greatest (6.2.4).   
 
The Statute facilitates the projection of the power of this new institution into the 
most dangerous of situations where risks to populations are greatest, but it does 
not require that its earliest cases should be those presenting the greatest 
dangers.  The setting aside of gradualism by engaging initially in the contexts of 
greatest humanitarian peril, most dissimilar to the contexts of previous legal 
enforcement, was a prosecutorial decision.  It is another respect in which the 
Court’s launch has been both utterly ground-breaking, and ill considered. 
 
8.1.3 Issues of justice application and concept  
 
Chapter 1 introduced the discussion on concepts of justice, their application 
including through the law, and their implementation.  The Court’s relationship to 
issues of implementation has been addressed in Chapter 7.  This has involved 
consideration of its approach to issues of power and military enforcement, the 
promotion of human rights, and the complex field of transitional justice and how 
societies move from violence to good governance.  As we have seen, the Court 
has struggled to advance these agendas in volatile environments.  It is now 
necessary to briefly revisit key concepts outlined at the 
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start of Chapter 1, in relation to the legal application of justice, and underlying 
conceptions of justice. 
8.1.3a  Legal positivism and idealism in volatile contexts 
Returning to concepts of legal positivism and idealism, the research conclusions 
can be understood in theoretical terms.  Such ideas concern choices about the 
basis of legal systems—whether they rest upon legal precedent and regulation 
in order to uphold legal consistency, or whether the legal frame should flex to 
accommodate circumstance in order to better reflect wider understandings of 
justice (Hart 1958; Dworkin 1986; Alexy 2002).  The extreme environments that 
are the focus of this study put these legal debates under great strain.  Positivist 
notions of justice, as applied in the LRA case, have not only failed to advance 
ICL and justice in their own terms; they have also been associated with human 
rights abuses and the sustenance of an environment in which crimes continue 
to be committed.  These issues are not confined to the case study.  Overly 
positivist interventions such as the Gaddafi case in Libya, and the warrants 
issued in Kenya, have also largely failed to advance legal justice or prevent 
crimes.  Legal idealism on the other hand is also pushed to its limits.  The 
requirement to avoid these terrible outcomes, which were in Uganda at least 
predicted, amount to permitting impunity and the abandonment of legal norms.  
Evidence indicates that in these most dangerous of contexts, debates about the 
foundations of legal form hold such great consequence that neither positivist or 
idealist approaches advance criminal justice, and there is little scope for 
compromise between them. 
 
The application of the Court’s legal process in volatile environments, whether in 
positivist or idealist mode, may fail to advance international criminal law, and 
can hinder the furtherance of broader justice notions that might be more 
successful.  Criminal legal process may function more effectively in contexts 
where consequences are constrained or predictable.  Such circumstances more 
commonly pertain within states with a functioning judiciary and civil means of 
arrest.   
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8.1.3b  Retributive and restorative justice in volatile contexts 
As discussed in Chapter 1, courts are conceived to help to regulate society in 
general, and to control the use of violence in particular.  Communities are 
denied the right to administer retributive justice as they see fit, conceding this 
power to a higher authority in order to promote the impartial application of the 
law.  An idealised view of this process would see them voluntarily surrendering 
their agency in this matter for the greater good, though of course more 
realistically the courts perform a role balanced somewhere between benign 
application of authority willingly given, and the enforcement of social control by 
the powerful (1.3).  The ICC is uniquely conceived in relation to these tensioned 
relationships.  First, its authority is only very indirectly drawn from communities 
where its justice will be administered, coming as it does from its Statute and the 
Assembly of States Parties (2.3).  Secondly, committed as it is to bringing 
retributive processes into the volatile contexts of its interventions, the Court’s 
use of violence for its own enforcement is new (3.2).  Approaches that fail to 
administer retribution are seen by some as ‘selling justice short’ (5.3.1), and 
depriving communities in developing countries of the standards of justice 
expected in the West. 
 
However, notions of justice are contested in Africa, just as they are in the West, 
and extend well beyond legal modes.  While restorative justice may be achieved 
between equals, retribution is rarely willingly accepted by transgressors.  Most 
commonly a body in authority administers retribution.  A prerequisite for more 
Western retributive modes is thus the establishment (usually through 
overwhelming force), of an authority such as a state (Weber 1922).  Retributive 
justice introduced into volatile contexts where no party holds such power may 
ignite violence to secure or evade that purpose (for example in the case of the 
ICC’s Kenyan warrants).  Introduced into volatile and contested contexts it may 
intensify violence in an effort either by either side to secure the right to 
administer retribution, or resist its application (as was the case with the LRA).  
In the dangerous environments of the Court’s investigations, where power is 
violently contested, the introduction of a retributive justice approach is 
misguided, and unlikely to reliably advance the rule of law.   
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8.1.3c  Deontology has consequences in volatile contexts 
More fundamental than the consideration of retributive or restorative justice 
modes for restoring just relations are issues of the identification of just actions, 
introduced at the start of Chapter 1.  At the heart of the issues encountered is 
the matter of deontology and consequentialism—a conundrum fundamental to 
Western moral thinking.  Consequentialist approaches may lead to 
infringements of individual rights, even though they promote the greater good; 
deontological methods may result in negative consequences for the many, even 
while applying a just rule.  If either of these elements triumphs over the other, 
the way is paved for great injustice (Schiff 2012). 
 
There is no doubt that the deontological process of applying legal codes may 
have negative consequences.  In stable democratic states with strong 
governance the consequences are generally contained.  However, application 
of the legal code can even be delayed or set aside, in order to prevent overly 
damaging outcomes.  Hostage situations provide one clear example.  The 
deontologically aligned legal imperative to arrest hostage-takers is balanced by 
consequentialist consideration concerning the well-being of the hostages.  
Negotiations take place that mediate these opposing poles. 
 
By contrast, unleashed into volatile and violent contexts and unfettered by 
consequentialist considerations, the deontology of the ICC process is 
unbalanced and unchecked by consequentialist concerns.  These contexts are 
almost always highly unpredictable in nature, and the consequences of 
enforcement measures are unknown.  When enforcement is by military third 
parties independent of the Court, who may or may not have regard for the law, 
the chances of significant violence rapidly escalates.  High principle, blind to the 
consequences of its own application, is a powerful new frame for international 
engagement in war. 
 
It has had disastrous results.  The failure of the Statute to anticipate this issue, 
and of the international community to establish balancing consequentialist 
structures to safeguard populations at risk, poses a profound problem for 
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advocates of ICL and most particularly for communities concerned.  Driven by 
the institutional imperative to end impunity, Prosecutors find themselves 
mandated to move forward on a deontological path by the Statute.  They cannot 
acknowledge the dangers of this process without drawing attention to the 
worrying limitations and inflexibility of the Statute.  Yet unlike the context of the 
application of law within states, for the ICC there is no balancing international 
machinery able to take into account the views of those affected, consider 
consequences of Court intervention, and manage associated risks. 
 
The founding principle of the Statute, that perpetrators of international crimes 
must never go unpunished, is intuitively attractive and even visionary.  Yet 
absolutist approaches are rarely helpful.  Those who drafted the Statute failed 
to sufficiently consider appropriate limits to its power.  Sometimes perhaps 
stability and security for the many should be prioritised over the arrest of a few 
individuals, however grave their crimes.  Sometimes military enforcement might 
be anticipated to involve the killing of too many innocent people to merit the 
prize of arrest (indeed, some might argue that one is too many).  Sometimes 
communities should be permitted to chart their own path out of violence, even if 
in doing so they choose forms of justice other than retribution.  Balancing 
mechanisms for upholding such consequentialist concerns are absent.   
 
When applied, the ideological notion that international criminal justice processes 
should bind international interventions in volatile regions can prove dangerous 
to civilian populations.  This has been demonstrated in the circumstance of the 
Court’s first arrest warrants.  When populations are at risk, ending impunity may 
not be the most pressing consideration.  Such situations demand that we look 
‘beyond retribution’ (Mani 2002). 
 
In Chapter 1 it was observed that justice is a concept held in tension between 
opposing poles.  Each extreme is essential—an aspect of the whole without 
which justice cannot be fully attained.  Yet in its pure form, each is 
fundamentally flawed, revealed as such by the balancing considerations of its 
opposite pole.  The threads that span the divide are tensioned, and hold justice 
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as if upon a web.  Should one thread break—one pole triumph over its opposite 
such that its rival’s footing is lost—the tension is broken, and the structure 
becomes distorted. 
 
So it is in this case.  The tension between two poles has broken.  In the 
contexts of this study, legally constituted deontological forces have triumphed 
over balancing considerations of consequentialism.  One pole has been 
detached, and a thread is trailing.  The web that held justice taut has lost its 
form.  This concluding section offers a reflection on the way this has occurred. 
 
Chapter 2 (2.2) considered the origins of the Court in the mid-19th Century, 
founded upon the abhorrence of human suffering in war, prompted by the 
impunity enjoyed by the most prominent perpetrators, and guided by the desire 
to bring them to trial.  Seventy years or so later the Nuremberg trials signalled 
the possibility that this vision might become a reality.  Facilitated by the allied 
military victory, Nazi atrocities were not overlooked in the final settlement, and 
their crimes were addressed through legal process (2.1.2, 7.1.4).  There was 
cause for optimism at this development, but it also raised questions.  The 
victors had considerable influence over the justice process, and the vision of 
impartial and unconstrained legal jurisdiction remained an aspiration.  Although 
the implementation of ICL post-conflict seemed relatively straightforward, 
questions concerning its application to ongoing wars and volatile contexts 
remained largely unexplored. 
 
By mandating the ICC to intervene even in the most violent ongoing conflicts, 
the architects of the Rome Statute failed to anticipate these complications.  
They neglected to adequately consider under what circumstances the Court 
might be successful in advancing ICL; when it might instead legitimise violence 
and a retributive ethos, and promote wars of enforcement in which civilians 
could be the principal casualties.  In Chapter 3 questionable aspects of the 
Court’s process were enumerated for consideration, and perhaps the most 
prominent of these was the anticipated application of principle, backed by 
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military violence where necessary, without thorough consideration of 
consequences. 
 
There are voices calling for ICC reform, advocating a transformational process 
that would enable it to become engaged in problem solving, deploying a wide 
variety of justice measures in a way that is significantly more accountable to 
those communities who will bear their consequences (Findlay and Henham 
2010).  However, the Preamble to the Rome Statute leaves little room for 
equivocation.  It states, ‘unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity […] the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished and […] their 
effective prosecution must be ensured’ (Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court 1998: Preamble).  This research has demonstrated that, in 
certain circumstances, the pursuit of arrest of a few individuals may become 
entangled with the continuation of a war that costs many innocent lives.  This 
study of the Court’s first case has demonstrated how unquestioning adherence 
to this principle of the Statute caused it to become associated with sustained 
violence against civilians. 
 
The finding that the ending of impunity should not be achieved at any cost 
should come as no surprise.  Sometimes the cost will be too great.  There are 
limits to the suffering that is acceptable in support of furthering the trial of one 
individual.  This possibility is inadequately catered for in the Rome Statute.  The 
tension between deontological and consequentialist considerations of justice 
should now be restored. 
 
8.1.4  Concluding remark—justice accommodated to power 
 
This study has demonstrated that deontological and retributive emphasis of the 
Court is ill suited to the administration of justice in volatile environments, where 
the consequences of its actions may be extreme.  In these contexts, 
interventions based on legal principle rather than considerations of 
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consequence are a profound departure for the international community.  The 
evidence indicates that by placing the ending of impunity above other justice or 
humanitarian considerations, the Court can legitimise violence of enforcement, 
trigger violence by perpetrators, and prevent negotiated settlements to wars. 
 
Ultimately this thesis is about how a powerful institution with even more 
powerful backers subordinated the interests of a relatively powerless 
community.  Casting them as victims, it claimed to be acting on their behalf, 
while stifling dissent.  Its actions were legitimised by a limited notion of justice, 
founded upon an ideology that authorises the use of violence. 
 
The community was seeking an alternative path out of insecurity and war that 
was inclusive, practical and effective.  In a most hostile environment it involved 
developing a capacity for empathy; an appreciation of the value of all human 
life; and an intolerance of violence.  These notions also inspired early 
aspirations for international criminal justice and the ICC.  But a critical attitude 
towards violence itself, essential to the Court’s original vision, was too bold a 
step to be enshrined in the Statute.  This left an ambiguity, and from the 
commencement of its first intervention the ICC associated itself instead with 
military power, and sought to turn violence to its own ends.   
 
8.2  Contribution, limitations and research implications 
8.2.1  Contribution  
 
Summarising the points concerning contribution brought at the outset, it is 
sufficient to note that this research is an original critique of the Court, founded 
upon its philosophically deontological mode of operation, revealing it to be 
highly unsuited to operation in volatile environments.  This is exemplified by the 
case study.  In the process of this research, assumptions embedded within the 
Statute are revealed.  These are tested by the case study, and shown to be 
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unsupported.  The ICC’s Statute and mode of operations are thus demonstrated 
to rest upon assumptions that are unsafe.  
 
Additional contributions to knowledge are made, through the exposition and 
demonstration of the LRA war as being rightly conceived as a three-sided 
conflict, placing the civilian population not only as a victim of both sides, but 
also as a third party with an independent strategy, objectives and agency in its 
efforts to end the war—efforts opposed by the Government, LRA and ICC.  In 
the process of analysis of the LRA war from 2000-2010, the prevailing largely 
supportive account of the ICC’s intervention is demonstrated to be widely 
disseminated, but inaccurate and fundamentally flawed in multiple respects. 
 
The consequences of these original findings are significant in relation to the 
application of international criminal law to volatile environments, demonstrating 
as they do that its approach is not necessarily aligned with the interests of war-
affected communities or the promotion of their human rights. 
 
8.2.2  Limitations and future work 
 
This study set out to draw conclusions from the LRA case that had relevance 
beyond the individual situation, for the ICC project as a whole.  While this has 
clearly been achieved, and systemic operational and conceptual issues in 
relation to the Court have been demonstrated, the study is not without its 
limitations, and these are now acknowledged.  Some of the most prominent are 
mentioned here. 
 
The research is firmly grounded in the Ugandan Acholi community experience 
of the conflict, and this has given it particular authority in presenting a view of 
the LRA war in Uganda between 2000 and 2008, and has ensured that the work 
made a contribution to knowledge.  However, strong engagement at a 
governmental level alongside the community-based analysis could have 
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provided a clearer understanding from a policy perspective, and further 
contributed to understanding of the Court’s involvement and influence.  
 
A more comprehensive study than that possible within the frame of a doctorate 
would have engaged the ICC Prosecutor, key staff, and prominent advocates 
for the Court on the systemic and conceptual issues raised by the work.  This 
might have permitted a more thorough interrogation of the findings, and taken 
the critical analysis to a new level.  It is regrettable that the Court was not 
forthcoming in providing its analyses of the Ugandan context prior to and soon 
after issuance of the warrants.  A clearer appreciation of its perceptions at that 
time might have yielded further insights. 
 
A third significant limitation was the use of one case study.  While this was a 
necessary and deliberate choice, in order to expose the poverty of the existing 
discourse on the Court’s intervention in Uganda, collaboration with other 
researchers equally well-versed in the ICC’s engagement in Sudan or DRC for 
example, could have enriched the learning from a single case.  The signposting 
to other situations and cases in Chapter 7 takes this some way, but further work 
remains to be carried out in this area. 
 
A fourth significant improvement could have related to the methodology.  The 
research was presented during its development to various academic audiences.  
However, a more focused and comprehensive engagement of scholars 
knowledgeable in the field, at regular intervals during the research process, 
might have further tested, developed, and strengthened the analysis.  That 
process may at least now be promoted through publication. 
 
A fifth limitation is undoubtedly the length of time that has elapsed since these 
events and the end of the Juba talks.  While this work has been self-funded and 
part-time (at best) the research itself highlights the power of early dissemination 
of material if a narrative is to be established in academic and policy circles.  It is 
regrettable that less well informed perspectives have come to dominate so 
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much of the discourse.  The timetable for writing and disseminating findings is 
pertinent to establishing understanding of events and contributing to knowledge. 
 
8.2.3  Research Implications 
8.2.3a  Evaluation and review of ICC interventions 
A review process organised and managed by supporters of the institution under 
examination will not be functional as an evaluation exercise.  As we have seen 
in relation to the case study, the 2010 Review Conference contributed to the re-
articulation of a narrative that fits the requirements of the institutions involved 
and their associated ideology.  Much of the evidence upon which this PhD 
research is based was present prior to the ICC’s intervention, and certainly by 
the time of the Review in 2010, yet it did not inform the analysis that emerged 
(Gersony 1997; Dolan 2000b; ARLPI and JPC 2001; Dolan 2002; HURIFO 
2002; ARLPI et al. 2003; Baines 2003; ARLPI 2004; Branch 2004; Branch 
2005; Dolan 2005; Finnström 2006a; Finnström 2006b; Baines 2007; Branch 
2007b; Branch 2008a; Finnström 2008; Branch 2009; Blattman and Annan 
2010; Branch 2010b; Dolan 2011).  The first warrants were even claimed as 
early signs of success in relation to harmonising the requirements of peace and 
justice (5.3.1).  The lack of evidence in support of the Court was no impediment 
to the drawing of positive conclusions.  Efforts by Afako and others to broaden 
the discussion to areas such as the relationship between ICL enforcement, 
peace and human rights—areas which this study has revealed as critically 
important—were decisively curtailed (Afako 2006; Afako 2008; Afako 2010; ICC 
2010b; ICC 2010a). 
 
The Review did not lead to the creation and refinement of transparent 
institutional checks and balances.  Hard lessons for the ICC’s normative 
process from this first case have not yet been gathered.  The presentation of 
evidence that should have promoted an investigative dialogue, the better to 
understand the Court’s impacts, is perceived as unhelpful.  The process of 
institutional review itself merits investigation, and could promote a more 
rigorous approach in future.   
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8.2.3b  Divergence of civil society interests from those of international 
criminal justice 
Potential divergences of civilian interests from those of ICL are likely to be an 
important field of work, as it may help to clarify the choices being made when 
the ICC engages in a region (6.2).  In the context of an intervention, one line of 
enquiry might be to investigate the disparity of views on ICC interventions 
between local and international human rights organisations.  The case study 
has revealed that local representatives from churches and the traditional 
leadership, as well as local human rights organisations, all opposed the ICC’s 
intervention (6.2), while international human rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were in favour (5.1).  This 
divergence concerns the former’s commitment to consequentialist 
considerations relating to community safety, and the latter’s primarily 
ideological, deontological or institutional commitments to arrest.  A clearer 
understanding of this divergence of position and interests in other volatile 
contexts could help to inform the grave nature of decisions being made in 
pursuit of the norms of ICL. 
8.2.3c  Local real-time assessment of ICC engagement 
A strong evidence-based assessment of ICC interventions might involve real-
time tracing of attitudes, events and experiences of communities on the ground.  
Local human rights organisations might be well placed to carry out such work, in 
collaboration with a university or research institute.  Such processes would yield 
on-the-ground data and analysis similar to that which has made this study 
possible, and its dissemination during any military enforcement stage of the ICC 
process would have the potential to greatly enhance understanding of the 
impacts of the Court.  Evidence gathering might be rooted in local experience of 
the violence, through the use not only of interviews and testimonies, but also 
cameras distributed to the population, and/or mobile phone apps that enable 
on-the-ground data gathering by text, photos or video in real time.  Engagement 
and dissemination of information of this kind would help to correct the tendency 
of narratives to reflect institutional interests, and strengthen efforts to root them 
in community understanding and experience.  It could raise the profile of civil 
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society perspectives and people’s experience of violence, making them harder 
to overlook in future.  The population’s experience of the implications of the 
enforcement of the norms of international criminal law might then become better 
understood. 
8.2.3d  Projecting local strategic analysis into the academic and policy 
debate 
A lost thread in the debate has been the articulation of community-based 
understanding of war and violence.  There has been a perception that local 
knowledge belongs to ethnographic or anthropological spheres, and that these 
are of marginal relevance to strategic considerations and the application of 
international standards of criminal justice.  There has even been a mis-
perception that the Court can speak and act on behalf of communities affected 
by violence (5.1).  Interest in, for example, traditional reconciliation ceremonies 
has been explored for its relevance to the dynamics of conflict resolution and 
the role of forgiveness, and challenged regarding its utility in the face of the 
extreme violence experienced (Pain 1997; Allen 2006b; Baines 2007; Allen 
2010; Allen and Vlassenroot 2010).  But the central point, that communities 
understood the cycle of killing and abduction, and sought to end this violence 
inflicted upon them by both sides through an alternative process of return and 
reintegration of abductees, is not one of ethnographic or anthropological 
importance alone.  Their understanding was of enormous strategic significance 
to the war, and this strategic aspect was ignored, causing great harm to the 
affected population. 
 
One can observe that the un-evidenced mainstream account that emerged in 
the literature, founded upon statements from the Prosecutor, Ugandan 
Government, institutional supporters of the Court and others, almost entirely 
eclipsed local evidence-based research and understanding.  It is regrettable 
that the profound insights of local peacebuilders and others, so inconvenient to 
the ICC’s cause, have been largely written out of the mainstream narrative.  It is 
disturbing that this is also true in accounts from international institutional human 
rights defenders (5.4).  This may be pure chance.  On the other hand it may be 
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that the marginalisation of local discourse on the war, and local remedies to it, 
was necessary in order to uphold institutional commitments to defend the Court. 
 
A significant area of future research work might involve the projection of local 
strategic analysis of violence and war that they have experienced into academic 
and policy debates, particularly in regions of ICC engagement, so that civil 
society approaches to conflict resolution may be less easily set aside in future.  
Communities have agency and expertise with significance at a strategic level.  
Their portrayal as helpless victims awaiting rescue by international institutions 
does a great disservice to them, and to prospects for conflict resolution.  As this 
research indicates, relative to those spearheading international interventions, 
local insights may be of superior strategic, humanitarian, moral and practical 
significance. 
8.2.3e  Strengthening the relationship between discourse and evidence 
This study has revealed verbal and documented claims made by Court officials 
and others that are unsubstantiated.  These have been disseminated in the 
literature, and then referenced as if providing evidence, eventually being 
restated in textbooks.  Some have even referenced their own previous, 
evidence-free assertion (6.3).  This poor practice has been instrumental in 
generating a pro-ICC discourse in which even the LRA warrants are cited as a 
success (Chapter 5).  If a fruitful debate is to be established it must rest upon 
evidence, and there are a number of ways in which the relationship of the 
evidence base to the discourse might be tested, and thus improved.  Research 
that examines the points below might be fruitful. 
 
There is a need for the Assembly of States Parties to distinguish between 
evidence-based assessment and advocacy positions when it receives 
statements and reports (5.1, 5.4, 6.5.1).   Research that examines the 
evidence-base of statements to the ASP by or about the Court may be a useful 
starting point in drawing their attention to this issue, and suggesting safeguards.   
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There has been an apparent willingness to believe statements made by those 
with a clear interest in the promotion of the Court.  The Prosecutor’s view, for 
example, has been accepted and disseminated uncritically as evidence of the 
Court’s good work even when asserted without evidence.  Such uncritical 
repetition of self-interested claims, including in peer-reviewed journals, is poor 
practice.  Further research to distinguish substantiated and unsubstantiated 
aspects of the discourse could be instrumental in promoting evidence-based 
debate.  This process might also help to determine whether the instances of 
assertion without evidence highlighted in this research are isolated, or part of a 
broader institutional or individual pattern of behaviour. 
8.2.3f  Monitoring of violent ICL enforcement 
There will undoubtedly be contexts where violence may be a result of ICC 
intervention, either by those named in arrest warrants and their supporters, or 
by military forces engaged in enforcement.  In our case study the use of the 
UPDF, with its violent strategy directed against the civilian population, has 
highlighted that there are troubling complications of military enforcement of ICL.  
An independent survey of the military strategies, practices and conduct of 
armies enforcing ICC warrants would bring a spotlight to bear on this 
unregulated and poorly understood aspect of the furtherance of ICL.  It might 
also serve as a foundation upon which to develop and promote better practice 
in relation to the co-option of violent enforcers, the use of violent enforcement 
methods, and the issuance of warrants into contexts in which violence is likely 
to be legitimised in the service of ICL.  While this would not address the most 
fundamental issues, it could help to mitigate some of the most violent impacts in 
the short-term. 
8.2.3g  Monitoring the impact on peace talks 
As we have seen, there is a need for evidence-based debate on the issue of the 
ICC’s impact on peace processes.  In this case, where it is apparent that the 
ICC twice precluded the positive resolution of peace talks, the baseless 
assertion that its impact on talks was positive was widely disseminated, and that 
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notion achieved sufficient support that learning has so far been prevented.  
Generating an inquiry into this issue rooted in evidence and free from 
institutional influence remains an important goal for research in this field.   
8.2.3h  Identifying Court constraints 
In addition to work in regions affected by ICC engagement, research is needed 
in volatile regions where perpetrators of international crimes are present and the 
Court has chosen not to intervene.  During its first decade the Court has 
focused on conflict regions in Africa, and this has brought criticism from various 
quarters.  Yet we have seen that in relation to wars and volatile regions there 
may be good reasons for the Court not to intervene.  In relation to conflict-
affected areas the problem may not be too little intervention outside Africa, but 
too much within.  If nothing else, this research has indicated that in volatile 
regions the combination of retributive ethos and military engagement, and 
principled intervention unfettered by consequential analysis should cause 
significant concern.   
 
If this were the case, then research that uncovers what has restrained ICC 
action outside Africa would be highly pertinent.  It may be that consequentialist 
considerations either for communities and states with a voice, or for the Court 
itself, have played a part in staying its hand in relation to other conflicts.  Stable, 
democratic or powerful states may experience international crimes less often, 
and be better equipped to deflect the interest of the Court if they do.  Those in 
weak states with poor governance, poor communications, and weak civil society 
institutions are more vulnerable to having their views, expectations and 
experiences ignored.  One could postulate that there is simply more space for 
the Court to operate in Africa.  Research that contributes to a strong analysis of 
what has stayed the hand of the Court might help contribute to efforts to 
sustain, develop, and most of all promote broad understanding of those issues.  
It might enable communities to defend themselves.  If consequentialist concerns 
are revealed, a stronger framework for civilian safety might emerge.  If they are 
not, then the absence of any such framework would be worthy of widespread 
debate.   
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Appendix 1  Timeline of the LRA conflict 1985-2010 
 
This appendix is provided to assist with clarifying the sequence of events 
referred to in the text, with indicative referencing.  It is not intended as a stand-
alone timeline of all main events relating to the LRA conflict.  Key sources for 
these listed events, particularly in the early years, are Allen and Vlassenroot 
(2010) and the International Crisis Group (2004), and these are not referenced 
individually by each item.  All other sources are referenced by their individual 
entry.  Another chronology for general use covering the same period is provided 
in Drew (2010). 
 
1985 July An Acholi-led coup ousted Obote in July '85. 
 
1986 January The NRA toppled Okello government in January.  The 
UPDA emerged in 1986. 
 March The NRA arrived in Acholiland, and the last remnants of 
the UNLA had disappeared from Acholiland by the end of 
March. 
 April Stories started to emerge about NRA abuses. 
 May Fighting in the North took place.  Gulu and Kitgum were 
declared war zones. 
 August 20th  Alice Lakwena began her direct involvement in the 
war.  The First UPDA incursions from Sudan took place.  
30 people were killed in Bibia by the NRA. 
 October Mid-late-'86  NRA-associated forces massacred over 40 
people in Nam-Okora.  Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) 
attacked Gulu and were defeated by the NRA. 
 November The UPDA came together around this time.  Karamojong 
cattle raiding took place from the east, supported by the 
NRA as far west as Gulu.  Lakwena backed by 150 troops 
from the UPDA successfully attacked the NRA at Corner 
Kilak.  Her HSMF force grew rapidly. 
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1987 January The Karamojong stole almost the entire Acholi cattle herd, 
their accumulated wealth, in successive raids during 1987 
(Rodriguez Soto 2009: 162). 
 February Kony joined the UPDA as spiritual mobiliser, and with 
some followers seized UPDA division command. 
 March The UPDA began to fall apart, having failed to protect 
civilians from the NRA.  The first 'protected camps' were 
created in Gulu by the Government of Uganda (GoU). 
 June The GoU declared an amnesty for rebels prepared to 
surrender. 
 July At Corner Kilak the NRA executed 97 people.  Operation 
Coy, which ran until September, began to flush out the 
UPDA. 
 November The HSMF were defeated near Jinja.  Kony attacked the 
UPDA base near Pawel Owor. 
 
1988 January Most UPDA surrendered during the year, though some 
joined Severino Lokoya, Alice's father, who attempted to 
sustain it.  Kony attacked the 115th Brigade of UPDA and 
integrated elements of it into his force. 
 February Bigombe was appointed this year as Minister of State for 
pacification of the North. 
 March A UPDA/NRA ceasefire was called. 
 June Odong Latek, overall commander of UPDA, joined Kony 
with 39 fighters.  The Pece Peace Agreement with the GoU 
dissolved the remaining UPDA force.  Major NRA 
operations against other rebels began, and 40 civilians 
were massacred at Koc Goma.  Museveni extended 
amnesty to all armed groups. 
 October The GoU continued to force civilian displacement. 
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1989 January Severino Lokoya was captured during 1989. 
 February Museveni declared a 3 month moratorium on military 
operations near Gulu.  After some failures the NRA 
intensified assaults and moved people back into camps. 
 July Fighting intensified from this period for three years.  NRA 
abuses continued.  The GoU continued moving people to 
camps. 
 December Kony’s force was named the ‘LRA’ by the end of '89.  
Bashir came to power in Sudan through a bloodless coup 
in 1989. 
 
1990 January The LRA became the only significant force fighting the 
GoU in Acholiland. 
 April The NRA launched 'Operation North' led by Daniel 
Tinyefuza. 
 
1991 July 
 
August 
The LRA committed major revenge killings and atrocities 
against civilians. 
Operation North was wound down by the Government. 
During 1991 John Garang was seen in Gulu, a sign of US 
engagement in the conflict and its internationalisation as a 
proxy war involving the SPLA and Sudan. 
 
1993 January 1993 Bigombe initiated her first direct talks with the LRA 
(Worden 2008). 
 February 93-'94  The LRA moved bases Eastern Equatoria in 
southern Sudan at the invitation of the Government of 
Sudan (GoS).  The GoS started to support the LRA. 
 May Over the mid-90s the LRA extended abduction with 
backing from Sudan, and became able to launch large 
attacks in Uganda and Sudan.  
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1994 January Sudanese support for the LRA was in place by 1994. 
 February The first Bigombe peace talks took place between LRA 
and GoU.  These collapsed after Museveni delivered a 7-
day ultimatum, while some observed that the LRA were 
already regrouping. 
 March Mass abduction after 1994 became essential to sustain 
LRA numbers. 
 
1995 January LRA violence and abductions intensified over the following 
two years. The LRA target of 1,200 abductions in Kitgum 
District for the year was exceeded. 
 April On around 21st April the LRA committed the Atiak 
massacre, killing over 200 people (Gersony 1997). 
During the year diplomatic relations between Uganda and 
Sudan were cut off.   
 
1996  
 
 
 
February 
During 1996 the GoU removed a significant proportion of 
the population to IDP camps.  The UPDF violently 
implemented this decision, resulting in widespread 
destitution (APRIL and JPC, 2001). 
An LRA offensive took place in Gulu. 
 March 8th The LRA committed the Karuma/Pakwach convoy 
ambush, killing 50 and injuring 30 bus passengers 
(Gersony 1997).   
 June Bigombe was dropped from Museveni's cabinet.  
 July The LRA committed the Acholpi refugee camp massacre, 
killing almost 100 people and seriously injuring many 
others (Gersony 1997). 
 October The LRA raided St Mary's College Oboke and abducted 
139 girls (Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
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 December In presidential and parliamentary elections Museveni won 
little support from the Acholi.  A Kacoke Madit peace 
meeting took place in London (Lucima 2002) 
1997  
 
 
January 
Mass abductions too place during this period.  From 1997-
99 between 6,000 and 10,000 people were abducted 
(HRW Africa 1997). 
During ’97 and ’98 diaspora-led attempts for settlement 
failed.  Raska Lukwiya led the massacre in Lamwo County 
at Lokung/Palabek in which over 400 civilians were killed—
the largest massacre at the time (Rodriguez 2004a).  From 
97-99 there were many LRA atrocities against civilians, 
and parliament also escalated the war.  St Egidio hosted a 
peace meeting between LRA and GoU. 
 February Estimates of LRA numbers vary, but reach 3-4,000. 
 
1998 March March-June  ARLPI presented a memorandum for peace 
to Museveni and held a three-day consultative meeting to 
focus on ending the war. 
 September The Amnesty Act was published in the Uganda Govt. 
gazette, supported by civil society in the North and the 
international community. 
 
1999  
 
January 
During 1999 efforts to restore diplomatic relations between 
Sudan and Uganda began. 
From 1999-2000 the LRA were mainly in Sudan, and 
Uganda was quieter. The Carter Centre process between 
Uganda and Sudan got underway in 1999, following an 
invitation from Bashir for their involvement. 
 November By end of 90s a significant proportion of the rural 
population, particularly West of the Aswa, were held in IDP 
camps, perceived as prisons. 
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 December The Nairobi Peace Agreement between Uganda and 
Sudan was signed on 8th December.  
 
2000 January The Ugandan Amnesty Law was passed following local 
and international pressure, despite Museveni’s opposition.  
An international agreement between Uganda and Sudan 
resolved that they should cease reciprocal support for each 
other’s rebel movements. 
 
2001  
 
 
 
January 
In Kitgum District up to 2001 LRA atrocities caused 
additional displacement to IDP camps, the total in the war-
affected area rising to 500,000.  Many children died 
(ARLPI and JPC 2001) 
The Carter Centre process led to strengthened 
Uganda/Sudan diplomatic ties again during 2001. 
 March Commanders started to return from the LRA—Onekomon 
came back to Pajule with 12 others (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 
8-18). 
 June A quieter period allowed contact with LRA commanders for 
return.  Local peace talks in Gulu by District Reconciliation 
and Peace Team ended in failure. 
 August Uganda and Sudan resumed diplomatic relations 
previously cut in 1995 (Lucima 2002: 57). 
 September 11th The US declared the LRA a terrorist group, bringing 
Sudan under further diplomatic pressure (ibid). 
 
2002 January LRA attacks on civilians were renewed.  Attacks intensified 
and more civilians were displaced to IDP camps, this time 
by the LRA. 
 March-April Military protocols between Uganda and Sudan allowed 
Operation Iron Fist to begin (UNOCHA 2003: 1).  Hundreds 
of LRA (including abductees) were killed.  The LRA 
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increased activities in Uganda.  The intensification of the 
war caused hundreds of thousands to be displaced. 
By mid-2002 only 1.6% of returnees had received amnesty 
packages (APRIL et. al. 2003). 
 June Purongo camp was attacked by the LRA, and then shelled 
by the UPDF (formerly the NRA) (Finnström 2008: 156-7).  
Between June 2002 and March 2003 5,000 were abducted 
by the LRA (HRW 2003a). 
 July The ICC began to function on 1st July. 
 August Museveni’s offer of a ceasefire for talks was rejected. 
 September 
 
 
 
October 
A further GoU ultimatum to the civilian population ordered 
more people to move to the IDP camps, contributing to 
raising the camp population to 800,000 by the end of the 
year (Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
There were renewed allegations of support for LRA by 
GoS. 12th The LRA massacred 100 at Amyel, and on 22-
24th 17 died in ambushes in Atanga (Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 118). 
 
2003 January On 7th the UPDF killed 19 using a helicopter gunship.  
They were being abducted; most of them were children 
(ibid).  During 2003 the LRA began using landmines, and 
extended its operations to Soroti, Katakwi, Lira, Teso and 
West Nile.  Various LRA commanders were killed 
(UNOCHA 2003). 
 February The GoU used civilians to form Arrow and Amuka Groups 
to fight the LRA in Teso and Lango during 2003. 
 March Kony announced a unilateral ceasefire.  Peace contacts 
were made from 1st March, but were bombed by the UPDF 
(Rodriguez Soto 2009: 132-143). 
 April LRA atrocities continued.  Some reported 5,000 abducted 
by the LRA in 12 months (HRW 2003a). 
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 June In a worsening humanitarian situation estimates reached 
12,000 abducted by the LRA in the previous year 
(Rodriguez Soto 2009: 168).  
 September Protocols further enabled the UPDF to operate in southern 
Sudan (UNOCHA Uganda CAP 2004:1)  The LRA 
intensified the war in Uganda’s Teso and Lango regions . 
 November Sam Kolo and Bigombe engaged in talks (Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 202). 
 December 16th Uganda referred the LRA leadership to ICC (Akhavan 
2005).  
By 2003 there was more frequent contacts between the 
religious leaders and LRA commanders, preparing the way 
for defections (Rodriguez Soto 2009).  1.2 million of the 
population had been displaced to IDP camps (UNOCHA 
2003). 
 
2004  
 
January 
3,000 LRA abductions were recorded in 2004 (UNOCHA 
2004). 
The LRA size was estimated to be 3,000.  Jan-June was a 
period of poor security (UNOCHA 2004).   
29th Museveni and Ocampo held a joint press briefing in 
London to announce that the ICC was looking into the LRA 
case (Allen 2005: 42). 
 February 2nd The LRA attacked Pabbo camp, followed by UPDF 
brutality to civilians there.  The LRA attacked Abiya camp 
near Lira killing 44.   
21st The LRA committed the Barlonyo Massacre, where 
nearly 300 were murdered (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 207). 
 March Uganda and Sudan renewed their protocol and Operation 
Iron Fist II was launched into southern Sudan.  Middle-
ranking LRA commanders were returning to claim 
amnesty.  Bigombe became more involved in talks again, 
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and community concerns about ICC engagement were 
expressed to Ocampo (UNOCHA 2004; Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 220-221). 
 April There was speculation that the LRA were weakened due to 
the return process, and UPDF action between April and 
October (ibid). 
 May The LRA committed the Pagak atrocity. 
 June By mid-2004 around 5,000 adults had passed through the 
return system and been given amnesty certificates.  
Bigombe travelled to southern Sudan for her peace 
process (ICG 2005c: 3).  The Prosecutor announced that 
there was a case to answer in Uganda . 
 July 28th  The Prosecutor opened the ICC investigation, having 
determined that there was a case to answer (Ocampo 
2005b). 
 August Due to insecurity night commuter numbers rose to 50,000 
(UNOCHA 2005a).  The return process gained momentum.  
In the period from April to August/September 400-500 LRA 
returned including 50 officers (HRW 2009b: 32; Rodriguez 
Soto 2009: 233). 
 September Radio stations such as Mega, and the UPDF, were 
increasingly supportive of the return and Amnesty process 
(ibid).  
 October There was increasing hope for peace due to the weakened 
state of the LRA (caused by return, UPDF activity, and 
reduced Sudanese support), and Bigombe’s peace efforts.  
About 3,000 people had been abducted by them in the 
previous year (UNOCHA 2004). 
 November From mid-November to the year-end there were further 
peace contacts with the LRA.  The Patiko ceasefire took 
place up to 31st December (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 237). 
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 December Bigombe secured face-to-face talks between the GoU and 
LRA, however these failed by 31st (ibid).   
Population displacement by the year end had risen to over 
1.6 million (UNOCHA 2005a).  4-5,000 LRA had applied for 
amnesty on return (Allen 2006). 
 
2005 January Fighting resumed, as did Bigombe’s peace contacts (Drew 
2010: 25).  9th The Sudanese CPA was signed, 
transforming the context of the war (Flint and de Waal 
2008).  
 February Bigombe threatened to end her talks if the ICC issued 
warrants (ICG 2005c: 5)  Museveni called a truce for over 
two weeks (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 245).  Prominent LRA 
commanders Onen Kamdulu and Sam Kolo returned in 
separate incidents, though night commuter numbers 
remained high at 30,000 (UNOCHA 2005a). 
 March Bigombe's efforts for further contacts were obstructed by 
the UPDF (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 246).  Amidst a 
deteriorating security in Uganda the LRA returned to 
committing body mutilations (UNOCHA 2005a: 2,13).   
 April There were thought to be 41,000 night commuters by this 
time (ibid).  There were thought to be approximately 3,000 
LRA remaining (ICG 2005c). 
 May The LRA massacred 20 at Koc Goma (Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 267).  6th The Prosecutor applied to the Pre-trial 
Chamber for arrest warrants against un-named individuals 
(Ocampo 2005b). 
 July 8th Warrants for the LRA leadership were issued under 
seal (ibid).  The WHO issued its report on deaths in the 
camps, which implicated both armed sides (Ministry of 
Health of Uganda and World Health Organisation 2005). 
 September LRA established Garamba bases in DRC (Drew 2010).   
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 October 13th The Prosecutor unsealed the warrants (ibid).  Bigombe 
announced her talks had collapsed (New Vision 2005). 
 November CR/QPSW presented to the Donor Technical Group 
speculating that the LRA had been reduced by 75% since 
2002 (author’s notes). 
 December The Government of South Sudan (GOSS) indicated its 
interest in acting as mediator (Drew 2010).  The 
International Court of Justice ruled against Uganda in the 
Uganda/Congo case, confirming that the UPDF carried out 
torture, killings, recruitment of child soldiers and other 
crimes against civilians (ICJ 2005b). 
By December 2005 over 10,000 had received amnesty in 
the Acholi region (Rodriguez Soto 2009). 
 
2006 January A United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC) operation against the LRA in Garamba 
failed (Drew 2010).  Bigombe left Uganda (Rodriguez Soto 
2009: 246). 
 February The LRA relocated more fully to Garamba during 2006 
(ICG 2010: 28). 
 April Otti and Machar met for the first time, in preparation for the 
Juba process (Drew 2010). 
 May Machar and Kony met (ibid). 
 June 8th The Juba process began, with Machar mediating.  Kony 
appointed a delegation to represent the LRA (ibid). 
 July 14th Talks began in Juba.  Raska Lukwiya was killed by the 
UPDF near Kitgum (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 261). 
 August 26th  A Cessation of Hostilities agreement was signed that 
came into force on 29th, and was later extended numerous 
times (Drew 2010). 
 October A Cessation of Hostilities monitoring was team 
established.  Attacks in northern Uganda diminished (ibid). 
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 November The LRA failed to assemble in the appointed areas. 
 December A comprehensive solutions protocol was signed.  It was 
believed that Sudan was continuing to support Kony at this 
time (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 262). 
 
2007 January The talks made very slow progress in the first quarter of 
2007 (Drew 2010). 
 April 26th The talks re-started (ibid).  
 May 2nd The ICC issued two Sudanese arrest warrants.  
Agreement was reached between the Gou and LRA on 
comprehensive solutions to the problems of northern 
Uganda.  31st Talks on accountability and reconciliation 
resumed (ibid). 
 June 24-25th The Prosecutor emphasised that any settlement 
must be compatible with the ICC’s Statute (by bringing 
suspects to trial), as he had done throughout the Juba 
talks process (Ocampo 2007a).  29th The GoU and LRA 
agreed to general principles on accountability and 
reconciliation (ibid).   
 September Museveni and Kabila set a 90 day deadline for departure of 
the LRA from DRC (ibid). 
 October Otti was arrested and killed by Kony, while LRA 
commander Opiyo Makasi surrendered (ibid). 
 November Contact with the LRA diminished.  29th Kony failed to sign 
the agreement on accountability (Rodriguez Soto 2009: 
272). 
 
2008 January Talks resumed with a new LRA delegation (ibid). 
 February 23rd A permanent ceasefire was signed.  29th DDR 
agreements were concluded.  Agreement was reached on 
accountability and reconciliation ready for signing, based 
upon prosecution by a Special Division of the Ugandan 
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High Court (Worden 2008). 
 March From March the LRA further strengthened their camps in 
Garamba (HRW 2009a: 15-17) 
 April 10th Kony failed to sign the final agreement (ibid).  LRA 
attacks and abductions increased (Drew 2010). 
 June Kony told journalists that he wished to return to 
negotiations but that the ICC should drop the warrant 
against him (ibid).  
 July LRA estimated to have 600 combatants (HRW 2009a: 13) 
 September Kony failed to attend a scheduled meeting citing the ICC 
warrants (Drew 2010).  Kony moved his HQ to Kiswahili 
camp in Garamba (HRW 2009a: 17-26).  The LRA turned 
on Congolese civilians in Duru and elsewhere, abducting 
161 and killing 100 (ibid). 
 October LRA atrocities continued including killings and abductions 
in Dungu (ibid). 
 November Machar demanded Kony sign the Final Peace Agreement 
by 30th Nov.   
28th Kony failed to attend the planned meeting, and talks 
effectively ended (ibid). 
 December 14th The Ugandan, Sudanese and Congolese militaries 
launched Operation Lightning Thunder, which failed to 
have a significant impact on LRA (ibid).   
24th The LRA responded by committing the Christmas 
Massacres in Doruma, Faradje, Tora and Duru (ibid). 
 
2009 January Continuing LRA attacks to mid-January left 620 killed—the 
largest ever LRA massacre (ibid). 
 March 15th Operation Lightning Thunder officially ended, though 
the UPDF continued operations against the LRA (ICG 
2010: 28).   
4th The ICC issued a warrant for Bashir. 
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 December There were reports of air drops by Sudan for Kony. 
 
2010 February LRA activity was widespread in south-west Sudan, 
including abductions and training, raising the possibility 
that Kony was still being assisted by Khartoum. 
 November The UPDF withdrew troops from CAR due to elections in 
Uganda, leaving only 1,200 in CAR and 1,200 in 
DRC/Sudan (Cakaj 2011). 
 December Kony present in CAR (ibid).  
 
